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STAI^IDARB  XIBMJaairEBITIOiF 


HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  & CO, 


American  Statesmen 


JAMES  MADISON 


BY 

SYDNEY  HOWARD  GAY 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 
SiitiEwibe  j^cejjjs,  -ffambtiboe 
1899 


Copyright,  1884, 

By  SYDNEY  HOWARD  GAY. 
Copyright,  1898, 

By  HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  & CO. 


All  rights  reserved. 


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EDITOR’S  PREFACE  — 

Few  men,  so  well  equipped  intellectually  as 
was  Madison,  have,  by  reason  of  the  characteristics 
of  their  equipment,  been  so  dependent  for  success 
upon  the  conditions  amid  which  they  have  been 
placed.  Madison  was  preeminently  what  may  be 
called  a cabinet  statesman.  He  was  better  as  a 
thinker  than  as  an  actor.  He  had  the  constructive 
quality,  and  was  a master  of  principles  of  govern- 
ment; but  in  the  practical  application  of  those 
principles  which  he  himself  had  formulated  and 
shaped,  if  not  created,  he  was  not  fitted  to  excel, 
unless  possibly  when  the  current  of  events  was 
running  smoothly.  His  strength  did  not  lie  in 
the  executive  or  administrative  directions.  Had 
he  died  before  he  was  President,  his  fame  would 
not  have  been  less  than  it  is  to-day,  when  he  is 
remembered  and  admired  chiefly  for  his  labors 
in  connection  with  the  creation  of  the  Constitu- 
tion and  the  foundation  of  the  government.  He 
amply  deserved  the  honor  of  the  presidential  office, 
though  it  added  so  little  to  his  reputation ; but  it 
really  meant  that  because  he  had  done  one  task 
exceedingly  well,  he  was  now  appointed  to  do  a 


VI 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


very  different  task  mucli  less  well.  Never  was  a 
ruler  less  fitted  to  hold  the  helm  in  troubled  times, 
and  it  was  hard  fortune  for  him  to  receive  from 
his  friend  and  predecessor  the  bequest  of  a war. 
Probably  no  man  could  have  made  the  confiict  of 
1812  a success,  but  Madison  hardly  knew  how 
even  to  try  to  make  it  so.  His  career  was  not 
picturesque.  I remember  that  Mr.  Gay  deplored 
the  difficulty  which  he  found  in  his  endeavors  to 
make  his  hero  appear  personally  interesting.  But 
this  was  a secondary  matter.  Madison  is  one  of 
the  men  of  whom  the  country  has  always,  and 
with  good  reason,  been  especially  proud.  It  was 
not  alone  that  his  character  was  high,  but  his 
qualities  as  a statesman  have  been  recognized  as 
of  the  first  order.  None  of  our  public  men  has 
been  more  useful  to  the  country.  He  was  in 
active  life  for  a very  long  time  ; he  was  concerned 
in  all  the  important  events  of  more  than  thirty 
years.  The  story  of  his  life  is  the  history  of  the 
country  during  all  that  period.  Mr.  Gay,  in  spite 
of  his  complaint,  has  certainly  contributed  to  the 
series  one  of  its  most  valuable  volumes.  He  was 
a writer  thoroughly  equipped  for  his  task,  a 
scholar  in  American  history.  It  seems  hard  that 
he  should  not  have  survived  to  witness  the  now 
prevalent  interest  in  the  study  of  that  subject, 
an  interest  which  he  did  so  much  to  promote, 
but  which  was  only  beginning  to  manifest  itself 


ILLUSTEATIONS 


James  Madison Frontispiece 

From  the  painting*  by  Sully  in  the  Corcoran  Gallery  of 
Art,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Autograph  from  a MS.  in  the  New  York  Public  Li- 
brary, Lenox  Building. 

The  vignette  of  “ Montpelier,”  Madison’s  home  at 


Montpelier,  Va.,  is  from  a photograph.  Page 

Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney foxing  98 


From  the  original  painting  by  Gilbert  Stuart  in  the  pos- 
session of  Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney,  D.  D.,  LL.  D., 
Charleston,  S.  C. 

Autograph  from  a MS,  in  the  New  York  Public  Library, 
Lenox  Building. 

Fisher  Ames facing  162 

From  the  miniature  painted  by  John  Trumbull  in  1792, 
now  in  the  Art  Gallery  of  Yale  University. 

Autograph  from  the  Chamberlain  Collection,  Boston 
Public  Library. 

Dolly  P.  Madison facing  222 

From  a miniature  in  the  possession  of  Dr.  H.  M.  Cutts, 
Brookline,  Mass. 

Autograph  from  a letter  kindly  loaned  by  Dr.  Cutts. 

Battle  of  Lake  Erie facing  310 

From  the  painting  by  W.  H.  Powell  in  the  Capitol  at 
Washington. 


. 


JAMES  MADISON 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 

James  Madison  was  born  on  March  16,  1751, 
at  Port  Conway,  Virginia ; he  died  at  Montpellier, 
in  that  State,  on  June  28,  1836.  Mr.  John  Quincy 
Adams,  recalling,  perhaps,  the  death  of  his  own 
father  and  of  Jefferson  on  the  same  Fourth  of 
July,  and  that  of  Monroe  on  a subsequent  anniver- 
sary of  that  day,  may  possibly  have  seen  a gener- 
ous propriety  in  finding  some  equally  appropriate 
commemoration  for  the  death  of  another  Virginian 
President.  For  it  was  quite  possible  that  Virginia 
might  think  him  capable  of  an  attempt  to  conceal, 
what  to  her  mind  would  seem  to  be  an  obvious 
intention  of  Providence : that  all  the  children  of 
the  Mother  of  Presidents  ” should  be  no  less  dis- 
tinguished in  their  deaths  than  in  their  lives  — 
that  the  “other  dynasty,”  which  John  Randolph 
was  wont  to  talk  about,  should  no  longer  pretend 
to  an  equality  with  them,  not  merely  in  this  world, 
but  in  the  manner  of  going  out  of  it.  At  any  rate, 


2 


JAMES  MADISON 


he  notes  the  date  of  Madison’s  death,  the  twenty- 
eighth  day  of  June,  as  ‘‘the  anniversary  of  the 
day  on  which  the  ratification  of  the  Convention  of 
Virginia  in  1788  had  affixed  the  seal  of  James 
Madison  as  the  father  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  when  his  earthly  part  sank  without 
a struggle  into  the  grave,  and  a spirit,  bright  as 
the  seraphim  that  surround  the  throne  of  Omnipo- 
tence, ascended  to  the  bosom  of  his  God.”  There 
can  be  no  doubt  of  the  deep  sincerity  of  this  tri- 
bute, whatever  question  there  may  be  of  its  gram- 
matical construction  and  its  rhetoric,  and  although 
the  date  is  erroneous.  The  ratification  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  by  the  Virginia  Con- 
vention was  on  June  25,  not  on  June  28.  It  is 
the  misfortune  of  our  time  that  we  have  no  living 
great  men  held  in  such  universal  veneration  that 
their  dying  on  common  days  like  common  mortals 
seems  quite  impossible.  Half  a century  ago,  how- 
ever, the  propriety  of  such  providential  arrange- 
ments appears  to  have  been  recognized  almost  as 
one  of  the  “ institutions.”  It  was  the  newspaper 
gossip  of  that  time  that  a “ distinguished  physi- 
cian ” declared  that  he  would  have  kept  a fourth 
ex-President  alive  to  die  on  a Fourth  of  July,  had 
the  illustrious  sick  man  been  under  his  treatment. 
The  patient  himself,  had  he  been  consulted,  might, 
in  that  case,  possibly  have  declined  to  have  a fatal 
illness  prolonged  a week  to  gratify  the  public  fond- 
ness for  patriotic  coincidence.  But  Mr.  Adams’s 
appropriation  of  another  anniversary  answered  all 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 


3 


the  purpose,  for  that  he  made  a mistake  as  to  the 
date  does  not  seem  to  have  been  discovered. 

It  was  accidental  that  Port* Conway  was  the 
birthplace  of  Madison.  His  maternal  grandfather, 
whose  name  was  Conway,  had  a plantation  at  that 
place,  and  young  Mrs.  Madison  happened  to  be 
there  on  a visit  to  her  mother  when  her  first  child, 
James,  was  born.  In  the  stately  — not  to  say 
stilted  — biography  of  him  by  William  C.  Rives, 
the  christened  name  of  this  lady  is  given  as 
Eleanor.  Mr.  Rives  may  have  thought  it  not  in 
accordance  with  ancestral  dignity  that  the  mother 
of  so  distinguished  a son  should  have  been  bur- 
dened with  so  commonplace  and  homely  a name 
as  Nelly.  But  we  are  afraid  it  is  true  that  Nelly 
was  her  name.  No  other  biographer  than  Mr. 
Rives,  that  we  know  of,  calls  her  Eleanor.  Even 
Madison  himself  permits  “ Nelly  ” to  pass  under 
his  eyes  and  from  his  hands  as  his  mother’s  name. 

In  1833-34  there  was  some  correspondence  be- 
tween him  and  Lyman  C.  Draper,  the  historian, 
which  includes  some  notes  upon  the  Madison 
genealogy.  These,  the  ex-President  writes,  were 
“ made  out  by  a member  of  the  family,”  and  they 
may  be  considered,  therefore,  as  having  his  sanc- 
tion. The  first  record  is,  that  “ J ames  Madison 
was  the  son  of  James  Madison  and  Nelly  Con- 
way.” On  such  authority  Nelly,  and  not  Elea- 
nor, must  be  accepted  as  the  mother’s  name. 
This,  of  course,  is  to  be  regretted  from  the  Rives 
point  of  view ; but  perhaps  the  name  had  a less 


4 


JAMES  MADISON 


familiar  sound  a century  and  a half  ago ; and  no 
doubt  it  was  chosen  by  her  parents  without  a 
thought  that  their  daughter  might  go  into  history 
as  the  mother  of  a President,  or  that  any  higher 
fortune  could  befall  her  than  to  be  the  respectable 
head  of  a tobacco  planter’s  family  on  the  banks  of 
the  Rappahannock. 

This  genealogical  record  further  says  that  his 
[Madison’s]  ancestors,  on  both  sides,  were  not 
among  the  most  wealthy  of  the  country,  but  in 
independent  and  comfortable  circumstances.”  If 
this  comment  was  added  at  the  ex-President’s  own 
dictation,  it  was  quite  in  accordance  with  his  un- 
pretentious character.^  One  might  venture  to  say 

1 Dr.  Draper  has  kindly  put  into  our  hands  the  correspondence 
between  himself  and  Mr.  Madison,  and  we  copy  these  genealogical 
notes  in  full,  with  the  letter  in  which  they  were  sent,  as  all  that 
the  ex-President  had  to  say  about  his  ancestry : — 

Montpellier,  February  1,  1834. 

Dear  Sir,  — I have  received  your  letter  of  December  31st,  and 
inclose  a sketch  on  the  subject  of  it,  made  out  by  a member  of  the 
family.  With  friendly  respects, 

James  Madison. 

“ James  Madison  was  the  son  of  James  Madison  and  Nelly  Con- 
way. He  was  born  on  the  5th  of  March,  1751  (O.  S.),  at  Port 
Conway,  on  the  Rappahannock  River,  where  she  was  at  the  time 
on  a visit  to  her  mother  residing  there. 

“ His  father  was  the  son  of  Ambrose  Madison  and  Frances 
Taylor.  His  mother  was  the  daughter  of  Francis  Conway  and 
Rebecca  Catlett. 

“ His  paternal  grandfather  was  the  son  of  John  Madison  and 
Isabella  Minor  Todd.  His  paternal  grandmother,  the  daughter 
of  James  Taylor  and  Martha  Thompson. 

“ His  maternal  grandfather  was  the  son  of  Edwin  Conway  and 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 


5 


as  mucli  of  a Northern  or  a Western  farmer.  But 
they  did  not  farm  in  Virginia ; they  planted. 
Mr.  Hives  says  that  the  elder  James  was  “sl  large 
landed  proprietor ; ” and  he  adds,  a large  landed 
estate  in  Virginia  . • . was  a mimic  common- 
wealth, with  its  foreign  and  domestic  relations, 
and  its  regular  administrative  hierarchy.”  The 
‘‘  foreign  relations  ” were  the  shipping,  once  a 
year,  a few  hogsheads  of  tobacco  to  a London 
factor  ; the  “ mimic  commonwealths  ” were  clusters 
of  negro  huts;  and  the  “ administrative  hierarchy” 
was  the  priest,  who  was  more  at  home  at  the  tavern 
or  a horse-race  than  in  the  discharge  of  his  clerical 
duties. 

As  Mr.  Madison  had  only  to  say  of  his  imme- 
diate ancestors  — which  seems  to  be  all  he  knew 
about  them  — that  they  were  in  independent 
and  comfortable  circumstances,”  so  he  was,  ap- 
parently, as  little  inclined  to  talk  about  himself ; 
even  at  that  age  when  it  is  supposed  that  men  who 
have  enjoyed  celebrity  find  their  own  lives  the 
most  agreeable  of  subjects.  In  answer  to  Dr. 
Draper’s  inquiries  he  wrote  this  modest  letter, 
now  for  the  first  time  published  : — 

Elizabeth  Thornton.  His  maternal  grandmother,  the  daughter  of 
John  Catlett  and Gaines. 

“ His  father  was  a planter,  and  dwelt  on  the  estate  now  called 
Montpellier,  where  he  died  February  27, 1801,  in  the  78th  year  of 
his  age.  His  mother  died  at  the  same  place  in  1829,  February 
11th,  in  the  98th  year  of  her  age. 

“His  grandfathers  were  also  planters.  It  appears  that  his  an- 
cestors, on  both  sides,  were  not  among  the  most  wealthy  of  the 
country,  but  in  independent  and  comfortable  circumstances.” 


6 


JAMES  MADISON 


Montpellier,  August  9,  1833. 

Dear  Sir,  — Since  your  letter  of  the  3d  of  June 
caihe  to  hand,  my  increasing  age  and  continued  mala- 
dies, with  the  many  attentions  due  from  me,  had  caused 
a delay  in  acknowledging  it,  for  which  these  circum- 
stances must  he  an  apology,  in  your  case,  as  I have  been 
obliged  to  make  them  in  others. 

You  wish  me  to  refer  you  to  sources  of  printed  in- 
formation on  my  career  in  life,  and  it  would  afford  me 
pleasure  to  do  so  ; but  my  recollection  on  the  subject  is 
very  defective.  It  occurs  [to  me]  that  there  was  a bio- 
graphical volume  in  an  enlarged  edition  compiled  by 
General  or  Judge  Rodgers  of  Pennsylvania,  and  which 
may  perhaps  have  included  my  name,  among  others. 
When  or  where  it  was  published  I cannot  say.  To  this 
reference  I can  only  add  generally  the  newspapers  at 
the  seat  of  government  and  elsewhere  during  the  elec- 
tioneering periods,  when  I was  one  of  the  objects  under 
review.  I need  scarcely  remark  that  a life,  which  has 
been  so  much  a public  life,  must  of  course  be  traced  in 
the  public  transactions  in  which  it  was  involved,  and 
that  the  most  important  of  them  are  to  be  found  in 
documents  already  in  print,  or  soon  to  be  so. 

With  friendly  respects,  James  Madison. 

Lyman  C.  Draper,  Lockport,  N.  Y. 

The  genealogical  statement,  it  will  be  observed, 
does  not  go  farther  back  than  Mr.  Madison’s  great- 
grandfather, John.  Mr.  Rives  supposes  that  this 
John  was  the  son  of  another  John  who,  as  “the 
pious  researches  of  kindred  have  ascertained,” 
took  out  a patent  for  land  about  1653  between  the 
North  and  York  rivers  on  the  shores  of  Chesa- 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 


7 


peake  Bay.  The  same  writer  further  assumes  that 
this  John  was  descended  from  Captain  Isaac  Madi- 
son, whose  name  appears  in  a document  in  the 
State  Paper  Office  at  London  containing  a list  of 
the  Colonists  in  1623.”  From  Sainsbury’s  Calen- 
dar ^ we  learn  something  more  of  this  Captain  Isaac 
than  this  mere  mention.  Under  date  of  January 
24,  1623,  there  is  this  record:  “Captain  Powell, 
gunner,  of  James  City,  is  dead;  Capt.  Nuce  (?), 
Capt.  Maddison,  Lieut.  Craddock’s  brother,  and 
divers  more  of  the  chief  men  reported  dead.”  But 
either  the  report  was  not  altogether  true  or  there 
was  another  Isaac  Maddison,  for  the  name  ap- 
pears among  the  signatures  to  a letter  dated  about  a 
month  later  — February  20  — from  the  governor, 
council,  and  Assembly  of  Virginia  to  the  king.  It 
is  of  record,  also,  that  four  months  later  still,  on 
June  4,  “ Capt.  Isaac  and  Mary  Maddison  ” were 
before  the  governor  and  council  as  witnesses  in 
the  case  of  Greville  Pooley  and  Cicely  Jordan, 
between  whom  there  was  a “ supposed  contract  of 
marriage,”  made  “ three  or  four  days  after  her 
husband’s  death.”  But  the  lively  widow,  it  seems, 
afterward  “ contracted  herself  to  Will  Ferrar  be- 
fore the  governor  and  council,  and  disavowed  the 
former  contract,”  and  the  case  therefore  became  so 
complicated  that  the  court  was  “ not  able  to  decide 

^ Calendar  of  State  Papers^  Colonial  Series,  1574-1660,  Pre- 
served in  the  State  Paper  Department  of  Her  Majesty's  Public 
Record  Office,  edited  by  W.  Noel  Sainsbury,  Esq.,  etc.  London, 
1860. 


8 


JAMES  MADISON 


so  nice  a difference.”  What  Captain  Isaac  and 
Mary  Maddison  knew  about  the  matter  the  record 
does  not  tell  us;  but  the  evidence  is  conclusive 
that  if  there  was  but  one  Isaac  Maddison  in  Vir- 
ginia in  1623  he  did  not  die  in  January  of  that 
year.  Probably  there  was  but  one,  and  he,  as 
Rives  assumes,  was  the  Captain  Madyson  of  whose 
‘‘achievement,”  as  Rives  calls  it,  there  is  a brief 
narrative  in  John  Smith’s  “ General  History  of 
Virginia.” 

Besides  the  record  in  Sainsbury’s  Calendar  of 
the  rumor  of  the  death  of  this  Isaac  in  Virginia, 
in  January,  1623,  his  signature  to  a letter  to  the 
king  in  February,  and  his  appearance  as  a wit- 
ness before  the  council  in  the  case  of  the  widow 
Jordan,  in  June,  it  appears  by  Hotten’s  Lists  of 
colonists,  taken  from  the  Records  in  the  English 
State  Paper  Department,  that  Captain  Isacke 
Maddeson  and  Mary  Maddeson  were  living  in 
1624  at  West  and  Sherlow  Hundred  Island.  The 
next  year,  at  the  same  place,  he  is  on  the  list  of 
dead ; and  there  is  given  under  the  same  date 
“ The  muster  of  Mrs.  Mary  Maddison,  widow,  aged 
30  years.”  Pier  family  consisted  of  “ Katherin 
Layden,  child,  aged  7 years,”  and  two  servants. 
Katherine,  it  may  be  assumed,  was  the  daughter 
of  the  widow  Mary  and  Captain  Isaac,  and  their 
only  child.  These  “ musters,”  it  should  be  said, 
appear  always  to  have  been  made  with  great  care, 
and  there  is  therefore  hardly  a possibility  that  a 
son,  if  there  were  one,  was  omitted  in  the  numer- 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 


9 


ation  of  the  widow’s  family,  while  the  name  and 
age  of  the  little  girl,  and  the  names  and  ages  of 
the  two  servants,  the  date  of  their  arrival  in  Vir- 
ginia, and  the  name  of  the  ship  that  each  came  in, 
are  all  carefully  given.  The  conclusion  is  inevita- 
ble : Isaac  Maddison  left  no  male  descendants,  and 
President  Madison’s  earliest  ancestor  in  Virginia, 
if  it  was  not  his  great-grandfather  John,  must  be 
looked  for  somewhere  else. 

Mr.  Rives  knew  nothing  of  these  Records.  His 
first  volume  was  published  before  either  Sainsbury’s 
Calendar  or  Hotten’s  Lists ; and  the  researches  on 
which  he  relied,  conducted  by  a distinguished 
member  of  the  Historical  Society  of  Virginia  ” in 
the  English  State  Paper  Office,  were,  so  far  as 
they  related  to  the  Madisons,  incomplete  and  worth- 
less. The  family  was  not,  apparently,  “ coeval  with 
the  foundation  of  the  Colony,”  and  did  not  arrive 
“ among  the  earliest  of  the  emigrants  in  the  New 
World.”  That  distinction  cannot  be  claimed  for 
James  Madison,  nor  is  there  any  reason  for  sup- 
posing that  he  believed  it  could  be.  He  seemed 
quite  content  with  the  knowledge  that  so  far  back 
as  his  great-grandfather  his  ancestors  had  been 
respectable  people,  “ in  independent  and  comforta- 
ble circumstances.” 

Of  his  own  generation  there  were  seven  children, 
of  whom  James  was  the  eldest,  and  alone  became 
of  any  note,  except  that  the  rest  were  reputable  and 
contented  people  in  their  stations  of  life.  A hun- 
dred years  ago  the  Arcadian  Virginia,  for  which 


10 


JAMES  MADISON 


Governor  Berkeley  had  thanked  God  so  devoutly, 
— when  there  was  not  a free  school  nor  a press  in 
the  province,  — had  passed  away.  The  elder  Madi- 
son resolved,  so  Mr.  Hives  tells  us,  that  his  children 
should  have  advantages  of  education  which  had  not 
been  within  his  own  reach,  and  that  they  should  all 
enjoy  them  equally.  James  was  sent  to  a school 
where  he  could  at  least  begin  the  studies  which 
should  fit  him  to  enter  college.  Of  the  master 
of  that  school  we  know  nothing  except  that  he 
was  a Scotchman,  of  the  name  of  Donald  Robert- 
son, and  that  many  years  afterward,  when  his  son 
was  an  applicant  for  office  to  Madison,  then  sec- 
retary of  state,  the  pupil  gratefully  remembered 
his  old  master,  and  indorsed  upon  the  application 
that  “ the  writer  is  son  of  Donald  Robertson,  the 
learned  Teacher  in  King  and  Queen  County,  Vir- 
ginia.” 

The  preparatory  studies  for  college  were  finished 
at  home  under  the  clergyman  of  the  parish,  the 
Rev.  Thomas  Martin,  who  was  a member  of  Mr. 
Madison’s  family,  perhaps  as  a private  tutor,  per- 
haps as  a boarder.  It  is  quite  likely  that  it  was 
by  the  advice  of  this  gentleman  — who  was  from 
New  Jersey  — that  the  lad  was  sent  to,Princeton 
instead  of  to  William  and  Mary  College  in  Vir- 
ginia. At  Princeton,  at  any  rate,  he  entered  at 
the  age  of  eighteen,  in  1769  ; or,  to  borrow  Mr. 
Rives’s  eloquent  statement  of  the  fact,  “ the  young 
Virginian,  invested  with  the  toga  virilis  of  anti- 
cipated manhood,  we  now  see  launched  on  that 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 


11 


disciplinary  career  which  is  to  form  him  for  the 
future  struggles  of  life.” 

One  of  his  biographers  says  that  he  shortened 
his  collegiate  term  by  taking  in  one  year  the 
studies  of  the  junior  and  senior  years,  but  that 
he  remained  another  twelve-month  at  Princeton 
for  the  sake  of  acquiring  Hebrew.  On  his  return 
home  he  undertook  the  instruction  of  his  younger 
brothers  and  sisters,  while  pursuing  his  own 
studies.  Still  another  biographer  asserts  that  he 
began  immediately  to  read  law,  but  Hives  gives 
some  evidence  that  he  devoted  himself  to  theology. 
This  and  his  giving  himself  to  Hebrew  for  a year 
point  to  the  ministry  as  his  chosen  profession.^- 
But  if  we  rightly  interpret  his  own  words,  he  had 
little  strength  or  spirit  for  a pursuit  of  any  sort. 
His  first  struggle  of  life  ” was  apparently  with 
ni-he^th,  and  the  career  he  looked  forward  to  was 
a speedy  journey  to  another  world.  In  a letter  to 
a friend  (November,  1772)  he  writes:  ‘‘lam  too 
dull  and  infirm  now  to  look  out  for  extraordinary 
things  in  this  world,  for  I think  my  sensations  for 
many  months  have  intimated  to  me  not  to  expect 
a long  or  healthy  life  ; though  it  may  be  better 
with  me  after  some  time  ; but  I hardly  dare  ex- 
pect it,  and  therefore  have  little  spirit  or  elasticity 
to  set  about  anything  that  is  difficult  in  acquiring, 
and  useless  in  possessing  after  one  has  exchanged 
time  for  eternity.”  In  the  same  letter  he  assures 
his  friend  that  he  approves  of  his  choice  of  history 
and  morals  as  the  subjects  of  his  winter  studies; 


12 


JAMES  MADISON 


but,  he  adds,  ‘‘  I doubt  not  but  you  design  to  sea- 
son them  with  a little  divinity  now  and  then,  which, 
like  the  philosopher’s  stone  in  the  hands  of  a good 
man,  will  turn  them  and  every  lawful  acquirement 
into  the  nature  of  itself,  and  make  them  more  pre- 
cious than  fine  gold.” 

The  bent  of  his  mind  at  this  time  seems  to 
have  been  decidedly  religious.  He  was  a diligent 
student  of  the  Bible,  and,  Mr.  Rives  says,  ‘‘he 
explored  the  whole  history  and  evidences  of 
Christianity  on  every  side,  through  clouds  of  wit- 
nesses and  champions  for  and  against,  from  the 
fathers  and  schoolmen  down  to  the  infidel  philo- 
sophers of  the  eighteenth  century.”  So  wide  a 
range  of  theological  study  is  remarkable  in  a youth 
of  only  two  or  three  and  twenty  years  of  age  ; but, 
remembering  that  he  was  at  this  time  living  at 
home,  it  is  even  more  remarkable  that  in  the  house 
of  an  ordinary  planter  in  Virginia  a hundred  and 
twenty  years  ago  could  be  found  a library  so  rich 
in  theology  as  to  admit  of  study  so  exhaustive. 
But  in  Virginia  history  nothing  is  impossible. 

His  studies  on  this  subject,  however,  whether 
wide  or  limited,  bore  good  fruit.  Religious  intol- 
erance was  at  that  time  common  in  his  immediate 
neighborhood,  and  it  aroused  him  to  earnest  and 
open  opposition  ; nor  did  that  opposition  cease  till 
years  afterward,  when  freedom  of  conscience  was 
established  by  law  in  Virginia,  largely  by  his  la- 
bors and  influence.  Even  in  1774,  when  all  the 
colonies  were  girding  themselves  for  the  coming 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS 


13 


revolutionary  conflict,  he  turned  aside  from  a dis- 
cussion of  the  momentous  question  of  the  hour,  in 
a letter  to  his  friend  ^ in  Philadelphia,  and  ex- 
claimed with  unwonted  heat : — 


“ But  away  with  politics ! . . . That  diabolical,  hell- 
conceived  principle  of  persecution  rages  among  some ; 
and,  to  their  eternal  infamy,  the  clergy  can  furnish 
their  quota  of  imps  for  such  purposes.  There  are  at 
this  time  in  the  adjacent  country  not  less  than  five  or 
six  well-meaning  men  in  close  jail  for  publishing  their 
religious  sentiments,  which  in  the  main  are  very  ortho- 
dox. I have  neither  patience  to  hear,  talk,  or  think  of 
anything  relative  to  this  matter  ; for  I have  squabbled 
and  scolded,  abused  and  ridiculed  so  long  about  it  to  lit- 
tle purpose  that  I am  without  common  patience.” 


These  are  stronger  terms  than  the  mild-tem- 
pered  Madison  often  indulged  in.  But  he  felt 
strongly.  Probably  he,  no  more  than  many^  other 
wiser  and  older  men,  understood  what  was  to  be 
the  end  of  the  political  struggle  which  was  getting 
so  earnest ; but  evidently  in  his  mind  it  was  reli- 
gious rather  than  civil  liberty  which  was  to  be 
guarded.  ‘‘  If  the  Church  of  England,”  he  says 
in  the  same  letter,  ‘‘  had  been  the  established  and 
general  religion  in  all  the  Northern  colonies,  as  it 
has  been  among  us  here,  and  uninterrupted  har- 
mony had  prevailed  throughout  the  continent,  it  is 


^ The  letters  to  a friend,  from  which  we  have  quoted,  were 
written  to  William  Bradford,  Jr.,  of  Philadelphia,  afterward  at- 
torney-general in  Washington’s  administration.  They  are  given 
in  full  in  The  Writings  of  James  Madison^  vol.  i. 


14 


JAMES  MADISON 


clear  to  me  that  slavery  and  subjection  might  and 
would  have  been  gradually  insinuated  among  us.” 
He  congratulated  his  friend  that  they  had  not 
permitted  the  tea-ships  to  break  cargo  in  Philadel- 
phia ; and  Boston,  he  hoped,  would  conduct  mat- 
ters with  as  much  discretion  as  they  seem  to  do 
with  boldness.”  These  things  were  interesting 
and  important ; but  ‘‘  away  with  politics ! Let  me 
address  you  as  a student  and  philosopher,  and  not 
as  a patriot.”  Shut  off  from  any  contact  with  the 
stirring  incidents  of  that  year  in  the  towns  of  the 
coast,  he  lost  something  of  the  sense  of  proportion. 

' To  a young  student,  solitary,  ill  in  body,  perhaps 
a trifle  morbid  in  mind,  a little  discontented  that 
all  the  learning  gained  at  Princeton  could  find 
no  better  use  than  to  save  schooling  for  the  six 
youngsters  at  home,  — to  him  it  may  have  seemed 
that  liberty  was  more  seriously  threatened  by 
that  outrage,  under  his  own  eyes,  of  ‘‘  five  or  six 
well-meaning  men  in  close  jail  for  publishing  their 
religious  sentiments,”  than  by  any  tax  which  Par- 
liament could  contrive.  Not  that  he  overestimated 
the  importance  of  this  wrong,  but  that  he  under- 
estimated the  importance  of  that.  He  was  not 
long,  however,  in  getting  the  true  perspective. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 

Madison’s  place,  both  from  temperament  and 
from  want  of  physical  vigor,  was  in  the  council, 
not  in  the  field.  One  of  his  early  biographers 
says  that  he  joined  a military  company,  raised  in 
his  own  county,  in  preparation  for  war ; but  this, 
there  can  hardly  be  a doubt,  is  an  error.  He 
speaks  with  enthusiasm  of  the  ‘‘  high-spirited  ” 
volunteers,  who  came  forward  to  defend  the  honor 
and  safety  of  their  country ; ” but  there  is  no  in- 
timation that  he  chose  for  himself  that  way  of 
showing  his  patriotism.  But  of  the  Committee  of 
Safety,  appointed  in  his  county  in  1774,  he  was 
made  a member,  — perhaps  the  youngest,  for  he 
was  then  only  twenty-three  years  old. 

Eighteen  months  afterward  he  was  elected  a 
delegate  to  the  Virginia  Convention  of  1776,  and 
this  he  calls  ‘‘  my  first  entrance  into  public  life.” 
It  gave  him  also  an  opportunity  for  some  distinc- 
tion, which,  whatever  may  have  been  his  earlier 
plans,  opened  public  life  to  him  as  a career.  The 
first  work  of  the  convention  was  to  consider  and 
adopt  a series  of  resolutions  instructing  the  Vir- 
ginian delegates  in  the  Continental  Congress,  then 


16 


JAMES  MADISON 


in  session  at  Philadelphia,  to  urge  an  immediate 
declaration  of  independence.  The  next  matter  was 
to  frame  a Bill  of  Rights  and  a Constitution  of 
government  for  the  province.  Madison  was  made 
a member  of  the  committee  to  which  this  latter  sub- 
ject was  referred.  One  question  necessarily  came 
up  for  consideration  which  had  for  him  a peculiar 
interest,  and  in  any  discussion  of  which  he,  no 
doubt,  felt  quite  at  ease.  This  was  concerning 
religious  freedom.  An  article  in  the  proposed  De- 
claration of  Rights  provided  that  all  men  should 
enjoy  the  fullest  toleration  in  the  exercise  of  reli- 
gion, according  to  the  dictates  of  conscience,  un- 
punished and  unrestrained  by  the  magistrate,  unless, 
under  color  of  religion,  any  man  disturb  the  peace, 
happiness,  or  safety  of  society.”  It  does  not 
appear  that  Mr.  Madison  offered  any  objection  to 
the  article  in  the  committee ; but  when  the  report 
was  made  to  the  convention  he  moved  an  amend- 
ment. He  pointed  out  the  distinction  between  the 
recognition  of  an  absolute  right  and  the  toleration 
of  its  exercise ; for  toleration  implies  the  power 
of  jurisdiction.  He  proposed,  therefore,  instead  of 
providing  that  “ all  men  should  enjoy  the  fullest 
toleration  in  the  exercise  of  religion,”  to  declare 
that  all  men  are  equally  entitled  to  the  full  and 
free  exercise  of  it  according  to  the  dictates  of  con- 
science ; ” and  that  “ no  man  or  class  of  men  ought, 
on  account  of  religion,  to  be  invested  with  peculiar 
emoluments  or  privileges,  nor  subjected  to  any 
penalties  or  disabilities,  unless,  under  color  of 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 


17 


religion,  the  preservation  of  equal  liberty  and  the 
existence  of  the  state  be  manifestly  endangered.’^ 
This  distinction  between  the  assertion  of  a right 
and  the  promise  to  grant  a privilege  only  needed 
to  be  pointed  out.  But  Mr.  Madison  evidently 
meant  more ; he  meant  not  only  that  religious  free- 
dom should  be  assured,  but  that*  an  Established 
Church,  which,  as  we  have  already  seen,  he  believed 
to  be  dangerous  to  liberty,  should  be  prohibited. 
Possibly  the  convention  was  not  quite  ready  for 
this  latter  step  ; or  possibly  its  members  thought 
that,  as  the  greater  includes  the  less,  should  free- 
dom of  conscience  be  established  a state  church 
would  be  impossible,  and  the  article  might  there- 
fore be  stripped  of  supererogation  and  verbiage. 
At  any  rate,  it  was  reduced  one  half,  and  finally 
adopted  in  this  simpler  form : “ That  religion,  or 
the  duty  we  owe  to  our  Creator,  and  the  manner  of 
discharging  it,  can  be  directed  only  by  reason  and 
conviction,  not  by  force  or  violence;  and,  there- 
fore, all  men  are  equally  entitled  to  the  free  exer- 
cise of  religion  according  to  the  dictates  of  con- 
science.” Thus  it  stands  to  this  day  in  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  Virginia,  and  of  other  States  which  sub- 
sequently made  it  their  own,  possessing  for  us  the 
personal  interest  of  being  the  first  public  work  of 
the  coming  statesman. 

Madison  was  thenceforth  for  the  next  forty 
years  a public  man.  Of  the  first  Assembly  under 
the  new  Constitution  he  was  elected  a member. 
For  the  next  session  also  he  was  a candidate,  but 


18 


JAMES  MADISON 


failed  to  be  returned  for  a reason  as  creditable  to 
him  as  it  was  uncommon  then,  whatever  it  may  be 
now,  in  Virginia.  “ The  sentiments  and  manners 
of  the  parent  nation,”  Mr.  Rives  says,  still  pre- 
vailed in  Virginia,  “ and  the  modes  of  canvassing 
for  popular  votes  in  that  country  were  generally 
practiced.  The  people  not  only  tolerated,  but  ex- 
pected and  even  required,  to  be  courted  and  treated. 
No  candidate  who  neglected  those  attentions  could 
be  elected.”  But  the  times,  Mr.  Madison  thought, 
seemed  “ to  favor  a more  chaste  mode  of  conduct- 
ing elections,”  and  he  determined  to  attempt,  by 
an  example,  to  introduce  it.”  He  failed  signally ; 
‘‘  the  sentiments  and  manners  of  the  parent  nation  ” 
were  too  much  for  him.  He  solicited  no  votes ; 
nobody  got  drunk  at  his  expense ; and  he  lost  the 
election.  An  attempt  was  made  to  contest  the 
return  of  his  opponent  on  the  ground  of  corrupt 
influence,  but,  adds  Mr.  Rives,  in  his  sesquipeda- 
lian measure,  for  the  want  of  adequate  proof  to 
sustain  the  allegations  of  the  petition  which  in  such 
cases  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  obtain  with  the 
requisite  precision,  the  proceeding  was  unavailing 
except  as  a perpetual  protest,  upon  the  legislative 
records  of  the  country,  against  a dangerous  abuse, 
of  which  one  of  her  sons,  so  qualified  to  serve  her, 
and  destined  to  be  one  of  her  chief  ornaments,  was 
the  early  though  temporary  victim.”  Mr.  Rives 
does  not  mean  that  Mr.  Madison  was  for  a little 
while  in  early  life  the  victim  of  a vicious  habit, 
but  that  he  lost  votes  because  he  would  do  nothing 
to  encourage  it  in  others. 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 


19 


The  country  lost  a good  representative,  but 
their  loss  was  his  gain.  The  Assembly  immedi- 
ately elected  him  a member  of  the  governor’s 
council,  and  in  this  position  he  so  grew  in  public 
favor  that,  two  years  afterward  (1780),  he  was 
chosen  as  a delegate  to  the  Continental  Congress. 
He  was  still  under  thirty,  and  had  he  been  even 
a more  brilliant  young  man  than  he  really  was,  it 
would  not  have  been  to  his  discredit  had  he  only 
been  seen  for  the  next  year  or  two,  if  seen  at  all, 
in  the  background.  He  had  taken  his  seat  among 
men,  every  one  of  whom,  probably,  was  his  senior, 
and  among  whom  were  many  of  the  wisest  men 
in  the  country,  not  older  ” merely,  but  ‘‘  better 
soldiers.” 

If  not  the  darkest,  at  least  there  was  no  darker 
year  in  the  Revolution  than  that  of  1780.  Within 
a few  days  of  his  arrival  at  Philadelphia,  Madison 
wrote  to  J efferson  — then  governor  of  Virginia  — 
his  opinion  of  the  state  of  the  country.  It  was 
gloomy  but  not  exaggerated.  The  only  bright  spot 
he  could  see  was  the  chance  that  Clinton’s  expe- 
dition to  South  Carolina  might  be  a failure ; but 
within  little  more  than  a month  from  the  date 
of  his  letter,  Lincoln  was  compelled  to  surrender 
Charleston,  and  the  whole  country  south  of  Vir- 
ginia seemed  about  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Could  he  have  foreseen  that  calamity, 
his  apprehensions  might  have  been  changed  to 
despair  ; for  he  writes : — 


20 


JAMES  MADISON 


“ Our  army  threatened  with  an  immediate  alternative 
of  disbanding  or  living  on  free  quarter  ; the  public  trea- 
sury empty  ; public  credit  exhausted,  nay,  the  private 
credit  of  purchasing  agents  employed,  I am  told,  as  far 
as  it  will  bear ; Congress  complaining  of  the  extortion  of 
the  people,  the  people  of  the  improvidence  of  Congress, 
and  the  army  of  both ; our  affairs  requiring  the  most 
mature  and  systematic  measures,  and  the  urgency  of 
occasions  admitting  only  of  temporary  expedients,  and 
these  expedients  generating  new  difficulties ; Congress 
recommending  plans  to  the  several  States  for  execution, 
and  the  States  separately  rejudging  the  expediency  of 
such  plans,  whereby  the  same  distrust  of  concurrent 
exertions  that  had  damped  the  ardor  of  patriotic  indi- 
viduals must  produce  the  same  effect  among  the  States 
themselves ; an  old  system  of  finance  discarded  as  incom- 
petent to  our  necessities,  an  untried  and  precarious  one 
substituted,  and  a total  stagnation  in  prospect  between 
the  end  of  the  former  and  the  operation  of  the  latter. 
These  are  the  outlines  of  the  picture  of  our  public  situa- 
tion. I leave  it  to  your  own  imagination  to  fill  them  up.” 

He  saw  more  clearly,  perhaps,  after  the  experi- 
ence of  one  session  of  Congress,  the  true  cause  of 
all  these  troubles ; at  any  rate,  he  was  able,  in  a 
letter  written  in  November  of  that  year  (1780),  to 
state  it  tersely  and  explicitly.  The  want  of  money, 
he  wrote  to  a friend,  “ is  the  source  of  all  our  pub- 
lic difficulties  and  misfortunes.  One  or  two  mil- 
lions of  guineas  properly  applied  would  diffuse 
vigor  and  satisfaction  throughout  the  whole  mili- 
tary department,  and  would  expel  the  enemy  from 
every  part  of  the  United  States.” 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 


21 


But  nobody  knew  better  than  he  the  difficulty 
of  raising  funds  except  by  borrowing  abroad,  and 
that  this  was  a precarious  reliance.  There  must 
be  some  sort  of  substitute  for  money.  In  specific 
taxation  he  had  no  faith.  Such  taxes,  if  paid  at 
all,  would  be  paid,  virtually,  in  the  paper  currency 
or  certificates  of  the  States,  and  these  had  already 
fallen  to  the  ratio  of  one  hundred  to  one  ; they 
kept  on  falling  till  they  reached  the  rate  of  a 
thousand  to  one,  and  then  soon  became  altogether 
worthless.  When  the  estimate  for  the  coming  year 
was  under  consideration,  he  proposed  to  Congress 
that  the  States  should  be  advised  to  abandon  the 
issue  of  this  paper  currency.  It  met,”  he  says, 
with  so  cool  a reception  that  I did  not  much  urge 
it.”  The  sufficient  answer  to  the  proposition  was, 
that  ‘‘the  practice  was  manifestly  repugnant  to 
the  Acts  of  Congress,”  and  as  these  were  disre- 
garded and  could  not  be  enforced,  a mere  remon- 
strance would  be  quite  useless.  The  Union  was 
little  more  than  a name  under  the  feeble  bonds  of 
the  Confederation,  and  each  State  was  a law  unto 
itself.  Not  that  in  this  case  there  was  much  rea- 
sonable ground  for  complaint ; for  what  else  could 
the  States  do  ? Where  there  was  no  money  there 
must  be  something  to  take  its  place  ; a promise  to 
pay  must  be  accepted  instead  of  payment.  The 
paper  answered  a temporary  purpose,  though  it 
was  plain  that  in  the  end  it  would  be  good  for 
nothing. 

The  evil,  however,  was  manifestly  so  great  that 


22 


JAMES  MADISON 


there  was  only  the  more  reason  for  trying  to  miti- 
gate it,  if  it  could  not  be  cured.  Madison,  like 
the  rest,  had  his  remedy.  He  proposed,  in  a let- 
ter to  one  of  his  colleagues,  that  the  demand  for 
army  supplies  should  be  duly  apportioned  among 
the  people,  their  collection  rigorously  enforced,  and 
payment  made  in  interest-bearing  certificates,  not 
transferable,  but  to  be  redeemed  at  a specified 
time  after  the  war  was  over.  The  plan  would  un- 
doubtedly have  put  a stop  to  the  circulation  of 
a vast  volume  of  paper  money  if  the  producers 
would  have  exchanged  the  products  of  their  labor 
for  certificates,  useless  at  the  time  of  exchange, 
and  having  only  a possible  prospective  value  in 
case  of  the  successful  termination  of  an  uncertain 
war.  Patriotic  as  the  people  were,  they  neither 
would  nor  could  have  submitted  to  such  a law,  nor 
had  Congress  the  power  to  enforce  it.  But  Mr. 
Madison  did  not  venture  apparently  to  urge  his 
plan  beyond  its  suggestion  to  his  colleague. 

Why  the  Assembly  of  Virginia  should  have  pro- 
posed to  elect  an  extra  delegate  to  Congress,  early 
in  1781,  is  not  clear,  unless  it  be  that  one  of  the 
number,  Joseph  Jones,  being  also  a member  of 
the  Assembly,  passed  much  of  his  time  in  Richmond. 
It  does  not  appear,  however,  that  the  delegate 
extraordinary  was  ever  sent,  perhaps  because  it 
was  known  to  Mr.  Madison’s  friends  that  it  would 
be  a mortification  to  him.  There  was  certainly  no 
good  reason  for  any  distrust  of  either  his  ability 
or  his  industry.  One  could  hardly  be  otherwise 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 


23 


than  industrious  who  had  it  in  him  — if  the  story 
be  true  — to  take  but  three  hours  out  of  the  twenty- 
four  for  sleep  during  the  last  year  of  his  college 
course,  that  he  might  crowd  the  studies  of  two 
years  into  one.  He  seemed  to  love  work  for  its 
own  sake,  and  he  was  a striking  example  of  how 
much  virtue  there  is  in  steadiness  of  pursuit.  Not 
that  he  had  at  this  time  any  special  goal  for  his 
ambition.  His  aim  seemed  to  be  simply  to  do  the 
best  he  could  wherever  he  might  be  placed;  to 
discharge  faithfully,  and  to  the  best  of  such  ability 
as  he  had,  whatever  duty  was  intrusted  to  him. 
His  report  of  the  proceedings  in  the  congressional 
session  of  1782-83,  and  the  letters  written  during 
those  years  and  the  year  before,  show  that  he  was 
not  merely  diligent  but  absorbed  in  the  duties  of 
his  office. 

He  was  more  faithful  to  his  constituents  than 
his  constituents  sometimes  were  to  him.  Any- 
thing that  might  happen  at  that  period  for  want 
of  money  can  hardly  be  a matter  of  surprise ; but 
Virginia,  even  then,  should  have  been  able,  it 
would  seem,  to  find  enough  to  enable  its  members 
of  Congress  to  pay  their  board-bills.  He  com- 
plains gently  in  his  Addisonian  way  of  the  incon- 
venience to  which  he  was  put  for  want  of  funds. 

I cannot,”  he  writes  to  Edmund  Randolph,  ‘‘  in 
any  way  make  you  more  sensible  of  the  importance 
of  your  kind  attention  to  pecuniary  remittances  for 
me,  than  by  informing  you  that  I have  for  some 
time  past  been  a pensioner  on  the  favor  of  Hayne 


24 


JAMES  MADISON 


Solomon,  a Jew  broker.”  A month  later  he  writes, 
that  to  draw  bills  on  Virginia  has  been  tried,  “ but 
in  vain ; ” nobody  would  buy  them ; and  he  adds, 
‘‘I  am  relapsing  fast  into  distress.  The  case  of 
my  brethren  is  equally  alarming.”  Within  a week 
he  again  writes : “ I am  almost  ashamed  to  reiterate 
my  wants  so  incessantly  to  you,  but  they  begin  to 
be  so  urgent  that  it  is  impossible  to  suppress  them.” 
But  the  Good  Samaritan,  Solomon,  is  still  an  un- 
failing reliance.  ‘‘  The  kindness  of  our  little  friend 
in  Front  Street,  near  the  coffee  house,  is  a fund 
which  will  preserve  me  from  extremities ; but  I 
never  resort  to  it  without  great  mortification,  as  he 
obstinately  rejects  all  recompense.  The  price  of 
money  is  so  usurious  that  he  thinks  it  ought  to  be 
extorted  from  none  but  those  who  aim  at  profitable 
speculations.  To  a necessitous  delegate  he  gratui- 
tously spares  a supply  out  of  his  private  stock.” 
It  is  a pretty  picture  of  the  simplicity  of  the  early 
days  of  the  Republic.  Between  the  average  modern 
member  and  the  money-broker,  under  such  circum- 
stances, there  would  lurk,  probably,  a contract  for 
carrying  the  mails  or  for  Indian  supplies. 

Relief,  however,  came  at  last.  An  appeal  was 
made  in  a letter  to  the  governor  of  Virginia, 
which  was  so  far  public  that  anybody  about  the 
executive  office  might  read  it.  The  answer  to 
this  letter,  says  Mr.  Madison,  ‘‘  seems  to  chide  our 
urgency.”  But  there  soon  came  a bill  for  two 
hundred  dollars,  which,  he  adds,  “ very  seasonably 
enabled  me  to  replace  a loan  by  which  I had  an- 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 


25 


ticipated  it.  About  three  hundred  and  fifty  more 
(not  less)  would  redeem  me  completely  from  the 
class  of  debtors.”  It  is  to  be  hoped  it  came  with- 
out further  chiding.^ 

The  young  member  was  not  less  attentive  to  his 
congressional  duties  because  of  these  little  diffi- 
culties in  the  personal  ways  and  means.  Military 
movements  seem,  without  altogether  escaping  his 
attention,  to  have  interested  him  the  least.  In  his 
letters  to  the  public  men  at  home,  which  were 
meant  in  some  degree  to  give  such  information  as 
in  later  times  the  newspapers  supplied,  questions 
relating  to  army  affairs,  even  news  directly  from 
the  army,  occupy  the  least  space.  They  are  not 
always,  for  that  reason,  altogether  entertaining 
reading.  One  would  be  glad,  occasionally,  to  ex- 
change their  sonorous  and  rounded  periods  for  any 
expression  of  quick,  impulsive  feeling.  ‘‘  I return 
you,”  he  writes  to  Pendleton,  ‘‘  my  fervent  congrat- 
ulations on  the  glorious  success  of  the  combined 
armies  at  York  and  Gloucester.  We  have  had 
from  the  Commander-in-Chief  an  official  report  of 
the  fact,”  — and  so  forth  and  so  forth ; and  then 
for  a page  or  more  is  a discussion  of  the  condition 
of  British  possessions  in  the  East  Indies,  that  ^‘rich 

^ The  members  of  Congress  were  paid,  at  that  time,  hy  the 
States  they  represented.  Virginia  allowed  her  delegates  their 
family  expenses,  including  three  servants  and  four  horses,  house 
rent  and  fuel,  two  dollars  a mile  for  travel,  and  twenty  dollars  a 
day  when  in  attendance  on  Congress.  The  members  were  required 
to  render  an  account  quarterly  of  their  household  expenses,  and 
the  State  paid  them  when  she  had  any  money. 


26 


JAMES  MADISON 


source  of  their  commerce  and  credit,  severed  from 
them,  perhaps  forever;”  of  “the  predatory  conquest 
of  Eustatia;”  and  of  the  “relief  of  Gibraltar,  which 
was  merely  a negative  advantage;”  — all  to  show 
that  “it  seems  scarcely  possible  for  them  much 
longer  to  shut  their  ears  against  the  voice  of 
peace.”  There  is  not  a word  in  all  this  that  is  not 
quite  true,  pertinent,  reflective,  and  becoming  a 
statesman ; but  neither  is  there  a word  of  sympa- 
thetic warmth  and  patriotic  fervor  which  at  that 
moment  made  the  heart  of  a whole  people  beat 
quicker  at  the  news  of  a great  victory,  and  in  the 
hope  that  the  cause  was  gained  at  last. 

All  the  letters  have  this  preternatural  solemnity, 
as  if  each  was  a study  in  style  after  the  favorite 
Addisonian  model.  One  wonders  if  he  did  not,  in 
the  privacy  of  his  own  room  and  with  the  door 
locked,  venture  to  throw  his  hat  to  the  ceiling  and 
give  one  hurrah  under  his  breath  at  the  discom- 
fiture of  the  vain  and  self-sufficient  Cornwallis. 
But  he  seems  never  to  have  been  a young  man. 
At  one  and  twenty  he  gravely  warned  his  friend 
Bradford  not  “to  suffer  those  impertinent  fops 
that  abound  in  every  city  to  divert  you  from  your 
business  and  philosophical  amusements.  ...  You 
will  make  them  respect  and  admire  you  more  by 
showing  your  indignation  at  their  follies,  and  by 
keeping  them  at  a becoming  distance.”  It  was  his 
loss,  however,  and  our  gain.  He  was  one  of  the 
men  the  times  demanded,  and  without  whom  they 
would  have  been  quite  different  times  and  followed 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN 


27 


by  quite  different  results.  The  sombre  hue  of  his 
life  was  due  partly,  no  doubt,  to  natural  tempera- 
ment ; partly  to  the^want  of  health  in  his  earlier 
manhood,  which  led  him  to  believe  that  his  days 
were  numbered;  but  quite  as  much,  if  not  more 
than  either,  to  a keen  sense  of  the  responsibility 
resting  upon  those  to  whom  had  fallen  the  conduct 
of  public  affairs. 


t 


CHAPTER  III 


IN  CONGRESS 

Madison  had  grown  steadily  in  the  estimation 
of  his  colleagues,  as  is  shown,  especially  in  1783, 
by  the  frequency  of  his  appointment  upon  impor- 
tant committees.  He  was  a member  of  that  one 
to  which  was  intrusted  the  question  of  national 
finances,  and  it  is  plain,  even  in  his  own  modest 
report  of  the  debates  of  that  session,  that  he  took 
an  important  part  in  the  long  discussions  of  the 
subject,  and  exercised  a marked  influence  upon  the 
result.  The  position  of  the  government  was  one 
of  extreme  difficulty.  To  tide  over  an  immediate 
necessity,  a further  loan  had  been  asked  of  France 
in  1782,  and  bills  were  drawn  against  it  without 
waiting  for  acceptance.  It  was  not  very  likely, 
but  it  was  not  impossible,  that  the  bills  might  go 
to  protest;  but  even  should  they  be  honored,  so 
irregular  a proceeding  was  a humiliating  acknow- 
ledgment of  poverty  and  weakness,  to  which  some 
of  the  delegates,  Mr.  Madison  among  them,  were 
extremely  sensitive. 

The  national  debt  altogether  was  not  less  than 
forty  million  dollars.  To  provide  for  the  inter- 
est on  this  debt,  and  a fund  for  expenses,  it  was 


IN  CONGRESS 


29 


necessary  to  raise  about  three  million  dollars  annu- 
ally. But  the  sum  actually  contributed  for  the 
support  of  the  confederate  government  in  1782  was 
only  half  a million  dollars.  This  was  not  from 
any  absolute  inability  on  the  part  of  the  people  to 
pay  more ; for  the  taxes  before  the  war  were  more 
than  double  that  sum,  and  for  the  first  three  or 
four  years  of  the  war  it  was  computed  that,  with 
the  depreciation  of  paper  money,  the  people  sub- 
mitted to  an  annual  tax  of  about  twenty  million 
dollars.  The  real  difficulty  lay  in  the  character  of 
the  Confederation.  Congress  might  contrive  but 
it  could  not  command.  The  States  might  agree,  or 
they  might  disagree,  or  any  two  or  more  of  them 
might  only  agree  to  disagree ; and  they  were  more 
likely  to  do  either  of  the  last  two  than  the  first. 
There  was  no  power  of  coercion  anywhere.  All 
that  Congress  could  do  was  to  try  to  frame  laws 
that  would  reconcile  differences,  and  bring  thirteen 
supreme  governments  upon  some  common  ground 
of  agreement.  To  distract  and  perplex  it  still 
more,  it  stood  face  to  face  with  a well-disciplined 
and  veteran  army  which  might  at  any  moment, 
could  it  find  a leader  to  its  mind,  march  upon 
Philadelphia  and  deal  with  Congress  as  Cromwell 
dealt  with  the  Long  Parliament.  There  were  some 
men,  probably,  in  that  body,  who  would  not  have 
been  sorry  to  see  that  precedent  followed.  Wash- 
ington might  have  done  it  if  he  would.  Gates 
probably  would  have  done  it  if  he  could. 

To  avert  this  threatened  danger;  to  contrive 


30 


JAMES  MADISON 


taxation  that  should  so  far  please  the  taxed  that 
they  would  refrain  from  using  the  power  in  their 
hands  to  escape  altogether  any  taxation  for  general 
purposes,  — was  the  knotty  problem  this  Congress 
had  to  solve  in  order  to  save  the  Confederacy  from 
dissolution.  There  was  no  want  of  plans  and  ex- 
pedients ; neither  were  there  wanting  men  in  that 
body  who  clearly  understood  the  conditions  of  the 
problem,  and  how  it  might  be  solved,  and  whose 
aim  was  direct  and  unfaltering.  Chief  among  them 
were  Hamilton,  Wilson,  Ellsworth,  and  Madison. 
However  wrong-headed,  or  weak,  or  intemperate 
others  may  have  been,  these  men  were  usually 
found  together  on  important  questions ; differing 
sometimes  in  details,  but  unmoved  by  passion  or 
prejudice,  and  strong  from  reserved  force,  they 
overwhelmed  their  opponents  at  the  right  moment 
with  irresistible  argument  and  by  weight  of  char- 
acter. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  more  important  ques- 
tions Mr.  Madison  is  conspicuous  — conspicuous 
without  being  obtrusive.  A reader  of  the  debates 
can  hardly  fail  to  be  struck  with  his  familiarity 
with  English  constitutional  law,  and  its  application 
to  the  necessities  of  this  offshoot  of  the  English 
people  in  setting  up  a government  for  themselves. 
The  stores  of  knowledge  he  drew  upon  must  needs 
have  been  laid  up  in  the  years  of  quiet  study  at 
home  before  he  entered  upon  public  life.  For 
there  was  no  congressional  library  then  where  a 
member  could  cram  ” for  debate  ; and  — though 


IN  CONGRESS 


31 


Philadelphia  already  had  a fair  public  library  — 
the  member  who  was  armed  at  all  points  must 
have  equipped  himself  before  entering  Congress. 
In  this  respect  Madison  probably  had  no  equal, 
except  Hamilton,  and  possibly  Ellsworth.  To  the 
need  of  such  a library,  however,  he  and  others 
were  not  insensible.  As  chairman  of  a committee 
he  reported  a list  of  books  proper  for  the  use 
of  Congress,”  and  advised  their  purchase.  The 
report  declared  that  certain  authorities  upon  inter- 
national law,  treaties,  negotiations,  and  other  ques- 
tions of  legislation  were  absolutely  indispensable, 
and  that  the  want  of  them  ‘‘was  manifest  in 
several  Acts  of  Congress.”  But  the  Congress  was 
not  to  be  moved  by  a little  thing  of  that  sort. 

The  attitude  of  his  own  State  sometimes  embar- 
rassed him  in  the  satisfactory  discharge  of  his  duty 
as  a legislator.  The  earliest  distinction  he  won 
after  entering  Congress  was  as  chairman  of  a 
committee  to  enforce  upon  Mr.  Jay,  then  minister 
to  Spain,  the  instructions  to  adhere  tenaciously  to 
the  right  of  navigation  on  the  Mississippi  in  his 
negotiations  for  an  alliance  with  that  power.  Mr. 
Madison,  in  his  dispatch,  maintained  the  American 
side  of  the  question  with  a force  and  clearness  to 
which  no  subsequent  discussion  of  the  subject  ever 
added  anything.  He  left  nothing  unsaid  that 
could  be  said  to  sustain  the  right  either  on  the 
ground  of  expediency,  of  national  comity,  or  of 
international  law ; and  his  arguments  were  not 
only  in  accordance  with  his  own  convictions,  but 


32 


JAMES  MADISON 


with  the  instructions  of  the  Assembly  of  his  own 
State.  It  was  a question  of  deep  interest  to  Vir- 
ginia, whose  western  boundary  at  that  time  was 
the  Mississippi.  But  Virginia  soon  afterward 
shifted  her  position.  The  course  of  the  v/ar  in 
the  Southern  States  in  the  winter  of  1780-81 
aroused  in  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  renewed 
anxiety  for  an  alliance  with  Spain.  The  fear  of 
their  people  was  that,  in  case  of  the  necessity  for 
a sudden  peace  while  the  British  troops  were  in 
possession  of  those  States  or  parts  of  them,  they 
might  be  compelled  to  remain  as  British  territory 
under  the  application  of  the  rule  of  uti  possidetis. 
It  was  urged,  therefore,  that  the  right  to  the 
Mississippi  should  be  surrendered  to  Spain,  if  it 
were  made  the  condition  of  an  alliance.  In  defer- 
ence to  her  neighbors,  Virginia  proposed  that  Mr. 
Jay  should  be  reinstructed  accordingly. 

Mr.  Madison  was  not  in  the  least  shaken  in  his 
conviction.  With  him,  the  question  was  one  of 
right  rather  than  of  expediency.  But  not  many 
at  that  time  ventured  to  doubt  that  representatives 
must  implicitly  obey  the  instructions  of  their  con- 
stituents. He  yielded ; but  not  till  he  had  ap- 
pealed to  the  Assembly  to  reconsider  their  decision. 
The  scale  was  turned  ; in  deference  to  the  wishes 
of  the  Southern  States  new  orders  were  sent  to 
Mr.  Jay.  Mr.  Madison,  however,  had  not  long  to 
wait  for  his  justification.  When  the  immediate 
danger,  which  had  so  alarmed  the  South,  had 
passed  away,  Virginia  returned  to  her  original 


IN  CONGEESS 


33 


position.  New  instructions  were  again  sent  to  her 
representatives,  and  Mr.  Jay  was  once  more  ad- 
vised by  Congress  that  on  the  Mississippi  ques- 
tion his  government  would  yield  nothing. 

On  another  question,  two  years  afterward,  Mr. 
Madison  refused  to  accept  a position  of  inconsist- 
ency in  obedience  to  instructions  which  his  State 
attempted  to  force  upon  him.  No  one  saw  more 
clearly  than  he  how  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
preservation  of  the  Confederacy  was  the  settle- 
ment of  its  financial  affairs  on  some  sound  and 
just  basis ; and  no  one  labored  more  earnestly  and 
more  intelligently  than  he  to  bring  about  such  a 
settlement.  Congress  had  proposed  in  1781  a tax 
upon  imports,  each  State  to  appoint  its  own  col- 
lectors, but  the  revenue  to  be  paid  over  to  the 
federal  government  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the 
war.  Rhode  Island  alone,  at  first,  refused  her 
assent  to  this  scheme.  An  impost  law  of  five  per 
cent,  upon  certain  imports  and  a specific  duty 
upon  others  for  twenty-five  years  were  an  essential 
part  of  the  plan  of  1783  to  provide  a revenue  to 
meet  the  interest  on  the  public  debt  and  for  other 
^ general  purposes.  That  Rhode  Island  would  con- 
tinue obstinate  on  this  point  was  more  than  prob- 
able ; and  the  only  hope  of  moving  her  was  that 
she  should  be  shamed  or  persuaded  into  compli- 
ance by  the  combined  influence  of  all  the  other 
States. 

Mr.  Madison  was  as  bitter  as  he  could  ever  be 
in  his  reflections  upon  that  State,  whose  course. 


34 


JAMES  MADISON 


lie  thought,  showed  a want  of  any  sense  of  honor 
or  of  patriotism.  Virginia,  he  argued,  should  re- 
buke her  by  making  her  own  compliance  with  the 
law  the  more  emphatic,  as  an  example  for  all  the 
rest.  But  Virginia  did  exactly  the  other  thing. 
At  the  moment  when  debate  upon  the  revenue 
law  was  the  most  earnest,  and  the  prospect  of  car- 
rying it  the  most  hopeful ; when  a committee  ap- 
pointed by  Congress  had  already  started  on  their 
journey  northward  to  expostulate  with,  and  if  pos- 
sible conciliate,  Rhode  Island,  — at  that  critical 
moment  came  news  from  Virginia  that  she  had 
revoked  her  assent  of  a previous  session  to  the  im- 
post law.  This  was  equivalent  to  instructing  her 
delegates  in  Congress  to  oppose  any  such  measure. 
The  situation  was  an  awkward  one  for  a represent- 
ative who  had  put  himself  among  the  foremost  of 
those  who  were  pushing  this  policy,  and  who  had 
been  making  invidious  reflections  upon  a State 
which  opposed  it.  The  rule  that  the  will  of  the 
constituents  should  govern  the  representative,  he 
now  declared,  had  its  exceptions,  and  here  was  a 
case  in  point.  He  continued  to  enforce  the  neces- 
sity of  a general  law  to  provide  a revenue,  though 
his  arguments  were  no  longer  pointed  with  the 
selfishness  and  want  of  patriotism  shown  by  the 
people  of  Rhode  Island.  In  the  end  his  firmness 
was  justified  by  Virginia,  who  again  shifted  her 
position  when  the  new  act  was  submitted  to  her. 

The  operation  of  the  law  was  limited  to  five  and 
twenty  years.  This  Hamilton  opposed  and  Madi- 


IN  CONGRESS 


35 


son  supported ; and  in  this  difference  some  of 
the  biographers  of  both  see  the  foreshadowing  of 
future  parties.  But  it  is  more  likely  that  neither 
of  those  statesmen  thought  of  their  difference  of 
opinion  as  difference  of  principle.  The  question 
was,  whether  anything  could  be  gained  by  a defer- 
ence to  that  party  which,  both  felt  at  that  time, 
threatened  to  throw  away,  in  adhering  to  the  state- 
rights  doctrine,  all  that  was  gained  by  the  Revolu- 
tion. They  were  agreed  upon  the  necessity  of  a 
general  law,  supreme  in  all  the  States,  to  meet 
the  obligation  of  a debt  contracted  for  the  general 
good.  Unless  — wrote  Madison  in  February  — 
‘‘  unless  some  amicable  and  adequate  arrangements 
be  speedily  taken  for  adjusting  all  the  subsisting 
accounts  and  discharging  the  public  engagements, 
a dissolution  of  the  Union  will  be  inevitable.”  He 
was  willing,  therefore,  to  temporize,  that  the  neces- 
sary assent  of  the  State  to  such  a law  might  be 
gained.  Nobody  hoped  that  the  public  debt  would 
be  paid  off  in  twenty-five  years  ; but  to  assume  to 
levy  a federal  tax  in  the  States  for  a longer  period, 
or  till  the  debt  should  be  discharged,  might  so 
arouse  state  jealousy  that  it  would  be  impossible 
to  get  an  assent  to  the  law  anywhere.  If  the 
law  for  twenty-five  years  should  be  accepted,  the 
threatened  destruction  of  the  government  would  be 
escaped  for  the  present,  and  it  might,  at  the  end 
of  a quarter  of  a century,  be  easy  to  reenact  the 
law.  At  any  rate,  the  evil  day  would  be  put  off. 
This  was  Madison’s  reasoning. 


36 


JAMES  MADISON 


But  Hamilton  did  not  believe  in  putting  oi¥  a 
crisis.  He  had  no  faith  in  the  permanency  of  the 
government  as  then  organized.  If  he  were  right, 
what  was  the  use  or  the  wisdom  of  postponing  a 
catastrophe  till  to-morrow  ? A possible  escape 
from  it  might  be  even  more  difficult  to-morrow 
than  to-day.  The  essential  difference  between 
the  two  men  was,  that  Madison  only  feared  what 
Hamilton  positively  knew,  or  thought  he  knew. 
It  was  a difference  of  faith.  Madison  hoped  some- 
thing would  turn  up  in  the  course  of  twenty-five 
years.  Hamilton  did  not  believe  that  anything 
good  could  turn  up  under  the  feeble  rule  of  the 
Confederation.  He  would  have  presented  to  the 
States,  then  and  there,  the  question.  Would  they 
surrender  to  the  confederate  government  the  right 
of  taxation  so  long  as  that  government  thought  it 
necessary  ? If  not,  then  the  Confederation  was  a 
rope  of  sand,  and  the  States  had  resolved  them- 
selves into  thirteen  separate  and  independent  gov- 
ernments. Therefore  he  opposed  the  condition  of 
twenty-five  years,  and  voted  against  the  bill. 

Nevertheless,  when  it  became  the  law  he  gave  it 
his  heartiest  support,  and  was  appointed  one  of  a 
committee  of  three  to  prepare  an  address,  which 
Madison  wrote,  to  commend  it  to  the  acceptance 
of  the  States.  Indeed,  the  last  serious  effort  made 
on  behalf  of  the  measure  was  made  by  Hamilton, 
who  used  all  his  eloquence  and  influence  to  in- 
duce the  legislature  of  his  own  State  to  ratify  it. 
It  was  the  law  against  his  better  judgment ; but 


IN  CONGRESS 


37 


being  the  law,  he  did  his  best  to  secure  its  recogni- 
tion. But  it  failed  of  hearty  support  in  most  of 
the  States,  while  in  New  York  and  Pennsylvania 
compliance  with  it  was  absolutely  refused.  No- 
thing, therefore,  would  have  been  lost  had  Hamil- 
ton’s firmness  prevailed  in  Congress ; and  nothing 
was  gained  by  Madison’s  deference  to  the  doctrine 
of  state  rights,  unless  it  was  that  the  question  of 
a “ more  perfect  Union  ” was  put  off  to  a more 
propitious  time,  when  a reconstruction  of  the  gov- 
ernment under  a new  federal  Constitution  was  pos- 
sible. Meanwhile  Congress  borrowed  the  money 
to  pay  the  interest  on  money  already  borrowed ; 
the  confederate  government  floundered  deeper 
and  deeper  into  inextricable  difficulties ; the  thir- 
teen ships  of  state  drifted  farther  and  farther  apart, 
with  a fair  promise  of  a general  wreck. 

But  the  bill  contained  another  compromise 
which  was  not  temporary,  and  once  made  could 
not  be  easily  unmade.  Agreed  to  now,  it  became 
a condition  of  the  adoption  of  the  federal  Con- 
stitution four  years  later;  and  there,  as  nobody 
now  is  so  blind  as  not  to  see,  it  was  the  source  of 
infinite  mischief  for  nearly  a century,  till  a third 
reconstruction  of  the  Union  was  brought  about  by 
the  war  of  1861-65.  The  Articles  of  Confedera- 
tion required  that  ‘‘  all  charges  of  war  and  all 
other  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the  com- 
mon defense  or  general  welfare  ” should  be  borne 
by  the  States  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  their 
lands.  It  was  proposed  to  amend  this  provision 


38 


JAMES  MADISON 


of  the  Constitution,  and  for  lands  substitute  popu- 
lation, exclusive  of  Indians  not  taxed,  as  the  basis 
for  taxation.  But  here  arose  at  once  a new  and 
perplexing  question.  There  were,  chiefly  in  one 
portion  of  the  country,  about  750,000  ‘‘persons 
held  to  service  or  labor,”  — the  euphuism  for  ne- 
gro slaves  which,  evolved  from  some  tender  and 
sentimental  conscience,  came  into  use  at  this  pe- 
riod. Should  these,  recognized  only  as  property 
by  state  law,  be  counted  as  750,000  persons  by 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  ? ^ Or  should  they, 
in  the  enumeration  of  population,  be  reckoned,  in 
accordance  with  the  civil  law,  as  'pro  nullis^  pro 
mortuis^  pro  quadrupedihus^  and  therefore  not  to 
be  counted  at  all  ? Or  should  they,  as  those  who 
owned  them  insisted,  be  counted,  if  included  in  the 
basis  of  taxation,  as  fractions  of  persons  only  ? 

The  South  contended  that  black  slaves  were  not 
equal  to  white  men  as  producers  of  wealth,  and 
that,  by  counting  them  as  such,  taxation  would 
be  unequal  and  unjust.  But  whether  counted  as 
units  or  as  fractions  of  units,  the  slaveholders  in- 
sisted that  representation  should  be  according  to 
that  enumeration.  The  Northern  reply  was  that, 
if  representation  was  to  be  according  to  population, 
the  slaves  being  included,  then  the  slave  States 
would  have  a representation  of  property,  for  which 
there  would  be  no  equivalent  in  States  where  there 
were  no  slaves ; but  if  slaves  were  enumerated  as 

1 In  some  of  the  States  slaves  were  reckoned  as  “ chattels  per- 
sonal ; ” in  others  as  “ real  estate.” 


IN  CONGRESS 


39 


a basis  of  representation,  then  that  enumeration 
should  also  be  taken  to  fix  the  rate  of  taxation. 

Here,  at  any  rate,  was  a basis  for  an  interesting 
deadlock.  One  simple  way  out  of  it  would  have 
been  to  insist  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  civil  law ; 
to  count  the  slaves  only  as  pro  quadrupedihus^  to 
be  left  out  of  the  enumeration  of  population  as 
being  no  part  of  the  State,  as  horses  and  cattle 
were  left  out.  But  the  bonds  of  union  hung 
loosely  upon  the  sisters  a hundred  years  ago ; 
there  was  not  one  of  them  who  did  not  think  she 
was  able  to  set  up  for  herself  and  take  her  place 
among  the  nations  as  an  independent  sovereign  ; 
and  it  is  more  than  likely  that  half  of  them  would 
have  refused  to  wear  those  bonds  any  longer  on 
such  a condition.  There  was  no  apprehension  then 
that  slavery  was  to  become  a power  for  evil  in  the 
State ; but  there  was  intense  anxiety  lest  the  States 
should  fly  asunder,  form  partial  and  local  unions 
among  neighbors,  or  become  entangled  in  alli- 
ances with  foreign  nations,  at  the  sacrifice  of  all, 
or  much,  that  was  gained  by  the  Revolution.  To 
make  any  concession,  therefore,  to  slavery  for  the 
sake  of  the  Union  was  hardly  held  to  be  a conces- 
sion. 

The  curious  student  of  history,  however,  who 
loves  to  study  those  problems  of  what  might  have 
happened  if  events  that  did  not  happen  had  come 
to  pass,  will  find  ample  room  for  speculation  in 
the  possibilities  of  this  one.  Had  there  been  no 
compromise,  it  is  as  easy  to  see  now,  as  it  was  easy 


40 


JAMES  MADISON 


to  foresee  then,  how  quickly  the  feeble  bond  of 
union  would  have  snapped  asunder.  But  never- 
theless, if  the  North  had  insisted  that  the  slaves 
should  neither  be  counted  nor  represented  at  all, 
or  else  should  be  reckoned  in  full  and  taxes  levied 
accordingly,  the  consequent  dissolution  of  the  Con- 
federacy might  have  had  consequences^  which  then 
nobody  dreamed  of.  For  it  is  not  impossible,  it 
is  not  even  improbable,  that,  in  that  event,  the 
year  1800  would  have  seen  slavery  in  the  process 
of  rapid  extinction  everywhere  except  in  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia.  Had  the  event  been  post- 
poned in  those  States  to  a later  period,  it  would 
only  have  been  because  they  had  already  found  in 
the  cultivation  of  indigo  and  rice  a profitable  use 
for  slave-labor,  which  did  not  exist  in  the  other 
slave  States,  where  the  supply  of  slaves  was  rap- 
idly exceeding  the  demand.  There  can  hardly  be 
a doubt  that,  in  case  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Con- 
federacy, the  Northern  free-labor  States  would 
soon  have  consolidated  into  a strong  union  of  their 
own.  There  was  every  reason  for  hastening  it, 
and  none  so  strong  for  hindering  it  as  those  which 
were  overborne  in  the  union  which  was  actually 
formed  soon  afterward  between  the  free-labor  and 
slave-labor  States.  To  such  a Northern  union  the 
border  States,  as  they  sloughed  off  the  old  system, 
would  have  been  naturally  attracted ; nor  can 
there  be  a doubt  that  a federal  union  so  formed 
would  ultimately  have  proved  quite  as  strong, 
quite  as  prosperous,  quite  as  happy,  and  quite  as 


IN  CONGRESS 


41 


respectable  among  the  nations,  as  one  purchased 
by  compromises  with  slavery,  followed,  as  those 
compromises  were,  by  three  quarters  of  a century 
of  bitter  political  strife  ending  in  a civil  war. 

But  the  Northern  members  were  no  less  ready  to 
make  compromises  than  Southern  members  were 
to  insist  upon  them,  these  no  more  understanding 
what  they  conceded  than  those  understood  what 
they  gained ; for  the  future  was  equally  concealed 
from  both.  A committee  reported  that  two  blacks 
should  be  rated  as  one  free  man.  This  was  un- 
satisfactory. To  some  it  seemed  too  large,  to 
others  too  small.  Other  ratios,  therefore,  were 
proposed,  — three  to  one,  three  to  two,  four  to  one, 
and  four  to  three.  Mr.  Madison  at  last,  in 
order,”  as  he  said,  ^‘to  give  a proof  of  the  sincer- 
ity of  his  professions  of  liberality,”  — and  doubt- 
less he  meant  to  be  liberal,  — proposed  “ that 
slaves  should  be  rated  as  five  to  three.”  His 
motion  was  adopted,  but  afterward  reconsidered. 
Four  days  later  — April  1st  — Mr.  Hamilton  re- 
newed the  proposition,  and  it  was  carried,  Mad- 
ison says,  ‘‘without  opposition.”  ^ The  law  on  this 
point  was  the  precedent  for  the  mischievous  three 
fifths  rule  of  the  Constitution  adopted  four  years 
later. 

^ J.  C.  Hamilton  says,  in  his  History  of  the  Republic,  that  the 
motion  prevailed  by  a vote  of  all  the  States  excepting-  Massachu- 
setts and  Rhode  Island.”  But  his  understanding  of  the  question 
is  in  other  respects  incorrect,  — misunderstood,  one  may  hope, 
rather  than  misstated  lest  he  should  give  credit,  for  what  he  con- 
sidered a meritorious  action,  to  Madison. 


42 


JAMES  MADISON 


Youth  finally  overtook  the  young  man  during 
the  last  winter  of  his  term  in  Congress,  for  he  fell 
in  love.  But  it  was  an  unfortunate  experience, 
^^anddsKe" outcome  of  it  doubtless  gave  a more  sombre 
hue  than  ever  to  his  life.  His  choice  was  not  a 
wise  one.  Probably  Mr.  Madison  seemed  a much 
older  man  than  he  really  was  at  that  period  of  his 
life,  and  to  a young  girl  may  have  appeared  really 
advanced  in  years.  At  any  rate,  it  was  his  un- 
happy fate  to  be  attached  to  a young  lady  of  more 
than  usual  beauty  and  of  irrepressible  vivacity, 
— Miss  Catherine  Floyd,  a daughter  of  General 
William  Floyd  of  Long  Island,  N.  Y.,  who  was  one 
of  the  signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
and  who  was  a delegate  to  Congress  from  1774  to 
1783.  Miss  Catherine’s  sixteenth  birthday  was  in 
April  of  the  latter  year ; Madison  was  double  her 
age,  as  his  thirty-second  birthday  was  a month 
earlier.  His  suit,  hpwever,  was  accepted,  and  they 
became  engaged.  But  it  was  the  father  rather 
than  the  daughter  who  admired  the  suitor ; for  the 
older  statesman  better  understood  the  character, 
and  better  appreciated  the  abilities,  of  his  young 
colleague,  and  predicted  a brilliant  career  for  him. 
The  girl’s  wisdom  was  of  another  kind.  The  future 
career  which  she  foresaw  and  wanted  to  share 
belonged  to  a young  clergyman,  who  — according 
to  the  reminiscences  of  an  aged  relative  of  hers  — 
“hung  round  her  at  the  harpsichord,”  and  made 
love  in  quite  another  fashion  than  that  of  the 


IN  CONGRESS 


43 


solemn  statesman  whom  the  old  general  so  ap- 
proved of.  It  is  altogether  a pretty  love  story,  and 
one’s  sympathy  goes  out  to  the  lively  young  beauty, 
who  was  thinking  of  love  and  not  of  ambition,  as 
she  turned  from  the  old  young  gentleman,  discuss- 
ing, with  her  wise  father,  the  public  debt  and  the 
necessity  of  an  impost,  to  that  really  young  young 
gentleman  who  knew  how  to  hang  over  the  harpsi- 
chord, and  talked  more  to  the  purpose  with  his 
eyes  than  ever  the  other  could  with  his  lips.  There 
is  a tradition  that  she  was  encouraged  to  be  thus 
on  with  the  new  love  before  she  was  off  with  the 
old,  by  a friend  somewhat  older  than  herself ; and 
possibly  this  maturer  lady  may  have  thought  that 
Madison  would  be  better  mated  with  one  nearer  his 
own  age.  At  any  rate,  the  engagement  was  broken 
off  before  long  by  the  dismissal  of  the  older  lover, 
much  to  the  father’s  disappointment,  and  in  due 
time  the  young  lady  married  the  other  suitor. 
There  is  no  reason  that  I know  of  for  supposing 
that  she  ever  regretted  that  her  more  humble  home 
was  in  a rectory,  when  it  might  have  been,  in  due 
time,  had  she  chosen  differently,  in  the  White 
House  at  Washington,  and  that  afterward  she 
might  have  lived,  the  remaining  sixteen  years  of 
her  life,  the  honored  wife  of  a revered  ex-President. 
Perhaps,  however,  she  smiled  in  those  later  years 
at  the  recollection  of  having  laughed  in  her  gay 
and  thoughtless  youth  at  her  solemn  lover,  and 
that,  when  at  last  she  dismissed  him,  she  sealed  her 


44 


JAMES  MADISON 


letter  — conveying  to  him  alone,  it  may  be,  some 
merry  but  mischievous  meaning  — with  a bit  of 
rye-dough.^ 

Mr.  iiives  gives  a letter  from  Jefferson  to  Madi- 
son at  this  time,  which  shows  that  he  stood  in 
need  of  consolation  from  his  friends.  ‘‘I  sincerely 
lament,”  Mr.  Jefferson  wrote  in  his  philosophical 
way,  the  misadventure  which  has  happened,  from 
whatever  cause  it  may  have  happened.  Should  it 
be  final,  however,  the  world  presents  the  same  and 
many  other  resources  of  happiness,  and  you  pos- 
sess many  within  yourself.  Firmness  of  mind  and 
unintermitting  occupation  will  not  long  leave  you 
in  pain.  No  event  has  been  more  contrary  to  my 
expectations,  and  these  were  founded  on  what  I 
thought  a good  knowledge  of  the  ground.  But  of 
all  machines  ours  is  the  most  complicated  and 
inexplicable.”  It  was  Solomon  who  said,  ‘‘there 
be  three  things  which  are  too  wonderful  for  me, 
yea,  four  which  I know  not.”  This  fourth  was, 
“ the  way  of  a man  with  a maid.”  He  might  have 
added  a fifth,  — the  way  of  a maid  with  a man, 
which,  evidently,  is  what  Jefferson  meant. 

^ For  the  details,  so  far  as  they  can  now  he  recalled,  of  this 
single  romantic  incident  in  Mr.  Madison’s  life,  I am  indebted  to 
NicoU  Floyd,  Esq.,  of  Moriches,  Long  Island,  a great-grandson  of 
General  William  Floyd. 


CHAPTER  IV 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 

As  tlie  election  of  the  same  delegate  to  Congress 
for  consecutive  sessions  was  then  forbidden  by  the 
law  of  Virginia,  Mr.  Madison  was  not  returned  to 
that  body  in  1784.  For  a brief  interval  of  three 
months  he  made  good  use  of  his  time,  we  are  told, 
by  continuing  his  law  studies,  till  in  the  spring  of 
that  year  he  was  chosen  to  represent  his  county 
in  the  Virginia  Assembly.  It  may  be  that  the 
sentiments  and  manners  of  the  parent  nation,” 
which  he  lamented  seven  years  before,  had  passed 
away,  and  nobody  now  insisted  upon  the  privilege 
of  getting  drunk  at  the  candidate’s  expense  before 
voting  for  him.  But  it  is  more  likely  that  the 
electors  had  not  changed.  The  difference  was  in 
the  candidate ; they  did  not  need  to  be  allured  to 
give  their  votes  to  a man  whom  they  were  proud  to 
call  upon  to  represent  the  county.  Mr.  Madison’s 
reputation  was  already  made  by  his  three  years  in 
Congress,  and  he  now  easily  took  a place  among 
the  pplitical  leaders  of  his  own  State. 

The  position  was  hardly  less  conspicuous  or  less 
influential  than  that  which  he  had  held  in  the 
national  Congress.  What  each  State  might  do 


46 


JAMES  MADISON 


was  of  quite  as  mucli  importance  as  anything  the 
federal  government  might  or  could  do.  Congress 
could  neither  open  nor  close  a single  port  in  Vir- 
ginia to  commerce,  whether  domestic  or  foreign, 
without  the  consent  of  the  State  ; it  could  not  levy 
a tax  of  a penny  on  anything,  whether  goods  com- 
ing in  or  products  going  out,  if  the  State  objected. 
As  a member  of  Congress,  Mr.  Madison  might  pro- 
pose or  oppose  any  of  these  things  ; as  a member 
of  the  Virginia  House  of  Delegates,  he  might,  if 
his  influence  was  strong  enough,  carry  or  forbid 
any  or  all  of  them,  whatever  might  be  the  wishes 
of  Congress.  It  was  in  the  power  of  Virginia  to 
influence  largely  the  welfare  of  her  neighbors,  so 
far  as  it  depended  upon  commerce,  and  indirectly 
that  of  every  State  in  the  Union. 

In  the  Assembly,  as  in  Congress,  Mr.  Madison’s 
aim  was  to  increase  the  powers  of  the  federal 
government,  for  want  of  which  it  was  rapidly  sink- 
ing into  imbecility  and  contempt.  I acceded,” 
he  says,  ^‘to  the  desire  of  my  fellow-citizens  of 
the  county  that  I should  be  one  of  its  representa- 
tives in  the  legislature,”  to  bring  about  “ a rescue 
of  the  Union  and  the  blessings  of  liberty  staked 
on  it  from  an  impending  catastrophe.”  Early  in 
the  session  the  Assembly  assented  to  the  amend- 
ment to  the  Articles  of  Confederation  proposed  at 
the  late  session  of  Congress,  which  substituted 
population  for  a land  valuation  as  the  basis  of  rep- 
resentation and  of  taxation.  The  Assembly  also 
asserted  that  all  requisitions  upon  the  States  for 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


47 


the  support  of  the  general  government  and  to  pro- 
vide for  the  public  debt  should  be  complied  with, 
and  payment  of  balances  on  old  accounts  should 
be  enforced ; and  it  assented  to  the  recommenda- 
tion of  Congress  that  that  body  should  have  power 
for  a limited  period  to  control  the  trade  with  for- 
eign nations  having  no  treaty  with  the  United 
States,  in  order  that  it  might  retaliate  upon  Great 
Britain  for  excluding  American  ships  from  her 
West  India  colonies.  All  these  measures  were 
designed  for  “ the  rescue  of  the  Union,”  and  they 
had,  of  course,  Madison’s  hearty  support.  For  it 
was  absolutely  essential,  as  he  believed,  that  some- 
thing should  be  done  if  the  Union  was  to  be  saved, 
or  to  be  made  worth  saving.  But  there  were 
obstacles  on  all  sides.  The  commercial  States 
were  reluctant  to  surrender  the  control  over  trade 
to  Congress ; in  the  planting  States  there  was 
hardly  any  trade  that  could  be  surrendered.  In 
Virginia  the  tobacco  planter  still  clung  to  the  old 
ways.  He  liked  to  have  the  English  ship  take  his 
tobacco  from  the  river  bank  of  his  own  plantation, 
and  to  receive  from  the  same  vessel  such  coarse 
goods  as  were  needed  to  clothe  his  slaves,  with  the 
more  expensive  luxuries  for  his  own  family,  — dry 
goods  for  his  wife  and  daughter ; the  pipe  of  ma- 
deira,  the  coats  and  breeches,  the  hats,  boots,  and 
saddles  for  himself  and  his  sons.  He  knew  that 
this  year’s  crop  went  to  pay  — if  it  did  pay  — for 
last  year’s  goods,  and  that  he  was  always  in  debt. 
But  the  debt  was  on  running  account,  and  did  not 


48 


JAMES  MADISON 


matter/  The  London  factor  was  skillful  in  charges 
for  interest  and  commissions,  and  the  account  for 
this  year  was  always  a lien  on  next  year’s  crop. 
He  knew,  and  the  planter  knew,  that  the  tobacco 
could  be  sold  at  a higher  price  in  New  York  or 
Philadelphia  than  the  factor  got,  or  seemed  to 
get,  for  it  in  London ; that  the  goods  sent  out 
in  exchange  were  charged  at  a higher  price  than 
they  could  be  bought  for  in  the  Northern  towns. 
Nevertheless,  the  planter  liked  to  see  his  own  hogs- 
heads rolled  on  board  ship  by  his  own  negroes  at 
his  own  wharf,  and  receive  in  return  his  own  boxes 
and  bales  shipped  direct  from  London  at  his  own 
order,  let  it  cost  what  it  might.  It  was  a shift- 
less and  ruinous  system  ; but  the  average  Virginia 
planter  was  not  over-quick  at  figures,  nor  even  at 
reading  and  writing.  He  was  proud  of  being  lord 
of  a thousand  or  two  acres,  and  one  or  two  hundred 
negroes,  and  fancied  that  this  was  to  rule  over,  as 
Mr.  Rives  called  it,  ‘‘a  mimic  commonwealth,  with 
its  foreign  and  domestic  relations,  and  its  regular 
administrative  hierarchy.”  He  did  not  compre- 
hend that  the  isolated  life  of  a slave  plantation 
was  ordinarily  only  a kind  of  perpetual  barbecue, 
with  its  rough  sports  and  vacuous  leisure,  where 
the  roasted  ox  was  largely  wasted  and  not  always 
pleasant  to  look  at.  There  was  a rude  hospitality, 
where  food,  provided  by  unpaid  labor,  was  cheap 
and  abundant,  and  where  the  host  was  always  glad 
to  welcome  any  guest  who  would  relieve  him  of  his 
own  tediousness ; but  there  was  little  luxury  and 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


49 


no  refinement  where  there  was  almost  no  culture. 
Of  course  there  were  a few  homes  and  families  of 
another  order,  where  the  women  were  refined  and 
the  men  educated ; but  these  were  the  exceptions. 
Society  generally,  with  its  bluff,  loud,  self-confident 
but  ignorant  planters,  its  numerous  poor  whites 
destitute  of  lands  and  of  slaves,  and  its  mass  of 
slaves  whose  aim  in  life  was  to  avoid  work  and 
escape  the  whip,  was  necessarily  only  one  remove 
from  semi-civilization. 

It  was  not  easy  to  indoctrinate  such  a people, 
more  arrogant  than  intelligent,  with  new  ideas. 
By  the  same  token  it  might  be  possible  to  lead 
them  into  new  ways  before  they  would  find  out 
whither  they  were  going.  Mr.  Madison  hoped  to 
change  the  wretched  system  of  plantation  com- 
merce by  a port  bill,  which  he  brought  into  the 
Assembly.  Imposts  require  custom-houses,  and 
obviously  there  could  not  be  custom-houses  nor 
even  custom-officers  on  every  plantation  in  the 
State.  The  bill  proposed  to  leave  open  two  ports 
of  entry  for  all  foreign  ships.  It  would  greatly 
simplify  matters  if  all  the  foreign  trade  of  the 
State  could  be  limited  to  these  two  ports  only.  It 
would  then  be  easy  enough  to  enforce  imposts, 
and  the  State  would  have  something  to  surrender 
to  the  federal  government  to  help  it  to  a revenue, 
if,  happily,  the  time  should  ever  come  when  all 
the  States  should  assent  to  that  measure  of  salva- 
tion for  the  Union.  Not  that  this  was  the  primary 
object  of  those  who  favored  this  port  law ; but  the 


50 


JAMES  MADISON 


question  of  commerce  was  the  question  on  which 
everything  hinged,  and  its  regulation  in  each  State 
must  needs  have  an  influence,  one  way  or  the  other, 
upon  the  possibility  of  strengthening,  even  of  pre- 
serving, the  Union.  Everything  depended  upon 
reconciling  these  state  interests  by  mutual  conces- 
sions. The  South  was  jealous  of  the  North,  be- 
cause trade  flourished  at  the  North  and  did  not 
flourish  at  the  South.  It  seemed  as  if  this  was  at 
the  expense  of  the  South,  and  so,  in  a certain  sense, 
it  was.  The  problem  was  to  find  where  the  diffi- 
culty lay,  and  to  apply  the  remedy. 

If  commerce  flourished  at  the  North,  where  each 
of  the  States  had  one  or  two  ports  of  entry  only, 
why  should  it  not  flourish  in  Virginia  if  regulated 
in  the  same  way  ? If  those  centres  of  trade  bred 
a race  of  merchants,  who  built  their  own  ships, 
bought  and  sold,  did  their  own  carrying,  competed 
with  and  stimulated  each  other,  and  encroached 
upon  the  trade  of  the  South,  why  should  not 
similar  results  follow  in  Virginia  if  she  should 
confine  her  trade  to  two  or  three  ports?  If  the 
buyer  and  the  seller,  the  importer  and  the  con- 
sumer, went  to  a common  place  of  exchange  in 
Philadelphia,  New  York,  and  Boston,  and  pro- 
sperity followed  as  a consequence,  why  should  they 
not  do  the  same  thing  at  Norfolk?  This  was 
what  Madison  aimed  to  bring  about  by  the  port 
bill.  But  it  was  impossible  to  get  it  through  the 
legislature  till  three  more  ports  were  added  to  the 
two  which  the  bill  at  first  proposed.  When  the 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


51 


planters  came  to  understand  that  such  a law  would 
take  away  their  cherished  privilege  of  trade  along 
the  banks  of  the  rivers,  wherever  anybody  chose  to 
run  out  a little  jetty,  the  opposition  was  persistent. 
At  every  succeeding  session,  till  the  new  federal 
Constitution  was  adopted,  an  attempt  was  made  to 
repeal  the  act;  and  though  that  was  not  successful, 
each  year  new  ports  of  entry  were  added.  It  did 
not,  indeed,  matter  much  whether  the  open  ports 
of  Virginia  were  two  or  whether  they  were  twenty. 
There  was  a factor  in  the  problem  which  neither 
Mr.  Madison  nor  anybody  else  would  take  into  the 
account.  It  was  possible,  of  course,  if  force  enough 
were  used,  to  break  up  the  traffic  with  English 
ships  on  the  banks  of  the  rivers;  but  when  that 
was  done,  commerce  would  follow  its  own  laws,  in 
spite  of  the  acts  of  the  legislature,  and  flow  into 
channels  of  its  own  choosing.  It  was  not  possible 
to  transmute  a planting  State,  where  labor  was 
enslaved,  into  a commercial  State,  where  labor 
must  be  free. 

However  desirous  Mr.  Madison  might  be  to 
transfer  the  power  over  commerce  to  the  federal 
government,  he  was  compelled,  as  a member  of  the 
Virginia  legislature,  to  care  first  for  the  trade  of 
his  own  State.  No  State  could  afford  to  neglect 
its  own  commercial  interests  so  long  as  the  thirteen 
States  remained  thirteen  commercial  rivals.  It 
was  becoming  plainer  and  plainer  every  day  that, 
while  that  relation  continued,  the  less  chance  there 
was  that  thirteen  petty,  independent  States  could 


U.  of  111.  Ub-5  Galesburg 


52 


JAMES  MADISON 


unite  into  one  great  nation.  No  foreign  power 
would  make  a treaty  with  a government  which 
could  not  enforce  that  treaty  among  its  own  people. 
Neither  could  any  separate  portion  of  that  people 
make  a treaty,  as  any  other  portion,  the  other  side 
of  an  imaginary  line,  need  not  hold  it  in  respect. 
What  good  was  there  in  revenue  laws,  or,  indeed, 
in  any  other  laws  in  Massachusetts  which  Connec- 
ticut and  Rhode  Island  disregarded?  or  in  New 
York,  if  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  laughed  at 
them?  or  in  Virginia,  if  Maryland  held  them  in 
contempt  ? 

But  Mr.  Madison  felt  that,  if  he  could  bring 
about  a healthful  state  of  things  in  the  trade  of 
his  own  State,  there  was  at  least  so  much  done 
towards  bringing  about  a healthful  state  of  things 
in  the  commerce  of  the  whole  country.  There 
came  up  a practical,  local  question  which,  when 
the  time  came,  he  was  quick  to  see  had  a logical 
bearing  upon  the  general  question.  The  Poto- 
mac was  the  boundary  line  between  Virginia  and 
Maryland ; but  Lord  Baltimore’s  charter  gave  to 
Maryland  jurisdiction  over  the  river  to  the  Vir- 
ginia bank;  and  this  right  Virginia  had  recog- 
nized, claiming  only  for  herself  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Potomac  and  the  Pocomoke.  Of  course  the 
laws  of  neither  State  were  regarded  when  it  was 
worth  while  to  evade  them  ; and  nothing  was  easier 
than  to  evade  them,  since  to  the  average  human 
mind  there  is  no  privilege  so  precious  as  a facility 
for  smuggling.  Nobody,  at  any  rate,  seems  to  have 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


53 


thought  anything  about  the  matter  till  it  came 
under  Madison’s  observation  after  his  return  home 
.from  Congress.  To  him  it  meant  something  more 
than  mere  evasion  of  state  laws  and  frauds  on  the 
state  revenue.  The  subject  fell  into  line  with  his 
reflections  upon  the  looseness  of  the  bonds  that 
held  the  States  together,  and  how  unlikely  it  was 
that  they  would  ever  grow  into  a respectable  or 
prosperous  nation  while  their  present  relations 
continued.  Virtually  there  was  no  maritime  law 
on  the  Potomac,  and  hardly  even  the  pretense  of 
any.  What  could  be  more  absurd  than  to  provide 
ports  of  entry  on  one  bank  of  a river,  while  on  the 
other  bank,  from  the  source  to  the  sea,  the  whole 
country  was  free  to  all  comers?  If  the  laws  of 
either  State  were  to  be  regarded  on  the  opposite 
bank,  a treaty  was  as  necessary  between  them  as 
between  any  two  contiguous  states  in  Europe. 

Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson,  who  was  now  a 
delegate  in  Congress,  pointing  out  this  anomalous 
condition  of  things  on  the  Potomac,  and  suggest- 
ing that  he  should  confer  with  the  Maryland  del- 
egates upon  the  subject.  The  proposal  met  with 
Jefferson’s  approbation;  he  sought  an  interview 
with  Mr.  Stone,  a delegate  from  Maryland,  and, 
as  he  wrote  to  Madison,  ‘‘finding  him  of  the  same 
opinion,  [I]  have  told  him  I would,  by  letters, 
bring  the  subject  forward  on  our  part.  They  will 
consider  it,  therefore,  as  originated  by  this  con- 
versation.” Why  “ they  ” should  not  have  been 
permitted  to  “ consider  it  as  originated  ” from 


54 


JAMES  MADISON 


Madison’s  suggestion  that  Jefferson  should  have 
such  a conversation  is  not  quite  plain ; for  it  was 
Madison,  not  Jefferson,  who  had  discovered  that 
here  was  a wrong  that  ought  to  be  righted,  and 
who  had  proposed  that  each  State  should  appoint 
commissioners  to  look  into  the  matter  and  apply  a 
remedy.  So,  also,  so  far  as  subsequent  negotia- 
tion on  this  subject  had  any  influence  in  bringing 
about  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787,  it 
was  only  because  Mr.  Madison,  having  suggested 
the  first  practical  step  in  the  one  case,  seized  an 
opportune  moment  in  that  negotiation  to  suggest 
a similar  practical  step  in  the  other  case.  As  it  is 
so  often  said  that  the  Annapolis  Convention  of 
1786  was  the  direct  result  of  the  discussion  of  the 
Potomac  question,  it  is  worth  while  to  explain 
what  they  really  had  to  do  with  each  other. 

The  Virginia  commissioners  were  appointed  early 
in  the  session  on  Mr.  Madison’s  motion.  Maryland 
moved  more  slowly,  and  it  was  not  till  the  spring 
of  1785  that  the  commissioners  met.  They  soon 
found  that  any  efficient  jurisdiction  over  the  Poto- 
mac involved  more  interests  than  they,  or  those 
who  appointed  them,  had  considered.  Existing 
difficulties  might  be  disposed  of  by  agreeing  upon 
uniform  duties  in  the  two  States,  and  this  the  com- 
missioners recommended.  But  when  the  subject 
came  before  the  Maryland  legislature  it  took  a 
wider  range. 

The  Potomac  Company,  of  which  Washington 
was  president,  had  been  chartered  only  a few 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


55 


months  before.  The  work  it  proposed  to  do  was 
to  make  the  upper  Potomac  navigable,  and  to  con- 
nect it  by  a good  road  with  the  Ohio  River.  This 
was  to  encourage  the  settlement  of  Western  lands. 
Another  company  was  chartered  about  the  same 
time  to  connect  the  Potomac  and  Delaware  by  a 
canal,  where  interstate  traffic  would  be  more  im- 
mediate. Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  must  neces- 
sarily have  a deep  interest  in  both  these  projects, 
and  the  Maryland  legislature  proposed  that  those 
States  be  invited  to  appoint  commissioners  to  act 
with  those  whom  Maryland  and  Virginia  had 
already  appointed  to  settle  the  conflict  between 
them  upon  the  question  of  jurisdiction  on  the  Po- 
tomac. Then  it  occurred  to  somebody : if  four 
States  can  confer,  why  should  not  thirteen  ? The 
Maryland  legislature  thereupon  suggested  that  all 
the  States  be  invited  to  send  delegates  to  a con- 
vention to  take  up  the  whole  question  of  American 
commerce. 

While  this  was  going  on  in  Maryland,  the  Vir- 
ginia legislature  was  considering  petitions  from 
the  principal  ports  of  the  State  praying  that  some 
remedy  might  be  devised  for  the  commercial  evils 
from  which  they  were  all  suffering.  The  port  bill 
had  manifestly  proved  a failure.  It  was  only  a 
few  weeks  before  that  Madison  had  complained, 
in  a letter  to  a friend,  that  the  trade  of  the  coun- 
try is  in  a most  deplorable  condition  ; ” that  the 
most  shameful  frauds  ” were  committed  by  the 
English  merchants  upon  those  in  Virginia,  as  well 


56 


JAMES  MADISON 


as  upon  the  planters  who  shipped  their  own  to< 
bacco ; that  the  difference  in  the  price  of  tobacco 
at  Philadelphia  and  in  Virginia  was  from  eleven 
shillings  to  fourteen  shillings  in  favor  of  the 
Northern  ports ; and  that  ‘‘  the  price  of  merchan- 
dise here  is,  at  least,  as  much  above,  as  that  of  to- 
bacco is  below,  the  Northern  standard.”  He  was 
only  the  more  confirmed  in  his  opinion  that  there 
was  no  cure  for  these  radical  evils  except  to  sur- 
render to  the  confederate  government  complete 
control  over  commerce.  The  debate  upon  these 
petitions  was  hot  and  long.  It  brought  out  the 
strongest  men  on  both  sides,  Madison  leading 
those  who  wished  to  give  to  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  trade  with  foreign  countries  when  no 
treaty  existed ; to  make  uniform  commercial  laws 
for  all  the  States ; and  to  levy  an  impost  of  five 
per  cent,  on  imported  merchandise,  as  a provision 
for  the  public  debt  and  for  the  support  of  the 
federal  government  generally.  A committee,  of 
which  he  was  a member,  at  length  reported  instruc- 
tions to  the  delegates  of  the  State  in  Congress  to 
labor  for  the  consent  of  all  the  States  to  these  pro- 
positions. But  in  Committee  of  the  Whole  the 
resolutions  were  so  changed  and  qualified  — espe- 
cially in  limiting  to  thirteen  years  the  period  for 
which  Congress  was  to  be  intrusted  with  a power 
so  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  government  - — 
that  the  measure  was  given  up  by  its  friends  as 
hopeless. 

But  before  the  report  was  disposed  of  Mr.  Madi- 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


57 


son  prepared  a resolution,  to  be  offered  as  a sub- 
stitute, with  the  hope  of  reaching  the  same  end  in 
another  way.  This  resolution  provided  for  the 
appointment  of  five  commissioners,  — Madison  to 
be  one  of  them,  — “ who,  or  any  three  of  whom, 
shall  meet  such  commissioners  as  may  be  appointed 
in  the  other  States  of  the  Union,  at  a time  and 
place  to  be  agreed  on,  to  take  into  consideration 
the  trade  of  the  United  States ; to  examine  the 
relative  situations  and  trade  of  said  States  ; to  con- 
sider how  far  a uniform  system  in  their  commercial 
regulations  may  be  necessary  to  their  common 
interest  and  their  permanent  harmony ; and  to 
report  to  the  several  States  such  an  act,  relative 
to  this  great  object,  as,  when  unanimously  ratified 
by  them,  will  enable  the  United  States,  in  Con- 
gress, effectually  to  provide  for  the  same.”  This 
he  was  careful  not  to  offer  himself,  but,  as  he  says, 
it  was  ‘‘  introduced  by  Mr.  Tyler,  an  influential 
member,  who,  having  never  served  in  Congress, 
had  more  the  ear  of  the  House  than  those  whose 
services  there  exposed  them  to  an  imputable  bias.” 
He  adds  that  “ it  was  so  little  acceptable  that  it 
was  not  then  persisted  in.” 

About  the  same  time  the  action  of  the  Maryland 
legislature  on  the  Potomac  question,  and  the  report 
of  the  Potomac  commissioners,  came  up  for  con- 
sideration. Mr.  Madison  said  afterward  that,  as 
Maryland  thought  the  concurrence  of  Pennsylvania 
and  Delaware  were  necessary  to  the  regulation  of 
trade  on  that  river,  so  those  States  would,  proba- 


58 


JAMES  MADISON 


bly,  wish  to  ask  for  the  concurrence  of  their  neigh- 
bors in  any  proposed  arrangement.  “ So  apt  and 
forcible  an  illustration,”  he  adds,  of  the  necessity 
of  an  uniformity  throughout  all  the  States  could 
not  but  favor  the  passage  of  a resolution  which 
proposed  a convention  having  that  for  its  object.” 
As  one  of  the  Potomac  commissioners,  he  knew, 
of  course,  what  was  coming  from  Maryland,  and 
how  apt  and  forcible  an  illustration  ” it  would 
seem,  when  it  did  come,  of  that  resolution  which 
he  had  written  and  had  induced  Mr.  Tyler  to  offer. 
It  did  not  matter  that  the  resolution  had  been  at 
the  moment  so  little  acceptable,”  and  therefore 
‘‘  not  then  persisted  in.”  It  was  where  it  was  sure, 
in  the  political  slang  of  our  day,  to  do  the  most 
good.  And  so  it  came  about.  All  that  Maryland 
had  proposed,  growing  out  of  the  consideration 
of  the  Potomac  question,  the  Virginia  legislature 
acceded  to.  Then,  on  the  last  day  of  the  session, 
the  Madison-Tyler  resolution  was  taken  from  the 
table,  where  it  had  lain  quietly  for  nearly  two 
months,  and  passed.  If  some,  who  had  been  con- 
tending all  winter  against  any  action  which  should 
lead  to  a possibility  of  strengthening  the  federal 
government,  failed  to  see  how  important  a step 
they  had  taken  to  that  very  end ; if  any,  who 
were  fearful  of  federal  usurpation  and  tenacious  of 
state  rights,  were  blind  to  the  fact  that  the  resolu- 
tion had  pushed  aside  the  Potomac  question  and 
put  the  Union  question  in  its  place,  Mr.  Madison, 
we  may  be  sure,  was  not  one  of  that  number.  He 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY 


59 


had  gained  that  for  which  he  had  been  striving  for 
years. 

The  commissioners  appointed  by  the  resolution 
soon  came  together.  They  appointed  Annapolis 
as  the  place^  and  the  second  Monday  of  the  follow- 
ing September  (1786)  as  the  time,  of  the  proposed 
national  convention  ; and  they  sent  to  all  the  other 
States  an  invitation  to  send  delegates  to  that  con- 
vention. 

On  September  11  commissioners  from  Virginia, 
Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  New 
York  assembled  at  Annapolis.  Others  had  been 
appointed  by  North  Carolina,  Rhode  Island,  Mas- 
sachusetts, and  New  Hampshire,  but  they  were  not 
present.  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  Maryland,  and 
Connecticut  had  taken  no  action  upon  the  subject. 
As  five  States  only  were  represented,  the  commis- 
sioners ‘‘  did  not  conceive  it  advisable  to  proceed 
on  the  business  of  their  mission,”  but  they  adopted 
an  address,  written  by  Alexander  Hamilton,  to  be 
sent  to  all  the  States. 

All  the  represented  States,  the  address  said,  had 
authorized  their  commissioners  ‘‘  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  trade  and  commerce  of  the  United 
States ; to  consider  how  far  an  uniform  system  in 
their  commercial  intercourse  and  regulations  might 
be  necessary  to  their  common  interest  and  perma- 
nent harmony.”  But  New  Jersey  had  gone  far- 
ther than  this ; her  delegates  were  instructed  ‘‘  to 
consider  how  far  an  uniform  system  in  their  com- 
mercial regulations  and  other  important  matters 


60 


JAMES  MADISON 


might  be  necessary  to  the  common  interest  and 
permanent  harmony  of  the  several  States.”  This, 
the  commissioners  present  thought,  ‘‘  was  an  im- 
provement on  the  original  plan,  and  will  deserve  to 
be  incorporated  into  that  of  a future  convention.” 
They  gave  their  reasons  at  length  for  this  opinion, 
and,  in  conclusion,  urged  that  commissioners  from 
all  the  States  be  appointed  to  meet  in  convention 
at  Philadelphia  on  the  second  Monday  of  the  fol- 
lowing May  (1787),  “to  devise  such  further  pro- 
visions as  shall  appear  to  them  necessary  to  render 
the  Constitution  of  the  federal  government  ade- 
quate to  the  exigencies  of  the  Union.” 

In  the  course  of  the  winter  delegates  to  this 
convention  were  chosen  by  the  several  States. 
Virginia  was  the  first  to  choose  her  delegates ; 
Madison  was  among  them,  and  at  their  head  was 
George  Washington. 


CHAPTER  V 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE 

That  the  Annapolis  Convention  ever  met  to 
make  smooth  the  way  for  the  more  important  one 
which  came  together  eight  months  afterward  and 
framed  a permanent  Constitution  for  the  United 
States  was  unquestionably  due  to  the  persistence 
and  the  political  adroitness  of  Mr.  Madison.  But 
it  was  not  exceptional  work.  The  same  diligence 
and  devotion  to  public  duty  mark  the  whole  of 
this  period  of  three  years  through  which  he  con- 
tinued a member  of  the  state  legislature.  As 
chairman  of  the  judiciary  committee  he  reduced 
with  much  labor  the  old  colonial  statutes  to  a body 
of  laws  befitting  the  condition  of  free  citizens 
in  an  independent  State.  From  his  first  to  his 
last  session  he  contended,  though  without  success, 
for  the  faith  of  treaties  and  the  honest  payment 
of  debts.  The  treaty  with  England  provided  that 
there  should  be  no  lawful  impediment  on  either 
side  to  the  recovery  of  debts  heretofore  con- 
tracted.” The  legislature  notified  Congress  that 
it  should  disregard  this  provision,  on  the  plea 
that  in  relation  to  ‘‘  slaves  and  other  property  ” 
it  had  not  been  observed  by  Great  Britain.  Mr. 


62 


JAMES  MADISON 


Madison  did  not  then  know  that  — as  he  said  three 
years  later  — “ the  infractions  [of  the  treaty]  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  preceded  even  the 
violation  on  the  other  side  in  the  instance  of  the 
negroes.”  He  maintained,  nevertheless,  that  the 
settlement  of  the  difficulty,  if  it  had  any  real 
foundation,  belonged  to  Congress,  the  party  to  the 
treaty,  and  not  to  a State  which  had  surrendered 
the  treaty-making  power ; and  that  in  common 
honesty  one  planter  was  not  relieved  from  his 
obligation  to  pay  a London  merchant  for  goods 
and  merchandise  received  before  the  war,  because 
other  planters  had  not  been  paid  for  the  negroes 
and  horses  they  had  lost  when  the  British  troops 
invaded  Virginia.  At  each  of  the  three  sessions 
of  the  legislature,  while  he  was  a member,  he 
tried  to  bring  that  body  to  adopt  some  line  of 
conduct  which  should  not  — to  use  his  own  words 
— ‘‘  extremely  dishonor  us  and  embarrass  Con- 
gress.” It  was  useless ; the  repudiators  were 
quite  deaf  to  any  appeals  either  to  their  honor 
or  their  patriotism. 

On  another  question  both  he  and  his  State  were 
more  fortunate.  Religious  freedom  had  to  be  once 
more  fought  for,  and  he  was  quick  to  come  to  the 
defense  of  a right  which  had  first  called  forth  his 
youthful  enthusiasm.  Two  measures  were  brought 
forward  from  session  to  session  to  secure  for  the 
church  the  support  of  the  state.  The  first  was  a 
bill  for  the  incorporation  of  religious  societies ; 
but  when  it  was  pushed  to  its  final  passage  it  pro- 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE 


63 


vided  for  the  incorporation  of  Episcopal  churches 
only.  For  this  Mr.  Madison  consented  to  vote, 
though  with  reluctance,  in  the  hope  that  the  church 
party  would  be  so  far  satisfied  with  this  measure 
as  to  abstain  from  pushing  another  which  was  still 
more  objectionable. 

He  was  disappointed.  Naturally  those  who  had 
carried  their  first  point  were  the  more,  not  the 
less,  anxious  for  further  success.  Now  it  was  in- 
sisted that  there  should  be  a universal  tax  ‘‘for 
the  support  of  teachers  of  the  Christian  religion.” 
The  tax-payer  was  to  be  permitted  to  name  the 
religious  society  for  the  support  of  which  he  pre- 
ferred to  contribute.  If  he  declined  this  volun- 
tary acquiescence  in  the  law,  the  money  would  be 
used  in  aid  of  a school ; but  from  the  tax  itself 
none  were  to  be  exempt  on  any  pretext.  Madison 
was  quick  to  see  in  such  a law  the  possibility  of 
religious  intolerance,  of  compulsory  uniformity 
enforced  by  the  civil  power,  and  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  any  freedom  of  conscience  or  opinion. 
The  act  did  not  define  who  were  and  who  were 
not  “ teachers  of  the  Christian  religion,”  and  that 
necessarily  would  be  left  to  the  courts  to  decide. 
A state  church  would  be  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence ; for  it  was  not  to  be  supposed  that  any 
dominant  sect  would  rest  till  it  secured  the  recog- 
nition by  law  of  its  own  denomination  as  the  sole 
representative  of  the  Christian  religion.  To  ex- 
pect anything  else  was  to  ignore  the  teachings  of 
all  history. 


64 


JAMES  MADISON 


The  burden  of  opposition  and  debate  fell,  at 
first,  almost  solely  upon  Madison.  Some  of  the 
wisest  and  best  men  of  the  State  were  slow  to  see, 
as  he  saw,  that  religious  freedom  was  in  danger 
from  such  legislation.  There  was,  it  was  said,  a 
sad  falling-off  in  public  morality  as  indifference 
to  religion  increased.  There  was  no  cure,  it  was 
declared,  for  prevalent  and  growing  corruption 
except  in  the  culture  of  the  religious  sentiment, 
and  the  teachers  of  religion,  therefore,  must  be 
upheld  and  supported.  But  granting  all  this, 
Madison  saw  that  the  proposed  remedy  would  be 
to  give,  not  bread  but  a stone,  and  a stone  that 
would  be  used  in  return  as  a weapon.  It  was 
impossible  to  regulate  religious  belief  by  act  of  the 
Assembly,  and  therefore  it  was  worse  than  foolish 
to  try. 

It  was  due  to  him  that  the  question  was  post- 
poned from  one  session  to  the  next.  A copy  of 
the  bill  was  sent,  meanwhile,  into  every  county 
of  the  State  for  the  consideration  of  the  people, 
and  that  was  aided  by  a ‘‘  Memorial  and  Remon- 
strance,” written  by  Madison,  which  was  circulated 
everywhere  for  signature,  in  readiness  for  presenta- 
tion to  the  next  legislature.  The  bill,  the  memo- 
rial said,  would  be  a dangerous  abuse  of  power,” 
and  the  signers  protested  against  it  with  unanswer- 
able arguments,  taking  for  a starting-point  the 
assertion  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  ‘‘  that  religion,  or 
the  duty  we  owe  to  our  Creator,  and  the  manner 
of  discharging  it,  can  be  directed  only  by  reason 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE 


65 


and  conviction,  not  by  force  or  violence.”  It  is 
not  at  all  improbable  that  many  signed  this  remon- 
strance, not  so  much  because  they  believed  it  to 
be  true  as  because  it  was  a protest  against  a tax ; 
that  others  were  more  moved  by  jealousy  of  the 
power  of  the  Episcopal  Church  than  they  were  by 
anxiety  to  protect  religious  liberty  outside  of  their 
own  sects.  But  whatever  the  motives,  the  move- 
ment was  too  formidable  to  be  disregarded.  It 
was  made  a test  question  in  the  election  of  mem- 
bers for  the  legislature  of  1785-86  ; at  that  session 
the  bill  for  the  support  of  religious  teachers  was 
rejected,  and  in  place  of  it  was  passed  an  act  for 
establishing  religious  freedom,”  written  by  Jeffer- 
son seven  years  before.  This  provided  “ that  no 
man  shall  be  compelled  to  frequent  or  support  any 
religious  worship,  place,  or  ministry  whatsoever, 
nor  shall  be  enforced,  restrained,  molested,  or 
burthened  in  his  body  or  goods,  nor  shall  other- 
wise suffer  on  account  of  his  religious  opinions  or 
belief ; but  that  all  men  shall  be  free  to  profess, 
and  by  argument  maintain,  their  opinions  in  mat- 
ters of  religion,  and  that  the  same  shall  in  no 
wise  diminish,  enlarge,  or  affect  their  civil  capaci- 
ties.” 1 

^ With  how  much  interest  Jefferson  watched  the  progress  of  this 
controversy  he  showed  in  his  letters  from  Paris.  In  February, 
1786,  he  wrote  to  Madison : “ 1 thank  you  for  the  communica- 
tion of  the  remonstrance  against  the  assessment.  Mazzei,  who  is 
now  in  Holland,  promised  me  to  have  it  published  in  the  Leyden 
Gazette.  It  will  do  us  great  honor.  I wish  it  may  be  as  much 
approved  by  our  Assembly  as  by  the  wisest  part  of  Europe.” 


G6 


JAMES  MADISON 


In  the  memorial  and  remonstrance  Madison  had 
said : If  this  freedom  be  abused,  it  is  an  offense 

against  God,  not  against  man.  To  God,  therefore, 
not  to  man,  must  an  account  of  it  be  rendered.” 
If  the  people  of  Virginia  did  not  clearly  compre- 
hend this  doctrine  in  all  its  length  and  breadth 
a hundred  years  ago,  it  is  not  quite  easy  to  say 
who  were  then,  or  who  are  now,  at  liberty  to  throw 
stones  at  them.  The  assertion  of  the  broadest 
religious  freedom  was  no  more  new  then  than  it 
is  true  that  persecution  for  opinion’s  sake  is  now 
only  an  ancient  evil.  It  was  not  till  fifty  years 
after  Virginia  had  refused  to  tax  her  citizens  for 
the  support  of  religious  teachers  that  Massachu- 
setts repealed  the  law  that  had  long  imposed  a 
similar  burden  upon  her  people. 

It  was  in  1786,  the  last  year  of  Madison’s  ser- 

Ag-ain,  in  December  of  the  same  year,  he  says  : “ The  Virginia 
Act  for  religious  freedom  has  been  received  with  infinite  approba- 
tion in  Europe,  and  propagated  with  enthusiasm.  I do  not  mean 
by  the  governments,  but  by  the  individuals  who  compose  them. 
It  has  been  translated  into  French  and  Italian,  has  been  sent  to 
most  of  the  courts  of  Europe,  and  has  been  the  best  evidence  of 
the  falsehood  of  those  reports  which  stated  us  to  be  in  anarchy. 
It  is  inserted  in  the  Encyclopedie,  and  is  appearing  in  most  of  the 
publications  respecting  America.  In  fact,  it  is  comfortable  to 
see  the  standard  of  reason  at  length  erected,  after  so  many  ages, 
during  which  the  human  mind  had  been  held  in  vassalage  by  kings, 
priests,  and  nobles ; and  it  is  honorable  for  us  to  have  produced 
the  first  legislature  who  had  the  courage  to  declare  that  the  reason 
of  man  may  be  trusted  with  the  formation  of  his  own  opinions ! ” 
This  latter  passage  is  characteristic,  and  many  who  do  not  like 
Jefferson  will  read  between  the  lines  the  exultation  of  a man  who 
was  not  always  careful  to  draw  the  line  between  religious  liberty 
and  irreligious  license. 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE 


67 


vice  in  the  Virginia  Assembly  before  he  returned 
to  Congress,  that  the  craze  of  paper  money  broke 
out  again  through  all  the  States.  The  measure 
was  carried  in  most  of  them,  followed  in  the  end 
by  the  usual  disastrous  consequences.  Madison’s 
anxiety  was  great  lest  his  own  State  should  be 
carried  away  by  this  delusion,  and  he  led  the  oppo- 
sition against  some  petitions  sent  to  the  Assembly 
praying  for  an  issue  of  currency.  The  vote  against 
it  was  too  large  to  be  due  altogether  to  his  influ- 
ence ; but  he  gave  great  strength  and  concentration 
to  the  opposition.  In  Virginia,  tobacco  certificates 
supplied  in  some  measure  the  want  of  a circulat- 
ing medium,  and  it  was,  therefore,  easier  there 
than  in  some  of  the  other  States  to  resist  the 
clamor  for  a paper  substitute  for  real  money.  A 
tobacco  certificate  at  least  represented  something 
worth  money.  Madison  assented  to  a bill  which 
authorized  the  use  of  such  certificates.  But  his 
acquiescence,”  he  wrote  to  Washington,  “was 
extorted  by  a fear  that  some  greater  evil,  under 
the  name  of  relief  to  the  people,  would  be  sub- 
stituted.” He  was  “ far  from  being  sure,”  he 
added,  that  he  “ did  right.”  But  no  evils  with 
which  he  had  to  reproach  himself  followed  that 
measure. 

These  three  years  of  his  life  were  probably 
among  the  happiest,  if  they  were  not  altogether 
the  happiest,  in  his  long  public  career.  There  was 
little  disappointment  or  anxiety,  and  evidently 
much  genuine  satisfaction  as  he  saw  how  certainly 


68 


JAMES  MADISON 


he  was  gaining  a high  place  in  the  estimation  of 
his  fellow-citizens  for  his  devotion  to  the  best 
interests  of  his  native  State.  In  the  recesses  of 
the  legislature  he  had  leisure  for  studies  in  which 
he  evidently  found  great  contentment.  He  trav- 
eled a good  deal  at  intervals,  especially  at  the 
North;  learned  much  of  the  resources  and  char- 
acter of  the  people  outside  of  Virginia,  and  became 
acquainted  with  the  leading  men  among  them. 
Jefferson  urged  him  to  pass  a summer  with  him  in 
Paris;  and  some  foreign  diplomatic  service  was 
open  to  him,  had  he  expressed  a willingness  to 
accept  it.  But  he  preferred  to  know  something 
more  of  his  own  country  while  he  had  the  leisure ; 
and  if  his  life  was  to  be  passed  in  public  service, 
as  now  seemed  probable  to  him,  he  chose,  at  least 
for  the  present,  to  serve  his  country  at  home, 
where  he  thought  he  was  more  needed,  rather  than 
abroad.  In  his  orders  for  books  sent  to  Jefferson 
the  direction  of  his  studies  is  evident.  He  sought 
largely  for  those  which  treated  of  the  science  of 
government;  but  they  were  not  confined  to  that 
subject.  Natural  history  had  great  charms  for 
him.  He  was  a diligent  student  of  Buffon,  and 
was  anxious  to  find,  if  possible,  the  plates  of  his 
thirty-one  volumes,  in  colors,  that  he  might  adorn 
the  walls  of  his  room  with  them.  He  made  careful 
comparisons  between  the  animals  of  other  conti- 
nents, as  described  and  portrayed  by  the  naturalist, 
and  similar  orders  in  America.  All  new  inventions 
interested  him.  ‘‘  I am  so  pleased,”  he  writes, 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE 


69 


“with  the  new  invented  lamp  that  I shall  not 
grudge  two  guineas  for  one  of  them.”  He  had 
seen  “ a pocket  compass  of  somewhat  larger  diame- 
ter than  a watch,  and  which  may  be  carried  in 
the  same  way.  It  has  a spring  for  stopping  the 
vibration  of  the  needle  when  not  in  use.  One  of 
these  would  be  very  convenient  in  case  of  a ramble 
into  the  western  country.”  A small  telescope,  he 
suggests,  might  be  fitted  on  as  a handle  to  a cane, 
which  might  “ be  a source  of  many  little  gratifica- 
tions,” when  “ in  walks  for  exercise  or  amusement 
objects  present  themselves  which  it  might  be  mat- 
ter of  curiosity  to  inspect,  but  which  it  was  difficult 
or  impossible  to  approach.”  Jefferson  writes  him 
of  a new  invention,  a pedometer ; and  he  wants  one 
for  his  own  pocket.  Trifles  like  these  show  the 
bent  of  his  mind ; and  they  show  a contented  mind 
as  well. 

While  writing  of  important  acts  of  the  legisla- 
ture of  1786,  he  is  careful  to  give  other  information 
in  a letter  to  J efferson,  which  is  not  uninteresting 
as  written  ninety-eight  years  ago,  and  written  by 
him. 

“ I.  Rumsey,”  he  says,  “ by  a memorial  to  the  last 
session,  represented  that  he  had  invented  a mechanism 
by  which  a boat  might  be  worked  with  little  labor,  at  the 
rate  of  from  twenty-five  to  forty  miles  a day,  against 
a stream  running  at  the  rate  of  ten  miles  an  hour,  and 
prayed  that  the  disclosure  of  his  invention  might  be  pur- 
chased by  the  public.  The  apparent  extravagance  of  his 
pretensions  brought  a ridicule  upon  them,  and  nothing 


70 


JAMES  MADISON 


was  done.  In  the  recess  of  the  Assembly  he  exemplified 
his  machinery  to  General  Washington  and  a few  other 
gentlemen,  who  gave  a certificate  of  the  reality  and  im- 
portance of  the  invention,  which  opened  the  ears  of  this 
Assembly  to  a second  memorial.  The  act  gives  a mo- 
nopoly for  ten  years,  reserving  a right  to  abolish  it  at 
any  time  by  paying  £10,000.  The  inventor  is  soliciting 
similar  acts  from  other  States,  and  will  not,  I suppose, 
publish  the  secret  till  he  either  obtains  or  despairs  of 
them.” 

This  intelligence  was  evidently  not  unheeded 
by  Jejfferson.  In  writing,  some  months  after  he 
received  it,  to  a friend  on  the  application  of  steam- 
power  to  grist-mills,  then  lately  introduced  in 
England,  he  adds  : I hear  you  are  applying  the 

same  agent  in  America  to  navigate  boats,  and  I 
have  little  doubt  but  that  it  will  be  applied  gen- 
erally to  machines,  so  as  to  supersede  the  use  of 
water-ponds,  and  of  course  to  lay  open  all  the 
streams  for  navigation.”  Nor  does  Madison  seem 
to  have  been  one  of  those  who  doubted  if  anything 
was  to  come  of  Eumsey’s  invention.  All  this  was 
less  than  a hundred  years  ago,  and  now  there  is  a 
steam-ferry  between  New  York  and  Europe  run- 
ning about  twice  a day. 

In  a similar  letter,  a year  later,  he  is  careful, 
among  grave  political  matters,  to  remember  and 
report  to  the  same  friend  that  in  the  sinking  of  a 
well  in  Richmond,  on  the  declivity  of  a hill,  there 
had  been  found,  ‘‘  about  seventy  feet  below  the 
surface,  several  large  bones,  apparently  belonging 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE 


71 


to  a fish  not  less  than  the  shark ; and,  what  is  more 
singular,  several  fragments  of  potter’s  ware  in  the 
style  of  the  Indians.  Before  he  [the  digger] 
reached  these  curiosities  he  passed  through  about 
fifty  feet  of  soft  blue  clay.”  Mr.  Madison  had 
only  just  heard  of  this  discovery,  and  he  had  not 
seen  the  unearthed  fragments.  But  he  evidently 
accepts  the  story  as  true  in  coming  from  ‘‘  unex- 
ceptionable witnesses.”  He  adds,  as  a corrobora- 
tion, that  he  is  told  by  a friend  from  Washington 
County  of  the  finding  there,  in  the  sinking  of  a 
salt-well,  of  the  hip-bone  of  the  incognitum,  the 
socket  of  which  was  about  eight  inches  in  diame- 
ter.” Such  things  w^ere  peculiarly  interesting  to 
Jefferson,  and  Madison  was  too  devoted  a friend 
to  him  to  leave  them  unnoticed.  But  they  were 
hardly  less  interesting  to  himself,  though  he  had 
not  much  of  Jefferson’s  habit  of  scientific  investi- 
gation. That  ‘‘the  potter’s  ware  in  the  style  of 
the  Indians  ” should  be  found  so  deeply  buried 
only  seems  to  him  “ singular ; ” nor,  indeed,  is  there 
any  record,  so  far  as  we  know,  that  this  particular 
fact  was  any  more  suggestive  to  Jefferson,  though 
apparently  so  likely  to  arouse  his  inquiring  mind 
to  seek  for  some  satisfactory  explanation.  But 
his  geological  notions  were  too  positive  to  admit 
even  of  a doubt  as  to  the  age  of  man.  Supposing 
a Creator,  he  assumed  that  “ he  created  the  earth 
at  once,  nearly  in  the  state  in  which  we  see  it,  fit 
for  the  preservation  of  the  beings  he  placed  on  it.” 
Theorist  as  he  was  himself,  he  had  little  patience 


72 


JAMES  MADISON 


with  the  other  theorists  who  were  already  begin- 
ning to  discover  in  the  structure  of  the  earth  the 
evidence  of  successive  geological  eras.  The  differ- 
ent strata  of  rocks  and  their  inclination  gave  him 
no  trouble.  He  explained  them  all  by  the  assump- 
tion that  rock  grows,  and  it  seems  that  it  grows 
in  layers  in  every  direction,  as  the  branches  of 
trees  grow  in  all  directions.”  That  evidences  of 
the  existence  of  man  should  be  found  with  a super- 
imposed weight  of  earth  seventy  feet  in  thickness 
would  present  to  him  no  difficulty.  If  the  fact 
had  specially  aroused  his  attention  he  would  have 
explained  it  in  some  ingenious  way  as  the  result  of 
accident. 


CHAPTER  VI 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES 

In  February,  1787,  Madison  again  took  a seat 
in  Congress.  It  was  an  anxious  period.  Shays’s 
rebellion  in  Massachusetts  had  assumed  rather 
formidable  possibilities,  and  seemed  not  unlikely 
to  spread  to  other  States.  Till  this  storm  should 
blow  over,  the  important  business  of  Congress  was 
to  raise  money  and  troops ; in  reality,  to  go  to  the 
help  of  Massachusetts,  if  need  should  be,  though 
the  object  ostensibly  was  to  protect  a handful  of 
people  on  the  frontier  against  the  Indians.  It  was 
a striking  instance  of  the  imbecility  of  the  gov- 
ernment under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  that 
it  could  only  undertake  to  suppress  rebellion  in  a 
State  under  the  pretense  of  doing  something  else 
which  came  within  the  law.  Massachusetts,  it  is 
true,  was  quite  able  to  deal  with  her  insurgents  ; 
but  when  Congress  convened  it  was  not  known  in 
New  York  that  Lincoln  had  dispersed  the  main 
body  of  them  at  Petersham.  Nevertheless,  a like 
difficulty  might  arise  at  any  moment  in  any  other 
of  the  States,  where  the  strength  to  meet  it  might 
be  quite  inadequate. 

Madison’s  ideal  still  was,  the  Union  before  the 


74 


JAMES  MADISON 


States,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  States ; the  whole 
before  the  parts,  to  save  the  parts ; the  binding 
the  fagot  together  that  the  sticks  might  not  be  lost. 
‘‘  Our  situation,”  he  wrote  to  Edmund  Randolph 
in  February,  “ is  becoming  every  day  more  and 
more  critical.  No  money  comes  into  the  federal 
treasury ; no  respect  is  paid  to  the  federal  author- 
ity ; and  people  of  reflection  unanimously  agree 
that  the  existing  Confederacy  is  tottering  to  its 
foundation.  Many  individuals  of  weight,  particu- 
larly in  the  eastern  district,  are  suspected  of  lean- 
ing toward  monarchy.  Other  individuals  predict 
a partition  of  the  States  into  two  or  more  confed- 
eracies. It  is  pretty  certain  that  if  some  radical 
amendment  of  the  single  one  cannot  be  devised  and 
introduced,  one  or  the  other  of  these  revolutions, 
the  latter  no  doubt,  will  take  place.” 

It  is  not  impossible  that  Madison  himself  may 
have  had  some  faith  in  this  suspicion  that  ‘‘  indi- 
viduals of  weight  in  the  eastern  district  ” were 
inclined  to  a monarchy.  For  such  suspicion,  how- 
ever, there  could  be  little  real  foundation.  There 
were,  doubtless,  men  of  weight  who  thought  and 
said  that  monarchy  was  better  than  anarchy. 
There  were,  doubtless,  impatient  men  then  who 
thought  and  said,  as  there  are  impatient  men  now 
who  think  and  say,  that  the  rule  of  a king  is  better 
than  the  rule  of  the  people.  But  there  was  no  dis- 
loyalty to  government  by  the  people  among  those 
who  only  maintained  that  the  English  in  America 
must  draw  from  the  common  heritage  of  English 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES  75 


institutions  and  English  law  the  material  where- 
with to  build  up  the  foundations  of  a new  nation. 
No  intelligent  and  candid  man  doubts  now  that 
they  were  wise ; nor  would  it  have  been  long 
doubted  then,  had  it  not  so  speedily  become  man- 
ifest that,  if  the  stigma  of  “ British  ” was  once 
affixed  to  a political  party,  any  appeal  from  pop- 
ular prejudice  to  reason  and  common  sense  was 
hopeless. 

There  were  a few  persons  who  would  have  done 
away  with  the  divisions  of  States  and  establish 
in  their  place  a central  government.  Those  most 
earnest  in  maintaining  the  autonomy  of  States 
declared  that  such  a government  was,  as  Luther 
Martin  of  Maryland  called  it,  of  “ a monarchical 
nature.”  What  else  could  that  be  but  a mon- 
archy? An  insinuation  took  on  the  form  of  a 
logical  deduction  and  became  a popular  fallacy. 
Yet  those  most  earnest  for  a central  government 
only  sought  to  establish  a stable  rule  in  place  of 
no  rule  at  all ; or,  worse  still,  of  the  tyranny  of 
an  ignorant  and  vicious  mob  under  the  outraged 
name  of  democracy,  into  which  there  was  danger  of 
drifting.  Whether  their  plan  was  wise  or  foolish, 
it  did  not  mean  a monarchy.  Even  of  Shays’s 
misguided  followers  Jefferson  said  : ‘‘  I believe  you 
may  be  assured  that  an  idea  or  desire  of  returning 
to  anything  like  their  ancient  government  never 
entered  into  their  heads.”  As  Madison  knew  and 
said,  the  real  danger  was  that  the  States  would 
divide  into  two  confederacies,  and  only  by  a new 


76 


JAMES  MADISON 


and  wiser  and  stronger  union  could  that  calamity 
be  averted. 

To  gain  the  assent  of  most  of  the  States  to  a 
convention  was  surmounting  only  the  least  of  the 
difficulties.  Three  weeks  before  the  time  of  meet- 
ing Madison  wrote : The  nearer  the  crisis  ap- 

proaches, the  more  I tremble  for  the  issue.  The 
necessity  of  gaining  the  concurrence  of  the  con- 
vention in  some  system  that  will  answer  the  pur- 
pose, the  subsequent  approbation  of  Congress,  and 
the  final  sanction  of  the  States,  present  a series  of 
chances  which  would  inspire  despair  in  any  case 
where  the  alternative  was  less  formidable.”  He 
said,  in  the  first  month  of  the  session  of  that  body, 
that  the  States  were  divided  into  different  inter- 
ests, not  by  their  difference  of  size,  but  by  other 
circumstances;  the  most  material  of  which  resulted 
partly  from  climate,  but  principally  from  the  effects 
of  their  having  or  not  having  slaves.  These  two 
causes  concurred  in  forming  the  great  division  of 
interests  in  the  United  States.  It  did  not  lie  be- 
tween the  large  and  small  States.  It  lay  between 
the  Northern  and  Southern.” 

During  the  earlier  weeks  of  this  session  of  Con- 
gress, and,  indeed,  for  some  months  before,  events 
had  made  so  manifest  this  difference  of  interest, 
coincident  with  the  difference  in  latitude,  that 
there  seemed  little  ground  for  hope  that  any  good 
would  come  out  of  a constitutional  convention. 
The  old  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi was  again  agitated.  The  South  held  her 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES  77 


right  to  that  river  to  be  of  much  more  value  than 
anything  she  could  gain  by  a closer  union  with  the 
North,  and  she  was  quite  ready  to  go  to  war  with 
Spain  in  defense  of  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Northern  States  were  quite  indifferent  to  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi,  and  not  disposed  ap- 
parently to  make  any  exertion  or  sacrifice  to  secure 
it.  Just  now  they  were  anxious  to  secure  a com- 
mercial treaty  with  Spain  ; but  Spain  insisted,  as 
a preliminary  condition,  that  the  United  States 
should  relinquish  all  claim  to  navigation  upon  a 
river  whose  mouths  were  within  Spanish  territory. 
In  the  Northern  mind  there  was  no  doubt  of  the 
value  of  trade  with  Spain ; and  there  was  a good 
deal  of  doubt  whether  there  was  anything  worth 
contending  for  in  the  right  to  sail  upon  a river 
running  through  a wilderness  where,  as  yet,  there 
were  few  inhabitants,  and  hardly  any  trade  worth 
talking  about.  More  than  that,  there  was  un- 
questionably a not  uncommon  belief  at  the  North 
and  East  that  the  settlement  and  prosperity  of  the 
West  would  be  at  the  expense  of  the  Atlantic 
States.  Perhaps  that  view  of  the  matter  was  not 
loudly  insisted  upon  ; but  many  were  none  the  less 
persuaded  that,  if  population  was  attracted  west- 
ward by  the  hope  of  acquiring  rich  and  cheap 
lands,  prosperity  and  power  would  go  with  it.  At 
any  rate,  those  of  this  way  of  thinking  were  not 
inclined  to  forego  a certain  good  for  that  which 
would  profit  them  nothing,  and  might  do  them 
lasting  harm. 


78 


JAMES  MADISON 


For  these  reasons,  spoken  and  unspoken,  the 
Northern  members  of  Congress  were  at  first  quite 
willing,  for  the  sake  of  a commercial  treaty,  to 
concede  to  Spain  the  exclusive  control  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. But  to  pacify  the  South  it  was  proposed 
that  the  concession  to  Spain  should  be  for  only 
five  and  twenty  years.  If  at  the  end  of  that  period 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  should  be  worth 
contending  for,  the  question  could  be  reopened. 
The  South  was,  of  course,  rather  exasperated  than 
pacified  by  such  a proposition.  The  navigation  of 
the  river  had  not  only  a certain  value  to  them  now, 
but  it  was  theirs  by  right,  and  that  was  reason 
enough  for  not  parting  with  it  even  for  a limited 
period.  Concessions  now  would  make  the  reasser- 
tion of  the  right  the  more  difficult  by  and  by.  If 
it  must  be  fought  for,  it  would  lessen  the  chance 
of  success  to  put  off  the  fighting  five  and  twenty 
years.  Indeed,  it  could  not  be  put  off,  for  war 
was  already  begun  in  a small  way.  The  Spaniards 
had  seized  American  boats  on  trading  voyages  down 
the  river,  and  the  Americans  had  retaliated  upon 
some  petty  Spanish  settlements.  Spain,  moreover, 
seemed  at  first  no  more  inclined  to  listen  to  com- 
promise than  the  South  was. 

England  watched  this  controversy  with  interest. 
She  had  no  expectation  of  recovering  for  herself 
the  Floridas,  which  she  had  lost  in  the  war  of  the 
Revolution,  and  had  finally  ceded  to  Spain  by  the 
treaty  of  1783;  but  she  was  quite  willing  to  see 
that  power  get  into  trouble  on  the  Mississippi 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES  79 


question,  and  more  than  willing  that  it  should 
threaten  the  peace  and  union  of  the  States.  Her 
own  boundary  line  west  of  the  Alleghanies  might 
possibly  be  extended  far  south  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
if  the  Northern  and  Southern  States  should  divide 
into  two  confederacies ; but,  apart  from  any  lust 
of  territory,  she  rejoiced  at  anything  that  threat- 
ened to  check  the  growth  of  her  late  colonies. 

Fortunately,  however,  the  question  was  disposed 
of,  before  the  Constitutional  Convention  met  at 
Philadelphia,  by  the  failure  to  secure  a treaty. 
The  Spanish  minister,  Guardoqui,  consented,  at 
length,  after  long  resistance,  to  accept  as  a com- 
promise the  navigation  of  the  river  for  five  and 
twenty  years ; but  Mr.  J ay,  who  was  willing,  could 
he  have  had  his  way,  to  concede  anything,  found 
at  that  stage  of  the  negotiations  he  could  not  com- 
mand votes  enough  in  Congress  to  secure  a treaty 
even  in  that  modified  form.  Hitherto  he  had 
relied  upon  a resolution  passed  by  Congress  in 
August,  1786,  by  the  vote  of  seven  Northern  States 
against  five  Southern.  This,  it  was  assumed, 
repealed  a resolution  of  the  year  before,  and  au- 
thorized the  secretary  to  make  a treaty.  The  res- 
olution of  the  year  before,  August,  1785,  had  been 
passed  by  the  votes  of  nine  States,  and  was  in 
confirmation  of  a provision  of  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation declaring  that  “ no  treaties  with  foreign 
powers  should  be  entered  into  but  by  the  assent  of 
nine  States.”  The  minority  contended  that  such 
a resolution  could  not  be  repealed  by  the  vote  of 


80 


JAMES  MADISON 


only  seven  States,  for  that  would  be  to  violate  a 
fundamental  condition  of  the  Articles  of  Confed- 
eration. It  is  easy  to  see  now  that  there  ought  not 
to  have  been  a difference  among  honorable  men  on 
such  a point  as  that.  Nevertheless  Mr.  Jay,  sup- 
ported by  some  of  the  strongest  Northern  men, 
held  that  the  votes  of  seven  States  could  be  made, 
in  a roundabout  way,  to  authorize  an  act  which  the 
Constitution  declared  should  never  be  lawful  except 
with  the  assent  of  nine  States.  So  the  secretary 
went  on  with  his  negotiations  and  came  to  terms 
with  the  Spanish  minister. 

In  April  the  secretary  was  called  upon  to  report 
to  Congress  what  was  the  position  of  these  nego- 
tiations. Then  it  first  publicly  appeared  that  a 
treaty  was  actually  agreed  upon  which  gave  up  the 
right  to  the  Mississippi  for  a quarter  of  a century. 
But  it  was  also  speedily  made  plain  by  various 
parliamentary  motions  that  the  seven  votes,  which 
the  friends  of  such  a treaty  had  relied  upon,  had 
fallen  from  seven  — even  could  that  number  in 
the  end  have  been  of  use  — to,  at  best,  four.  The 
New  Jersey  delegates  had  been  instructed  not  to 
consent  to  the  surrender  of  the  American  right  to 
the  use  of  the  Mississippi ; a new  delegate  from 
Pennsylvania  had  changed  the  vote  of  that  State ; 
and  Rhode  Island  had  also  gone  over  to  the  other 
side.  It  was  considered,  on  the  whole,”  wrote 
Madison,  that  the  project  for  shutting  the  Mis- 
sissippi was  at  an  end.” 

These  details  are  not  unimportant.  Forty-five 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES  81 


years  afterward  Madison  wrote  that  ‘‘  his  main  ob- 
ject, in  returning  to  Congress  at  this  time,  was  to 
bring  about,  if  possible,  the  canceling  of  Mr.  Jay’s 
project  for  shutting  the  Mississippi.”  Probably  it 
had  occurred  to  nobody  then  that  within  less  than 
twenty  years  the  Province  of  Louisiana  would 
belong  to  the  United  States,  when  their  right  to 
the  navigation  of  the  river  could  be  no  longer  dis- 
puted. But  so  long  as  both  its  banks  from  the 
thirty-first  degree  of  latitude  southward  to  the 
Gulf  remained  foreign  territory,  it  was  of  the  last 
importance  to  the  Southern  States,  whose  territory 
extended  to  the  Mississippi,  that  the  right  of  way 
should  not  be  surrendered.  If  a treaty  with  Spain 
could  be  carried  that  gave  up  this  right,  and  the 
Southern  States  should  be  compelled  to  choose 
between  the  loss  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  loss  of 
the  Union,  there  could  be  little  doubt  as  to  what 
their  choice  would  be.  It  was  not  a question  to 
be  postponed  till  after  the  Philadelphia  Convention 
had  convened  ; if  not  disposed  of  before,  the  con- 
vention might  as  well  not  meet. 

Madison’s  letters,  while  the  question  was  pend- 
ing, show  great  anxiety.  He  was  glad  to  know 
that  the  South  was  of  one  mind  on  this  subject  and 
would  not  yield  an  inch.  He  was  quite  confident 
that  his  own  State  would  take  the  lead,  as  she  soon 
did,  in  the  firm  avowal  of  Southern  opinion.  But 
he  rejoiced  that  the  question  did  not  come  up  in 
the  Virginia  legislature  till  after  the  act  was  passed 
to  send  delegates  to  the  Philadelphia  Convention. 


82 


JAMES  MADISON 


That  he  looked  upon  as  a point  gained,  and  the 
delegates  were  presently  appointed  ; but  he  still 
despaired  of  any  good  coming  of  the  convention, 
unless  Mr,  Jay’s  project  for  shutting  the  Missis- 
sippi ” could  be  first  got  rid  of. 

In  a recent  work  ^ Mr.  Madison  is  represented 
as  having  struck  a bargain  ” with  the  Kentucky 
delegates  to  the  Virginia  Assembly,  agreeing  to 
speak  on  behalf  of  a petition  relating  to  the  Missis- 
sippi question,  provided  the  delegates  from  Ken- 
tucky — then  a part  of  Virginia  — would  vote 
for  the  representation  of  Virginia  at  Philadelphia. 
A ‘‘  bargain  ” implies  an  exchange  of  one  thing 
for  another,  and  Madison  had  no  convictions  in 
favor  of  closing  the  Mississippi  to  exchange  for  a 
service  rendered  on  behalf  of  a measure  for  which 
he  wished  to  secure  votes.  Moreover,  no  bargain 
was  necessary.  It  was  not  easy  to  find  anybody 
in  Virginia  who  needed  to  be  persuaded  that  the 
right  to  the  Mississippi  must  not  be  surrendered. 
Madison  wrote  to  Monroe  in  October,  1786,  that 
it  would  be  defended  by  the  legislature  with  as 
much  zeal  as  could  be  wished.  Indeed,  the  only 
danger  is  that  too  much  resentment  may  be  in- 
dulged by  many  against  the  federal  councils.”  His 
only  apprehension  was  lest  the  Mississippi  ques- 
tion should  come  up  in  the  Assembly  before  the 
report  from  the  Annapolis  Convention  should  be 
disposed  of,  for  if  that  were  accepted  the  appoint- 

^ A History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States.  Vol.  i.  By  John 
Bach  McMaster. 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES  83 


ment  of  delegates  to  Philadelphia  was  assured. 
‘‘I  hope,”  he  wrote  to  Washington  in  November, 
‘‘  the  report  will  be  called  for  before  the  business 
of  the  Mississippi  begins  to  ferment.”  It  hap- 
pened as  he  wished.  The  recommendation  from 
Annapolis,”  he  wrote  again  a week  later,  ‘‘  in  favor 
of  a general  revision  of  the  federal  system  was 
unanimously  agreed  to”  (the  emphasis  is  his  own). 
He  afterward  reported  to  Jefferson  “that  the  pro- 
ject for  bartering  the  Mississippi  to  Spain  was 
brought  before  the  Assembly  after  the  preceding 
measure  had  been  adopted.”  There  was  neither 
delay  nor  difficulty  in  securing  the  unanimous  con- 
sent of  the  Assembly  to  resolutions  instructing  the 
members  of  Congress  to  oppose  any  concession 
to  Spain.  But  Madison’s  anxiety  was  not  in  the 
least  relieved  by  the  speedy  appointment  of  del- 
egates to  the  Philadelphia  Convention ; for,  he 
wrote  presently  to  Washington,  “I  am  entirely 
convinced,  from  what  I observe  here  (at  Rich- 
mond), that,  unless  the  project  of  Congress  can 
be  reversed,  the  hopes  of  carrying  this  State  into 
a proper  federal  system  will  be  demolished.”  He 
had  already  said,  in  the  same  letter,  that  the 
resolutions  on  the  Mississippi  question  had  been 
“ agreed  to  unanimously  in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates,” and  three  days  before  the  letter  was 
written  the  delegates  to  Philadelphia  had  been 
appointed. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 

J Mr.  Madison  is  called  ‘‘the  Father  of  thei  Con- 
/ stitution.”  A paper  written  by  him  was  laid  before 
his  colleagues  of  Virginia,  before  the  meeting  of 
the  Constitutional  Convention  at  Philadelphia, 
and  was  made  the  basis  of  the  “ Virginia  plan,”  as 
it  was  called,  out  of  which  the  Constitution  was 
evolved.  In  another  way  his  name  is  so  identified 
with  it  that  one  cannot  be  forgotten  so  long  as  the 

t other  is  remembered.  From  that  full  and  faith- 
ful report  of  the  proceedings  of  the  convention,  in 
which  his  own  part  was  so  active  and  conspicuous, 
we  know  most  that  we  do  or  ever  can  know  of  the 
perplexities  and  trials,  the  concessions  and  triumphs, 
the  acts  of  wisdom  and  the  acts  of  weakness,  of 
that  body  of  men  whose  coming  together  time  has 
shown  to  have  been  one  of  the  important  events 
in  the  history  of  mankind. 

Then  it  is  also  true  that  no  man  had  worked 
harder,  perhaps  none  had  worked  so  hard,  to  bring 
the  public  mind  to  a serious  consideration  of  affairs 
and  a recognition  of  the  necessity  of  reorganizing 
the  government,  if  the  States  were  to  be  held 
together.  Never,  it  seemed,  had  men  better  reason 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  85 


to  be  satisfied  with  the  result  of  their  labors  when, 
a few  months  later,  the  new  Constitution  was 
accepted  by  all  the  States.  Yet  the  time  was  not 
far  distant  when  even  Madison  would  be  in  doubt 
as  to  the  character  of  this  new  bond  of  union,  and 
as  to  what  sort  of  government  had  been  secured  by 
it.  Nor  till  he  had  been  dead  near  thirty  years 
was  it  to  be  determined  what  union  under  the 
Constitution  really  meant ; nor  till  three  quarters 
of  a century  after  the  adoption  of  that  instrument 
was  the  more  perfect  union  formed,  justice  estab- 
lished, domestic  tranquillity  insured,  the  general 
welfare  promoted,  and  the  blessings  of  liberty 
secured  to  all  the  people,  which  by  that  great 
charter  it  was  intended,  in  1787,  to  ordain  and 
establish.  All  the  difficulties,  which  they  who 
framed  it  escaped  by  their  work,  were  as  nothing 
to  those  which  it  entailed  upon  their  descendants. 

Two  parties  went  into  the  convention.  On  one 
point,  of  course,  they  were  agreed,  else  they  would 
never  have  come  together  at  all,  — that  a united 
government  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
was  a failure,  and,  unless  some  remedy  should  be 
speedily  devised,  States  with  common  local  inter- 
ests would  gravitate  into  separate  and  perhaps 
antagonistic  nationalities.  But  the  differences  be- 
tween these  two  parties  were  radical,  and  for  a 
time  seemed  insurmountable.  One  proposed  sim- 
ply to  repair  the  Articles  of  Confederation  as  they 
might  overhaul  a machine  that  was  out  of  gear; 
the  other  proposed  to  form  an  altogether  new  Con- 


86 


JAMES  MADISON 


stitution.  One  wanted  a merely  federal  govern- 
ment; not,  however,  meaning  by  that  term  what 
the  other  party  — soon,  nevertheless,  to  be  known 
as  Federalists  — were  striving  for,  but  a confed- 
eration of  States,  each  independent  of  all  the  rest 
and  supreme  in  its  own  right,  while  consenting  to 
unite  with  the  rest  in  a limited  government  for  the 
administration  of  certain  common  interests.^ 

This  idea  of  the  independence  of  the  States  was 
a survival  of  the  old  colonial  system,  when  each 
colony  under  its  distinct  relation  to  the  crown  had 
attained  a growth  of  its  own  with  its  separate 
interests.  Each  of  these  colonies  had  become  a 
State.  The  Revolution  had  secured  to  each,  it  was 
maintained,  a separate  independence,  achieved,  it 
was  true,  by  united  efforts,  but  not  therefore  bind- 
ing them  together  as  a single  nation.  It  was  held 

^ Those  who  were  zealous  for  state  rights,  and  opposed  to  a 
central  government,  called  the  system  they  wished  to  reestablish 
a Federal  System,  — a confederacy  of  States.  It  was  too  conven- 
ient and  probably  too  popular  a term  to  be  lost,  and  the  other 
party  adopted  it  when  the  new  Constitution  was  formed.  The 
Federalist  was  the  name  chosen  for  the  volume  in  which  were 
collected  the  papers,  written  first  under  the  signature  of  A Citi- 
zen of  New  York,”  but  afterward  changed  to  “ Publius,”  in  sup- 
port of  the  new  Constitution,  by  Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay.  In 
one  of  the  earlier  papers  Mr.  Hamilton  refers  to  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  which  were  to  be  superseded,  as  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution ; but  in  the  later  papers  Madison  is  careful  to  refer  to 
the  proposed  form  of  government  as  the  Federal  Constitution, 
and  Federal  soon  came  to  be  the  distinguishing  name  of  the  party 
which  first  came  into  power  under  the  new  Constitution.  What- 
ever may  be  said  of  Madison’s  other  title,  his  right  to  that  of 
father  of  the  Federal  party  can  hardly  be  disputed. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  87 


as  a legitimate  result  of  that  doctrine  that  each 
State,  not  the  people  of  the  State,  whether  many 
or  few,  should  be  represented  by  the  same  num- 
ber of  votes  in  a federal  government  as  they  were 
under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  because  such 
a government  was  a union  of  States,  not  of  a 
people. 

All  men,  it  was  argued,  — going  back  to  a state 
of  nature,  — are  equally  free  and  independent ; 
and  when  a government  is  formed  every  man  has 
an  equal  share  by  natural  right  in  its  formation 
and  in  its  subsequent  conduct.  While  numbers 
are  few,  every  member  of  the  State  exercises  his 
individual  right  in  person,  and  none  can  rightfully 
do  more  than  this,  however  wise,  or  powerful,  or 
rich  he  may  be.  But  when  government  by  the 
whole  body  of  the  people  becomes  cumbersome 
and  inconvenient  through  increase  of  numbers, 
the  individual  citizen  loses  none  of  his  rights  by 
intrusting  their  exercise  to  representatives,  in 
choosing  and  instructing  whom  all  have  an  equal 
voice.  So  when  States  are  united  in  a confederacy 
each  State  has  the  same  relation  to  that  govern- 
ment that  individuals  have  to  each  other  in  a 
single  State.  They  are  free  and  equal,  and  none 
has  a larger  share  of  rights  in  the  confederacy 
because  its  people  are  more  numerous,  or  because 
it  is  richer  or  more  powerful,  than  the  rest.  In 
such  a confederacy  it  is  not  the  individual  citizen 
who  is  to  be  represented,  but  the  individual  State. 
In  such  a confederacy  there  would  be  the  same 


88 


JAMES  MADISON 


representation  for  a State,  say  of  ten  thousand 
inhabitants,  as  for  one  of  fifty  thousand.  This, 
it  was  maintained,  preserved  equality  of  suffrage 
in  the  equality  of  States ; while  the  representation 
of  the  individual  citizens  of  the  States  would  be 
in  reality  inequality  of  suffrage,  because  the  au- 
tonomy of  the  State  would  be  lost  sight  of.  If 
in  such  a case  it  were  asked  what  had  become  of 
the  rights  which  the  majority  of  forty  thousand 
had  inherited  from  nature,  the  answer  was  that 
those  rights  were  preserved  and  represented  in 
the  state  government.  The  difficulty,  nevertheless, 
remained  : how  to  reconcile  in  practice  this  doc- 
trine of  the  equal  ‘rights  of  States,  where  there 
might  be  a minority  of  persons,  with  the  actual 
rights  of  the  whole  people  where,  according  to  the 
underlying  democratic  doctrine,  the  good  of  the 
whole  must  be  decided  by  the  larger  number. 

Those  who  proposed  only  to  amend  the  old 
Articles  of  Confederation,  and  opposed  a new 
Constitution,  objected  that  a government  formed 
under  such  a Constitution  would  be  not  a federal 
but  a national  government.  Luther  Martin  said, 
when  he  returned  to  Maryland,  that  the  delegates 
appeared  totally  to  have  forgot  the  business  for 
which  we  were  sent.  ...  We  had  not  been  sent 
to  form  a government  over  the  inhabitants  of 
America  considered  as  individuals.  . . . That  the 
system  of  government  we  were  intrusted  to  pre- 
pare was  a government  over  these  thirteen  States, 
but  that  in  our  proceedings  we  adopted  principles 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  89 


which  would  be  right  and  proper  only  on  the  sup- 
position that  there  were  no  state  governments  at 
all,  but  that  all  the  inhabitants  of  this  extensive 
continent  were  in  their  individual  capacity,  with- 
out government,  and  Jn  a state  of  nature.”  He 
added  that  ‘‘  in  the  whole  system  there  was  but 
one  federal  feature,  the  appointment  of  the  sena- 
tors by  the  States  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  that 
is,  by  their  legislatures,  and  the  equality  of  suffrage 
in  that  branch ; but  it  was  said  that  this  feature 
was  only  federal  in  appearance.” 

The  Senate,  the  second  house  as  it  was  called  in 
the  convention,  was  in  part  created,  it  is  needless 
to  say,  to  meet,  or  rather  in  obedience  to,  reasoning 
like  this.  There  was  almost  nobody  who  would 
have  been  willing  to  abandon  the  state  govern- 
ments, as  there  was  next  to  nobody  who  wanted 
a monarchy.  ‘‘We  were  eternally  troubled,” 
Martin  said,  “ with  arguments  and  precedents 
from  the  British  government.”  He  could  not  get 
beyond  the  fixed  notion  that  those  whom  he  op- 
posed were  determined  to  establish  “ one  general 
government  over  this  extensive  continent,  of  a 
monarchical  nature.”  If  he,  and  those  who  agreed 
with  him,  sincerely  believed  this  to  be  true,  it 
was  natural  enough  that  the  frequent  allusions 
to  British  precedents,  as  wise  rules  for  American 
guidance  in  constructing  a government,  should  be 
looked  upon  as  an  unmistakable  hankering  after 
lost  flesh-pots.  Should  the  state  governments  be 
swept  away,  it  might  be  that,  in  time  of  danger 


90 


JAMES  MADISON 


from  without  or  of  peril  from  internal  dissensions, 
the  country,  under  “ a government  of  a monarchical 
nature,”  might  drift  back  to  its  old  allegiance.  If 
those  who  feared,  or  said  they  feared,  this  were 
not  quite  sincere,  the  temptation  was  almost  irre- 
sistible to  use  such  arguments  to  arouse  popular 
prejudice  against  political  opponents.  It  is  curi- 
ous tkat  Madison^  seemed  quite  unconscious  of 
how  much  the  frequent  allusions  in  his  articles 
in  “ The  Federalist  ” to  the  British  Constitution 
might~~strehgtheiif  these  accusations  of  the  oppo- 
sition ; while  he  half  believed  that  the  same  thing 
in  others  showed  in  them  a leaning  toward  Eng- 
land, from  which  he  knew  that  he  himself  was 
quite  free. 

The  Luther  Martin  protestants  were  too  radical 
to  remain  in  the  convention  to  the  end,  when  they 
saw  that  such  a confederacy  as  they  wanted  was 
impossible.  But  there  were  not  many  who  went 
the  length  they  did  in  believing  that  a strong  cen- 
tral government  was  necessarily  the  destruction 
of  the  state  governments.  Still  fewer  were  those 
who  would  have  brought  this  about  if  they  could. 
That  the  rights  of  the  States  must  be  preserved 
was  the  general  opinion  and  determination,  and  it 
was  not  difficult  to  do  this  by  limiting  the  powers 
of  the  higher  government,  or  federal  as  it  soon 
came  to  be  called,  and  by  the  organization  of  the 
second  house,  the  Senate,  in  which  all  the  States 
had  an  equal  representation.  The  smaller  States 
were  satisfied  with  this  concession,  and  the  larger 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  91 


were  willing  to  make  it,  not  only  for  the  sake  of 
the  Union,  but  because  of  the  just  estimate  in 
which  they  held  the  rights  belonging  to  all  the 
States  alike.  The  real  difficulty,  as  Madison  said 
in  the  debate  on  that  question,  and  as  he  repeated 
again  and  again  after  that  question  was  settled, 
was  not  between  the  larger  and  smaller  States, 
but  between  the  North  and  the  South ; between 
those  States  that  held  slaves  and  those  that  had 
none. 

Slavery  in  the  Constitution,  which  has  given  so 
much  trouble  to  the  Abolitionists  of  this  century, 
and  indeed  to  everybody  else,  gave  quite  as  much 
in  the  last  century  to  those  who  put  it  there.  Many 
of  the  wisest  and  best  men  of  the  time,  Southerners 
as  well  as  Northerners,  and  among  them  Madison, 
were  opposed  to  slavery.  They  could  see  little 
good  in  it,  hardly  even  any  compensation  for  the 
existence  of  a system  so  full  of  evil.  There  was 
hardly  a State  in  the  Union  at  that  time  that  had 
not  its  emancipation  society ; and  there  was  hardly 
a man  of  any  eminence  in  the  country  who  was 
not  an  officer,  or  at  least  a member,  of  such  a soci- 
ety. Everywhere  north  of  South  Carolina,  slavery 
was  looked  upon  as  a misfortune  which  it  was 
exceedingly  desirable  to  be  free  from  at  the  earli- 
est possible  moment ; everywhere  north  of  Mason 
and  Dixon’s  line,  measures  had  already  been  taken, 
or  were  certain  soon  to  be  taken,  to  put  an  end  to 
it ; and  by  the  ordinance  for  the  government  of 
all  the  territory  north  of  the  Ohio  Kiver  it  was 


92 


JAMES  MADISON 


absolutely  prohibited  by  Congress  in  the  same  year 
in  which  the  Constitutional  Congress  met. 

But  it  was,  nevertheless,  a thing  to  the  continued 
existence  of  which  the  anti-slavery  people  of  that 
time  could  consent  without  any  violation  of  con- 
science. Bad  as  it  was,  unwise,  wasteful,  cruel,  a 
mockery  of  every  pretense  of  respect  for  the  rights 
of  man,  they  did  not  believe  it  to  be  absolutely 
wicked.  If  they  had  so  believed,  let  us  hope  they 
would  have  washed  their  hands  of  it.  As  it  was, 
it  was  only  a question  of  expediency  whether,  for 
the  sake  of  the  Union,  they  should  protect  the  sys- 
tem of  slavery,  and  give  to  the  slaveholders,  as 
slaveholders,  a certain  degree  of  political  power. 
To  refuse  to  admit  a slaveholding  State  into  the 
Union  did  not  occur,  probably,  to  the  most  earnest 
opponent  of  the  system  ; for  that  would  have  been 
simply  to  say  that  there  should  be  no  Union.  That 
was  what  Madison  meant  in  saying  so  repeatedly 
that  the  real  difficulty  in  the  way  was,  th^ iif- 

fergnce  between  theTar^e"  andr~the  small  States, 
but  the  difference  between  the  slaveholding  and 
the  non-slaveholding  States.  If  there  could  be 
no  conciliation  on  that  point  there  could  be  no 
Union. 

Some  hoped,  perhaps,  rather  than  believed,  that 
slavery  was  likely  to  disappear  ere  long  at  the 
South  as  it  was  disappearing  at  the  North.  It  is 
an  impeachment  of  their  intelligence,  however,  to 
suppose  that  they  relied  much  upon  any  such  hope. 
The  simple  truth  is  that  slavery  was  then,  as  it 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  93 


continued  to  be  for  three  quarters  of  a century 
longer,  the  paramount  interest  of  the  South.  To 
withstand  or  disregard  it  was  not  merely  difficult, 
but  was  to  brave  immediate  possible  dangers  and 
sufferings,  which  are  never  voluntarily  encoun- 
tered except  in  obedience  to  the  highest  sense  of 
duty ; or  to  meet  a necessity,  from  which  there  was 
no  manly  way  of  escape.  The  sense  of  absolute 
duty  was  wanting;  the  necessity,  it  was  hoped, 
might  be  avoided  by  concessions.  It  can  only  be 
said  for  those  who  made  them  that  they  did  not 
see  what  fruitful  seeds  of  future  trouble  they  were 
sowing  in  the  Constitution. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  COMPROMISES  ” 

The  question  with  the  North  was,  how  far  could 
it  yield ; with  the  South,  how  far  could  it  encroach. 
It  turned  mainly  on  representation,  — on  the 
unimportant  anomaly,”  as  Mr.  George  Ticknor 
Curtis  calls  it  in  his  “History  of  the  Constitution,” 
“ of  a representation  of  men  without  political  rights 
or  social  privileges.”  However  much  they  differed 
upon  the  subject  in  the  convention,  there  was  no- 
body then  and  there  who  regarded  the  question  as 
“ unimportant ; ” nor  was  there  a political  event  to 
happen  for  the  coming  eighty  years  that  it  did  not 
influence  and  generally  govern.  There  were  some 
who  maintained  at  first  that  the  slave  population 
should  not  be  represented  at  all.  Hamilton  pro- 
posed in  the  first  days  of  the  convention  “ that  the 
rights  of  suffrage  in  the  national  legislature  ought 
to  be  proportioned  to  the  number  of  free  inhabit- 
ants.” Madison  was  willing  to  concede  this  in 
one  branch  of  the  legislature,  provided  that  in  the 
representation  in  the  other  house  the  slaves  were 
counted  as  free  inhabitants.  The  constitution  of 
the  Senate  subsequently  disposed  of  that  proposi- 
tion. 


«THE  COMPROMISES 


95 


But  why  should  slaves  be  represented  at  all  ? 
They  are  not  free  agents,”  said  Patterson,  a dele- 
gate to  the  convention  from  New  J ersey ; they 
have  no  personal  liberty,  no  faculty  of  acquiring 
property,  but,  on  the  contrary,  are  themselves 
property,  and,  like  other  property,  entirely  at  the 
will  of  the  master.  Has  a man  in  Virginia  a 
number  of  votes  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
his  slaves?  And  if  negroes  are  not  represented 
in  the  States  to  which  they  belong,  why  should 
they  be  represented  in  the  general  government? 
...  If  a meeting  of  the  people  was  actually  to 
take  place  in  a slave  State,  would  the  slaves  vote  ? 
They  would  not.  Why,  then,  should  they  be  re- 
presented in  a federal  government?”  There  could 
be  but  one  reply,  but  that  was  one  which  it  would 
not  have  been  wise  to  make.  It  was  slave  property 
that  was  to  be  represented,  and  this  would  not  be 
submitted  to  among  slaveholders  as  against  each 
other,  while  yet  they  were  a unit  in  insisting  upon  it 
in  a union  with  those  who  were  not  slaveholders. 
Among  themselves  slavery  needed  no  protection; 
their  safety  was  in  equality.  But  to  their  great 
interest  every  non-slaveholder  was,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  an  enemy ; and  prudence  required  that 
the  power  either  to  vote  him  down  or  to  buy  him 
up  should  never  be  wanting.  It  was  as  much  a 
matter  of  instinct  as  of  deliberation,  for  love  of 
life  is  the  first  law.  The  truth  was  covered  up  in 
Madison’s  specious  assertion  that  every  peculiar 
interest,  whether  in  any  class  of  citizens  or  any 


96 


JAMES  MADISON 


description  of  States,  ought  to  be  secured  as  far 
as  possible.”  The  only  “ peculiar  ” interest,  how- 
ever, belonging  either  to  citizens  or  States,  that 
was  imbedded  in  the  Constitution,  was  slavery. 

So  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania  asked : “ Are  they 
[the  slaves]  admitted  as  citizens  — then  why  are 
they  not  admitted  on  an  equality  with  white  citi- 
zens ? Are  they  admitted  as  property  — then  why 
is  not  other  property  admitted  into  the  computa- 
tion ? ” He  was  willing,  however,  to  concede  that 
it  was  a difficulty  to  be  overcome  by  the  necessity 
of  compromise.” 

Never,  probably,  in  the  history  of  legislation, 
was  there  a more  serious  question  debated.  Com- 
promise is  ordinarily  understood  to  mean  an 
adjustment  by  mutual  concessions,  where  there 
are  rights  on  both  sides.  Here  it  meant  whether 
the  side  which  had  no  shadow  of  right  whatever 
to  that  which  it  demanded  would  consent  to  take 
a little  less  than  the  whole.  It  was  the  kind  of 
compromise  made  between  the  bandit  and  his 
victim  when  the  former  decides  that  he  will  not 
put  himself  to  the  trouble  of  shooting  the  other, 
and  will  even  leave  him  his  shirt.  It  was  not 
difficult  to  understand  that  horses  and  cattle  could 
be  justly  counted  only  where  property  was  to  be 
the  basis  of  representation.  Yet  the  slaves,  who 
were  counted,  were,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  either 
personal  property  or  real  estate,  and  were  no 
more  represented  as  citizens  than  if  they  also  had 
gone  upon  all  fours.  Their  enumeration,  never- 


THE  COMPROMISES 


97 


theless,  was  carried,  and  it  so  increased  the  repre- 
sentative power  of  their  masters  that  inequality 
of  citizenship  became  the  fundamental  principle  of 
the  government.  This,  of  course,  was  to  form  an 
oligarchy,  not  a democracy.  Practically  the  gov- 
ernment was  put  in  the  hands  of  a class,  and 
there  it  remained  from  the  moment  of  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  to  the  rebellion  of  1860  ; while 
that  class,  including  those  of  so  little  consequence 
as  to  own  only  a slave  or  two,  in  its  best  estate, 
probably  never  exceeded  ten  per  centum  of  the 
whole  people. 

There  was,  if  one  may  venture  to  say  so,  a 
singular  confusion  in  the  minds  of  the  venerable 
fathers  of  the  republic  on  this  subject.  They 
could  not  quite  get  rid  of  the  notion  that  the 
slaves,  being  human,  ought  to  be  included  in  the 
enumeration  of  population,  notwithstanding  that 
their  enumeration  as  citizens  must  necessarily  dis- 
appear in  their  representation  as  chattels.  Slaves, 
as  slaves,  were  the  wealth  of  the  South,  as  ships, 
for  example,  were  the  wealth  of  the  North;  but, 
being  human,  the  mind  was  not  shocked  at  having 
the  slaves  reckoned  as  population  in  fixing  the 
basis  of  representation,  though  in  reality  they  only 
represented  the  masters’  ownership.  But  nobody 
would  have  been  at  a loss  to  see  the  absurdity 
of  counting  three  fifths  of  the  Northern  ships  as 
population.  Even  a Webster  Whig  of  sixty-five 
years  later  could,  perhaps,  have  understood  that 
that  was  something  more  than  an  “ unimportant 


98 


JAMES  MADISON 


anomaly.”  There  was  no  clearer-headed  man  in 
the  convention  than  Gouverneur  Morris;  yet  he 
said  that  he  was  compelled  to  declare  himself 
reduced  to  the  dilemma  of  doing  injustice  to  the 
Southern  States  or  to  human  nature,  and  he  must 
do  it  to  the  former.”  C.  C.  Pinckney  of  South 
Carolina  declared  that  he  was  alarmed  ” at  such 
an  avowal  as  that.  Yet  had  the  question  been  one 
of  counting  three  fifths  of  the  Northern  ships  in 
the  enumeration  of  population,  Morris  would  have 
discovered  no  “dilemma,”  and  Pinckney  nothing 
to  be  “ alarmed  ” at.  So  palpable  an  outrage  on 
common  sense  would  have  been  merely  laughed  at 
by  both. 

In  reply  to  Pinckney,  however,  Morris  grew 
bolder.  “ It  was  high  time,”  he  said,  “ to  speak 
out.”  He  came  there  “ to  form  a compact  for  the 
good  of  America.  He  hoped  and  believed  that  all 
would  enter  into  such  compact.  If  they  would 
not,  he  was  ready  to  join  with  any  States  that 
would.  But  as  the  compact  was  to  be  voluntary, 
it  is  in  vain  for  the  Eastern  States  to  insist  on 
what  the  Southern  States  will  never  agree  to. 
It  is  equally  vain  for  the  latter  to  require  what 
the  other  States  can  never  admit,  and  he  verily 
believed  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  will  never 
agree  to  a representation  of  negroes  ; ” of  negroes, 
he  meant,  counted  as  human  beings,  not  for  their 
own  representation,  but,  as  ships  might  be  counted, 
for  the  increased  representation  of  those  who  held 
them  as  property.  The  next  day  he  “ spoke  out  ” 


“THE  COMPROMISES” 


99 


still  more  plainly.  “If  negroes,”  he  said,  “were 
to  be  viewed  as  inhabitants,  . . . they  ought  to  be 
added  in  their  entire  number,  and  not  in  the  pro- 
portion of  three  fifths.  If  as  property,  the  word 
‘ wealth  ’ was  right,”  — as  the  basis,  that  is,  of 
representation.  The  distinction  that  had  been  set 
up  by  Madison  and  others  between  the  Northern 
and  Southern  States  he  considered  as  heretical  and 
groundless.  But  it  was  persisted  in,  and  “ he  saw 
that  the  Southern  gentlemen  will  not  be  satisfied 
unless  they  see  the  way  open  to  their  gaining  a 
majority  in  the  public  councils.  . . . Either  this 
distinction  [between  the  North  and  the  South]  is 
fictitious  or  real ; if  fictitious,  let  it  be  dismissed, 
and  let  us  proceed  with  due  confidence.  If  it  be 
real,  instead  of  attempting  to  blend  incompatible 
things,  let  us  at  once  take  a friendly  leave  of  each 
other.” 

But  could  they  take  “ a friendly  leave  of  each 
other  ” ? Should  a union  be  secured  on  the  terms 
the  South  offered?  or  should  it  be  declined,  as 
Morris  proposed,  if  it  could  not  be  a union  of 
equality?  The  next  day  Madison  again  set  forth 
the  real  issue,  quietly  but  unmistakably.  “ It 
seemed  now,”  he  said,  “to  be  pretty  well  under- 
stood that  the  real  difference  of  interests  lay,  not 
between  the  large  and  small,  but  between  the 
Northern  and  Southern  States.  The  institution 
of  slavery  and  its  consequences  formed  the  line  of 
discrimination.”  There  is  sometimes  great  power, 
as  he  well  knew,  in  firm  reiteration.  So  long  as 


100 


JAMES  MADISON 


slavery  lasted,  the  lesson  he  then  inculcated  was 
never  forgotten.  Thenceforward,  as  then,  ‘‘the 
line  of  discrimination,”  in  Southern  politics,  lay 
with  “ slavery  and  its  consequences.”  One  side 
would  abate  nothing  of  its  demands ; there  could 
be  no  “ friendly  leave  ” unless  the  determination, 
on  the  other  side,  to  overcome  the  desire  for  union 
and  take  the  consequences  was  equally  firm. 

When  the  question  again  came  up,  however, 
Morris  had  not  lost  heart.  His  talk  was  the  talk 
of  a modern  abolitionist : — 

“ He  never  would  concur  in  upholding  domestic 
slavery.  It  was  a nefarious  institution.  It  was  the  curse 
of  Heaven  on  the  States  where  it  prevailed.  Compare 
the  free  regions  of  the  Middle  States,  where  a rich  and 
noble  cultivation  marks  the  prosperity  and  happiness  of 
the  people,  with  the  misery  and  poverty  which  over- 
spread the  barren  wastes  of  Virginia,  Maryland,  and 
the  other  States  having  slaves.  Travel  through  the 
whole  continent,  and  you  behold  the  prospect  continu- 
ally varying  with  the  appearance  and  disappearance  of 
slavery.  . . . Proceed  southwardly,  and  every  step  you 
take  through  the  great  regions  of  slavery  presents  a 
desert  increasing  with  the  increasing  proportion  of  these 
wretched  beings.  Upon  what  principle  is  it  that  the 
slaves  shall  be  computed  in  the  representation?  Are 
they  men  ? Then  make  them  citizens,  and  let  them  vote. 
Are  they  property  ? Why  then  is  no  other  property 
included  ? The  houses  in  this  city  [Philadelphia]  are 
worth  more  than  all  the  wretched  slaves  who  cover  the 
rice  swamps  of  South  Carolina.  . . . And  what  is  the 
proposed  compensation  to  the  Northern  States  for  a 


THE  COMPROMISES 


101 


sacrifice  of  every  principle  of  right,  of  every  impulse 
of  humanity  ? They  are  to  bind  themselves  to  march 
their  militia  for  the  defense  of  the  Southern  States,  for 
their  defense  against  those  very  slaves  of  whom  they 
complain.  They  must  supply  vessels  and  seamen  in 
case  of  foreign  attack.  The  legislature  will  have  indefi- 
nite power  to  tax  them  by  excises  and  duties  on  imports, 
both  of  which  will  fall  heavier  on  them  than  on  the 
Southern  inhabitants ; for  the  Bohea  tea  used  by  a 
Northern  freeman  will  pay  more  tax  than  the  whole 
consumption  of  the  miserable  slave,  which  consists  of 
nothing  more  than  his  physical  subsistence  and  the  rags 
that  cover  his  nakedness.  . . . Let  it  not  be  said  that 
direct  taxation  is  to  be  proportioned  to  representation. 
It  is  idle  to  suppose  that  the  general  government  can 
stretch  its  hand  directly  into  the  pockets  of  the  people 
scattered  over  so  vast  a country.  . . . He  would  sooner 
submit  himself  to  a tax  for  paying  for  all  the  negroes 
in  the  United  States  than  saddle  posterity  with  such  a 
Constitution.” 

So  much  of  this  as  was  not  already  fact  was 
prophecy.  Yet  not  many  weeks  later  this  impas- 
sioned orator  put  his  name  to  the  Constitution, 
though  it  had  grown  meanwhile  into  larger  pro- 
slavery proportions.  There  was  undoubtedly  some 
sympathy  with  him  among  a few  of  the  members  ; 
but  the  general  feeling  was  more  truly  expressed  a 
few  days  later  by  Rutledge  of  South  Carolina,  in 
the  debate  on  the  continuance  of  the  African  slave 
trade.  ‘‘  Religion  and  humanity,”  he  said,  had 
nothing  to  do  with  this  question.  Interest  alone  is 
the  governing  principle  with  nations.  The  true 


102 


JAMES  MADISON 


question  at  present  is,  whether  the  Southern  States 
shall  or  shall  not  be  parties  to  the  Union.  If  the 
Northern  States  consult  their  interest,  they  will 
not  oppose  the  increase  of  slaves,  which  will  in- 
crease the  commodities  of  which  they  will  become 
the  carriers.”  The  response  came  from  Connecti- 
cut, Oliver  Ellsworth  saying : “ Let  every  State 
import  what  it  pleases.  The  morality  or  wisdom 
of  slavery  are  considerations  belonging  to  the 
States  themselves.  What  enriches  a part  enriches 
the  whole,”  — especially  Newport  and  its  adjacent 
coasts,  he  might  have  added,  with  its  trade  to  the 
African  coast. 

But  a Virginian,  George  Mason,  had  another 
tone.  He  called  the  traffic  infernal.”  “ Slavery,” 
he  went  on,  discourages  arts  and  manufactures. 
The  poor  despise  labor  when  performed  by  slaves. 
They  prevent  the  emigration  of  whites,  who  really 
enrich  and  strengthen  a country.  They  produce 
the  most  pernicious  effect  on  manners.  Every 
master  of  slaves  is  born  a petty  tyrant.  They 
bring  the  judgment  of  Heaven  on  a country.  As 
nations  cannot  be  rewarded  or  punished  in  the 
next  world,  they  must  be  in  this.  By  an  inevitable 
chain  of  causes  and  effects.  Providence  punishes 
national  sins  by  national  calamities.” 

These  were  warnings  worth  heeding.  But  Ells- 
worth retorted  with  a sneer : ‘‘  As  he  had  never 
owned  a slave,  he  could  not  judge  of  the  effect  of 
slavery  on  character.”  He  said,  however,  that, 
if  it  was  to  be  considered  in  a moral  light,  we 


THE  COMPROMISES 


103 


ought  to  go  farther,  and  free  those  already  in  the 
country.”  But,  so  far  from  that,  he  thought  it 
would  be  unjust  toward  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia,”  in  whose  sickly  rice  swamps  ” negroes 
died  so  fast,  should  there  be  any  intermeddling  to 
prevent  the  importation  of  fresh  Africans  to  labor, 
and,  of  course,  to  perish  there.  Perhaps  it  was 
this  shrewd  argument  of  the  Connecticut  delegate 
that  suggested,  half  a century  afterward,  to  a Mis- 
sissippi agricultural  society,  the  economical  calcu- 
lation that  it  was  cheaper  to  use  up  a gang  of 
negroes  every  few  years,  and  supply  its  place  by 
a fresh  gang  from  Virginia,  than  rely  upon  the  nat- 
ural increase  that  would  follow  their  humane  treat- 
ment as  men  and  women.  His  colleague,  Roger 
Sherman,  came  to  Ellsworth’s  aid.  It  would  be, 
he  thought,  the  duty  of  the  general  government 
to  prohibit  the  foreign  trade  in  slaves,  and,  should 
this  be  left  in  its  power,  it  would  probably  be 
done.  But  he  would  not,  if  the  Southern  States 
made  it  the  condition  of  consenting  to  the  Con- 
stitution that  the  trade  should  be  protected,  leave 
it  in  the  power  of  the  general  government  to  do 
that  v/hich  he  acknowledged  that  it  should  and 
probably  would  do. 

Delegates  from  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  de- 
clared that  to  be  the  condition,  — among  them 
C.  C.  Pinckney  of  South  Carolina.  ‘‘He  should 
consider,”  he  said,  “a  rejection  of  the  clause  as 
an  exclusion  of  South  Carolina  from  the  Union.” 
Nevertheless  he  said  to  the  people  at  home,  when 


104 


JAMES  MADISON 


they  came  together  to  consider  the  Constitution : 
‘‘We  are  so  weak  that  by  ourselves  we  could  not 
form  a union  strong  enough  for  the  purpose  of 
effectually  protecting  each  other.  Without  union 
with  the  other  States,  South  Carolina  must  soon 
fall.”  On  the  part  of  that  State  it  had  been  a 
game  of  brag  all  along.  The  first  lesson  in  the 
South  Carolinian  policy  was  given  in  the  Consti- 
tutional Convention.  Of  the  result,  this  was 
Pinckney’s  summing  up  to  his  constituents : — 

“ By  this  settlement  we  have  secured  an  unlimited  im- 
portation of  negroes  for  twenty  years ; nor  is  it  declared 
that  the  importation  shall  be  then  stopped ; it  may  be 
continued.  We  have  a security  that  the  general  govern- 
ment can  never  emancipate  them,  for  no  such  authority 
is  granted.  ...  We  have  obtained  a right  to  recover 
our  slaves,  in  whatever  part  of  America  they  may  take 
refuge,  which  is  a right  we  had  not  before.  In  short, 
considering  all  circumstances,  we  have  made  the  best 
terms,  for  the  security  of  this  species  of  property,  it  was 
in  our  power  to  make.  We  would  have  made  better  if 
we  could,  but  on  the  whole  I do  not  think  them  bad.” 

A more  moderate  and  a more  significant  state- 
ment could  hardly  have  been  made. 

On  the  foreign  slave  trade  Madison  had  little 
to  say,  but,  like  most  of  the  Southern  delegates 
north  of  the  Carolinas,  he  was  opposed  to  it. 
“Twenty  years,”  he  said,  “will  produce  all  the 
mischief  that  can  be  apprehended  from  the  liberty 
to  import  slaves.  So  long  a term  will  be  more 
dishonorable  to  the  American  character  than  to 


THE  COMPROMISES 


105 


say  nothing  about  it  in  the  Constitution.”  The 
words  are  a little  ambiguous,  though  he  is  his  own 
reporter.  But  what  he  meant  evidently  was,  that 
any  protection  of  the  trade  would  dishonor  the 
nation ; for  at  another  point  of  the  debate,  on  the 
same  day,  he  said  that  ‘‘he  thought  it  wrong 
to  admit  in  the  Constitution  the  idea  that  there 
could  be  property  in  men.”  Such  property  he 
was  anxious  to  protect  as  the  great  Southern  inter- 
est, so  long  as  it  lasted ; but  he  was  not  willing  to 
strengthen  it  by  permitting  the  continuance  of  the 
African  slave  trade  for  twenty  years  longer  under 
the  sanction  of  the  Constitution.  But  he  held  it 
to  be,  as  he  wrote  in  “ The  Federalist,”  “ a great 
point  gained  in  favor  of  humanity  that  a period  of 
twenty  years  may  terminate  forever  within  these 
States  a traffic  which  has  so  long  and  so  loudly 
upbraided  the  barbarism  of  modern  policy.”  He 
added,  “ The  attempt  that  had  been  made  to  pervert 
this  clause  into  an  objection  against  the  Constitu- 
tion, by  representing  it  as  a criminal  toleration  of 
an  illicit  practice,”  was  a misconstruction  which  he 
did  not  think  deserving  of  an  answer. 

It  was,  in  fact,  a bargain  which  he  had  not  ap- 
proved of,  and  did  not  now  probably  care  to  talk 
about.  It  was  made  at  the  suggestion  of  Gouver- 
neur  Morris,  who  moved  that  the  foreign  slave 
trade,  a navigation  act,  and  a duty  on  exports  be 
referred  for  consideration  to  a committee.  “ These 
things,”  he  said,  “ may  form  a bargain  among  the 
Northern  and  Southern  States.”  When  the  com- 


106 


JAMES  MADISON 


mittee  reported  in  favor  of  the  slave  trade,  C.  C. 
Pinckney  proposed  that  its  limitation  should  be 
extended  from  1800  to  1808.  Gorham  of  Massa- 
chusetts seconded  the  motion,  and  it  was  carried 
by  the  addition  of  the  votes  of  New  Hampshire, 
Massachusetts,  and  Connecticut  to  those  of  Mary- 
land, North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia. 

The  committee  also  reported  the  substitution  of 
a majority  vote  for  that  of  two  thirds  in  legislation 
relating  to  commerce.  The  concession  was  made 
without  much  difficulty,  a Georgia  delegate  and 
three  of  the  four  South  Carolina  delegates  favoring 
it,  two  of  the  latter  frankly  saying  they  did  so  to 
gratify  New  England.  It  was,  C.  C.  Pinckney 
said,  the  true  interest  of  the  Southern  States  to 
have  no  regulation  of  commerce ; ” but  he  assented 
to  this  proposition,  and  his  constituents  ‘‘  would  be 
reconciled  to  this  liberality,”  because,  among  other 
considerations,  of  “the  liberal  conduct  [of  the  New 
England  States]  towards  the  views  of  South  Caro- 
lina.” There  was  no  question  of  the  meaning  of 
this  sudden  avowal  of  friendly  feeling.  Jefferson 
relates  in  his  “ Ana,”  on  the  authority  of  George 
Mason,  a member  of  the  convention,  that  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina  had  “ struck  up  a bargain  with 
the  three  New  England  States,  that  if  they  would 
admit  slaves  for  twenty  years,  the  two  southernmost 
States  would  join  in  changing  the  clause  which 
required  two  thirds  of  the  legislature  in  any  vote.” 

The  settlement  of  these  questions  was  an  oppor- 
tune moment  for  the  introduction  of  that  relating 


THE  COMPROMISES 


107 


to  fugitive  slaves.  Butler  of  South  Carolina  im- 
mediately proposed  a section  which  should  secure 
their  return  to  their  masters,  and  it  was  passed 
without  a word.  As  Pinckney  said  in  the  passage 
already  quoted,  when  he  went  back  to  report  to 
his  constituents,  “ it  is  a right  to  recover  our  slaves, 
in  whatever  part  of  America  they  may  take  refuge, 
wdiich  is  a right  we  had  not  before.” 

It  is  notable  how  complete  and  final  a settle- 
ment of  the  slavery  question  these  compromises,” 
as  they  were  called,  seemed  to  be  to  those  who 
made  them.  They  were  meant  to  be,  as  Mr.  Mad- 
ison called  them,  ‘‘adjustments  of  the  different 
interests  of  different  parts  of  the  country,”  and 
being  once  agreed  upon  they  were  considered  as 
having  the  binding  force  and  stability  of  a con- 
tract. The  evils  of  slavery  were  set  forth  as  an 
element  in  the  negotiation,  but  no  question  of  es- 
sential morality  was  raised  that  brought  the  system 
within  the  category  of  forbidden  wrong.  What- 
ever results  might  follow  would  be  limited,  it  was 
thought,  by  the  terms  of  the  contract ; whereas,  in 
fact,  the  actual  results  were  not  foreseen,  and  could 
not  be  guarded  against,  except  by  the  refusal  to 
enter  into  any  contract  whatever. 

On  all  other  questions  involving  political  prin- 
ciples,— the  just  relations  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment and  the  governments  of  the  States  ; the  re- 
lations between  the  larger  and  the  smaller  States ; 
the  regulation  of  the  functions  of  the  executive, 
the  legislative,  and  the  judicial  departments  of 


108 


JAMES  MADISON 


government,  — on  all  these  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  brought  to  bear  the  profoundest  wis- 
dom. When  one  reflects  upon  the  magnitude  and 
character  of  the  work,  Madison’s  conclusion  seems 
hardly  extravagant,  that  “ adding  to  these  consider- 
ations the  natural  diversity  of  human  opinions  on 
all  new  and  complicated  subjects,  it  is  impossible 
to  consider  the  degree  of  concord  which  ultimately 
prevailed  as  less  than  a miracle.”  There  were, 
nevertheless,  the  gravest  and  most  anxious  doubts 
how  far  the  Constitution  would  stand  the  test  of 
time ; yet  as  a system  of  government  for  a nation 
of  freemen  it  remains  to  this  day  practically  un- 
changed. But  where  its  architects  thought  them- 
selves wisest  they  were  weakest.  That  which  they 
thought  they  had  settled  forever  was  the  one  thing 
which  they  did  not  settle.  Of  all  the  ‘^adjust- 
ments ” of  the  Constitution,  slavery  was  precisely 
that  one  which  was  not  adjusted. 

Madison’s  responsibility  for  this  result  was  that 
of  every  other  delegate,  — no  more  and  no  less. 
Neither  he  nor  they,  whether  more  or  less  opposed 
to  slavery,  saw  in  it  a system  so  subversive  of  the 
rights  of  man  that  no  just  government  should  tol- 
erate it.  That  was  reserved  for  a later  generation, 
and  even  that  was  slow  to  learn.  To  the  fathers 
it  was,  at  worst,  only  an  unfortunate  and  unhappy 
social  condition,  which  it  would  be  well  to  be  rid 
of  if  this  could  be  done  without  too  much  sacrifice ; 
but  otherwise,  to  be  submitted  to,  like  any  other 
misfortune. 


THE  COMPROMISES 


109 


While  it  did  exist,  however,  Madison  believed 
it  should  be  protected,  though  not  encouraged,  as 
a Southern  interest.  The  question  resolved  itself 
into  one  of  expediency,  — of  union  or  disunion. 
What  disunion  would  be,  he  knew,  or  thought  he 
kneWo  Perhaps  he  was  mistaken.  Disunion,  had 
it  come  then,  might  have  been  the  way  to  a true 
union.  ‘‘We  are  so  weak,”  said  C.  C.  Pinckney, 
“ that  by  ourselves  we  could  not  form  a union 
strong  enough  for  the  purpose  of  effectually  pro- 
tecting each  other.  Without  union  with  the  other 
States,  South  Carolina  must  soon  fall.”  But  he 
was  careful  to  say  this  at  home,  not  in  Philadel- 
phia. In  the  convention,  Madison  wrote  a month 
after  it  adjourned,  “ South  Carolina  and  Georgia 
were  inflexible  on  the  point  of  the  slaves.”  What 
was  to  be  the  union  which  that  inflexibility  carried 
was  not  foreseen.  It  was  the  children’s  teeth  that 
were  to  be  set  on  edge. 


CHAPTER  IX 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 

Madison’s  labors  for  the  Constitution  did  not 
cease  when  the  convention  adjourned,  although  he 
was  not  at  that  moment  in  a hopeful  frame  of 
mind  in  regard  to  it.  Within  a week  of  the  ad- 
journment he  wrote  to  Jefferson : I hazard  an 

opinion  that  the  plan,  should  it  be  adopted,  will 
neither  effectually  answer  its  national  object,  nor 
prevent  the  local  mischiefs  which  excite  disgusts 
against  the  state  governments.” 

But  this  feeling  seems  to  have  soon  passed  away. 
Perhaps,  when  he  devoted  himself  to  a careful 
study  of  what  had  been  done,  he  saw,  in  looking  at 
it  as  a whole,  how  just  and  true  it  was  in  its  fair 
proportions.  He  now  diligently  sought  to  prove 
how  certainly  the  Constitution  would  answer  its 
purpose ; how  wisely  all  its  parts  were  adjusted ; 
how  successfully  the  obstacles  to  a perfect  union 
of  the  States  had  been,  as  he  thought,  overcome ; 
how  carefully  the  rights  of  the  separate  States  had 
been  guarded,  while  the  needed  general  govern- 
ment would  be  secured.  Whether  there  should  be 
an  American  nation  or  not  depended,  as  he  had 
believed  for  years,  upon  whether  a national  Con- 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  111 


stitution  could  be  agreed  upon.  Now  that  it  was 
framed  he  believed  that  upon  its  adoption  depended 
whether  there  should  be,  or  should  not  be,  a nation. 
In  September,  as  he  wrote  to  Jefferson,  he  was  in 
doubt ; in  February  he  wrote  to  Pendleton : ‘‘  I 
have  for  some  time  been  persuaded  that  the  ques- 
tion on  which  the  proposed  Constitution  must  turn 
is  the  simple  one,  whether  the  Union  shall  or  shall 
not  be  continued.  There  is,  in  my  opinion,  no 
middle  ground  to  be  taken.” 

Those  who  would  have  called  a second  conven- 
tion to  revise  the  labors  of  the  first  had  no  sym- 
pathy from  him.  He  not  only  doubted  if  the 
work  could  be  done  so  well  again ; he  doubted  if 
it  could  be  done  at  all.  With  him,  it  was  this 
Constitution  or  none.  Every  man,”  he  said  in 
The  Federalist,”  referring  to  a picture  he  had 
just  drawn  of  the  perils  of  disunion,  — “ every  man 
who  loves  peace,  every  man  who  loves  his  country, 
every  man  who  loves  liberty,  ought  to  have  it  ever 
before  his  eyes,  that  he  may  cherish  in  his  heart 
a due  attachment  to  the  Union  of  America,  and  be 
able  to  set  a due  value  on  the  means  of  preserving 
it.”  This  “ means  ” was  the  Constitution. 

Of  the  eighty  papers  of  The  Federalist  ” he 
wrote  twenty-nine ; Hamilton  writing  forty-six, 
and  Jay  only  five.  These  famous  essays,  of  wider 
repute  than  any  other  American  book,  are  yet 
more  generally  accepted  upon  faith  than  upon 
knowledge.  But  at  that  time,  when  the  new  Con- 
stitution was  in  the  mind  and  on  the  tongue  of 


112 


JAMES  MADISON 


every  thoughtful  man,  they  were  eagerly  read  as 
they  followed  each  other  rapidly  in  the  columns  of 
a New  York  newspaper.  They  were  an  armory, 
wherein  all  who  entered  into  the  controversy  could 
find  such  weapons  as  they  could  best  handle.  What 
governments  had  been,  what  governments  ought  to 
be,  and  what  the  political  union  of  these  American 
States  would  be  under  their  new  Constitution, 
were  questions  on  which  the  writers  of  these  papers 
undertook  to  answer  all  reasonable  inquiries,  and 
to  silence  all  cavils.  Madison  would  undoubtedly 
have  written  more  than  his  two  fifths  of  them,  had 
he  not  been  called  upon  early  in  March  to  return 
to  Virginia  ; for  the  work  was  of  the  deepest  inter- 
est to  him,  and  the  popularity  of  the  papers  would 
have  stimulated  to  exertion  one  as  indolent  as  he 
was  industrious. 

But  the  canvass  for  the  election  of  delegates  to 
the  Constitutional  Convention  of  Virginia  called 
him  home.  He  had  been  nominated  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  his  county,  and  his  friends  had  urged 
him  to  return  before  the  election,  for  there  was 
reason  to  fear  that  the  majority  was  on  the  wrong 
side.  Henry,  Mason,  Randolph,  Lee,  and  others 
among  the  most  influential  men  of  Virginia,  were 
opposed  to  the  Constitution.  There  must  be  some- 
body in  the  convention  to  meet  strong  men  like 
these,  and  Madison  was  urged  to  take  the  stump 
and  canvass  for  his  own  election.  Even  this  he 
was  willing  to  do  at  this  crisis,  if  need  be,  though 
he  said  it  would  be  at  the  sacrifice  of  every  private 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  113 


inclination,  and  of  the  rule  which  hitherto  from 
the  beginning  of  his  public  career  he  had  strictly 
adhered  to,  — never  to  ask,  directly  or  indirectly, 
for  votes  for  himself. 

^ It  is  quite  possible,  even  quite  probable,  that 
*Mr.  Madison  had  little  of  that  gift  which  has 
always  passed  for  eloquence,  and  is,  indeed,  elo- 
quence of  a certain  kind.  If  we  may  trust  the 
reports  of  his  contemporaries,  though  he  wanted 
some  of  the  graces  of  oratory,  he  was  not  wanting 
in  the  power  of  winning  and  convincing.  His 
arguments  were  often,  if  not  always,  prepared 
with  care.  If  there  was  no  play  of  fancy,  there 
was  no  forgetfulness  of  facts.  If  there  was  lack  of 
imagination,  there  was  none  of  historical  illustra- 
tion, when  the  subject  admitted  it.  If  manner  was 
forgotten,  method  was  not.  His  aim  was  to  prove 
and  to  hold  fast ; to  make  the  wrong  clear,  and  to 
put  the  right  in  its  place ; to  appeal  to  reason,  not 
to  passion,  nor  to  prejudice  ; to  try  his  cause  by 
the  light  of  clear  logic,  hard  facts,  and  sound  learn- 
ing ; to  convince  his  hearers  of  the  truth,  as  he 
believed  in  it,  not  to  take  their  judgment  captive 
by  surprise  with  harmonious  modulation  and  grace 
of  movement.  /Not  his  neighbors  only,  but  the 
most  zealous*tTr  the  Federalists  of  the  State,  sent 
him  to  the  convention.  It  was  there  that  such  elo- 
quence as  he  possessed  was  peculiarly  needed.  The 
ground  was  to  be  fought  over  inch  by  inch,  and 
with  antagonists  whom  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  beat.  There  was  to  be  contest  over 


114 


JAMES  MADISON 


every  word  of  the  Constitution  from  its  first  to  its  ^ 
last.  Give  me  leave,”  cried  Patrick  Henry  in 
his  opening  speech,  to  demand  what  right  had 
they  to  say  ‘ We  the  people  ’ instead  of  ‘ We  the 
States  ’ ? ” He  began  at  the  beginning.  It  was 
the  gage  of  the  coming  battle ; the  defenders  were 
challenged  to  show  that  any  better  union  than  that 
already  in  existence  was  needed,  and  that  in  this 
new  Constitution  a better  union  was  furnished. 

As  month  after  month  passed  away  while  the 
Constitution  was  before  the  people  for  adoption, 
the  anxiety  of  the  Federalists  grew,  lest  the  requi- 
site nine  States  should  not  give  their  assent.  But 
when  eight  were  secured  there  was  room  to  hope 
even  for  unanimity,  if  Virginia  should  come  in  as 
the  ninth.  Should  she  say  Yes,  the  Union  might 
be  perfect ; for  the  remaining  States  would  be 
almost  sure  to  follow  her  lead.  But  should  she 
say  No,  the  final  result  would  be  doubtful,  even  if 
the  requisite  nine  should  be  secured  by  the  acquies- 
cence of  one  of  the  smaller  States.  This  answer 
could  not,  of  course,  depend  altogether  upon  one 
man,  but  it  did  depend  more  upon  Madison  than 
upon  anybody  else. 

The  convention  was  in  session  nearly  a month. 
At  the  ^nd  of  a fortnight  he  was  not  hopeful. 
‘‘The  business,”  he  wrote  to  Washington,  “is  in 
the  most  ticklish  state  that  can  be  imagined.  The 
majority  will  certainly  be  very  small,  on  whatever 
side  it  may  finally  lie ; and  I dare  not  encourage 
much  expectation  that  it  will  be  on  the  favorable 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  115 


side.”  But  his  fears  stimulated  rather  than  dis- 
couraged him.  He  was  always  on  his  feet ; always 
ready  to  meet  argument  with  argument ; always 
prompt  to  appeal  from  passion  to  reason;  quick 
to  brush  aside  mere  declamation,  and  to  bring  the 
minds  of  his  hearers  back  to  a calm  consideration 
of  how  much  was  at  stake,  and  of  the  weight  of  the 
responsibility  resting  on  that  convention.  Others 
were  no  less  earnest  and  diligent  than  he  ; but  he 
was  easily  chief,  and  the  burden  and  heat  of  the 
day  fell  mainly  upon  him.  Probably  when  the 
convention  assembled  the  majority  were  opposed 
to  the  Constitution  ; but  its  adoption  was  carried 
at  last  by  a vote  of  eighty-nine  to  seventy-nine. 
Thenceforth  opposition  in  the  remaining  States  was 
hopeless. 

New  Hampshire  — though  the  fact  was  not 
known  in  Virginia  — preceded  that  State  by  a 
few  days  in  accepting  the  Constitution,  so  that  the 
requisite  nine  were  secured  before  the  convention 
at  Richmond  came  to  a decision.  But  it  was  her 
decision,  nevertheless,  that  really  settled,  so  far  as 
can  be  seen  now,  the  question  of  a permanent 
Union.  Had  the  vote  of  Virginia  been  the  other 
way  it  is  not  likely  that  Hamilton  would  have 
carried  New  York,  or  that  North  Carolina  and 
Rhode  Island  would  have  finally  decided  not  to 
be  left  in  solitude  outside.  What  the  history  of 
the  nine  united  States  only,  with  four  disunited 
States  among  them,  might  have  been,  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  know,  and  quite  useless  to  conjecture.  The 


116 


JAMES  MADISON 


conditions  which  some  of  the  States  attached  to  the 
act  of  adoption,  the  addition  of  a Bill  of  Rights, 
proposed  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  and  the 
suggestion  of  submitting  it  to  a second  conven- 
tion, were  matters  of  comparatively  little  moment, 
when  the  majority  of  ten  delegates  was  secured  at 
Richmond.  These  were  questions  that  could  be 
postponed.  The  delay  of  a few  years,”  Madison 
wrote  to  Jefferson,  will  assuage  the  jealousies 
which  have  been  artificially  created  by  designing 
men,  and  will  at  the  same  time  point  out  the  faults 
which  call  for  amendment.” 

Immediately  after  the  adjo.urnrnent  of  the  Rich- 
mond Convention  he  returned  to  New  York,  where 
the  confederate  Congress  was  still  in  session. 
That  body  had  little  to  do  now  but  decide  upon 
the  time  and  place  of  the  inauguration  of  the  new 
government.  Madison  had  entered  upon  his  thirty- 
eighth  year,  and  we  get  an  interesting  glimpse  of 
him  as  he  appeared  at  this  time  of  his  life  to  an 
intelligent  foreigner.  ‘‘Mr.  Warville  Brissot  has 
just  arrived  here,”  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  in  August, 
1788.  This  was  Brissot  de  Warville,  a Frenchman 
of  the  new  philosophy,  — whose  head,  nevertheless, 
his  compatriots  cut  off  a few  years  later,  — then 
traveling  in  America  to  observe  the  condition  and 
progress  of  the  new  republic.  His  tour  extended 
to  nearly  all  the  States  ; he  met  with  most  of  the 
distinguished  men  of  the  country  ; and  he  made  a 
careful  and  intelligent  use  of  his  many  opportuni- 
ties for  observation.  On  his  return  to  France  he 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  117 


wrote  an  entertaining  volume,  — ‘‘  New  Travels  in 
the  United  States  of  America,”  — still  to  be  found 
in  some  old  libraries.  What  he  says  of  Madison 
is  worth  repeating,  not  only  for  the  impression  he 
made  upon  an  observant  stranger,  but  as  the  evi- 
dence of  the  contemporary  estimate  of  his  charac- 
ter and  reputation,  which  De  Warville  must  have 
gathered  from  others. 

“ The  name  of  Madison,”  he  writes,  celebrated  in 
America,  is  well  known  in  Europe  by  the  merited  eulo- 
gium  made  of  him  by  his  countryman  and  friend,  Mr. 
Jefferson. 

“ Though  still  young,  he  has  rendered  the  greatest 
services  to  Virginia,  to  the  American  Confederation,  and 
to  liberty  and  humanity  in  general.  He  contributed 
much,  with  Mr.  White,  in  reforming  the  civil  and  crim- 
inal codes  of  his  country.  He  distinguished  himself 
particularly  in  the  convention  for  the  acceptation  of  the 
new  federal  system.  Virginia  balanced  a long  time  in 
adhering  to  it.  Mr.  Madison  determined  to  it  the  mem- 
bers of  the  convention  by  his  eloquence  and  logic.  This 
republican  appears  to  be  about  thirty-eight  years  of  age. 
He  had,  when  I saw  him,  an  air  of  fatigue  ; perhaps  it 
was  the  effect  of  the  immense  labors  to  which  he  has 
devoted  himself  for  some  time  past.  His  look  announces 
a censor,  his  conversation  discovers  the  man  of  learning, 
and  his  reserve  was  that  of  a man  conscious  of  his  talents 
and  of  his  duties. 

During  the  dinner,  to  which  he  invited  me,  they 
spoke  of  the  refusal  of  North  Carolina  to  accede  to  the 
new  Constitution.  The  majority  against  it  was  one 
hundred.  Mr.  Madison  believed  that  this  refusal  would 


118 


JAMES  MADISON 


have  no  weight  on  the  minds  of  the  Americans,  and  that 
it  would  not  impede  the  operations  of  Congress.  I told 
him  that  though  this  refusal  might  be  regarded  as  a trifle 
in  America,  it  would  have  great  weight  in  Europe ; that 
they  would  never  inquire  there  into  the  motives  which 
dictated  it,  nor  consider  the  small  consequence  of  this 
State  in  the  confederation  ; that  it  would  be  regarded  as 
a germ  of  division,  calculated  to  retard  the  operations  of 
Congress  ; and  that  certainly  this  idea  would  prevent  the 
resurrection  of  American  credit. 

“ Mr.  Madison  attributed  this  refusal  to  the  attach- 
ment of  a great  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  that  State  to 
their  paper  money  and  their  tender  act.  He  was  much 
inclined  to  believe  that  this  disposition  would  not  remain 
a long  time.’’ 

In  October  the  Virginia  Assembly  met.  Two 
thirds  of  its  members  were  opposed  to  the  new 
Constitution,  and  at  their  head  was  Patrick  Henry, 
his  zeal  against  it  not  in  the  least  abated  because 
he  had  been  defeated  in  the  late  convention.  The 
acceptance  of  the  Constitution  by  that  representa- 
tive body  could  not  be  recalled.  But  the  Assembly 
could,  at  least,  protest  against  it,  and  was  led  by 
Henry  to  call  upon  Congress  to  convene  a second 
national  convention  to  do  over  again  the  work  of 
the  first.  The  legislature  was  to  elect  senators  for 
the  first  Senate  under  the  new  government;  and 
it  was  also  to  divide  the  State  into  districts  for 
its  representation  in  the  lower  house  of  Congress. 
In  ordinary  fairness,  as  the  State  had,  in  a popular 
convention,  so  recently  accepted  the  Constitution, 
the  party  then  in  the  majority  was  entitled  to  at 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  119 


least  one  of  the  representatives  in  the  Senate. 
But  Henry  nominated  both,  and  could  command 
votes  enough  to  elect  them.  In  modern  party 
usage  this  would  seem  quite  unobjectionable ; in- 
deed, a modern  politician  who  should  not  use  such 
an  advantage  for  his  party  would  be  considered  as 
unfit  for  practical  politics.  But  a hundred  years 
ago  it  was  thought  sharp  practice,  and  a fair  pro- 
portion of  Henry’s  partisans  refused  to  be  bound 
by  it.  One  of  Henry’s  nominees  was  elected  by  a 
majority  of  twenty  over  Madison  ; but  in  the  case 
of  the  other  that  majority  was  reduced  more  than 
half,  and  a change  of  five  more  votes  would  have 
elected  Madison. 

He  had,  however,  neither  expected  nor  wished 
to  be  sent  to  the  Senate,  while  he  did  hope  to  be 
elected  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  The 
Senate  was  intended  to  be  the  more  dignified  body, 
requiring  in  its  members  a certain  style  of  living 
for  which  wealth  was  indispensable.  Madison  had 
not  the  means  to  give  that  kind  of  social  support 
to  official  position  ; but  he  could  afford  to  belong 
to  that  body  where  a member  was  not  the  less 
respectable  because  his  whole  domestic  establish- 
ment might  be  a bachelor’s  room  in  a boarding- 
house. 

Virginia  was,  as  he  wrote  to  Washington,  ‘‘the 
only  instance  among  the  ratifying  States  in  which 
the  politics  of  the  legislature  are  at  variance  with 
the  sense  of  the  people,  expressed  by  their  repre- 
sentatives in  convention.”  This  had  enabled  Henry 


120 


JAMES  MADISON 


and  a majority  of  his  friends  to  elect  senators  who, 
representing  ‘‘the  politics  of  the  legislature,”  did 
not  represent  “ the  sense  of  the  people  ” in  regard 
to  the  national  Constitution.  But  in  the  election 
of  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  the 
sense  of  the  people  was  to  be  again  appealed  to, 
and  a new  way  must  be  devised  for  asserting  the 
supremacy  of  legislative  power.  The  cleverness 
of  Elbridge  Gerry  of  Massachusetts,  many  years 
later,  under  similar  circumstances,  introduced  a 
new  word  into  the  language  of  the  country,  and,  it 
was  supposed  at  the  time,  a new  device  in  Amer- 
ican politics.  But  what  has  since  been  known  as 
“Gerrymandering”  was  really  the  invention  of 
Patrick  Henry.  This  method  of  arranging  coun- 
ties into  congressional  districts  in  accordance  with 
their  political  affinities,  without  regard  to  their 
geographical  lines,  Henry  attempted  to  do  with 
Mr.  Madison’s  own  county.  By  joining  it  to  dis- 
tant counties  it  was  expected  that  an  anti-Eederal 
majority  would  be  secured  large  enough  to  insure 
his  defeat.  The  attempt  to  elect  him  to  the  Senate 
was,  Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson,  “defeated  by 
Mr.  Henry,  who  is  omnipotent  in  the  present 
legislature.”  He  adds  that  Henry  “ has  taken 
equal  pains,  in  forming  the  counties  into  districts 
for  the  election  of  representatives,  to  associate  with 
Orange  such  as  are  most  devoted  to  his  politics, 
and  most  likely  to  be  swayed  by  the  prejudices 
excited  against  me.”  The  scheme,  however,  was 
unsuccessful,  perhaps  partly  because  of  the  indig- 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  121 


nation  which  so  dishonorable  a measure  to  defeat 
a political  opponent  excited  throughout  the  State. 
Madison  entered  upon  an  active  canvass  of  his 
district  against  James  Monroe,  who  had  been 
nominated  as  a moderate  anti-Federalist,  and  de- 
feated him.  It  was  winter  time,  and  in  the  ex- 
posure of  some  of  his  long  rides  his  ears  were 
frozen.  In  later  life  he  sometimes  laughingly 
pointed  to  the  scars  of  these  wounds  received,  he 
said,  in  the  service  of  his  country. 

Thus  Henry’s  Gerrymander,”  like  many  an- 
other useful  and  curious  device,  brought  neither 
profit  nor  credit  to  the  original  inventor.  Had 
Henry  acted  in  the  broader  spirit  of  the  modern 
politician,  who  sees  that  he  serves  himself  best 
who  serves  his  party  best,  he  would  have  disposed 
of  every  Federal  county  in  the  State  as  he  dis- 
posed of  Orange.  As  it  was,  he  only  aroused  a 
good  deal  of  indignation  and  defeated  himself  by 
openly  aiming  to  gratify  his  personal  resentments. 
Had  he  scattered  his  shot  for  the  general  good  of 
the  party,  he  would,  perhaps,  have  brought  down 
his  particular  bird. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  FIKST  CONGRESS 

The  confederate  Congress,  at  its  final  session 
in  1788,  had  fixed  the  time  for  the  election  of 
President  and  Vice-President  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  the  time  and  place  for  the  meeting  of 
the  first  Congress  of  the  new  government.  The 
day  appointed  was  the  first  Wednesday  of  the  fol- 
lowing March,  and,  as  that  date  fell  on  the  fourth 
of  the  month,  a precedent  was  established  which 
has  ever  since  been  observed  in  the  installation  of 
a new  President.  The  place  was  not  so  easily 
determined.  The  choice  lay  between  New  York 
and  Philadelphia,  and  the  struggle  was  prolonged, 
not  because  the  question  of  the  temporary  seat 
of  government  was  of  much  moment,  but  because 
of  the  influence  the  decision  might  have  upon  the 
future  settlement  of  the  permanent  place  for  the 
capital. 

No  quorum  of  the  new  Congress  was  present  at 
New  York  on  March  4,  1789,  and  neither  house 
was  organized  until  early  in  April.  On  the  23d 
Washington  arrived ; and  on  the  30th  he  took 
the  oath  of  office  as  first  President  of  the  United 
States,  standing  on  the  balcony  of  Federal  Hall, 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


123 


at  the  corner  of  Wall  and  Broad  streets,  a site 
now  occupied  by  another  building  used  as  the  sub- 
treasury. A week  before,  when  the  ceremonies 
proper  for  such  an  occasion  were  a subject  of 
discussion  in  Congress,  the  question  of  fitting  titles 
for  the  President  and  Vice-President  came  up  for 
consideration.  It  was  decided  that  when  the  Pre- 
sident arrived  the  Vice-President  should  meet  him 
at  the  door  of  the  senate  chamber,  lead  him  to 
the  chair,  and  then,  in  a formal  address,  inform 
him  that  the  two  houses  were  ready  to  witness 
the  administration  of  the  oath  of  office.  ‘‘Upon 
this,”  says  John  Adams  in  a letter  written  three 
years  afterward,  “ I arose  in  my  place  and  asked 
the  advice  of  the  Senate,  in  what  form  I should 
address  him,  whether  I should  say  ‘Mr.  Wash- 
ington,’ ‘ Mr.  President,’  ‘ Sir,’  ‘ May  it  please 
your  Excellency,’  or  what  else?  I observed  that 
it  had  been  common  while  he  commanded  the 
army  to  call  him  ‘ His  Excellency,’  but  I was  free 
to  own  it  would  appear  to  me  better  to  give  him 
no  title  but  ‘ Sir,’  or  ‘ Mr.  President,’  than  to  put 
him  on  a level  with  a governor  of  Bermuda,  or  one 
of  his  own  ambassadors,  or  a governor  of  any  one 
of  our  States.” 

Thereupon  the  question  went  to  a conference 
committee  of  both  houses,  who  reported  that  no 
other  title  would  be  proper  for  either  President  or 
Vice-President,  at  any  time,  than  those  which  were 
given  by  the  Constitution.  To  this  report  the 
Senate  disagreed  and  appointed  a new  committee. 


124 


JAMES  MADISON 


This  proposed  that  the  President  should  be  called 
‘‘  His  Highness  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  Protector  of  their  Liberties.”  When  wise  men 
are  absurd  they  presume  on  their  prerogative.  The 
Senate  accepted  the  report,  but  the  House  had  the 
good  sense  to  reject  it,  consenting,  however,  to 
leave  the  question  in  abeyance.  On  these  pro- 
ceedings Mr.  Madison  thus  commented  in  a letter 
to  Jefferson  : — 

“ My  last  inclosed  copies  of  the  President’s  inaugural 
speech,  and  the  answer  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 
I now  add  the  answer  of  the  Senate.  It  will  not  have 
escaped  you  that  the  former  was  addressed  with  a truly 
republican  simplicity  to  George  Washington,  President 
of  the  United  States.  The  latter  follows  the  example, 
with  the  omission  of  the  personal  name,  but  without  any 
other  than  the  constitutional  title.  The  proceeding  on 
this  point  was,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  spon- 
taneous. The  imitation  by  the  Senate  was  extorted. 
The  question  became  a serious  one  between  the  two 
houses.  J.  Adams  espoused  the  cause  of  titles  with 
great  earnestness.  His  friend,  R.  H.  Lee,  although 
elected  as  a republican  enemy  to  an  aristocratic  Con- 
stitution, was  a most  zealous  second.  The  projected 
title  was.  His  Highness  the  President  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Protector  of  their  Liberties.  Had  the 
project  succeeded,  it  would  have  subjected  the  Presi- 
dent to  a severe  dilemma,  and  given  a deep  wound  to 
our  infant  government.” 

Washington  has  sometimes  been  accused  of  wish- 
ing for  the  title  of  His  Highness,”  and  of  having 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


125 


suggested  it.  Had  this  been  true,  Madison  would 
have  been  certain  to  know  it,  and  he  was  quite 
incapable  of  asserting  in  that  case  that  such  a 
title  would  have  been  to  the  President  a severe 
dilemma.”  About  Mr.  Adams  he  was  perhaps 
mistaken,  as  he  might  easily  have  been,  since  he 
was  not  a member  of  the  Senate,  and  probably 
heard  only  a confused  report  of  how  the  question 
was  brought  before  that  body.  As  Mr.  Adams’s 
letter,  quoted  just  now,  shows,  he  regarded  the 
charge  as  a calumny  and  resented  it.  He  gave 
them,  according  to  his  own  statement,  no  other 
opinion  than  that  he  preferred  ‘‘Sir,”  or  “Mr. 
President,”  as  a more  proper  address  than  “ Excel- 
lency,” a title  then,  as  now,  pertaining  to  governors 
of  States.  He  probably  took  no  further  part  in 
the  debate,  but  it  is  not  impossible  that  he  may  in 
private  have  avowed  a preference  for  some  other 
and  higher  title  than  either  “ Mr.  President  ” or 
“ Your  Excellency.”  “ For,”  he  said  in  the  explan- 
atory letter  to  his  friend,  “ I freely  own  that  I 
think  decent  and  moderate  titles,  as  distinctions 
of  offices,  are  not  only  harmless,  but  useful  in 
society ; and  that  in  this  country,  where  I know 
them  to  be  prized  by  the  people  as  well  as  their 
magistrates  as  highly  as  by  any  people  or  any 
magistrates  in  the  world,  I should  think  some  dis- 
tinction between  the  magistrates  of  the  national 
government  and  those  of  the  state  governments 
proper.”  A distinction  might  be  proper  enough  if 
there  were  to  be  any  titles  whatever  ; but  certainly 


126 


JAMES  MADISON 


they  were  the  wiser  who  preferred  good  homespun 
to  threadbare  old  clothes.  Had  rags  of  that  sort 
been  made  a legal  uniform,  it  is  almost  appalling  to 
reflect  upon  the  absurdities  to  which  the  national 
fondness  for  titles  would  have  carried  us. 

From  March  4 to  April  1,  though  the  House  of 
Eepresentatives  met  daily,  there  were  not  members 
enough  present  to  make  a quorum.  The  first  real 
business  brought  before  the  House,  except  that 
relating  to  its  organization,  was  introduced  by 
Madison,  two  days  after  the  inauguration.  It 
was  a proposition  to  raise  a revenue  by  duties  on 
imports,  and  by  a tonnage  duty  on  all  vessels, 
American  and  foreign,  bringing  goods,  wares,  or 
merchandise  into  the  United  States.  The  essential 
weakness  of  the  late  Confederacy  was,  first  of  all, 
to  be  remedied  by  uniform  rules  for  the  regulation 
of  trade.  Revenue  must  be  provided  for  the  sup- 
port of  government,  and  that  in  a way  which  should 
not  be  oppressive  to  the  people.  Commerce,  Mr. 
Madison  said,  “ ought  to  be  as  free  as  the  policy 
of  nations  will  admit,”  but  government  must  be 
supported,  and  taxes  the  least  burdensome  and 
most  easily  collected  are  those  derived  from  duties 
on  imports.  He  agreed,  however,  as  he  said  on  the 
second  day  of  the  debate,  with  those  who  would  so 
adjust  the  duties  on  foreign  goods  as  to  protect 
the  “ infant  manufactories  ” of  the  country.  With 
little  interruption  this  subject  was  debated  for  the 
first  six  weeks  of  the  opening  session  of  the  First 
Congress.  No  other  could  have  been  hit  upon  to 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


127 


test  so  thoroughly  the  strength  of  the  new  bond 
of  union.  It  was  to  brush  aside  all  those  trade 
regulations  in  the  several  States  which  each  had 
hitherto  thought  essential  to  its  prosperity.  Every 
interest  in  the  country  was  to  be  considered,  and 
their  different,  sometimes  opposing,  claims  to  be 
reconciled. 

New  England  was  sure  that,  should  the  tax  on 
molasses  be  too  high,  the  distilleries  would  be  shut 
up,  and  a great  New  England  industry  destroyed. 
Nor  would  the  injury  stop  there.  The  fisheries, 
as  well  as  the  distilleries,  would  be  ruined.  For 
three  fifths  of  the  fish  put  up  for  the  West  Indies 
could  find  no  market  anywhere  else  ; and  a market 
existed  there  only  because  molasses  was  taken  in 
exchange.  A prohibitory  duty  on  that  article, 
or  a duty  that  should  seriously  interfere  with  its 
importation,  would  wellnigh  destroy  the  fisheries. 
What  then  would  become  of  the  nursery  of  Ameri- 
can seamen  ? With  no  seamen  there  would  be  no 
shipbuilding.  What  sadder  picture  than  this  of  a 
New  England  without  rum,  without  codfish,  with- 
out seamen,  and  without  ships ! One  can  easily 
conceive  that  even  in  that  restrained  and  dignified 
First  Congress  there  was  no  want  of  serious  and 
alarmed  expostulation,  and  even  some  threatening 
talk  from  such  men  as  the  tranquil  Goodhue,  the 
thoughtful  and  scholarly  Ames,  and  the  impulsive 
Gerry. 

Then  the  South,  for  her  part,  was  alarmed  lest, 
among  other  things,  too  high  a tonnage  duty  should 


128 


JAMES  MADISON 


leave  her  tobacco,  her  rice  and  indigo,  rotting  in 
the  fields  and  warehouses  for  want  of  ships  to  take 
them  to  market.  She  had  no  ships  of  her  own  and 
could  have  none,  and  she  invited  the  ships  of  the 
rest  of  the  world  to  come  for  her  products  and 
bring  in  return  all  she  needed  for  her  own  con- 
sumption. The  picture  of  the  possible  ruin  of  New 
England  was  as  nothing  to  that  of  the  Southern 
planter  scanning  the  horizon  with  weary  eyes  in 
vain  for  the  sight  of  a sail,  while  behind  him 
was  a dangerous  crowd  of  hungry  blacks  with 
nothing  to  do.  That  desolation  seemed  complete 
to  the  southernmost  States  when  it  was  also  pro- 
posed to  levy  a tax  of  ten  dollars  upon  every  slave 
imported.  In  short,  the  whole  subject  bristled 
with  difficulties.  The  problem  was  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  how  to  tax  everything,  and  at  the 
same  time  convince  everybody  that  the  scheme 
was  for  the  general  good,  while  nobody’s  special 
interests  were  sacrificed.  The  ‘‘  infant  indus- 
tries,” to  which  Mr.  Madison  alluded,  really  re- 
ceived no  special  (?onsideration  in  the  final  adjust- 
ment, and  they  were  too  feeble  then  even  to  cry  for 
nursing.  They  have  grown  stronger  since,  though 
they  are  ‘‘  infants  ” still ; and  they  should  never 
cease  to  be  grateful  to  him  who,  however  unwit- 
tingly, gave  them  a name  to  live  by  for  a hundred 
years. 

But  the  most  remarkable  part  of  the  debate  was 
that  upon  the  proposition  of  Mr.  Parker  of  Vir- 
ginia to  impose  a duty  upon  the  importation  of 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


129 


slaves.  Could  the  progress  of  events  have  been 
foreseen,  that  proposal  might  have  been  regarded 
as  meant  to  protect  an  infant  industry  ” of  the 
northernmost  slave  States.  But  the  wildest  imagi- 
nation then  could  not  conceive  of  the  domestic 
slave  trade  of  a few  years  later,  when  a chief 
source  of  the  prosperity  of  Virginia  would  be  her 
perennial  crop  of  young  men  and  women  to  be 
shipped  for  New  Orleans  and  a market.  But  Mr. 
Parker  had  no  ulterior  motive  when  he  avowed  his 
regret  that  the  Constitution  had  failed  to  prohibit 
the  importation  of  slaves  from  Africa,  and  hoped 
that  the  duty  he  proposed  would  prevent,  in  some 
degree,  a traffic  which  he  pronounced  irrational 
and  inhuman.”  It  would  have  been  difficult  to 
have  found  a Virginian  of  that  day  who  would  not 
have  taken  down  his  shotgun  on  hearing  that 
there  were  miscreants  prowling  about  his  kitchen 
doors  in  the  hope  of  buying  up  the  strongest 
young  people  of  his  household  for  export  to  the 
Southwest. 

Judging  from  the  imperfect  report  of  the  debate 
upon  the  subject,  it  would  seem  that  the  bargain 
relative  to  the  slave  trade,  made  in  the  Constitu- 
tional Convention  of  two  years  before  between 
New  England  and  the  tw^o  southernmost  States, 
might  still  hold  good.  Or  there  may  have  been  a 
new  bargain ; or,  perhaps,  both  sides  trusted  to  a 
tacit  recognition  of  the  eternal  fitness  of  things, 
and  made  common  cause  where  legislation  threat- 
ened at  the  same  time  the  distillery  and  the 


130 


JAMES  MADISON 


slave-ship.^  At  auy  rate,  the  extreme  Southerners 
expressed  surprise  at  the  audacity  which  would 
disturb  a compromise  of  the  Constitution ; the  ex- 
treme Northerners  deprecated  it  as  quite  uncalled 
for  in  any  consideration  of  the  subject  of  revenue. 
The  principle  of  Mr.  Parker’s  motion,  Mr.  Sher- 
man of  Connecticut  thought,  was  to  correct  a moral 
evil ; the  principle  of  the  bill  before  the  House  was 
to  raise  a revenue.  At  some  other  time  he  would 
be  willing  to  consider  the  question  of  taxing  the 
importation  of  negroes  on  the  ground  of  humanity 
and  policy ; but  it  was  a sufficient  reason  with 
him  for  not  admitting  it  as  an  object  of  revenue 
that  the  burden  would  fall  upon  two  States  only. 
Fisher  Ames  of  Massachusetts  could  only  take 
counsel  of  his  conscience.  From  his  soul,  he  said, 

^ Eleven  years  afterward,  when  the  question  of  prohibiting  the 
carrying  on  the  slave  trade  from  American  ports  came  up,  one 
John  Brown  of  Rhode  Island  said  in  Congress,  “ Our  distilleries 
and  manufactories  were  all  lying  idle  for  want  of  an  extended 
commerce.  He  had  been  well  informed  that  on  those  coasts 
[African]  New  England  rum  was  much  preferred  to  the  best 
Jamaica  spirits,  and  would  fetch  a better  price.  Why  should  it 
not  be  sent  there,  and  a profitable  return  be  made  ? Why  should 
a heavy  fine  and  imprisonment  [of  slave  traders]  be  made  the 
penalty  for  carrying  on  a trade  so  advantageous  ? ” Sixty  years 
later  still,  there  was  another  Brown  in  Providence,  Rhode  Island, 
who  was  a member  of  the  Committee  of  the  Kansas  Aid  Society 
of  New  England.  He  was  about  to  withdraw  from  it  for  want  of 
time  to  attend  to  its  duties,  — had,  indeed,  actually  sent  in  his 
resignation,  — when  news  came  of  the  doings  of  another  John 
Brown  at  Harper’s  Ferry.  The  resignation  was  instantly  recalled, 
with  the  remark  that  it  was  not  a time  for  Browns  to  seem  to  be 
backward  on  the  question  of  slavery.  Such  is  the  irony  of  coinci- 
dence in  names. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


131 


he  detested  slavery ; and  — forgetting,  apparently, 
that  this  tax  was  provided  for  by  the  Constitution 
— he  doubted  whether  imposing  it  would  not 
have  the  appearance  of  authorizing  the  practice  ” 
of  trading  in  slaves.  This  was  his  reason  for  wish- 
ing to  postpone  the  subject.  But  Mr.  Livermore 
of  New  Hampshire  was  more  ingenious  still.  If 
the  imported  negroes  were  goods,  wares,  or  mer- 
chandise, they  would  come  within  the  title  of  the 
bill,  and  be  taxed  under  the  general  rule  of  five 
per  centum,  which  would  be  about  the  same  rate 
as  ten  dollars  a head ; but  if  they  were  not  goods, 
wares,  or  merchandise,  then  such  importation  could 
not  properly  be  included  in  the  consideration  of 
the  question  of  a revenue  from  duties  on  such 
articles  of  trade. 

Mr.  Madison  came  to  the  help  of  his  colleague, 
and  brushed  aside  the  sophistries  of  the  New 
England  allies  of  the  slave  traders.  If  there  were 
anything  wanting  in  the  title  of  the  bill  to  cover 
this  particular  duty,  it  was  easy  to  add  it.  If  the 
question  was  not  one  of  taxation  because  it  was 
one  of  humanity,  it  would  be  quite  as  difficult  to 
deal  with  it  under  any  other  bill  for  levying  a 
duty  as  under  this.  If  the  tax  seemed  unjust  be- 
cause it  bore  heavily  upon  a single  class,  that 
would  be  a good  reason  for  remitting  many  taxes 
which  there  was  no  hesitation  in  imposing.  If  ten 
dollars  seemed  a heavy  duty,  a little  calculation 
would  show  that  it  was  only  about  the  proposed 
ad  valorem  duty  of  five  per  centum  on  most  other 


132 


JAMES  MADISON 


importations.  It  is  to  be  hoped,”  he  added,  ‘‘that 
by  expressing  a national  disapprobation  of  this 
trade  we  may  destroy  it,  and  save  ourselves  from 
reproaches,  and  our  posterity  the  imbecility  ever 
attendant  on  a country  filled  with  slaves.”  “If 
there  is  any  one  point,”  he  continued,  “ in  which 
it  is  clearly  the  policy  of  this  nation,  so  far  as  we 
constitutionally  can,  to  vary  the  practice  obtaining 
under  some  of  the  state  governments,  it  is  this.  . . . 
It  is  as  much  the  interest  of  Georgia  and  South 
Carolina  as  of  any  in  the  Union.  Every  addition 
they  receive  to  their  number  of  slaves  tends  to 
weaken  and  render  them  less  capable  of  self- 
defense.  ...  It  is  a necessary  duty  of  the  general 
government  to  protect  every  part  of  the  empire 
against  danger,  as  well  internal  as  external. 
Everything,  therefore,  which  tends  to  increase 
this  danger,  though  it  may  be  a local  affair,  yet, 
if  it  involves  national  expense  or  safety,  becomes 
of  concern  to  every  part  of  the  Union,  and  is  a pro- 
per subject  for  the  consideration  of  those  charged 
with  the  general  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment.” No  Northern  man,  except  Elbridge  Gerry 
of  Massachusetts,  supported  this  measure ; and 
none  from  the  Southern  States,  except  three  of 
the  Virginia  members,  with  Madison  leading.  As 
the  foreign  slave  trade  was  protected  in  the  Con- 
stitution for  twenty  years  by  a bargain  between 
the  two  southernmost  States  and  New  England,  so 
now  the  same  infiuence  staved  off  the  imposition  of 
the  tax  which  was  a part  of  the  consideration  to  be 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


133 


given  for  that  constitutional  protection  of  the  trade. 
It  is  not  a creditable  fact ; but  it  is,  nevertheless, 
a fact  and  a representative  one  in  the  history  of 
the  United  States.  And  it  is  to  Madison’s  great 
honor  that  he  had  neither  part  nor  lot  in  it. 

After  six  weeks  of  earnest  debate,  an  amicable 
and  satisfactory  agreement  was  made  to  impose  a 
moderate  duty  upon  pretty  much  everything  im- 
ported, except  slaves  from  Africa.  It  was  liter- 
ally a tariff  for  revenue  ; but  it  was  a settlement 
that  settled  nothing  definitely,  except  that  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Constitution  for  a tax  of  ten  dollars 
on  imported  slaves  should  be  a dead  letter.  Thence- 
forth the  policy  of  free  trade  was  established,  so 
far  as  African  slaves  were  concerned,  till  the  traffic 
was  supposed  to  cease  by  constitutional  limitation 
and  Act  of  Congress  in  1808.^ 

^ The  subsequent  legislation  on  this  subject  is  a curious  exem- 
plification of  the  ingenuity  'With  'which  any  law  obnoxious  to  the 
owners  of  slaves  was  got  rid  of,  when  it  was  clear  that  it  could 
not  be  defeated  by  force  of  numbers.  In  1806  a final  attempt  was 
made  to  impose  the  duty  of  ten  dollars  upon  slaves  imported,  and 
a resolution  passed  in  favor  of  it.  This  was  referred  to  a com- 
mittee, with  instructions  to  bring  in  a bill.  A bill  was  reported 
and  pushed  so  far  as  a third  reading,  when  it  was  recommitted, 
which  put  it  off  for  a year.  When  it  next  appeared  it  was  a bill 
for  the  prohibition  of  the  importation  of  slaves,  in  accordance  with 
the  constitutional  provision  that  the  traffic  should  cease  in  1808. 
The  new  question,  after  some  debate,  in  which  there  was  no  allu- 
sion to  the  tax,  was  postponed  for  further  consideration.  But  it 
never  again  came  before  the  House.  A month  later,  February 
13,  1807,  a bill  from  the  Senate,  providing  that  the  foreign  slave 
trade  should  cease  on  the  first  day  of  the  following  .January,  was 
received  and  immediately  concurred  in,  and  that  seems  to  have 


134 


JAMES  MADISON 


The  determination  to  protect  the  commercial 
interests  of  the  country,  beyond  the  point  of  mere 
revenue,  was  more  manifest  in  fixing  the  rate  of 
duty  upon  tonnage  than  in  duties  upon  importa- 
tions. It  was  generally  agreed,  after  much  debate, 
that  American  commerce  had  better  be  in  Ameri- 
can hands,  and  a difference  of  twenty  cents  a ton 
was  made  between  the  tax  upon  domestic  and  that 
upon  foreign  ships,  as  a measure  of  protection  to 
American  shipping.  Mr.  Madison  proposed  to 
make  it  still  larger,  but  the  House  would  only 
agree  to  increase  it  to  forty  cents  on  ships  belong- 
ing to  powers  with  which  the  United  States  had 
no  treaties.  The  Senate,  however,  refused  to  ad- 
mit this  distinction,  and  insisted  that  all  foreign 
ships  should  be  subject  to  the  same  tonnage  duty 
without  regard  to  existing  treaties.  The  House 
assented,  lest  the  bill  should  be  lost  altogether. 
This  proposed  differential  duty  on  foreign  vessels 
was  as  clearly  aimed  at  Great  Britain  as  if  that 
power  had  been  named  in  the  bill.  Nor,  indeed, 
was  there  any  attempt  at  concealment ; for  it  was 
openly  avowed  that  America  had  no  formidable 
rival  except  the  English,  who  already  largely  con- 
trolled the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  In  the 
debates  and  in  the  final  decision  of  the  question 

been  silently  accepted  as  disposing  of  the  whole  subject.  No  tax 
was  ever  paid;  but  the  importation  of  slaves,  notwithstanding 
the  law  to  put  an  end  to  importation  in  1808,  continued  at  the 
rate,  it  was  estimated,  of  about  fifteen  thousand  a year.  Prob- 
ably it  never  ceased  altogether  till  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion 
of  1860. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


135 


IS  shown  clearly  enough  the  difference  of  opinion 
and  of  feeling,  which  soon  made  the  dividing  line 
between  the  two  great  parties  of  the  first  quarter 
of  a century  under  the  Constitution.  Nobody  then 
foresaw  how  bitter  that  difference  of  party  was 
to  be,  nor  what  disastrous  consequences  would  fol- 
low it. 

Mr.  Madison  was  am  most  zealous  of 

those" whd^msisted  upon  a discrimination  against 
“GreaF  BHtaih.^^  it  should  be  made 

for  the  dignity  no  less  than  for  the  interest  of  the 
United  States.  He  had  no  fear,  he  said,  ‘‘  of  enter- 
ing into  a commercial  warfare  with  that  nation.” 
England,  he  believed,  could  do  this  country  no 
harm  by  any  peaceful  reprisals  she  could  devise. 
She  supplied  the  United  States  with  no  article 
either  of  necessity  or  of  luxury  that  the  people  of 
the  United  States  could  not  manufacture  for  them- 
selves. He  called  those  ‘‘Anglicists”  who  did  not 
agree  with  him,  and  who  believed  that  it  was  in 
the  power  of  Great  Britain  to  hinder  or  to  help 
immensely  the  prosperity  of  the  United  States.  It 
was  not  of  so  much  moment  what  America  bought 
of  England  as  it  was  that  England  should  con- 
sent to  free  trade  with  her  colonies ; and  on  every 
account  it  was  wiser  to  conciliate  than  to  defy  Great 
Britain  ; wiser  to  induce  her  to  enter  into  a friendly 
commercial  alliance  than  to  provoke  her  to  retali- 
ate upon  the  feeble  commerce  of  this  country,  upon 
which  she  had  so  strong  a grip.  Madison  had 
shown  himself,  before  this  time,  half  credulous  of 


136 


JAMES  MADISON 


the  charges  of  a leaning  toward  England,  and 
toward  monarchy,  made  by  those  who  wanted  a 
congress  of  petty  states  against  those  who  wanted 
a strong  national  government.  If,  however,  there 
were  Anglicism  on  one  side,  so  there  was  quite  as 
much  Gallicism,  if  not  a good  deal  more,  on  the 
other.  In  writing  to  Jefferson  of  the  probability 
that  the  Senate  would  make  no  discrimination  in 
the  tonnage  duties,  he  said  that  in  that  case  Great 
Britain  will  be  quieted  in  the  enjoyment  of  our 
trade  as  she  may  please  to  regulate  it,  and  France 
discouraged  from  her  efforts  at  a competition  which 
it  is  not  less  our  interest  than  hers  to  promote.” 
Whatever  may  be  thought  of  this  first  concession 
of  the  new  government  to  England,  it  is  quite  as 
much  the  coming  party  leader  as  the  statesman 
who  speaks  here.  It  may  not  be  doubted  that  he 
sincerely  thought  it  to  be,  as  he  said,  impolitic, 
in  every  view  that  can  be  taken  of  the  subject,  to 
put  Great  Britain  at  once  on  the  footing  of  the 
most  favored  nation.”  But  the  relation  of  Amer- 
ican interests  to  English  interests  was  evidently 
already  associated  in  his  mind  with  the  relations 
of  France  and  England,  so  soon  to  be  the  absorb- 
ing question  in  American  politics. 

The  impost  act  was  followed  by  others  hardly 
less  important  in  putting  the  new  Constitution  into 
operation  under  its  first  Congress.  The  direction 
of  business  seems,  by  common  consent,  to  have 
been  intrusted  to  Mr.  Madison  among  the  many 
able  men  of  that  body ; doubtless  because  of  his 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


137 


thorough  familiarity  with  the  Constitution,  and  of 
his  methodical  ways.  He  was  sure  to  bring  things 
forward  in  their  due  order,  to  provide  judiciously 
for  the  more  immediate  needs.  The  impost  bill 
secured  the  means  to  work  with  ; the  next  neces- 
sity was  to  organize  the  machinery  to  do  the  work. 
Resolutions  to  create  the  executive  departments  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  of  the  Treasury,  and  of  W ar  were 
offered  by  Mr.  Madison.  These  were  required  in 
general  terms  by  the  Constitution,  with  a single 
officer  at  the  head  of  each,  to  be  appointed  by  the 
President  ‘‘  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate.”  The  manner  of  the  appointment  of 
subordinate  officers  was  provided  for  by  the  Con- 
stitution, but  the  manner  of  their  removal  from 
office  was  not.  Was  the  tenure  of  office  to  be 
good  behavior?  Were  the  incumbents  removable, 
with  or  without  cause  ? If  the  power  of  removal 
existed,  did  it  vest  in  the  power  that  appointed, 
that  is,  in  the  President  and  Senate  conjointly,  or 
in  the  President  alone  ? 

As  the  Constitution  was  silent,  the  question 
had  to  be  settled  on  its  own  merits.  With  all 
the  arguments  that  could  be  urged,  either  on  one 
side  or  the  other,  we  are  familiar  enough  in  our 
time,  coming  up  as  the  question  so  often  does  in 
changes  in  state  constitutions  and  municipal  char- 
ters, and  in  the  discussion  of  the  necessity  for 
civil  service  reform.  There  is  this  essential  dif- 
ference, however,  between  now  and  then : we  know 
the  mischiefs  that  come  from  the  power  of  official 


138 


JAMES  MADISON 


removal,  which  were  then  only  dimly  apprehended. 
The  power  of  removal  from  office  belonged,  Mr. 
Madison  believed,  rightfully  to  the  chief  magis- 
trate, and,  if  by  some  unhappy  chance  the  wrong 
man  should  find  his  way  to  that  position  and  abuse 
the  power  intrusted  to  him,  the  wanton  removal 
of  meritorious  officers  would,”  he  said,  “ subject 
the  President  to  impeachment  and  removal  from 
his  own  high  trust.” 

Lofty  political  principles  like  these  may  still  be 
found  in  the  platforms  of  modern  political  par- 
ties, — 

“ The  souls  of  them  fumed-forth,  the  hearts  of  them  torn-out.” 

But  Mr.  Madison  believed,  at  least,  that  he  be- 
lieved in  them.  There  is  in  politics  as  in  religion 
an  accepted  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith ; and 
this,  perhaps,  sustained  him  when,  twelve  years 
later,  as  JefiPerson’s  secretary  of  state,  he  learned 
from  his  chief  that,  as  ‘^Federalists  seldom  died 
and  never  resigned,”  party  necessities  must  find  a 
way  of  supplementing  the  law  of  nature.  Jeffer- 
son was  a little  timid  in  applying  the  remedy,  but 
Madison  lived  long  enough  to  see  Jackson  boldly 
remove,  in  the  course  of  his  administration,  about 
two  thousand  office-holders,  whose  places  he  wanted 
as  rewards  for  his  own  political  followers.  From 
that  time  to  this,  there  has  not  been  a President 
who  might  not,  if  Madison’s  doctrine  was  sound, 
have  been  impeached  for  a “ wanton  ” abuse  of 
power. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


139 


Though  the  Constitution  had  been  adopted  by 
the  States,  it  was  not  without  objections  by  some 
of  them.  To  meet  these  objections  Mr.  Madison 
proposed  twelve  amendments  declaratory  of  cer- 
tain fundamental  popular  rights,  which,  it  was 
thought  by  many  persons,  were  not  sufficiently 
guarded  by  the  original  articles.  This,  also,  was 
left  to  him  to  do,  no  doubt  because  of  his  thor- 
ough knowledge  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the 
points  wherein  it  was  still  imperfect,  as  well  as 
those  wherein  it  had  better  not  be  meddled  with. 
The  amendments,  as  finally  agreed  to  after  long 
debate,  were  essentially  those  which  he  proposed, 
and  in  due  time  ten  of  them  were  ratified  by  the 
States.  The  two  that  were  not  accepted  referred 
only  to  the  number  of  representatives  in  the 
House,  and  to  the  pay  of  members  of  Congress. 

It  was  hoped  that  the  selection  of  a place  for  the 
permanent  seat  of  government  would  be  made  by 
this  Congress.  There  was  much  talk  of  the  centres 
of  wealth,  of  territory,  and  of  population  then, 
and  of  where  such  centres  might  be  in  the  future. 
But  the  question  was  really  a sectional  one.  The 
Northern  members  were  accused  of  having  made 
a bargain  out  of  doors  with  the  members  of  the 
Middle  States.  The  bargain,  however,  was  only 
this  : that,  inasmuch  as  it  was  hopeless  that  the 
actual  centre  should  be  chosen  as  the  site  for  a cap- 
ital city,  a place  as  near  as  possible  to  it  should 
be  insisted  upon.  The  South,  on  the  other  hand, 
determined  that  the  seat  of  government  should 


140 


JAMES  MADISON 


be  within  the  boundaries  of  the  Southern  States. 
That  was  a foregone  conclusion  with  them,  that 
needed  no  bargain.  The  nearest  navigable  river 
to  the  centre  of  population  was  the  Delaware ; but 
the  jealousy  of  New  York  stood  in  the  way  of  any 
selection  that  favored  Philadelphia.  The  Sus- 
quehanna was  proposed.  It  empties  into  Chesa- 
peake Bay.  North  of  it  was,  as  Mr.  Sherman 
showed,  a population  of  1,400,000  ; and  south  of  it, 
1,200,000.  The  South  wanted  the  capital  on  the 
Potomac,  not  because  it  was  the  centre  of  popu- 
lation then,  but  because  it  might  be  at  some  future 
time,  from  the  growth  of  the  West.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  insisted  that  the  population  south  of 
the  Potomac  was  then  only  960,000,  while  north 
of  it  there  were  1,680,000  people,  and  that  it  was 
no  more  accessible  from  the  W est  than  the  Susque- 
hanna was.  To  many  members,  moreover,  this  talk 
of  the  great  future  of  the  West  seemed  hardly 
worthy  of  consideration.  It  was  an  unmeasur- 
able wilderness,”  and  ^^when  it  would  be  settled 
was  past  calculation,”  Fisher  Ames  said.  It 
was,”  he  added,  perfectly  romantic  to  make  this 
decision  depend  upon  that  circumstance.  Proba- 
bly it  will  be  near  a century  before  these  people 
will  be  considerable.”  He  was  nearer  right  when 
he  said  in  the  same  speech  that  trade  and  manu- 
factures will  accumulate  people  in  the  Eastern 
States  in  proportion  of  five  to  three,  compared 
with  the  Southern.  The  disproportion  will,  doubt- 
less, continue  to  be  much  greater  than  I have 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


141 


calculated.  It  is  actually  greater  at  present,  for 
the  climate  and  negro  slavery  are  acknowledged  to 
be  unfavorable  to  population,  so  that  husbandry  as 
well  as  commerce  and  manufactures  will  give  more 
people  in  the  Eastern  than  in  the  Southern  States.” 
It  was,  however,  finally  resolved  by  the  House 
‘‘that  the  permanent  seat  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  ought  to  be  at  some  convenient 
place  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Susquehanna  in 
the  State  of  Pennsylvania ; ” and  a bill  accordingly 
was  sent  to  the  Senate. 

Had  the  Senate  agreed  to  this  bill,  there  are 
some  luminous  pages  of  American  history  that 
would  never  have  been  written;  for  the  progress 
of  events  would  have  taken  quite  another  direction 
had  the  infiuences  surrounding  the  national  capital 
for  the  first  half  of  this  century  been  Northern 
instead  of  Southern.  But  the  Senate  did  not 
agree.  For  “ the  convenient  place  on  the  banks  of 
the  Susquehanna  ” it  substituted  ten  miles  square 
on  the  river  Delaware,  beginning  one  mile  from 
Philadelphia  and  including  the  village  of  German- 
town. To  this  amendment  the  House  agreed,  and 
there,  but  for  Madison,  the  matter  would  have 
ended.  He  had  labored  earnestly  for  the  site  on 
the  Potomac ; but  failing  in  that,  he  hoped  to  post- 
pone the  question  till  the  next  session  of  Congress, 
when  the  representatives  from  North  Carolina 
would  be  present.  He  moved  a proviso  that  the 
laws  of  Pennsylvania  should  remain  in  force  within 
the  district  ceded  by  the  State  till  Congress  should 


142 


JAMES  MADISON 


otherwise  provide  by  law.  It  seems  to  have  been 
accepted  without  consideration,  a single  member 
only  saying  that  he  saw  no  necessity  for  it.  At 
any  rate,  whether  that  was  Mr.  Madison’s  motive 
or  not,  time  was  gained,  for  it  compelled  the  return 
of  the  bill  to  the  Senate.  This  was  on  September 
28,  and  the  next  day  the  session  was  closed  by 
adjournment  till  the  following  January. 

When  in  that  next  session  the  bill  came  back 
from  the  Senate  to  the  House,  a member  from 
South  Carolina  said,  in  the  course  of  debate,  that 
‘‘  a Quaker  State  was  a bad  neighborhood  for  the 
South  Carolinians.”  The  Senate  had  also  come 
to  that  conclusion,  for  the  bill  now  proposed  that 
the  capital  should  be  at  Philadelphia  for  ten  years 
only,  and  should  then  be  removed  to  the  banks  of 
the  Potomac.  It  was  done,  Madison  wrote  to 
Monroe,  by  a single  vote,  for  two  Southern  sen- 
ators voted  against  it.  But  the  two  senators  from 
North  Carolina  were  now  present,  and  the  majority 
of  one  was  made  sure  of  somehow. 

So  much  was  gained  by  gaining  time,  and  Mad- 
ison thought  the  passage  of  the  bill  through  the 
House  was  possible,  ‘‘  but  attended  with  great 
difficulties.”  Did  he  know  how  these  difficulties 
were  to  be  overcome?  ‘Hf  the  Potomac  succeeds,” 
he  adds,  ‘‘  it  will  have  resulted  from  a fortuitous 
coincidence  of  circumstances  which  might  never 
happen  again.”  What  the  fortuitous  coinci- 
dence ” was  he  does  not  explain ; but  the  term  was 
a felicitous  euphuism  to  cover  up  what  in  the 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS 


143 


blunter  political  language  of  our  time  is  called 
log-rolling.” 

The  reader  of  this  series  of  biographies  is  al- 
ready familiar  with  Hamilton’s  skillful  barter  of 
votes  for  the  Potomac  site  of  the  capital  in  ex- 
change for  votes  in  favor  of  his  scheme  for  the 
assumption  of  the  state  debts.  Madison  seems 
not  to  have  been  ignorant  of  the  progress  of  that 
bargain,  with  which  Jefferson  was  afterward  so 
anxious  to  prove  that  he  had  nothing  to  do.  Mad- 
ison earnestly  opposed  the  assumption  of  the  state 
debts  from  first  to  last ; but,  when  he  saw  that  the 
measure  was  sure  to  pass  the  House,  he  wrote  to 
Monroe : “ I cannot  deny  that  the  crisis  demands 
a spirit  of  accommodation  to  a certain  extent.  If 
the  measure  should  be  adopted,  I shall  wish  it  to 
be  considered  as  an  unavoidable  evil,  and  possibly 
not  the  worst  side  of  the  dilemma.”  In  other 
words,  he  was  willing  to  assent  silently  to  what 
he  believed  to  be  a great  injustice  to  several  of  the 
States,  provided  that  the  bargain  should  be  a gain 
to  his  own  State.  If  Hamilton  and  Jefferson  were 
sinners  in  this  business,  Madison  will  hardly  pass 
for  a saint. 


CHAPTER  XI 


NATIONAL  FINANCES  — SLAVERY 

Hamilton’s  famous  report  to  the  First  Congress, 
as  secretary  of  the  treasury,  was  made  at  the  second 
session  in  January,  1790.  Near  the  close  of  the 
previous  session  a petition  asking  for  some  settle- 
ment of  the  public  debt  was  received  and  referred 
to  a committee  of  which  Madison  was  chairman. 
The  committee  reported  in  favor  of  the  petition, 
and  the  House  accordingly  called  upon  the  sec- 
retary to  prepare  a plan  for  the  support  of  the 
public  credit.” 

So  far  as  Hamilton’s  funding  scheme  provided 
for  that  portion  of  the  debt  due  to  foreigners,  it 
was  accepted  without  demur.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  that  there  the  ostensible  creditor  was  the  real 
creditor,  who  should  be  paid  in  full.  The  report 
assumed  that  this  was  equally  true  of  the  domestic 
debt.  A citizen  holding  a certificate  of  the  indebt- 
edness of  the  government,  no  matter  how  he  came 
by  it,  nor  at  what  price,  was  entitled  to  payment  at 
its  face  value.  But  here  the  question  was  raised. 
Was  this  ostensible  creditor  the  sole  creditor?  Was 
he,  whose  necessities  had  compelled  him  to  part 
with  the  government’s  note  of  hand  at  a large  dis- 


NATIONAL  FINANCES 


145 


count  when  full  payment  was  impossible,  to  receive 
nothing  now  when  at  last  government  was  able  to 
pay  in  full?  Was  it  equity  to  let  all  the  loss  fall 
upon  the  original  creditor,  and  all  the  gain  go  to 
him  who  had  lost  nothing  originally,  and  had  only 
assumed  at  small  cost  the  risk  of  a profitable  spec- 
ulation ? Moreover  it  was  charged,  and  not  denied, 
that  in  some  of  these  speculations  there  had  been 
no  risk  whatever  ; and  that,  so  soon  as  the  tenor 
of  the  report  was  known,  fast-sailing  vessels  were 
dispatched  from  New  York  to  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia  to  buy  up  public  securities  held  by  persons 
ignorant  of  their  recent  rapid  rise  in  value.  As 
hitherto  they  had  been  worth  only  about  fifteen 
cents  on  the  dollar ; as  upon  the  publication  of  the 
secretary’s  report  they  had  risen  to  fifty  cents  on 
the  dollar ; and  as,  if  the  secretary’s  advice  should 
be  taken,  they  would  rise  to  a hundred  cents  on  the 
dollar,  — it  would  be  securing  what  in  the  slang 
of  the  modern  stock  exchange  is  called  a good 
thing”  to  send  agents  into  the  rural  districts  in 
advance  of  the  news  to  buy  up  government  paper. 
My  soul  rises  indignant,”  exclaimed  a member, 
at  the  avaricious  and  moral  turpitude  which  so 
vile  a conduct  displays.”  Nor  on  that  point  did 
anybody  venture  then  to  disagree  with  him  openly. 

But,  besides  the  question  as  to  who  were  in 
reality  the  public  creditors,  a doubt  was  also  raised 
whether  the  debt  ought  to  be  paid  in  full  to  any- 
body. Every  dollar  of  the  foreign  debt  was  for 
an  actual  dollar  borrowed.  But  the  domestic  debt 


146 


JAMES  MADISON 


was  not  incurred  to  any  large  amount  for  money 
borrowed,  but  in  payment  for  services,  or  for  pro- 
visions and  goods  purchased,  for  which  double, 
or  more  than  double,  prices  had  been  exacted  by 
those  who  exchanged  them  for  government  paper. 
If  the  exigencies  of  war  had  compelled  the  govern- 
ment to  promise  to  pay  for  fifty  bushels  of  wheat 
the  price  of  a hundred  bushels,  the  creditor,  now 
that  the  government  was  in  a condition  to  redeem 
its  promise,  was  not  entitled  in  equity  to  receive 
more  than  the  actual  value  of  the  fifty  bushels  at 
the  time  of  the  purchase.  Moreover,  it  was  con- 
tended, there  was  no  injustice  in  such  a settlement 
of  the  debt,  for  the  war  had  been  carried  on  and 
brought  to  a successful  end,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
creditor  as  well  as  of  everybody  else.  The  argu- 
ment was  analogous  in  a measure  to  that  used  by 
a certain  class  of  politicians  in  our  time,  who  main- 
tained that  the  bonds  of  the  United  States,  bought 
at  a discount  for  “ greenbacks  ” during  the  late 
rebellion,  should  not  be  redeemed  in  gold  when 
the  war  was  over. 

The  answer  to  all  this  was  obvious.  The  nation 
must  first  be  just  by  paying  its  debts  to  those 
who  could  present  the  evidence  that  they  were  its 
creditors.  If,  when  that  was  done,  it  could  afford 
to  be  generous,  it  might,  if  so  disposed,  reimburse 
those  who  had  lost  by  parting  with  the  certificates 
of  debt  at  a discount.  The  government  could  not 
in  honor  go  behind  its  own  contracts.  The  Consti- 
tution provided  that  ‘‘  all  debts  and  engagements. 


NATIONAL  FINANCES 


147 


entered  into  before  the  adoption  of  this  Constitu- 
tion, shall  be  as  valid  against  the  United  States 
under  this  Constitution  as  under  the  Confedera- 
tion.” Here  was  a debt  which  the  Confederation 
had  contracted,  and  the  federal  government  had 
no  more  right  ‘‘  to  impair  the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts ” for  its  own  benefit  than  the  separate  States 
had;  and  that  they  were  expressly  forbidden  by 
the  Constitution  to  do. 

Madison  listened  quietly  day  after  day  to  the 
long  and  earnest  debates  upon  the  subject,  and 
then  advanced  an  entirely  new  proposition.  He 
agreed  with  one  party  in  maintaining  the  inviola- 
bility of  contracts.  The  Confederacy  had  incurred 
a debt  to  its  own  citizens  which  the  new  govern- 
ment had  agreed  to  assume.  But  he  also  agreed 
with  the  other  party  that  there  was  a question  as 
to  whom  that  debt  was  due.  Were  those  who  now 
held  the  certificates  entitled  to  the  payment  of 
their  face  value,  dollar  for  dollar,  although  the  cost 
to  them  was  only  somewhere  from  fifteen  to  fifty 
cents  on  the  dollar  ? It  was  true  that  the  original 
contract  was  transferable,  and  these  present  cred- 
itors held  the  evidence  of  the  transfer.  But  did 
that  transfer  entitle  the  holder  to  the  full  value 
without  regard  to  the  price  paid  for  it  ? W as 
there  not  in  equity  a reserved  right  in  the  original 
holder,  who,  having  given  a full  equivalent  for 
the  debt,  had  only  parted  with  the  evidence  of  it, 
under  the  compulsion  of  his  own  poverty,  and  the 
inability  of  the  government  at  that  time  to  meet 


148 


JAMES  MADISON 


its  obligations?  Was  not  this  specially  true  in 
the  case  of  the  soldiers  of  the  late  war,  to  whose 
devotion  and  sacrifices  the  nation  owed  its  exist- 
ence ? 

Mr.  Madison  thought  that  an  affirmative  reply 
to  the  last  two  queries  would  present  the  true  view 
of  the  case,  and  he  proposed,  therefore,  to  pay  both 
classes  of  creditors,  — those  who  now  held  the  evi- 
dence of  indebtedness,  acquired  by  purchase  at  no 
matter  what  price ; and  those  who  had  parted  with 
that  evidence  without  receiving  the  amount  which 
the  government  had  promised  to  pay  for  services 
rendered.  It  was  not,  however,  to  be  expected 
that  the  entire  debt  should  be  paid  in  full  to  both 
classes.  That  was  beyond  the  ability  of  the  gov- 
ernment. But  it  would  be  an  equitable  settlement, 
he  contended,  to  pay  the  present  holders  the  high- 
est price  the  certificates  had  ever  reached,  and  to 
award  the  remainder  to  those  who  were  the  original 
creditors. 

This  proposition  received  only  thirteen  votes  out 
of  forty-nine.  Many  of  those  opposed  to  it  were 
quite  ready  to  grant  that  it  was  hard  upon  the  vet- 
erans of  the  war  that  they,  who  had  received  so 
little  and  who  had  borne  so  much,  should  not  now 
be  recognized  as  creditors  when  at  last  the  govern- 
ment was  able  to  pay  its  debts.  But  the  House 
could  not  indulge  in  sentimental  legislation.  That 
would  be  to  launch  the  ship  of  state  upon  another 
sea  of  bankruptcy.  There  were  in  the  hands  of 
the  people  tens  of  millions  of  paper  money  not 


NATIONAL  FINANCES 


149 


worth  at  the  current  rate  a cent  on  the  dollar.  If 
everybody  who  had  lost  was  to  be  paid,  the  point 
would  soon  be  reached  where  nobody  would  be 
paid  at  all.  A limit  must  be  fixed  somewhere ; 
let  it  be  at  these  certificates  of  debt  which  were 
the  evidence  of  a contract  made  between  the  gov- 
ernment and  its  creditors.  These  could  be  paid, 
and  they  should  be  paid,  to  those  who  were  in  law- 
ful possession  of  them.  The  law,  if  not  the  equity, 
of  the  case  was  clearly  against  Madison.  That 
the  government  should  be  absolutely  just  to  every- 
body who  had  ever  trusted  to  ic,  and  lost  by  it,  was 
impossible.  It  was  a bankrupt  compelled  to  name 
its  preferred  creditors,  and  it  named  those  whom  it 
was  in  honor  and  law  bound  to  take  care  of,  and 
over  whose  claims  there  was,  on  the  whole,  the  least 
shadow  of  doubt.  That  the  loss  should  remain 
chiefly  with  the  soldiers  of  the  Revolution,  and  the 
gain  fall  chiefly  to  those  who  were  shrewd  enough, 
or  had  the  means  to  speculate  in  the  public  funds, 
was  a lamentable  fact ; but  to  discriminate  between 
them  was  not  within  the  right  of  the  government. 
That  he  would  have  had  it  discriminate  was  credit- 
able to  Madison’s  heart;'  it  was  rather  less  credit- 
able to  his  head. 

Of  course,  underneath  all  this  debate  there  lay 
other  considerations  than  those  merely  of  debtor 
and  creditor,  of  moral  and  legal  obligation,  of  pity 
for  the  soldiers,  and  of  strict  regard  for  the  letter 
of  a contract.  Mr.  Hamilton  and  his  friends,  it 
was  said,  were  anxious  to  establish  the  public 


150 


JAMES  MADISON 


credit,  not  so  much  because  they  wished  to  keep 
faith  with  creditors  as  because  they  wished  to 
strengthen  the  government  and  build  up  their  own 
party.  The  reply  to  these  accusations  was,  that 
the  other  side,  under  pretense  of  consideration  for 
the  soldiers  and  others  on  whom  the  burden  of  the 
war  had  borne  most  heavily,  concealed  hostility  to 
the  Constitution  and  a consolidated  government. 
These  were  not  reflections  to  be  spoken  of  in 
debate,  but  they  were  not  the  less  cherished,  and 
gave  to  it  piquancy  and  spirit.  There  was  truth 
on  both  sides  without  doubt. 

Though  defeated  in  this  measure,  Madison  was 
not  less  determined  in  his  opposition  to  the  as- 
sumption of  the  debts  of  the  States.  Of  these 
debts  some  States  had  discharged  more  than 
others ; and  he  complained,  not  without  reason,  of 
the  injustice  of  compelling  those  which  had  borne 
their  own  burdens  unaided  to  share  in  the  oblio;ar 
tions  which  others  had  neglected.  He  was  un- 
fortunate, however,  in  assuming  a superiority  for 
Virginia  over  some  of  the  Eastern  States,  and 
especially  over  Massachusetts,  in  services  rendered 
in  the  struggle  for  independence.  The  compari- 
son provoked  a call  for  official  inquiry ; and  that 
proved  that  Massachusetts  alone  had  sent  more 
men  into  the  fleld  during  the  war  than  all  the 
Southern  States  together.  It  was  not  much  to 
be  wondered  at,  when  this  fact  was  considered, 
that  the  debt  of  Massachusetts  should  be  larger 
than  that  of  Virginia  by  $800,000.  The  difference 


NATIONAL  FINANCES 


151 


between  Virginia  and  South  Carolina  was  the  same, 
the  truth  being  that  the  war  had  cost  Massachu- 
setts more  money  to  pay  her  soldiers  for  the  gen- 
eral service,  and  South  Carolina  more  to  repel  the 
enemy  upon  her  own  soil,  than  it  had  cost  Virginia 
for  either  purpose.  Massachusetts  and  South  Car- 
olina were  again  found  acting  together,  simply 
because  each  of  them  had  a debt  — f4, 000, 000  — 
larger  than  that  of  any  other  State.  The  total 
debt  of  all  the  States  was  about  $21,000,000 ; and 
as  that  of  North  Carolina,  Pennsylvania,  or  Con- 
necticut, when  added  to  the  $8,000,000  of  Massa- 
chusetts and  South  Carolina,  amounted  to  half,  or 
more,  of  the  whole  sum,  there  was  no  difficulty  in 
forming  a strong  combination  in  favor  of  assump- 
tion. No  combination,  however,  was  strong  enough 
to  carry  the  measure  on  its  own  merits,  notwith- 
standing its  advocates  attempted  to  defeat  the 
funding  of  the  domestic  debt  of  the  Federal  Union 
unless  the  debts  of  the  several  States  were  assumed 
at  the  same  time. 

The  domestic  debt,  however,  was  at  length  pro- 
vided for,  and  the  assumption  of  the  debts  of  the 
States  was  rejected  till  that  bargain,  referred  to  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  which  gave  to  the  Southern 
States  the  permanent  seat  of  government,  was  con- 
cluded. It  would  not  have  been  difficult,  prob- 
ably, to  defeat  that  piece  of  political  jobbery  by 
a public  exposure  of  its  terms.  Why  Madison 
did  not  resort  to  it,  if,  as  seems  certain,  he  knew 
that  such  a bargain  had  been  privately  made,  can 


152 


JAMES  MADISON 


only  be  conjectured.  Perhaps  he  saw  that  Ham- 
ilton, who  was  applauded  by  his  friends  and  de- 
nounced by  his  enemies  for  his  clever  management, 
had,  after  all,  only  made  a temporary  gain ; and 
that  Jefferson,  whose  defense  was  that  Hamilton 
had  taken  advantage  of  his  ignorance  and  inno- 
cence, would  not,  had  he  not  been  short-sighted, 
have  made  any  defense  at  all.  For  the  assumption 
of  the  state  debts  by  the  general  government  was 
only  a distribution  of  a single  local  burden  ; and 
this  was  a small  price  for  Virginia  and  the  other 
Southern  States  to  pay  for  the  permanent  posses- 
sion of  the  federal  capital. 

While  these  questions  were  pending,  another 
was  thrown  into  the  House  which  was  not  disposed 
of  for  nearly  two  months.  The  debates  upon  it, 
Madison  said  in  one  of  his  letters,  were  shame- 
fully indecent,”  though  he  thought  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  subject  into  Congress  injudicious. 
The  Yearly  Meeting  of  Friends  in  New  York  and 
in  Pennsylvania  sent  a memorial  against  the  con- 
tinued toleration  of  the  slave  trade ; and  this  was 
followed  the  next  day  by  a petition  from  the  Penn- 
sylvania Society  for  the  Promotion  of  the  Abolition 
of  Slavery,  signed  by  Benjamin  Franklin  as  presi- 
dent, asking  for  a more  radical  measure. 

They  earnestly  entreat,”  they  said,  your  serious 
attention  to  the  subject  of  slavery ; that  you  will  be 
pleased  to  countenance  the  restoration  of  liberty  to 
these  unhappy  men,  who  alone  in  this  land  of  freedom 
are  degraded  into  perpetual  bondage,  and  who,  amidst 


SLAVERY 


153 


the  general  joy  of  surrounding  freemen,  are  groaning 
in  servile  subjection  ; that  you  will  devise  means  for 
removing  this  inconsistency  from  the  character  of  the 
American  people ; that  you  will  promote  mercy  and 
justice  towards  this  distressed  race  ; and  that  you  will 
step  to  the  very  verge  of  the  power  vested  in  you  for 
discouraging  every  species  of  traffic  in  the  persons  of 
our  fellow-men.” 

The  words  were  probably  Franklin’s  own,  and, 
as  he  died  a few  weeks  after  they  were  written, 
they  may  be  considered  as  his  dying  words  to  his 
countrymen,  — counsel  wise  and  merciful  as  his 
always  was. 

A memorable  debate  followed  the  presentation 
of  these  memorials.  Even  in  the  imperfect  report 
of  it  that  has  come  down  to  us,  the  ‘‘  shameful  inde- 
cency ” of  which  Madison  speaks  is  visible  enough. 
Franklin,  venerable  in  years,  exalted  in  character, 
and  eminent  above  almost  all  the  men  of  the  time 
for  services  to  his  country,  was  sneered  at  for 
senility  and  denounced  as  disregarding  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  Constitution.  But  the  wrath  of  the 
pro-slavery  extremists  was  specially  aroused  against 
the  Society  of  Friends,  and  was  unrestrained  by 
any  considerations  of  either  decency  or  truth.  In 
this  respect  the  debate  was  the  precursor  of  every 
contest  in  Congress  upon  the  subject  that  was  to 
follow  for  the  coming  seventy  years.  The  Quakers 
were  the  representative  abolitionists  of  that  day,  and 
the  measure  of  bitter  and  angry  denunciation  that 
was  meted  out  to  them  was  the  same  measure  which, 


154 


JAMES  MADISON 


heaped  up  and  overflowing,  was  poured  out  upon 
those  who,  in  later  times,  took  upon  themselves 
the  burden  of  the  cause  of  the  slave.  The  line  of 
argument,  the  appeals  to  prejudice,  the  disregard 
of  facts  and  the  false  conclusions,  the  misrepre- 
sentation of  past  history  and  the  misapprehension 
of  the  future,  the  contempt  of  reason,  of  common 
sense,  and  common  humanity,  then  laboriously  and 
unscrupulously  arrayed  in  defense  of  slavery,  left 
nothing  for  the  exercise  of  the  ingenuity  of  mod- 
ern orators.  A single  difference  only  between 
the  earlier  and  the  later  time  is  conspicuous ; the 
‘‘  plantation  manners,”  as  they  were  called  five  and 
twenty  years  ago,  which  the  Wises,  the  Brookses, 
the  Barksdales,  and  the  Priors  of  the  modern 
South  relied  upon  as  potent  weapons  of  defense 
and  assault,  were  unknown  in  the  earlier  Con- 
gresses. 

Mr.  Madison  and  some  other  members  from 
the  South,  particularly  those  from  Virginia,  op- 
posed the  majority  of  their  colleagues,  who  were 
unwilling  that  these  memorials  should  be  referred 
to  a committee.  “ The  true  policy  of  the  Southern 
members,”  Madison  wrote  to  a friend,  ‘‘  was  to 
have  let  the  affair  proceed  with  as  little  noise  as 
possible,  and  to  have  made  use  of  the  occasion  to 
obtain,  along  with  an  assertion  of  the  powers  of 
Congress,  a recognition  of  the  restraints  imposed 
by  the  Constitution.”  This  in  effect  was  done  in 
the  end,  but  not  till  near  two  months  had  passed, 


SLAVERY 


155 


within  which  time  the  more  violent  of  the  Southern 
members  had  ample  opportunity  to  free  their  minds 
and  exhaust  the  subject.  The  more  these  people 
talked  the  worse  it  was,  of  course,  for  their  cause. 
Had  Madison’s  moderate  advice  been  accepted 
then,  and  had  that  example  been  followed  for  the 
next  sixty  or  seventy  years,  it  is  quite  likely  that 
the  colored  race  would  still  be  in  bondage  in  at 
least  one  half  of  the  States.  But  there  was  never 
a more  notable  example  of  manifest  destiny  than 
the  gradual  but  certain  progress  of  the  opposition 
to  slavery ; for  there  never  was  a system,  any 
attempt  to  defend  which  showed  how  utterly  inde- 
fensible such  a system  must  needs  be.  Every 
argument  advanced  in  its  favor  was  so  manifestly 
absurd,  or  so  shocking  to  the  ordinary  sense  of 
mankind,  that  the  more  it  was  discussed  the  more 
widespread  and  earnest  became  the  opposition. 
Had  the  slaveholders  been  wise,  they  would  never 
have  opened  their  mouths  upon  the  subject.  But, 
like  the  man  possessed  of  the  devil,  they  never 
ceased  to  cry,  Let  me  alone ! ” And  the  more 
they  cried,  the  more  there  were  who  understood 
where  that  cry  came  from. 

In  one  respect  Mr.  Madison  declared  that  the 
memorial  of  the  Friends  demanded  attention.  If 
the  American  flag  was  used  to  protect  foreigners 
in  carrying  on  the  slave  trade  in  other  countries, 
that  was  a proper  subject  for  the  consideration  of 
Congress.  If  this  is  the  case,”  he  said,  is 


156 


JAMES  MADISON 


there  any  person  of  humanity  that  would  not  wish 
to  prevent  them  ? ” ^ But  he  recognized  the  lim- 
itations of  the  Constitution  in  relation  to  the  im- 
portation of  slaves  into  the  United  States,  and  the 
want  of  any  authority  in  the  letter  of  the  Consti- 
tution, or  of  any  wish  on  the  part  of  Congress,  to 
interfere  with  slavery  in  the  States.  On  these 
points  he  would  have  a decisive  declaration,  with- 
out agitation,  and  with  as  little  discussion  as  possi- 
ble, and  there  would  have  dropped  the  subject.  It 
only  needed,  he  evidently  thought,  that  everybody, 
North  and  South,  should  understand  the  Constitu- 
tion to  be  a mutual  agreement  to  let  slavery  alto- 
gether alone,  when  the  bargain  would  be  on  both 
sides  faithfully  adhered  to. 

This  was  all  very  well  with  the  numerous  per- 
sons who  were  quite  indifferent  to  the  subject,  or 
who  thought  it  very  unreasonable  in  the  blacks  not 
to  be  quite  willing  to  remain  slaves  a few  hundred 
years  longer.  But  there  were  two  other  classes 
to  reckon  with,  and  Mr.  Madison  was  not  much 
inclined  to  be  patient  with  either  of  them.  To  let 
the  subject  alone  was  precisely  what  the  hot-headed 

^ The  most  serious  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  final  suppression 
of  the  African  slave  trade  in  the  present  century  was,  that  it  could 
be  carried  on  without  molestation  in  American  bottoms,  under  the 
American  fiag.  The  ruling  power  in  the  United  States,  from  1787 
to  1860,  was  never  willing  that  their  own  cruisers  should  meddle 
with  the  slavers,  and  resented  as  an  insult  to  the  fiag  the  search, 
by  the  cruisers  of  other  powers,  of  any  vessel  under  the  American 
flag,  though  it  might  be  absolutely  certain  that  she  had  come 
straight  from  the  coast  of  Africa,  and  that  her  “ between-decks  ” 
was  crowded  full  of  negroes  to  be  sold  as  slaves  in  Cuba. 


SLAVERY 


157 


members  from  the  South  were  incapable  of  doing 
then,  as  they  proved  to  be  incapable  of  doing  for 
the  next  seventy  years.  On  the  other  hand,  all 
the  petitioners  could  really  hope  for  was  that  there 
should  be  discussion.  The  galleries  were  crowded 
at  those  earliest  debates,  as  they  continued  to  be 
crowded  on  all  such  occasions  in  subsequent  years. 
Many  went  to  learn  what  could  be  said  on  behalf 
of  slavery,  who  came  away  convinced  that  the  least 
said  the  better.  Agitation  might  disturb  the  har- 
mony of  the  Union,  which  was  Madison’s  dread  ; 
it  might  lead  to  the  death  of  an  abolitionist,  as  it 
sometimes  did  in  later  times  ; but  it  was  sure  in 
the  end  to  be  the  death  of  slavery,  though  its  short- 
sighted defenders  could  never  understand  why. 
They  could  never  be  made  to  see  that  its  most 
dangerous  foes  were  the  friends  of  its  own  house- 
hold, who  could  not  hold  their  tongues ; that  for 
their  case  all  wisdom  was  epitomized  in  the  vulgar 
caution  to  lie  low  and  keep  dark  ; ” that  the  ex- 
posure of  the  true  character  of  slavery  must  needs 
be  its  destruction,  and  that  nothing  so  exposed  it 
as  any  attempt  to  defend  it.  Slavery  was  quite 
safe  under  the  Constitution,  as  Mr.  Madison  inti- 
mated, if  its  friends  would  only  leave  it  there  and 
claim  no  other  protection. 

Advocates  are  never  wanting  in  any  court  who 
believe  that  the  most  effective  line  of  defense  is 
to  abuse  the  plaintiff.  The  Quakers,  it  was  said, 
notwithstanding  their  outward  pretenses,”  had 
no  ‘‘more  virtue  or  religion  than  other  people, 


158 


JAMES  MADISON 


nor  perhaps  so  much.”  They  had  not  made  the 
Constitution,  nor  risked  their  lives  and  fortunes 
by  fighting  for  their  country.  Why  should  they 
‘‘set  themselves  up  in  such  a particular  manner 
against  slavery  ” ? Did  they  not  know  that  the 
Bible  not  only  allowed  but  commended  it,  “ from 
Genesis  to  Revelation  ” ? That  the  Saviour  had 
permitted  it?  That  the  Apostles,  in  spreading 
Christianity,  had  never  preached  against  it  ? That 
it  had  been  — the  illustration  was  not  altogether  a 
happy  one  — “ no  novel  doctrine  since  the  days  of 
Cain  ” ? The  condition  of  these  American  slaves 
was  said  to  be  one  of  great  happiness  and  comfort ; 
yet  almost  in  the  same  breath  it  was  asserted  that 
to  excite  in  their  minds  any  hope  of  change  would 
lead  to  the  most  disastrous  consequences,  and  pos- 
sibly to  massacre.  The  memorialists  were  bidden 
to  remember  that,  even  if  slavery  “ were  an  evil, 
it  was  one  for  which  there  was  no  remedy ; ” for 
that  reason  the  North  had  acquiesced  in  it ; “a 
compromise  was  made  on  both  sides,  — we  took 
each  other,  with  our  mutual  bad  habits  and  respec- 
tive evils,  for  better,  for  worse  ; the  Northern  States 
adopted  us  with  our  slaves,  and  we  adopted  them 
with  their  Quakers.”  Without  such  a compromise 
there  could  have  been  no  Union,  and  any  interfer- 
ence now  with  slavery  by  the  government  would 
end  in  a civil  war.  These  people  were  meddling 
with  what  was  none  of  their  business,  and  exciting 
the  slaves  to  insurrection.  Yet  how  forbearing 
were  the  people  of  the  Southern  States  who,  not- 


SLAVERY 


159 


withstanding  all  this,  had  not  required  the  assist- 
ance of  Congress  to  exterminate  the  Quakers  ! ” 

This  was  not  conciliatory.  Those  who  had  been 
disposed  at  the  beginning  to  meet  the  petitions  with 
a quiet  reply  that  the  subject  was  out  of  the  juris- 
diction of  Congress  were  now  provoked  to  give 
them  a much  warmer  reception.  They  could  not 
listen  patiently  to  the  abuse  of  the  Quakers,  and, 
though  they  might  acquiesce  in  the  toleration  of 
slavery,  they  were  not  inclined  to  have  it  crammed 
down  their  throats  as  a wise,  beneficent,  and  con- 
sistent condition  of  society  under  a republican 
government.  Even  Madison,  who  at  first  was 
most  anxious  that  nothing  should  be  said  or  done 
to  arouse  agitation,  while  acknowledging  that  all 
citizens  might  rightfully  appeal  to  Congress  for  a 
redress  of  what  they  considered  grievances,  was 
moved  at  last  to  say  that  the  memorial  of  the 
Friends  was  “ well  worthy  of  consideration.” 
While  admitting  that  under  the  Constitution  the 
slave  trade  could  not  be  prohibited  for  twenty 
years,  “ yet,”  he  declared,  ‘‘  there  are  a variety  of 
ways  by  which  it  [Congress]  could  countenance 
the  abolition,  and  regulations  might  be  made  in 
relation  to  the  introduction  of  [slavery]  into  the 
new  States  to  be  formed  out  of  the  western  terri- 
tory.” 

Gerry  was  still  more  emphatic  in  the  assertion 
of  the  right  of  interference.  He  boldly  asserted 
that  “ flagrant  acts  of  cruelty  ” were  committed  in 
carrying  on  the  African  slave  trade  ; and,  while 


160 


JAMES  MADISON 


nobody  proposed  to  violate  the  Constitution,  that 
we  have  a right  to  regulate  this  business  is  as 
clear  as  that  we  have  any  right  whatever;  nor 
has  the  contrary  been  shown  by  anybody  who  has 
spoken  on  the  occasion.”  Nor  did  he  stop  there. 
He  told  the  slaveholders  that  the  value  of  their 
slaves  in  money  was  only  about  ten  million  dollars, 
and  that  Congress  had  the  right  to  propose  ‘‘  to 
purchase  the  whole  of  them ; and  their  resources 
in  the  western  territory  might  furnish  them  with 
the  means.”  The  Southern  members  would,  per- 
haps, have  been  startled  by  such  a proposition 
as  this,  had  he  not  immediately  added  that  he 
did  not  intend  to  suggest  a measure  of  this  kind ; 
he  only  instanced  these  particulars  to  show  that 
Congress  certainly  had  a right  to  intermeddle  in 
the  business.”  It  is  quite  likely,  had  he  pushed 
such  a measure  with  his  well-known  zeal  and  deter- 
mination, that  it  would  have  been  at  least  received 
with  a good  deal  of  favor  ; and,  as  the  admirers  of 
Jefferson  are  tenacious  of  his  fame  as  the  author 
of  the  original  Northwest  Ordinance,  so  Gerry, 
had  he  seriously  and  earnestly  urged  the  policy 
of  using  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  territorial 
lands  to  remunerate  the  owners  of  slaves  for  their 
liberation,  would  have  left  behind  him  a more  fra- 
grant memory  than  that  which  clings  to  him  as  a 
minister  to  France,  and  as  the  ‘‘  Gerrymandering  ” 
governor  of  Massachusetts.  The  debate,  how- 
ever, came  to  an  end  at  last  with  no  other  result 
than  that  which  would  have  been  reached  at  the 


SLAVERY 


161 


beginning  without  debate,  except,  perhaps,  that  the 
vote  in  favor  of  the  reports  upon  the  memorials 
was  smaller  than  it  might  have  been  had  there 
been  no  discussion. 

Within  less  than  two  years,  however,  Warner 
Mifflin  of  Delaware,  an  eminent  member  of  the 
Society  of  Friends,  who  was  one  of  the  first,  if 
not  the  first,  of  that  society  to  manumit  his  own 
slaves,  petitioned  Congress  to  take  some  measure 
for  general  emancipation.  The  petition  was  en- 
tered upon  the  journal ; but  on  a subsequent  day 
a North  Carolina  member,  Mr.  Steele,  said  that, 
‘‘  after  what  had  passed  at  New  York  on  this  sub- 
ject, he  had  hoped  the  House  would  have  heard  no 
more  of  it ; ” and  he  moved  that  the  petition  be 
returned  to  Mifflin  and  be  expunged  from  the  jour- 
nal. Fisher  Ames  explained  in  a rather  apologetic 
tone  that  he  had  presented  the  petition  at  Mr. 
Mifflin’s  request,  because  the  member  from  Dela- 
ware was  absent,  and  because  he  believed  in  the 
right  of  petition,  though  he  considered  it  as 
totally  inexpedient  to  interfere  with  the  subject.” 
The  House  agreed  that  the  petition  should  be 
returned,  and  Steele  then  withdrew  the  motion  to 
expunge  it  from  the  journal. 

In  the  next  Congress,  eighteen  months  after- 
ward, the  House  took  up  the  subject  of  the  slave 
trade,  apparently  of  its  own  motion,  and  a bill  was 
passed  prohibiting  the  carrying  on  of  that  traffic 
from  the  ports  of  the  United  States  in  foreign 
vessels.  The  question  was  as  inexorable  as  death, 


162 


JAMES  MADISON 


and  tlie  difference  in  regard  to  it  then  was  pre- 
cisely what  it  was  in  the  final  discussion  of  the 
next  century  which  settled  it  forever.  One  set  of 
men  was  given  over  to  perdition  if  they  dared  so 
much  as  talk ; the  other  set  talked  all  the  more, 
and  went  to  the  very  verge  of  the  Constitution  in 
act  all  the  more,  because  they  were  bidden  neither 
to  speak  nor  to  move.  Courage  was  not  one  of 
Madison’s  marked  characteristics,  but  he  never 
showed  more  of  it  than  in  his  hostility  to  slavery. 

At  the  third  session  of  the  First  Congress,  which 
had  adjourned  from  New  York  to  Philadelphia, 
where  it  met  in  December,  1790,  Madison  led  his 
party  in  opposition  to  the  establishment  of  a na- 
tional bank,  which  Hamilton  had  recommended ; 
and  again,  as  in  the  adjustment  of  the  domestic 
debt,  he  and  his  party  were  defeated.  He  com- 
pared the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of 
banks,  and  possibly  he  did  not  satisfy  himself,  as 
he  certainly  did  not  the  other  side,  that  the  weight 
of  the  argument  was  against  their  utility.  At  any 
rate,  he  fell  back  upon  the  Constitution  as  his 
strongest  position.  To  incorporate  a bank  was 
not,  he  maintained,  among  the  powers  conferred 
upon  Congress.  The  Federalists,  who  were  begin- 
ning to  recognize  him  as  the  leader  of  the  opposi- 
tion, were  quite  ready  to  accept  that  challenge. 
‘‘  Little  doubt  remains,”  said  Fisher  Ames  in  rising 
to  reply,  “ with  respect  to  the  utility  of  banks.” 
Assuming  that  to  be  settled,  — whether  he  meant, 
or  not,  that  such  was  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn 


. 


SLAVERY 


^aTU 

163 

from  Madison’s  argument  on  that  point,  — he 
addressed  himself  to  the  constitutional  question. 
If  the  incorporation  of  a bank  was  forbidden  by 
the  Constitution,  there  was  an  end  of  the  matter. 
If  it  was  not  forbidden,  but  if  Congress  may  exer- 
cise powers  not  expressly  bestowed  upon  it,  and  if 
by  a bank  some  of  the  things  which  the  federal 
government  had  to  do  could  be  best  done,  it  would 
be  not  only  right  but  wise  to  establish  such  an 
agency.  This  was  the  burden  of  the  argument  of 
the  Federalists,  and  Madison  and  his  friends  had 
no  sufficient  answer.  The  bill  was  at  length  passed 
by  a vote  of  thirty-nine  to  twenty. 

But  it  had  still  to  pass  the  ordeal  of  the  cabinet. 
The  President  was  not  disposed  to  rely  upon  his 
own  judgment  either  one  way  or  the  other.  He 
asked,  therefore,  for  the  written  opinions  of  the 
secretaries  of  the  treasury  and  of  state,  Hamilton 
and  Jefferson,  and  the  attorney-general,  Randolph. 
The  same  request  was  made  to  Madison,  probably 
more  because  Washington  held  his  ability  and 
knowledge  of  constitutional  law  in  high  esteem 
than  because  of  the  prominent  part  he  had  taken 
in  the  debate.  Hamilton’s  argument  in  favor  of 
the  bill  was  an  answer  to  the  papers  of  the  three 
other  gentlemen,  and  was  accepted  as  conclusive 
by  the  President. 


CHAPTER  XII 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS 

Madison  was  a Federalist  until,  unfortunately, 
he  drifted  into  the  opposition.  He  was  swept 
away  partly,  perhaps,  by  the  influence  of  personal 
friends,  particularly  of  J eff erson,  and  partly  by  the 
influence  of  locality,  — that  go-with-the-State  ” 
doctrine,  which  is  a harmless  kind  of  patriotism 
when  kept  within  proper  limits,  but  dangerous  in 
a mixed  government  like  ours  when  unrestrained. 
Had  he  been  born  in  a free  State  it  seems  more 
than  probable  that  he  would  never  have  been 
President;  but  it  is  quite  possible  that  his  place 
in  the  history  of  his  country  would  have  been 
higher.  The  better  part  of  his  life  was  before  he 
became  a party  leader.  As  his  career  is  followed 
the  presence  of  the  statesman  grows  gradually 
dimmer  in  the  shadow  of  the  successful  politician. 

In  the  course  of  the  three  sessions  of  the  First 
Congress  the  line  was  distinctly  drawn  between 
the  Federal  and  Republican  (or  Democratic)  par- 
ties. The  Federalists,  it  was  evident,  had  suc- 
ceeded in  firmly  uniting  thirteen  separate  States 
into  one  great  nation,  or  into  what,  in  due  time, 
was  sure  to  become  a great  nation.  It  was  no 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  165 


longer  a loose  assemblage  of  thirteen  independent 
bodies,  revolving,  indeed,  around  a central  power, 
but  with  a centrifugal  motion  that  might  at  any 
time  send  them  flying  off  into  space,  or  destroy 
them  by  collisions  at  various  tangents.  Those  who 
opposed  the  Federalists,  however,  had  no  fear  of 
a tendency  to  tangents;  the  danger  was,  as  they 
believed,  of  too  much  centripetal  force^  and  that 
the  circling  planets  might  fall  into  the  central  sun 
and  disappear  altogether.  Even  if  there  were  no 
flying  off  into  space,  and  no  falling  into  the  sun, 
they  had  no  faith  in  this  sort  of  political  astro- 
nomy. They  were  unwilling  to  float  in  fixed  orbits 
obedient  to  a supreme  law  other  than  their  own. 

There  is  no  need  to  doubt  the  honesty  of  either 
party  then,  whatever  came  to  pass  in  later  years. 
Nor,  however,  is  there  any  more  doubt  now  which 
was  the  wiser.  Before  the  end  of  the  century  the 
administration  of  government  was  wrested  from 
the  hands  of  those  who  had  created  the  Union ; 
and  within  fifteen  years  more  the  Federal  party, 
under  that  name,  had  disappeared.  It  would  not 
be  quite  just  to  say  that  they  were  opposed  for  no 
better  reason  than  because  they  were  in  power. 
But  it  is  quite  true  that  the  principles  and  the 
policy  of  the  Federalists  survived  the  party  organ- 
ization ; and  they  not  only  survived,  but,  so  far 
as  the  opposite  party  was  ever  of  service  to  the 
country,  it  was  when  that  party  adopted  the  fed- 
eral measures.  It  was  in  accordance  with  the 
early  principles  of  Federalism  that  the  republic 


166 


JAMES  MADISON 


was  defended  and  saved  in  the  war  of  1860-65 ; 
as  it  was  the  principles  of  the  Democratic  state- 
rights  party,  administered  by  a slaveholding  oli- 
garchy, that  made  that  war  inevitable. 

Hamilton  said,  in  the  well-known  Carrington 
letter  in  the  spring  of  1792,  that  he  was  thor- 
oughly convinced  by  Madison’s  course  in  the  late 
Congress  that  he,  ‘‘  cooperating  with  Mr.  Jefferson, 
is  at  the  head  of  a faction  decidedly  hostile  to  me 
and  my  administration,  and  actuated  by  views,  in 
my  judgment,  subversive  of  the  principles  of  good 
government,  and  dangerous  to  the  union,  peace, 
and  happiness  of  the  country.”  At  first  he  was 
disposed  to  believe,  because  of  his  previous  im- 
pressions of  the  fairness  of  Mr.  Madison’s  char- 
acter,” that  there  was  nothing  personal  or  factious 
in  this  hostility.  But  he  soon  changed  his  mind. 
Up  to  the  time  of  the  meeting  of  the  First  Con- 
gress there  had  always  been  perfect  accord  be- 
tween them,  and  Hamilton  accepted  his  seat  in 
the  cabinet  under  the  full  persuasion,”  he  said, 
‘‘  that  from  similarity  of  thinking,  conspiring  with 
personal  good-will,  I should  have  the  firm  support 
of  Mr.  Madison  in  the  general  course  of  my  admin- 
istration.” But  when  he  found  in  Madison  his 
most  determined  opponent,  either  open  or  covert, 
in  the  most  important  measures  he  urged  upon 
Congress,  — the  settlement  of  the  domestic  debt, 
the  assumption  of  the  debts  of  the  States,  and  the 
establishment  of  a national  bank,  — he  was  com- 
pelled to  seek  for  other  than  public  motives  for 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  167 


this  opposition.  It  had  been,”  he  declared, 
more  uniform  and  persevering  than  I have  been 
able  to  resolve  into  a sincere  difference  of  opinion. 
I cannot  persuade  myself  that  Mr.  Madison  and  I, 
whose  politics  had  formerly  so  much  the  same 
point  of  departure,  should  now  diverge  so  widely 
in  our  opinions  of  the  measures  which  are  proper 
to  be  pursued.” 

In  the  letter  from  which  these  extracts  are 
made  Jefferson  and  Madison  are  painted  as  al- 
most equally  black,  though  the  color  was  laid  the 
thicker  on  Jefferson,  if  there  was  any  difference. 
Hamilton  seemed  to  think  that,  if  Jefferson  was 
the  more  malicious,  Madison  was  the  more  artful. 
He  is  accused  of  an  attempt  to  get  the  better  of 
the  secretary  of  the  treasury  by  a trick  which 
was  dishonorable  in  itself,  and  at  the  same  time 
an  abuse  of  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by 
Washington.  Before  sending  in  his  message  at 
the  opening  of  the  Second  Congress  the  President 
submitted  it  to  Madison,  who,  Hamilton  declares, 
so  altered  it,  by  transposing  a passage  and  by  the 
addition  of  a few  words,  that  the  President  was 
made  to  seem,  unconsciously  to  himself,  to  approve 
of  Jefferson’s  proposal  to  establish  the  same  unit 
for  coins  as  for  weights.  This  would  have  been  to 
disapprove  of  the  proposal  of  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury  that  the  dollar  should  remain  the  unit 
of  coinage.  The  statement  rests  on  Hamilton’s 
assertion ; and  as  he  had  forgotten  the  words  which 
made  the  change  he  complained  of,  and  as  the 


168 


JAMES  MADISON 


message  was  restored  to  its  original  form  by  the 
President  when  its  possible  interpretation  was 
pointed  out  to  him,  it  is  impossible  now  to  judge 
whether  Madison  may  not  have  been  quite  inno- 
cent of  the  intention  imputed  to  him.  It  is  plain 
enough,  however,  that  Hamilton  was  sore  and  dis- 
appointed at  Madison’s  conduct,  and  that  he  was 
quick  to  seize  upon  any  incident  that  justified  him 
in  saying,  ‘‘  The  opinion  I once  entertained  of  the 
candor  and  simplicity  and  fairness  of  Mr.  Madi- 
son’s character  has,  I acknowledge,  given  way  to 
a decided  opinion  that  it  is  one  of  a peculiarly 
artificial  and  complicated  kind.”  To  justify  this 
opinion,  and  as  an  evidence  of  how  bitter  Madi- 
son’s political  and  personal  enmity  toward  him  had 
become,  he  refers  in  the  same  letter  to  Madison’s 
relation  to  Freneau  and  his  paper,  “ The  National 
Gazette.”  “As  the  coadjutor  of  Jefferson,”  he 
wrote,  “ in  the  establishment  of  this  paper,  I in- 
clude Mr.  Madison  in  the  consequences  imputable 
to  it.” 

The  story  of  Freneau  need  not  be  repeated  here 
at  length,  having  been  already  told  in  another 
volume  of  this  series  of  biographies.  If  there  were 
anything  in  that  affair,  however,  for  which  Jeffer- 
son could  be  fairly  called  to  account,  Madison  may 
be  held  as  not  less  responsible.  When  the  charge 
was  made  that  he  had  a sinister  motive  in  procur- 
ing for  Freneau  a clerkship  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment, and  in  aiding  him  to  establish  a newspaper, 
Madison  frankly  related  the  facts  in  a letter  to 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  169 


Edmund  Randolph.  He  had  nothing  to  deny 
except  to  repel  with  some  indignation  the  charge 
that  he  had  helped  to  establish  the  journal  in  order 
that  it  might  sap  the  Constitution,”  or  that  there 
was  the  slightest  expectation  or  intention  on  his 
part  of  any  relation  between  the  State  Department 
and  the  newspaper.  Freneau  was  one  of  his  col- 
lege friends,  a deserving  man,  to  whom  he  was 
attached,  and  whom  he  was  glad  to  help.  There 
was  nothing  improper  in  commending  one  well 
qualified  to  discharge  its  duties  for  the  post  of 
translator  in  a government  office ; and  as  those 
duties,  for  which  the  yearly  salary  was  only  two 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  were  light,  there  was  no 
good  reason  why  the  clerk  should  not  find  other 
employment  for  leisure  hours. 

If  Mr.  Madison,  having  said  this,  had  stopped 
there,  his  critics  would  have  been  silenced.  But 
when  he  added  that  he  advised  his  friend  with 
another  motive  besides  that  of  helping  him  to 
start  a newspaper,  then,  as  the  expressive  modern 
phrase  is,  he  ‘‘gave  himself  away.”  There  is  a 
feeling,  common  even  in  those  early  and  innocent 
days  when  such  things  were  rare,  that  the  editor, 
whose  daily  bread,  whether  it  be  cake  or  crust, 
comes  from  the  bounty  of  the  man  in  office  or 
other  place  of  power,  — that  an  editor  so  fed,  and 
perhaps  fattened,  is  only  a servant  bought  at  a 
price.  Madison  said  that  to  help  a needy  man 
whom  he  held  in  high  esteem  was  his  “primary 
and  governing  motive.”  But  he  adds:  “That,  as  a 


170 


JAMES  MADISON 


consequential  one,  I entertained  hopes  that  a free 
paper  . . . would  be  an  antidote  to  the  doctrines 
and  discourses  circulated  in  favor  of  monarchy 
and  aristocracy ; would  be  an  acceptable  vehicle  pf 
public  information  in  many  places  not  sufficiently 
supplied  with  it,  — this  also  is  a certain  truth.” 
What  was  this  but  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
essential  truth  of  the  charge  brought  against  Jef- 
ferson and  himself?  Not  that  he  might  not  de- 
voutly hope  for  an  antidote  to  the  poisonous  doc- 
trines of  monarchy  and  aristocracy,  though  in  very 
truth  the  existence  of  any  such  poison  was  only 
one  of  the  maggots  which,  bred  in  the  muck  of 
party  strife,  had  found  a lodgment  in  his  brain ; 
not  that  it  was  not  a commendable  public  spirit 
to  wish  for  a good  newspaper  to  circulate  where  it 
was  most  needed;  not  that  it  was  not  a most  excel- 
lent thing  in  him  to  hold  out  a helping  hand  to  the 
friend  who  had  been  less  fortunate  than  himself, — 
but  that,  in  helping  his  friend  to  a clerkship  in  a 
department  of  the  government,  his  motive  was  in 
part  that  the  possession  of  a public  office  would 
enable  the  man  to  establish  a party  organ.  That 
was  precisely  the  point  of  the  charge  which  he 
seems  to  have  failed  to  apprehend,  — that  public 
patronage  was  used  at  his  suggestion  to  further 
party  ends. 

Freneau  had  intended  to  start  a newspaper 
somewhere  in  New  Jersey.  Whetlier  or  not  that 
known  intention  suggested  that  the  project  could 
be  better  carried  out  in  Philadelphia,  and  a clerk- 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  171 


ship  in  the  State  Department  would  be  an  aid  to 
it,  the  change  of  plan  was  adopted  and  the  clerk- 
ship bestowed  upon  him.  The  paper  — the  first 
number  of  which  appeared  five  days  after  his  ap- 
pointment — was,  as  it  was  known  that  it  would 
be,  an  earnest  defender  of  J eff erson  and  his  friends, 
and  a formidable  opponent  of  Hamilton  and  his 
party.  The  logical  conclusion  was  that  the  man, 
being  put  in  place  for  a purpose,  was  diligent  in 
using  the  opportunities  the  place  afforded  him  to 
fulfill  the  hopes  of  those  to  whom  he  was  indebted. 
Madison  and  Jefferson  both  denied,  with  much 
heat  and  indignation,  that  they  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  editorial  conduct  of  the  paper.  No 
doubt  they  spoke  the  truth.  They  had  to  draw 
the  line  somewhere ; they  drew  it  there ; and  an 
exceedingly  sharp  and  fine  line  it  was.  For  it  is 
plain  that  Freneau  knew  very  well  what  he  was 
about  and  what  was  expected  of  him,  and  his 
powerful  friends  knew  very  well  that  he  knew  it. 
They  could  feel  in  him  the  most  implicit  confi- 
dence as  an  untamed  and  untamable  democrat,  and 
one,  perhaps,  whose  gratitude  would  be  kept  alive 
by  the  remembrance  of  poverty  and  the  hope  of 
future  favors.  There  was  clearly  no  need  of  a 
board  of  directors  for  the  editorial  supervision 
of  “ The  National  Gazette,”  and  it  was  quite  safe 
to  deny  that  any  existed.  The  fact,  nevertheless, 
remained  that  a seat  had  been  given  the  editor  at 
Mr.  Jefferson’s  elbow. 

Three  months  before  Madison  heard  that  his 


172 


JAMES  MADISON 


relation  to  Freneau  wa^  bringing  him  under  pub- 
lic censure,  he  showed  an  evident  interest  in . the 
‘‘  Gazette  ” hardly  consistent  with  his  subsequent 
avowal  of  having  nothing  to  do  with  its  manage- 
ment. In  a letter  to  Jefferson  he  refers  to  the 
postage  on  newspapers  established  by  the  bill  for 
the  regulation  of  post-offices,  and  fears  that  it  will 
prove  a grievance  in  the  loss  of  subscribers.  He 
suggests  that  a notice  be  given  that  the  papers 
‘‘  will  not  be  put  into  the  mail,  but  s>ent  as  hereto- 
fore^''  meaning  by  that,  probably,  that  they  would 
be  sent  under  the  franks  of  members  of  Congress, 
or  by  any  other  chance  that  might  offer.  ‘‘Will 
you,”  he  adds,  “hint  this  to  Freneau?  His  sub- 
scribers in  this  quarter  seem  pretty  well  satisfied 
with  the  degree  of  regularity  and  safety  with  which 
they  get  the  papers,  and  highly  pleased  with  the 
paper  itself.”  This  was  careful  dry-nursing  for 
the  bantling  which  had  been  provided  with  so  com- 
fortable a cradle  in  the  State  Department. 

The  political  casuist  of  our  time  may  wonder 
at  the  importance  which  attached  to  this  Freneau 
affair.  We  are  taught  that  “ there  were  giants  in 
those  days,”  but  we  may  also  remember  that  in  the 
modern  science  of  “ practical  politics  ” they  were 
as  babes  and  sucklings.  Madison  was  making 
good  his  place  as  a leader  of  the  opposition  hardly 
second  to  Jefferson  himself.  As  with  Hamilton, 
so  with  the  Federalists  generally,  he  fell  more 
even  than  Jefferson  fell  in  their  esteem.  He  fell 
more,  because  he  had  farther  to  fall.  No  man 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  173 


had  been  more  earnest  than  he  for  a consolidated 
government ; no  one  had  shown  more  activity  to 
bring  about  a convention  to  frame  a federal  Con- 
stitution ; and  when  at  last  that  work  was  done, 
no  one,  not  even  Hamilton  himself,  was  more  zeal- 
ous to  convince  his  countrymen  that  national  sal- 
vation depended  upon  union,  and  that  union  was 
hopeless  unless  the  Constitution  should  be  adopted. 
The  disappointment  and  the  shock  were  all  the 
greater  when  he  gradually  drew  off  from  those  who 
had  hitherto  counted  him  as  on  their  side.  They 
could  not  understand  how  he  could  find  so  much 
to  oppose  in  the  legitimate  administration  — as 
they  believed  it  to  be  — of  a Constitution  he  had 
done  so  much  to  create,  and  the  beneficent  results 
of  which  he  had  foreseen  and  foretold.  Or,  if 
they  understood  him,  it  was  on  the  supposition 
that  he  had  thrown  his  convictions  and  his  princi- 
ples to  the  winds,  abandoned  his  old  friends  and 
attached  himself  to  new  ones,  from  motives  of 
personal  ambition.  This,  of  course,  may  not  have 
been  absolutely  just.  It  is  quite  possible  that  he 
did  not  deliberately  surrender  his  principles,  but 
persuaded  himself  that  he  was  as  true  as  ever  to 
the  Constitution.  It  is,  nevertheless,  certainly  true 
that  the  men  with  whom  he  was  now  acting  were 
the  men  who,  having  failed  to  prevent  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  now  aimed,  by  zealous 
endeavors  for  an  assumed  strict  construction,  to 
defeat  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  framed.^ 

^ “ I reverence  the  Constitution,’  ’ said  Fisher  Ames  in  debate, 


174 


JAMES  MADISON 


Naturally  his  motives  were  suspected,  and  his 
conduct  narrowly  watched.  Jefferson’s  influence 
over  him  was  known  to  be  great,  and  Jefferson  had 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  framing  of  the  Consti- 
tution, had  been  doubtful  at  first  of  its  wisdom, 
and  gave  his  assent  to  it  at  last  with  many  doubts. 
The  Anti-Federal  party  was  growing  gradually 
stronger  in  Virginia  as  in  all  the  Southern  States ; 
most  of  Madison’s  warmest  personal  friends,  as 
well  as  Jefferson,  were  of  that  party.  What 
chance  would  he  have  in  the  public  career  he  had 
marked  out  for  himself  if  his  path  and  theirs  led 
in  opposite  directions  ? How  much  he  was  influ- 
enced by  these  considerations  it  is  impossible  to 
tell ; perhaps  he  himself  could  not  have  told. 
Perhaps  they  were  not  even  considerations,  but 
only  unconscious  influences,  which  he  would  have 
thrown  behind  him  had  he  recognized  them  as  pos- 
sible motives.  To  others,  however,  whether  justly 
or  not,  they  were  quite  sufficient  to  explain  his 
course,  and,  once  accepted,  no  other  explanation 
was  sought  for.  The  appointment  of  Freneau  to 
office  at  Madison’s  request,  followed  by  the  almost 
immediate  appearance  of  a violent  party  organ, 

“ and  I readily  admit  that  the  frequent  appeal  to  that  as  a stand- 
ard proceeds  from  a respectful  attachment  to  it.  So  far  it  is 
a source  of  agreeable  reflection.  But  I feel  very  different  emo- 
tions when  I find  it  almost  daily  resorted  to  in  questions  of  little 
importance.  When  by  strained  and  fanciful  constructions  it  is 
made  an  instrument  of  casuistry,  it  is  to  he  feared  it  may  lose 
something  in  our  minds  in  point  of  certainty,  and  more  in  point 
of  dignity.” 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  175 


edited  by  this  clerk  in  Mr.  Jefferson’s  department, 
was  quite  enough  to  raise  an  outcry  among  the 
Federalists ; and  Madison’s  explanation,  when  it 
came  to  be  known,  of  his  share  in  that  business, 
did  not  add  to  his  reputation  either  for  frankness 
or  political  rectitude.  Perhaps  it  was  at  first  more 
the  seeming  want  of  frankness  that  disgusted  his 
old  friends.  They  could  have  more  readily  for- 
given him  had  he  openly  declared  that  he  had  gone 
over  to  the  enemy,  instead  of  professing  to  find  in 
the  Constitution  sufficient  ground  for  hostility  to 
their  measures.  These  constitutional  scruples  they 
sometimes  thought  so  thin  a disguise  of  other  mo- 
tives as  to  be  better  deserving  of  ridicule  than  of 
argument. 

All  he  said  and  did  was  watched  with  suspicion. 
In  the  interval  between  the  First  and  Second  Con- 
gresses, he  and  Jefferson  made  a tour  through  some 
of  the  Eastern  States,  as  they  said,  for  relaxation 
and  pleasure.  But  it  was  looked  upon  as  a strategic 
movement.  Interviews  between  them  and  Living- 
ston and  Burr  in  New  York  were  reported  to  Ham- 
ilton as  “a  passionate  courtship.”  They  visited 
Albany,  it  was  said,  ‘‘  under  the  pretext  of  a botani- 
cal excursion,”  but  in  reality  to  meet  with  Clinton. 
Botany  naturally  suggests  agriculture,  and  as  they 
continued  on  their  journey  into  New  England  they 
were  accused  of  “ sowing  tares  ” as  they  traveled. 
Such  treachery  would  have  been  considered  as 
aggravated  by  hypocrisy  had  it  been  known  then 
that  on  his  return  Mr.  Madison  wrote  to  his  father 


176 


JAMES  MADISON 


from  New  York:  ‘‘The  tour  I lately  made  with 
Mr.  Jefferson,  of  which  I have  given  the  outlines 
to  my  brother,  was  a very  agreeable  one,  and  car- 
ried us  through  interesting  country,  new  to  us 
both.”  This  was  cool,  if  the  journey  really  was  a 
political  reconnoissance. 

Though  Mr.  Madison  may  have  been  for  a time 
a special  target  for  this  kind  of  partisan  rancor,  it 
was  by  no  means  confined  to  him.  Jefferson  had 
a very  pretty  talent  for  exasperating  his  enemies, 
and  nobody  could  long  divide  with  him  the  distinc- 
tion of  being  the  best  hated  man  in  the  country. 
A curious  instance  of  it  was  given  when  the  ques- 
tion was  discussed,  both  in  the  First  and  Second 
Congresses,  as  to  the  successor  to  the  presidency  in 
case  the  office  should  become  vacant  by  the  deaths 
of  both  President  and  Vice-President.  A bill  was 
sent  down  from  the  Senate  to  the  House  providing, 
in  case  such  a thing  should  ever  happen,  that  the 
president  ])to  tempore  of  the  Senate,  or,  should  the 
Senate  have  no  temporary  president,  the  speaker 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  should  succeed 
to  the  vacant  office.  The  House  sent  back  the  bill 
with  an  amendment  substituting  the  secretary  of 
state  for  the  succession  in  the  possible  vacancy 
instead  of  the  presiding  officers  of  the  two  houses 
of  Congress.  Madison  was  very  earnest  for  this 
amendment,  but  the  Senate  rejected  it,  and  the 
House  finally  assented  to  the  original  bill.  It  was 
shown  in  the  course  of  the  debate  that  aceording 
to  the  doctrine  of  chances  the  office  of  president 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS  177 


would  not  devolve,  through  the  accident  of  death, 
upon  a third  person  oftener  than  once  in  about 
eight  hundred  and  forty  years.  The  rejection  of 
the  amendment  naming  the  secretary  of  state  as 
the  proper  person  to  succeed  to  the  presidency, 
in  the  improbable  event  supposed,  v/as  neverthe- 
less resented  by  the  Eepublicans  as  a direct  reflec- 
tion upon  Mr.  Jefferson.  Nor  did  the  Federalists 
deny  it.  With  grim  humor  they  seized  upon  the 
opportunity,  apparently,  to  announce  that  not  with 
their  consent  should  he  ever  be  president,  even  by 
accident,  though  he  should  wait  literally  eight  hun- 
dred and  forty  years.  It  was  a long-range  shot, 
but  there  could  not  have  been  one  better  aimed. 

If  before  there  had  been  some  room  for  hope, 
Madison’s  course  in  the  Second  Congress  left  no 
doubt  as  to  which  party  he  had  cast  his  lot  with. 
His  hostility  to  the  establishment  of  a bank  was, 
he  thought,  justifled  by  what  he  saw  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  subscription  books  in  New  York.  The 
anxiety  to  get  possession  of  the  stock  was  not  to 
him  an  evidence  of  public  confidence,  and  an  argu- 
ment, therefore,  in  favor  of  such  an  institution, 
but  ‘‘  a mere  scramble  for  so  much  public  plun- 
der.” He  could  only  see  that  stock-jobbing 
drowns  every  other  subject.  The  coffee-house  is  in 
an  eternal  buzz  with  the  gamblers.”  ‘‘It  pretty 
clearly  appears  also,”  he  said,  “ in  what  propor- 
tions the  public  debt  lies  in  the  country,  what  sort 
of  hands  holding  it,  and  by  whom  the  people 
of  the  United  States  are  to  be  governed.”  Here, 


178 


JAMES  MADISON 


perhaps,  was  one  cause  of  his  hostility  to  Hamil- 
ton’s financial  policy.  Its  immediate  benefit  was 
for  that  class  whose  pecuniary  stake  in  the  stability 
of  the  government  was  the  largest.  This  class  was 
chiefly  in  the  Northern  States,  where  capital  was  in 
money  and  was  always  on  the  lookout  for  safe  and 
profitable  investment.  At  the  South,  capital  was 
in  slaves  and  land,  and  could  not  be  easily  changed. 
If  the  Bank  and  the  bondholders  were  to  exer- 
cise — as  he  feared  they  would,  and  as  he  believed 
that  the  Federalists  meant  they  should  — a con- 
trolling influence  over  the  government,  it  was  cer- 
tainly pretty  apparent  “ by  whom  the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  to  be  governed.”  It  would  be 
the  North,  not  the  South ; and  he  was  a Virginian 
before  he  was  a Unionist. 

Perhaps  he  was  influenced  by  this  consideration 
when  he  proposed  that  the  payment  of  the  domes- 
tic debt  should  be  divided  between  those  who  had 
originally  held,  and  those  who  had  acquired  by 
purchase,  the  certificates  of  indebtedness.  The 
public  creditors  would  in  that  case  have  been 
more  widely  distributed  in  different  sections  of  the 
country  and  among  different  classes.  The  thought, 
at  any  rate,  does  not  seem  to  have  been  a new  one 
when  he  saw  and  reported  the  eagerness  with 
which  the  bank  stock  was  sought  for,  denounced 
it  as  stock-jobbing  and  gambling,  and  indignantly 
reflected  that  in  these  men  he  saw  the  future  gov- 
ernors of  the  country,  and  particularly  of  his  own 
people.  No  doubt  there  was  a good  deal  of  speeu- 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS 


179 


lation  ; and,  as  at  all  such  times,  there  were  a few 
who  made  fortunes,  while  many,  who  had  at  first 
much  money  and  no  stock,  next  much  stock  and  no 
money,  had  at  last  neither  stock  nor  money.  But 
Mr.  Madison’s  indignation  was  quite  wasted,  and 
his  fears  quite  unfounded.  Neither  the  stock-job- 
bers, the  Bank,  nor  the  bondholders  ever  usurped 
the  government,  whatever  may  have  been  Hamil- 
ton’s hopes  or  schemes,  if  he  had  any  other  than 
to  serve  his  country.  The  money-power  of  the 
North  built  cities  and  ships,  factories  and  towns, 
and  stretched  out  its  hands  to  the  great  lakes  and 
over  the  broad  prairies,  to  add  to  its  dominion, 
to  extend  its  civilization,  and  to  give  to  labor  and 
industry  their  due  reward.  It  was  the  South  that 
devoted  itself  to  the  business  of  politics,  and,  united 
by  stronger  bonds  than  can  ever  be  forged  of  gold 
alone,  soon  entered  into  possession  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  it  retained  and  used  for  its  own  inter- 
ests, without  regard  to  the  interests  or  the  rights  of 
the  North,  for  nearly  three  quarters  of  a century. 
Mr.  Madison  had  no  prescience  of  any  such  future 
in  the  history  of  the  country,  nor,  indeed,  then 
had  anybody  else.  He  may  have  really  believed 
that  the  holders  of  a large  public  debt  and  the 
owners  of  a great  national  bank,  through  which 
the  monetary  affairs  of  the  country  could  be  con- 
trolled, were  aiming  to  lay  hold  of  the  government. 
If  all  this  were  true,  imminent  peril  was  impending 
over  republican  institutions.  The  inconsistency  of 
which  Hamilton  accused  Madison  was  therefore  not 


180 


JAMES  MADISON 


necessarily  a crime.  It  might  even  be  a virtue,  and 
Madison  be  applauded  for  his  courage  in  avowing  a 
change  of  opinion,  if  he  saw  in  the  practical  appli- 
cation of  Hamilton’s  principles  dangers  that  had 
not  occurred  to  him  when  looking  at  them  only 
as  abstract  theories.  But  the  Federalists  believed 
that  Madison,  governed  by  these  purely  selfish  mo- 
tives, sacrificed  his  convictions  of  what  was  best 
for  the  country  that  he  might  secure  for  himself  a 
position  on  what  he  foresaw  was  the  winning  side. 
It  is  quite  likely  that  the  more  pronounced  enmity 
he  showed  towards  Hamilton  during  the  second  ses- 
sion of  Congress  was  due  in  some  measure  to  his 
knowledge  of  this  feeling  towards  himself  among 
Federalists.  He  seemed,  at  any  rate,  to  be  ani- 
mated  by  something  more  than  the  proverbial  zeal 
of  the  new  convert.  If  it  was  not  always  shown 
in  debate,  it  lurked  in  his  letters.  Anything  that 
came  from  the  secretary,  or  anything  that  favored 
the  secretary’s  measures,  was  sure  to  be  opposed 
by  him.  He  was  not,  of  course,  always  in  the 
wrong,  and  sometimes  he  was  very  right.  There 
was  a manifest  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  Fed- 
eralists in  the  House  to  defer  to  the  secretary  in  a 
way  to  provoke  opposition  from  those  who  did  not 
share  in  their  estimate  of  his  great  ability.  There 
was  some  resentment,  for  example,  when  it  was 
proposed  that  Congress  should  submit  to  the  secre- 
tary the  question  of  ways  and  means  to  carry  on 
the  Indian  war  at  the  West,  after  St.  Clair’s  dis- 
astrous defeat,  and  when,  a few  days  later,  it  was 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS 


181 


suggested  that  he  should  be  called  upon  to  report 
a plan  for  the  reduction  of  the  public  debt.  Mem- 
bers, chief  among  them  Madison,  thought  that  they 
were  quite  capable  of  discharging  the  duties  belong- 
ing to  their  branch  of  the  government  without  in- 
structions from  a head  of  department  whom  many 
of  them  looked  upon  as  only  an  official  subordinate 
of  Congress.  For  the  same  reason  they  refused 
with  prompt  decision  to  permit  the  secretary  to 
appear  upon  the  floor  of  the  House  to  explain 
some  proposed  measure.  In  the  Carrington  letter 
Hamilton  said  that  he  had  ‘‘openly  declared”  a 
“ determination  to  treat  him  [Madison]  as  a politi- 
cal enemy.”  He  probably  took  care  that  Madison 
should  hear  of  it,  for  he  was  not  a man  who  made 
idle  threats.  He  was  sometimes  arrogant  and  over- 
bearing in  manner,  was  always  ready  for  a fight, 
which  he  rather  preferred  to  quietude,  and  had  lit- 
tle disposition  to  spare  an  enemy.  These  were  not 
conciliating  qualities  likely  to  temper  the  asperi- 
ties of  political  warfare,  and  they  may  have  pro- 
voked even  Madison,  mild-mannered  and  almost 
timid  as  he  was,  to  unusual  heat. 

All  this,  of  course,  is  aside  from  the  question 
whether  the  party,  to  which  Mr.  Madison  had  given 
his  allegiance,  was  right  or  wrong.  On  that  point 
there  may  be  an  honest  difference  of  opinion.  It 
is  apart  also  from  the  question  whether  a man  may 
not  honestly  change  sides  in  politics,  notwithstand- 
ing the  suspicion  that  always  follows  him  who 
runs  from  one  side  to  the  other,  when  in  neither  has 


182 


JAMES  MADISON 


there  been  any  change  in  principles  or  measureSo 
It  is  quite  possible  that  he  may  be  governed  by  the 
most  sincere  convictions;  and  if  he  obeys  them 
and  abandons  old  friends  for  new  ones,  or  con- 
sents to  be  friendless,  it  is  the  strongest  proof  the 
statesman  or  politician  can  give  of  a moral  courage 
which  ought  to  gain  for  him  all  the  more  respect. 
But  whether  that  respect  must  be  denied  to  Mr. 
Madison,  because  he  was  governed  by  other  and 
lower  motives,  is  the  question.  There  had  been  no 
change  of  political  principles  either  in  the  party  he 
had  left  or  the  party  he  had  joined  ; but  each  was 
striving  with  all  its  might  to  adapt  the  old  doc- 
trines to  the  altered  condition  of  affairs  under  the 
new  Union.  The  change  was  \^holly  in  Mr.  Madi- 
son. That  which  had  been  white  to  him  was  now 
black ; that  which  had  been  black  was  now  as  the 
driven  snow.  Why  was  this?  Had  he  come  to 
see  that  in  all  those  years  he  had  been  wrong  ? Or 
had  he  suddenly  learned,  not  that  he  was  wrong, 
but  that  he  had  mistaken  a straight  and  narrow 
path  for  the  broad  road  which  would  lead  to  the 
goal  he  was  seeking  ? These  are  not  pleasant  ques- 
tions. He  had  served  his  country  well ; one  does 
not  like  to  doubt  whether  it  was  with  a selfish 
rather  than  a noble  purpose.  But  of  any  public 
man  who  changed  front  as  he  changed,  the  ques- 
tion always  will  be.  What  moved  him  ? Not  to  ask 
it  in  regard  to  Madison  is  to  drop  out  of  sight 
the  turning-point  of  his  career  ; not  to  consider  it 


FEDEKALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS 


183 


is  to  leave  unheeded  essential  light  upon  one  side 
of  his  character.  For  his  own  fortunes  the  choice 
he  made  was  judicious,  if  to  “ gain  the  whole 
world  ” is  always  the  wisest  and  best  thing  to  do. 
He  gained  his  world,  and  was  wise  and  virtuous 
in  his  generation  according  to  the  vote  of  a large 
majority.  Whether  that  decision  still  holds  good 
it  is  not  so  easy  to  say  ; probably  it  does,  however  ; 
for  the  popular  estimate  of  men  often  remains  un- 
changed long  after  the  judgment  upon  the  events 
which  gave  them  celebrity  is  completely  reversed. 
But  history,  in  the  long  run,  weighs  with  even 
scales ; and  the  verdict  on  Madison’s  character 
usually  comes  with  that  pitiful  recommendation  to 
mercy  from  a jury  loath  to  condemn.  Admiration 
for  his  great  services  in  the  Constitutional  Con- 
vention and  after  it,  when  its  work  was  presented 
to  the  people  for  their  approval,  has  never  been 
withheld ; upon  his  official  integrity  and  his  high 
sense  of  honor  in  all  his  personal  relations,  except 
when  obligation  to  party  may  have  overshadowed 
it,  there  rests  no  cloud  ; and  his  intellectual  power 
is  never  questioned.  One  having  these  recognized 
qualities,  and  who  for  five  and  twenty  years  was 
generally  high  in  office,  must  needs  be  held  in 
high  estimation,  especially  in  a new  country  where 
fame,  like  everything  else,  is  cheap.  Nevertheless, 
impartial  historians,  who  venture  to  believe  that 
nature  admits  of  imperfections  in  a native  of  Vir- 
ginia, declare  their  conviction  that  Mr.  Madison 


184 


JAMES  MADISON 


either  wanted  the  strength  and  courage  to  resist 
the  influence  of  those  about  him,  or  that  the  ambi- 
tion of  the  politician  was  strong  enough  to  over- 
come any  consideration  of  principles  that  might 
stand  in  his  way. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


FRENCH  POLITICS 

If  any  proof  were  wanting  of  how  completely 
Madison  had  gone  over  to  the  opposition,  he  gave 
it  in  the  memorable  attack  upon  the  secretary  of 
the  treasury  in  the  spring  of  1793,  within  four 
days  of  the  close  of  the  second  session  of  the  Sec- 
ond Congress.  It  was  hoped  by  that  proceeding 
to  overwhelm  Hamilton  with  disgrace,  and  that 
the  President  would  feel  himself  obliged  to  expel 
him  from  the  cabinet.  When  the  resolutions  with 
this  aim  were  offered,  a member  said  that  delicacy, 
decency,  and  every  rule  of  justice  had  been  vio- 
lated ; a more  unhandsome  proceeding  he  had 
never  seen  in  Congress ; ” he  might  have  remained 
a member  to  this  day,  and,  save  for  the  attempts 
in  our  time  to  expel  John  Quincy  Adams  and 
Joshua  R.  Giddings,  not  have  changed  his  opinion. 

In  the  course  of  the  preceding  year  Hamilton, 
under  various  signatures,  had  met  his  opponents 
in  the  newspapers.  But  it  was  a veil,  not  a visor, 
behind  which  he  fought ; for  everybody  knew 
from  whom  came  the  vigorous  blows  that  he  dealt 
about  him  right  and  left.  It  was  a boast  always 
of  Jefferson  that  he  never  condescended  to  news- 


186 


JAMES  MADISON 


paper  controversy ; but  it  was  pretty  well  under- 
stood that  he  himself  did  not  enter  upon  that 
rather  unsatisfactory  mode  of  warfare  because  he 
preferred  the  safer  method  of  fighting  by  proxy. 
Hamilton  never  was  in  doubt  as  to  who  was  his 
real  antagonist,  and  he  aimed  his  blows  over  the 
heads  of  his  petty  assailants  to  where  he  knew 
they  would  hit  home.  They  left  bad  bruises  upon 
his  colleague  in  the  cabinet.  Among  other  papers 
of  the  time,  though  not  a newspaper  article,  was  an 
official  letter  to  the  President,  in  which  Hamilton 
defended  his  principles  and  his  measures.  Early 
in  1792  the  President,  longing  to  escape  the  toils 
of  public  life  and  to  spend  the  rest  of  his  days  in 
tranquillity,  had  consulted  Madison  and  his  two 
secretaries,  Jefferson  and  Hamilton,  upon  the  pro- 
priety of  his  declining  a reelection.  He  soon 
changed  his  mind,  influenced,  perhaps,  as  much  by 
the  dissensions,  so  evident  in  the  expostulations  of 
his  friends,  as  by  the  expostulations  themselves. 
He  deprecated  this  open  feud  between  his  secre- 
taries as  a public  misfortune,  and  sought,  if  he 
could  not  reconcile  them,  to  silence  it.  That  the 
Federalists  were  monarchists,  as  Jefferson  and 
Madison  never  ceased  asserting,  he  knew  was  not 
true,  without  the  emphatic  and  indignant  declara- 
tions of  Hamilton,  Adams,  and  other  leading  men 
of  that  party,  when  they  condescended  to  notice  a 
charge  which  they  deemed  so  absurd  that  it  was 
difficult  to  believe  that  anybody  could  make  it  in 
earnest.  But,  while  he  knew  there  was  no  real 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


187 


danger  from  that  quarter,  he  could  not  fail  to  see 
that  the  reverence  and  love  in  which  he  was  held 
constituted  a bond  of  unity,  so  long  as  he  remained 
chief  magistrate;  and  he  may  have  felt  that,  should 
he  retire,  there  was  no  other  common  tie  strong 
enough  at  that  moment  to  hold  together  a Union, 
the  possible  dissolution  of  which  was,  both  at  the 
North  and  at  the  South,  considered  with  calmness, 
sometimes  with  complacency,  and,  when  party 
passion  was  at  a red  heat,  even  as  a thing  to  be 
prayed  for.  At  any  rate,  the  President  consented 
to  take  the  advice  of  the  counselors  whom  he  had 
consulted ; but  in  asking  that  advice  he  unwit- 
tingly aggravated  the  quarrel  among  them  which 
caused  him  so  much  uneasiness. 

Jefferson,  in  the  arguments  he  set  forth  both  in 
conversation  and  by  letter  to  influence  Washing- 
ton’s decision,  dwelt  upon  the  unhappy  condition 
of  public  affairs.  It  was  a storm  which  he  him- 
self meant  to  get  out  of  by  retiring  to  Monticello, 
though  he  thought  it  was  Washington’s  duty  to 
remain  at  the  helm  and  keep  an  eye  to  windward. 
This  unhappy  condition  of  affairs,  he  said,  had 
all  come  from  the  course  pursued  by  the  secretary 
of  the  treasury,  and  was  the  natural  consequence  of 
the  acts  of  Congress  in  relation  to  the  public  debt, 
the  Bank,  excise,  currency,  and  other  important 
measures  passed  in  accordance  with  the  secre- 
tary’s policy.  Whether  this  policy  was  meant  to 
destroy  the  Union,  subvert  the  republic,  and  es- 
tablish a monarchy  upon  its  ruins,  at  any  rate 


188 


JAMES  MADISON 


such  must  be  the  inevitable  result  of  those  mis- 
chievous measures.  He  urged  this  view  of  the 
subject  with  such  pertinacity  that  Washington, 
either  because  he  was  impressed  by  so  much  ear- 
nestness, or  because  he  was  curious  to  know  how 
the  assertions  could  best  be  answered,  sent  them 
to  Hamilton,  with  other  objections  of  a similar 
character  from  other  persons,  and  asked  for  a 
reply.  No  names  were  given,  but  it  is  not  likely 
that  Hamilton  was  at  any  loss  in  guessing  where 
such  strictures  upon  his  administration  of  affairs 
came  from.  I have  not  fortitude  enough,”  he 
said  in  his  answer,  always  to  hear  with  calmness 
calumnies  which  necessarily  include  me  as  a princi- 
pal object  in  the  measures  censured,  of  the  false- 
hood of  which  I have  the  most  unqualified  con- 
sciousness. ...  I acknowledge  that  I cannot  be 
entirely  patient  under  charges  which  impeach  the 
integrity  of  my  public  motives  or  conduct.  I feel 
that  I merit  them  in  no  degree,  and  expressions  of 
indignation  sometimes  escape  me  in  spite  of  every 
effort  to  suppress  them.”  There  were  only  two 
men  in  the  country  whom  he  could  have  had  in 
mind  when  he  wrote  such  words  as  these.  In  all 
Washington’s  career  there  is  nowhere  a stronger 
proof  of  his  strong  will,  self-reliance,  and  passion- 
less impartiality  than  that  he  could  stand  between 
two  such  furnaces  as  Hamilton  on  one  side  and 
Jefferson  and  Madison  on  the  other,  both  glowing 
at  the  intensest  white  heat,  while  he  remained 
usually  as  calm  and  as  unmoved  as  if  breathing 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


189 


the  softest,  balmiest,  and  gentlest  airs  of  a day  in 
June.  But  all  this  personal  controversy  in  the 
public  prints,  and  in  the  official  intercourse  of  the 
cabinet,  left  on  both  sides  an  intense  exasperation, 
which  could  not  fail  to  have  a controlling  influence 
in  the  conduct  of  political  parties.  Whether  Jef- 
ferson was  conscious  or  not  — and  whatever  his 
feeling  was,  Madison  shared  it  with  him  — that  in 
this  paper  warfare  he  was  signally  defeated,  the 
attempt  to  ruin  Hamilton  by  an  attack  upon  him 
in  Congress  followed,  if  it  was  not  the  consequence 
of,  the  mortification  of  defeat. 

In  February,  1793,  Mr.  Giles,  a representative 
from  Virginia,  offered  a series  of  resolutions  call- 
ing upon  the  President  for  certain  information 
relating  to  the  finances.  They  were  a bold  attack 
upon  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  and,  should  it 
prove  that  they  could  not  be  satisfactorily  answered, 
would  convict  him  of  mismanagement  of  the  finan- 
cial affairs  of  the  government,  of  a disregard  of 
law,  of  usurpation  of  power,  and  even  of  embezzle- 
ment of  the  public  funds.  Any  reasonable  ground 
for  believing  such  charges  to  be  well-founded  would 
be  quite  sufficient  to  bring  the  secretary  to  trial 
by  impeachment.  There  was  probably  little  doubt 
at  the  moment  as  to  whence  this  blow  came ; for 
though  the  hand  might  seem  the  hand  of  Esau,  the 
voice  was  the  voice  of  Jacob.  Behind  Giles  was 
Madison;  and  behind  Madison,  of  course,  was  Jef- 
ferson. Mr.  John  C.  Hamilton,  in  his  “ History 
of  the  Republic,”  asserts  that  the  resolutions  were 


190 


JAMES  MADISON 


still  — when  he  wrote,  twenty-five  years  ago  — in 
the  archives  of  the  State  Department  at  Washing- 
ton, in  Madison’s  handwriting ; and  he  further  de- 
clares that  Giles  assured  Rufus  King  that  Madison 
was  their  author. 

Hamilton’s  reply,  so  far  as  any  intentional 
wrong-doing  was  imputed  to  him,  was  conclusive. 
There  had  been  technical  violations  of  acts  of  Con- 
gress in  one  instance,  but  it  was  only  to  carry  out 
the  acts  themselves.  Congress  had,  three  years 
before,  passed  two  acts  authorizing  the  negotiation 
of  two  loans,  one  for  twelve  million  dollars  for  the 
discharge  of  the  foreign  debt,  and  another  for  two 
million  dollars  to  be  used  at  home.  It  had  been 
convenient,  and  had  conduced  to  the  success  of  the 
negotiation,  to  offer  in  Holland  to  contract  a loan 
for  fourteen  million  dollars,  without  the  unneces- 
sary, and  to  foreigners  probably  the  confusing, 
statement  that  the  authority  for  borrowing  that 
amount  was  derived  from  two  separate  acts  of  Con- 
gress. It  was  only  in  this  borrowing  of  the  money 
that  there  was  any  seeming  disregard  of  the  letter 
of  the  law.  The  loans  and  their  purposes  were 
kept  entirely  distinct  in  the  accounts  of  the  depart- 
ment. Other  questions  touching  the  management 
of  these  loans  were  so  clearly  and  frankly  explained 
that  nothing  but  the  captiousness  of  party  could 
refuse  to  be  satisfied.  On  one  point  — the  charge 
of  an  alleged  deficit  — the  opposition  was  abso- 
lutely silenced.  The  secretary  indignantly  ex- 
plained that  the  sum  — as  anybody  could  have 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


191 


known  for  the  asking  from  any  officer  in  the 
Treasury  Department  — which  was  made  to  ap- 
pear as  missing  was  in  credits  for  customs  bonds 
not  yet  due,  and  bills  of  exchange  on  Europe  sold 
but  not  yet  paid  for. 

Though  there  was  enough  of  decency,  or  of  pru- 
dence which  took  the  place  of  decency,  to  drop  the 
insinuation  that  the  secretary  had  stolen  what  had 
never  been  in  his  possession,  it  was  not  so  with 
the  rest  of  the  accusations.  Only  four  days  before 
Congress  was  to  adjourn,  Giles  offered  another  set 
of  resolutions.  These  assumed  that  the  defiance 
of  law  and  unwarranted  assumption  of  power, 
which,  at  first,  were  only  suggested  by  the  in- 
quiries, were  now  proved  to  be  true  by  the  ex- 
planations that  had  been  given.  The  indictment, 
therefore,  was  made  to  include  the  verdict  and 
the  sentence;  the  criminal  was  accused,  was  to 
be  found  guilty,  and  condemned  to  capital  pun- 
ishment in  one  proceeding,  without  the  privilege 
of  trial,  or  a recognition  of  the  right  to  be  heard. 
The  argument  of  the  resolutions  was,  that  certain 
acts  were  a violation  of  law;  that  the  secretary 
had  committed  all  those  acts ; and  therefore  it 
was  the  will  of  the  House  that  the  facts  be  re- 
ported to  the  President.  The  presumption  obvi- 
ously was,  that  the  President  would  immediately 
dismiss  from  office  a disgraced  and  faithless  public 
servant.  But  the  prosecution  was  an  utter  failure. 
The  largest  vote  received  for  any  of  the  resolu- 
tions was  only  fifteen ; that  on  the  others  was 


192 


JAMES  MADISON 


from  seven  to  twelve,  in  a quorum  of  from  fifty 
to  sixty  members.  In  the  course  of  the  debate 
Mr.  Madison  had  said  that  his  colleague  [Giles] 
had  rendered  a service  highly  valuable  to  the  legis- 
lature, and  no  less  important  and  acceptable  to  the 
public.”  The  House  showed  by  its  votes  how  very 
far  it  was  from  agreeing  with  him.  But  Fisher 
Ames  wrote  about  that  time : “ Madison  is  be- 
come a desperate  party  leader,  and  I am  not  sure 
of  his  stopping  at  any  ordinary  point  of  extrem- 
ity.” If  it  be  really  true  that  he  instigated  this 
attack  upon  Hamilton,  and  was  the  author  of  the 
resolutions,  using  Giles  as  his  tool  to  get  them 
before  the  House,  Ames’s  reflection  was  not  un- 
charitable. 

It  would  not  be  just,  however,  to  leave  the  im- 
pression that  the  hostility  shown  in  this  affair  was 
purely  personal.  Both  Jefferson  and  Madison  had 
a hearty  hatred  for  Hamilton  which  would  have 
been  greatly  gratified  could  they  have  made  it 
the  plain  duty  of  the  President  to  put  him  out  of 
the  Treasury  Department  a dishonored  and  ruined 
man.  But  this  particular  outbreak  of  their  en- 
mity was  intensified  by  their  sincere  and  earnest 
enthusiasm  for  France.  They  were  quite  willing 
to  bring  Hamilton  to  grief  at  any  time  because 
he  was  Hamilton ; they  were  more  than  ordina- 
rily exasperated  against  him  just  now  because  in 
recent  newspaper  and  other  controversies  he  had 
altogether  got  the  better  of  them ; but  in  this 
particular  instance  they  wanted  to  punish  him 


FKENCH  POLITICS 


193 


because  of  delay  of  payments  in  discharge  of 
the  indebtedness  of  the  United  States  to  France. 
This  was  the  essential  delinquency  at  which  the 
Giles  resolutions  were  pointed.  The  difficulty  was, 
not  that  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  was  not 
careful  enough  of  the  public  money,  but  that  he 
was  too  careful.  He  insisted  upon  being  quite 
certain,  when  paying  off  a public  debt,  that  he 
w^as  paying  it  to  the  right  persons,  and  that  no 
risk  should  be  incurred  of  its  being  demanded  a 
second  time.  He  felt  there  was  no  such  certainty 
about  payments  to  France.  The  king  was  de- 
throned ; but  it  was  not  wise,  the  secretary  thought, 
to  be  hasty  in  recognizing  revolutionary  govern- 
ments. It  was  a republic  to-day ; it  might  be  a 
regency  to-morrow ; a monarchy  again  the  third 
day.  It  was  more  prudent  to  await  a reasonable 
period  for  the  evidence  of  permanency  on  one  side 
or  the  other.  Those  old  enough  to  remember  the 
late  war  of  the  rebellion  know  how  important 
the  maintenance  of  this  doctrine  was  in  regard  to 
the  recognition  of  the  rebel  confederacy  by  Eng- 
land and  France. 

But  to  all  this  Jefferson  did  not  in  the  least 
agree;  neither  did  Madison.  They  were  in  full, 
even  passionate,  sympathy  with  the  men  who 
brought  Louis  XVI.  to  the  guillotine.  Money, 
they  knew,  was  needed,  and  it  was  a crime  against 
liberty  to  delay  payment  when  payment  was  due 
to  the  French  government.  With  Hamilton  the 
question  was,  not  whether  the  revolutionists  ought 


194 


JAMES  MADISON 


to  be,  but  whether  they  were,  France.  With  Jef- 
ferson and  Madison  they  were  France,  because 
they  ought  to  be.  Hesitation  to  acknowledge  that 
the  Revolution  was  the  nation,  they  thought,  could 
only  come  from  an  “Anglican  party,”  the  “ene- 
mies of  France  and  of  Liberty,”  who  would  lead 
the  American  people  “ into  the  arms  and  ulti- 
mately into  the  government  of  Great  Britain,”  — 
to  use  the  terms  in  which  Madison  spoke,  a little 
later,  of  the  Federalists.  Which  of  these  men, 
in  this  regard  at  least,  were  the  thoughtful  and 
prudent  statesmen,  and  which  were  doctrinaires^ 
nobody  now,  probably,  questions.  The  larger  pro- 
^orjtion  of  the  people,  however,  were  then  carried 
-.away  by  the  enthusiasm  for  the  French  revolu- 
tionists. It  was  so,  no  doubt,  at  first  without 
much  distinction  of  party ; but  it  was  inevitable, 
when  the  government  should  be  called  upon  to 
take  some  decisive  stand  in  relation  to  European 
politics,  that  the  country  should  divide  into  two 
hostile  camps  ; or,  rather,  that  the  two  camps  al- 
ready existing  should  become  more  hostile  to  each 
other  than  ever.  It  is  not  necessary  to  assume 
that  the  mass  of  the  people  gave  themselves  up  to 
any  very  hard  thinking  about  the  matter.  For 
the  most  part  they  followed,  as  the  way  is  with 
parties,  the  political  leaders  to  whom  they  were 
already  accustomed,  never  doubting  that  not  to  do 
so  would  be  treacherous  to  the  gratitude  America 
owed  to  France,  and  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and 
democracy,  which,  in  the  hands  of  the  Frenchmen, 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


195 


was  hurling  monarchs  from  their  thrones  — at  least 
one  monarch  from  his,  and  more,  it  was  hoped, 
would  follow.  But  when  the  revolution  ran  into 
the  terrible  excesses  of  a later  stage,  if  any  Fed- 
eralists had  wavered  in  their  allegiance  to  their 
chiefs  they  soon  returned,  persuaded  that  the  wild 
and  bloody  anarchy  of  Paris  was  not  the  road  that 
led  to  the  establishment  of  a wise  and  safe  popular 
government. 

There  was  no  need  now  of  pretexts  for  quarreP 
ing;  real  causes  came  fast  enough.  France  de- 
clared war  against  England,  and  the  United  States 
had  its  part  to  play  in  this  strife  of  giants.  Its 
real  interest  was  to  keep  out  of  trouble ; and,  if  all 
were  agreed  on  that  point,  it  does  not  seem  that 
there  should  have  been  much  difficulty  in  saying 
so.  It  behooves  the  government  of  this  coun- 
try,” wrote  Washington  to  Hamilton,  “to  use 
every  means  in  its  power  to  prevent  the  citizens 
thereof  from  embroiling  us  with  either  of  those 
powers,  by  endeavoring  to  maintain  a strict  neu- 
trality.” It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a man  being 
sincerely  desirous  of  helping  neither  one  side  nor 
the  other ; of  injuring  neither  one  side  nor  the 
other ; of  maintaining,  so  far  as  help  or  harm 
could  go,  an  attitude  of  absolute  impartiality 
towards  both,  — it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  such 
a man  quarreling  with  the  word  “ neutrality  ” as 
applied  to  his  position.  But  JefPerson,  neverthe- 
less, quarreled  with  it ; not  frankly  and  directly 
as  a thing  he  did  not  want,  but  captiously  and 


196 


JAMES  MADISON 


hypercritically  objecting  to  the  word  to  cover  his 
dislike  to  the  thing  itself.  declaration  of 

neutrality,”  he  said,  was  a declaration  that  there 
should  be  no  war,  to  which  the  Executive  was  not 
competent.” 

It  was  true  that  the  Executive  was  not  compe- 
tent to  declare  that  there  should  be  no  war ; it  was 
not  true  that  the  use  of  the  word  neutrality  ” 
could  have  any  such  application  to  the  future  as  to 
prevent  Congress,  when  it  should  assemble,  from 
declaring  war  should  it  see  fit  to  do  so.  But 
meanwhile.  Congress  not  being  in  session,  and  no 
exigency  having  arisen  that  made  it  desirable  in 
the  President’s  judgment  to  call  an  extra  session, 
he,  with  the  assent  of  the  cabinet,  — for  Jefferson 
did  not  venture  upon  direct  opposition,  — issued  a 
proclamation  ‘‘  to  exhort  and  warn  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States  carefully  to  avoid  all  acts  and 
proceedings  whatsoever  ” that  might  interfere  with 

the  duty  and  interest  of  the  United  States  ” to 

adopt  and  pursue  a conduct  friendly  and  impar- 
tial towards  the  belligerent  powers.”  The  objec- 
tionable word  was  left  out  in  deference  to  Mr. 
Jefferson,  who,  really  preferring  that  there  should 
be  no  proclamation  at  all,  hoped  to  take  the  sting 
out  of  it  by  the  omission  of  a phrase.  It  was  the 
thing  said,  not  the  way  of  saying  it,  that  the  Pre- 
sident insisted  upon,  as  it  was  his  duty  to  preserve 
the  peace  till  the  legislature  should  declare  for 
war,  and  his  inclination  to  preserve  it  altogether. 

It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  Jefferson  and  his 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


197 


friends  saw  as  plainly  as  tlie  other  party  saw  how 
perilous  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  a 
foreign  war  would  probably  be.  But,  while  pro- 
fessing a desire  to  avoid  it,  they  were  far  more 
anxious,  apparently,  to  give  aid,  moral  as  well  as 
material,  to  France,  with  whose  revolutionary 
struggles  they  sympathized  so  deeply,  than  they 
were  to  avoid  offense  to  England,  whom  they 
hated  and  would  gladly  see  crippled.  Not  to  be  an 
enemy  of  England  they  held  was  to  be  an  enemy 
of  France ; and  not  of  France  merely,  but  of  the 
‘‘rights  of  man.”  They  could  not  or  would  not 
comprehend  any  wisdom  in  moderation,  any  pru- 
dence in  delay.  It  is  curious  to  see  how  party 
animosity  blinded  even  the  best  of  them.  The 
objection  to  the  word  “neutrality”  was  a mere 
quibble ; for  the  proclamation  called  upon  all  good 
citizens  to  maintain  at  their  peril  that  state  which, 
in  all  dictionaries,  neutrality  is  defined  to  be.  Mr. 
Jefferson,  in  instructing  as  secretary  of  state  the 
American  ministers  abroad  as  to  the  attitude  as- 
sumed by  the  government,  could  find  no  better 
term  than  “a  fair  neutrality.”  The  fact  was,  the 
Republican  leaders  wished  to  avoid  taking  any 
positive  stand,  partly  because  delay  might  be  a 
help  to  France,  and  partly  in  obedience  to  the  law 
of  party  politics,  in  opposition  to  the  other  side. 
They  were  not  at  first  quite  sure  of  their  ground, 
and  wanted  to  gain  time.  Mr.  Madison  seems  to 
have  waited  about  six  weeks  before  he  could  ven- 
ture upon  a positive  opinion  as  to  the  proclamation. 


198 


JAMES  MADISON 


The  newspapers  helped  him  to  a knowledge  of 
party  opinion,  and  party  opinion  helped  him  to 
make  up  his  own.  “ Every  ‘ Gazette  ’ I see,”  — 
he  wrote  in  June,  about  eight  weeks  after  the 
proclamation  was  published,  — ‘‘  every  ‘ Gazette  ’ 
I see  (except  that  of  the  United  States  [Federal- 
ist]) exhibits  a spirit  of  criticism  on  the  Anglified 
complexion  charged  on  the  Executive  politics.  . . . 
The  proclamation  was,  in  truth,  a most  unfortunate 
error.”  A week  before,  he  had  been  seemingly 
cautious  even  in  writing  to  Jefferson.  Then  he 
had  observed  that  newspaper  criticisms  aroused 
attention,  and  he  had  heard  expressions  of  sur- 
prise “ that  the  President  should  have  declared 
the  United  States  to  be  neutral  in  the  unqualified 
terms  used,  when  we  were  so  notoriously  and  un- 
equivocally under  eventual  engagements  to  defend 
the  American  possessions  of  France.  I have  heard 
it  remarked,  also,  that  the  impartiality  enjoined 
on  the  people  was  as  little  reconcilable  with  their 
moral  obligations  as  the  unconditional  neutrality 
proclaimed  by  the  government  is  with  the  express 
articles  of  the  treaty.”  He  adds : I have  been 

mortified  that  on  these  points  I could  offer  no 
hona  fide  explanations  that  might  be  satisfactory.” 
He  was  not  in  doubt  long,  however.  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son sent  him  within  two  or  three  weeks  a series 
of  papers  by  Hamilton,  under  the  signature  of 
‘‘  Pacificus,”  in  defense  of  the  proclamation,  and 
urged  him  to  reply.  This  Madison  undertook  to 
do  at  once,  and  in  five  papers,  under  the  signature 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


199 


of  Helvidius,”  he  took  up  all  the  points  in  dis- 
pute. 

The  question  relating  to  treaty  obligations  was 
the  more  serious.  By  the  treaty  of  1778  the 
United  States  had  guaranteed  ‘‘  to  his  Most  Chris- 
tian Majesty  the  present  possessions  of  the  Crown 
of  France  in  America.”  An  attempt  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  to  take  any  of  the  French  West 
India  Islands  would  involve  the  United  States  in 
the  war.  How,  then,  Mr.  Madison’s  friends  might 
well  ask,  as  in  the  letter  just  quoted  he  said 
they  did,  could  the  President  declare  the  United 
States  to  be  neutral  in  the  unqualified  terms  used, 
when  we  were  so  notoriously  and  unequivocally 
under  eventual  engagements  to  defend  the  Ameri- 
can possessions  of  France  ” ? Hamilton’s  ground 
was. that  the  treaty,  by  its  terms,  was  “a  defen- 
sive alliance,”  and  therefore  not  binding  in  this 
case,  inasmuch  as  the  present  war  against  England 
was  offensive;  and  that,  besides,  the  treaty  was 
in  suspension,  as  France  herself  was,  in  a sense,  in 
suspension,  having  only  a provisional  government, 
the  permanent  and  legitimate  successor  to  which 
was  uncertain.  But  an  important  point  was 
gained,  it  was  thought,  in  the  decision  to  receive 
Genet  as  the  French  minister.  Hamilton,  still 
acting  in  accordance  with  that  cautious  policy 
which  he  thought  to  be,  in  such  a crisis,  the  most 
judicious,  questioned  whether  a minister  from  the 
provisional  government  in  Paris  should  be  recog- 
nized without  reservations.  Such  an  ambassador 


200 


JAMES  MADISON 


might  be  followed  presently  by  another  accredited 
by  a new  power  in  the  revolutionary  progress. 
This  would,  at  the  least,  be  an  awkward  dilemma 
not  to  be  recovered  from  without  the  loss  of  some 
dignity  by  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
But  this  point  also  was  yielded  in  deference  to 
Jefferson,  and  much  to  his  mortification  the  con- 
cession turned  out  to  be  before  he  was  many  weeks 
older. 

‘‘I  anxiously  wish,”  Madison  wrote  to  Jeffer- 
son, that  the  reception  of  Genet  may  testify 
what  I believe  to  be  the  real  affections  of  the  peo- 
ple.” He  was  amply  gratified.  From  Charles- 
ton, where  he  landed,  to  Philadelphia,  Genet  was 
received  with  the  warmest  enthusiasm  by  all  who 
sympathized  with  France,  and  by  that  larger  num- 
ber among  Americans  who  are  always  ready  to 
hurrah  for  anything  or  anybody  that  has  caught 
the  popular  fancy.  Madison  watched  his  progress 
with  great  interest,  and  apparently  with  some 
misgivings.  Writing  again  a few  days  later  to 
Jefferson,  he  says  that  the  fiscal  party  in  Alex- 
andria was  an  overmatch  for  those  who  wished 
to  testify  the  American  sentiment.”  Indeed,  he 
thinks  it  certain,  he  says  in  the  same  letter,  ‘‘  that 
Genet  will  be  misled  if  he  takes  either  the  fashion- 
able cant  of  the  cities  or  the  cold  caution  of  the 
government  for  the  sense  of  the  public,”  — falling 
himself,  before  he  reaches  the  end  of  the  sentence, 
into  the  cant  of  assuming  neutrality  in  the  govern- 
ment to  be  only  a mask  ” behind  which  to  hide 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


201 


its  ‘‘  secret  Anglomany.”  But  he  was  quite  mis- 
taken in  supposing  that  Genet  was  likely  to  be 
misled,  or  led  at  all,  by  anybody.  He  was  almost 
capable,  as  General  Knox  said,  of  declaring  the 
United  States  a department  of  France,  and  of  levy- 
ing troops  here  to  reduce  the  Americans  to  obedi- 
ence. The  man’s  conduct,  if  it  had  not  been 
so  outrageous,  would  have  been  ludicrous  in  its 
assumption  of  power,  its  disregard  of  the  laws  of 
the  country,  and  its  defiance  of  the  government. 
Within  three  months  of  his  arrival  Jefferson  him- 
self was  constrained  to  acknowledge  that  he  had 
developed  a character  and  conduct  so  unexpected 
and  so  extraordinary  as  to  place  us  in  the  most 
distressing  dilemma,  between  our  regard  for  his 
nation,  which  is  constant  and  sincere,  and  a regard 
for  our  laws,  the  authority  of  which  must  be  main- 
tained; for  the  peace  of  our  country,  which  the 
executive  magistrate  is  charged  to  preserve ; for  its 
honor,  offended  in  the  person  of  that  magistrate ; 
and  for  its  character,  grossly  traduced  in  the  con- 
versations and  letters  of  this  gentleman.”  Though 
this  was  in  an  oflftcial  letter,  it  gave,  no  doubt, 
Jefferson’s  real  opinion ; for  no  man  had  more 
reason  than  he  for  resenting  the  conduct  of  the 
irrepressible  Frenchman.  Jefferson  has  been  ac- 
cused of  too  much  familiarity  with  the  French  min- 
ister in  private,  and  of  tardiness  in  the  discharge 
of  his  own  duty  as  secretary  where  it  was  likely 
to  clash  with  the  other’s  schemes.  Genet  himself 
complained  that  he  was  thrown  over  by  Jefferson 


202 


JAMES  MADISON 


after  receiving  from  him  every  encouragement. 
This  is,  of  course,  true,  but  not  in  the  least  dis- 
creditable to  Jefferson.  When  Genet  arrived  in 
Philadelphia,  he  was,  although  he  had  already 
committed  some  illegal  acts  in  Charleston,  profuse 
in  his  promises  of  good  behavior.  The  secretary 
of  state  had  welcomed  him  as  the  representative 
of  France  and  the  Revolution,  and  naturally  he 
meant  to  make  the  most  he  could  out  of  him,  for 
the  sake  of  the  Republican  party,  as  well  as  for  the 
sake  of  the  sacred  cause  of  liberty,  equality,  and 
fraternity.”  But  he  soon  saw  that  he  was  dealing 
with  one  who  was  a cross  between  a mountebank 
and  a madman,  as  we  learn  from  a letter  of  Madi- 
son to  Jefferson,  written  within  two  months  of 
Jefferson’s  first  interview  with  Genet.  “ Your 
account  of  Genet,”  says  the  letter,  “is  dreadful. 
He  must  be  brought  right  if  possible.  His  folly 
will  otherwise  do  mischief  which  no  wisdom  can 
repair.” 

The  mischief  dreaded  was  that  the  administra- 
tion party  would  take  advantage  of  the  insolent 
and  outrageous  conduct  of  the  French  minister 
to  show  the  folly  of  precipitancy,  and  to  gain 
popularity  and  strength  for  itself.  Madison  soon 
writes  to  Jefferson  to  acquaint  him  with  the  reac- 
tion taking  place  in  Virginia,  “ in  the  surprise  and 
disgust  of  those  who  are  attached  to  the  French 
cause,  and  who  viewed  this  minister  as  the  instru- 
ment for  cementing,  instead  of  alienating,  the  two 
republics.”  He  asserts  that  “ the  Anglican  party 


FRENCH  POLITICS 


203 


is  busy,  as  you  may  suppose,  in  making  the  worst 
of  everything,  and  in  turning  the  public  feelings 
against  France  and  thence  in  favor  of  England.” 
In  a sense  this  must  have  been  true.  The  ‘‘  fiscals,” 
the  “ Anglomanys,”  the  “ Anglican  party,”  the 
‘‘  monarchists,”  — which  were  Mr.  Madison’s  pet 
names  for  his  old  friends,  — were  good  enough 
politicians  to  take  great  satisfaction  in  keeping 
well  stirred  and  in  lively  use  the  muddy  waters 
into  which  their  opponents  had  floundered.  They 
were  not,  probably,  careful  always  to  remember 
that  France  was  neither  the  better  nor  worse,  nei- 
ther the  wiser  nor  the  less  wise,  because  one  of 
the  mad  fanatics,  bred  of  the  Eevolution,  had 
found  his  way,  unfortunately,  to  the  United  States 
as  a minister  plenipotentiary.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  was  not  true  that  there  was  any  “ Angli- 
can party,”  in  the  sense  in  which  Madison  used 
the  term,  — a party  led  by  men  who  were  the 
enemies  of  France  and  of  liberty,  at  work  to  lead 
the  well-meaning  from  their  honorable  connection 
with  those  [the  French  people]  into  the  arms  and 
ultimately  into  the  government  of  Great  Britain.” 
Washington  said  that  he  did  not  believe  there 
were  ten  men  in  the  United  States,  whose  opinions 
deserved  any  respect,  who  would  change  the  form 
of  government  to  a monarchy.  But  if  there  were 
only  ten  men  in  the  country  whose  opinions,  in  the 
estimate  of  Jefferson  and  Madison,  were  not  worth 
much,  Washington  was  among  them.  The  affec- 
tion and  reverence,  with  which  he  was  regarded  by 


204 


JAMES  MADISON 


the  people,  they  would  have  been  glad  to  appeal 
to  on  behalf  of  their  own  party ; but  it  is  easy  to 
read  between  the  lines  in  Jefferson’s  Ana,”  and 
in  his  and  Madison’s  correspondence,  that  they 
looked  upon  the  President  as  the  dupe  of  his  secre- 
tary of  the  treasury.  Not  that  they  were  ever 
wanting  in  terms  of  respect  and  even  of  venera- 
tion for  the  President,  but  the  tone  was  often  one 
of  pitiful  regret  almost  akin  to  contempt. 

‘‘  I am  extremely  afraid,”  Madison  wrote  to 
Jefferson,  ‘‘that  the  President  may  not  be  suffi- 
ciently aware  of  the  snares  that  may  be  laid  for 
his  good  intentions  by  men  whose  politics  at  bot- 
tom are  very  different  from  his  own.”  Again  he 
says,  a few  days  later : “ I regret  extremely  the 
position  into  which  the  President  has  been  thrown. 
The  unpopular  cause  of  Anglomany  is  openly  lay- 
ing claim  to  him.  His  enemies,  masking  them- 
selves under  the  popular  cause  of  France,  are  play- 
ing off  the  most  tremendous  batteries  on  him.  . . . 
It  is  mortifying  to  the  real  friends  of  the  Presi- 
dent that  his  fame  and  his  influence  should  have 
anything  to  apprehend  from  the  success  of  liberty 
in  another  country,  since  he  owes  his  preeminence 
to  the  success  of  it  in  his  own.  If  France  tri- 
umphs, the  ill-fated  proclamation  will  be  a mill- 
stone, which  would  sink  any  other  character  and 
will  force  a struggle  even  on  his.”  Yet  it  is  cer- 
tain that  Washington  was  not  in  the  least  doubt  as 
to  his  own  political  principles ; that  he  was  never 
in  danger  of  being  inveigled  into  the  betrayal  of 


FKENCH  POLITICS 


205 


those  principles,  whatever  they  might  be ; and  that 
he  was  quite  capable  of  due  care  for  his  own  repu- 
tation. 

If  Madison  did  not  know  that  these  tears  over 
Washington,  if  sincere,  were  quite  uncalled  for, 
Jefferson  was  not  in  the  least  deceived.  He 
records  in  his  ‘‘  Ana  ” that  the  President,  referring 
to  certain  articles  that  had  recently  appeared  in 
Freneau’s  Gazette,”  said  that  ‘‘  he  considered 
those  papers  as  attacking  him  [Washington]  di- 
rectly ; for  he  must  be  a fool  indeed  to  swallow 
the  little  sugar-plums  here  and  there  thrown  out 
to  him  ; that  in  condemning  the  administration 
of  the  government  they  condemned  him,  for  if  they 
thought  there  were  measures  pursued  contrary  to 
his  sentiments,  they  must  conceive  him  too  care- 
less to  attend  to  them,  or  too  stupid  to  understand 
them.”  Again,  some  months  later,  the  President, 
alluding  to  another  article  in  Freneau’s  paper,  — 
that  ‘‘rascal  Freneau,”  as  he  called  him, — said 
“ that  he  despised  all  their  attacks  on  him  person- 
ally, but  there  never  had  been  an  act  of  the  govern- 
ment — not  meaning  in  the  executive  line  only, 
but  in  any  line  — which  that  paper  had  not  abused. 
He  was  evidently  sore  and  warm,”  continues  the 
candid  secretary,  “ and  I took  his  intention  to  be, 
that  I should  interpose  in  some  way  with  Freneau, 
perhaps  withdraw  his  appointment  of  translating 
clerk  in  my  office.  But  I will  not  do  it.” 

These  frank  and  indignant  avowals  of  feeling 
and  opinion  were  not,  if  we  may  believe  Jefferson, 


206 


JAMES  MADISON 


unusual  with  Washington,  even  in  cabinet  meet- 
ings ; and  it  seems  hardly  likely  that  Madison, 
who  was  on  the  most  friendly  and  intimate  terms 
with  the  President,  could  have  been  so  ignorant  of 
how  he  felt  and  thought  as  to  suppose  him  the 
mere  dupe  of  designing  men.  The  truth  is,  proba- 
bly, that  Madison  did  not,  any  more  than  Jeffer- 
son, believe  this.  It  was  only  a bit  of  party  tactics 
to  assume,  lest  the  President  should  have  too  much 
influence  over  the  minds  of  the  people,  that,  in  the 
hands  of  the  wicked  “ Anglicists,”  he  was  as  clay 
in  the  hands  of  the  potter.  The  two  friends, 
whether  in  writing  or  by  speech  they  lamented 
and  excused  the  unhappy  position,  as  they  were 
pleased  to  call  it,  of  the  President,  must  have 
appeared  to  each  other  like  the  Koman  augurs  in 
Gerome’s  picture. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS 

Genet  was  at  last  got  rid  of,  but  the  evil  that 
he  did  lived  after  him.  His  presence  had  provoked 
an  outbreak,  to  some  degree,  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  French  Revolution,  which,  however  significant 
they  might  be  in  the  upheaval  of  an  old  monarchi- 
cal despotism,  w’ere  an  unwholesome  growth  among 
a simple  people,  where  one  man  was  as  good  as 
another  before  the  law ; where,  from  the  first  set- 
tlement of  the  country,  all  had  largely  possessed 
the  advantages  of  a popular  government ; and 
where  any  other  than  a republican  government 
for  the  future  was  wellnigh  impossible.  For  men 
to  address  each  other  as  “ citizen,”  as  if  the  word 
had  the  new  significance  in  America  that  it  had 
just  gained  in  France ; to  swear  eternal  fidelity  to 
liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity,  as  if  these  were 
lately  discovered  rights  which  had  been  denied  the 
common  people  for  centuries  by  kings  and  nobles, 
who  had  always  lived  in  the  next  street  in  incon- 
ceivable luxury  wrung  from  the  blood  and  sweat 
of  the  poor ; to  form  J acobin  clubs  pledged  to  the 
suppression  of  the  tyranny  of  aristocrats  in  a coun- 
try where,  as  Samuel  Dexter  said  of  New  England, 


208 


JAMES  MADISON 


there  was  hardly  a man  rich  enough  to  own  a car- 
riage, and  few  so  poor  as  not  to  own  a horse ; for 
men  thus  to  ape  those  revolutionary  ways,  which 
meant  so  much  in  Paris,  may  have  seemed  at  the 
moment,  to  sober-minded  people,  more  fantastic 
than  harmful.  It  was  harmful,  however,  insomuch 
as  it  substituted  sentiment  for  common  sense,  and 
made  enthusiasm,  not  reason,  the  guide  of  conduct. 
A character  was  given  to  political  conflict  which 
obtained  for  years  to  come.  There  was,  it  is  true, 
a certain  manliness  about  it  in  remarkable  contrast 
with  that  maudlin  sentimentality  of  our  time  which 
is  rather  inclined  to  ask  pardon  of  the  rebels  of  the 
late  civil  war  for  having  put  them  to  the  trouble 
of  getting  up  a rebellion.  It  was  a conflict,  never- 
theless, more  of  party  passion  than  of  principle, 
wherein  it  is  impossible  to  see  that  either  party 
was  absolutely  right,  or  either  absolutely  wrong. 
The  Francomania  phase  of  it  disappeared  for  a 
time  in  John  Adams’s  administration ; but  it 
revived  again,  and  gave  intensity  and  virulence  to 
the  political  struggles,  in  the  first  decade  of  this 
century.  Then  it  was  that  men  went  about  their 
daily  affairs  with  cockades  on  their  hats  as  dis- 
tinctive party  badges.  In  their  social  as  well  as 
in  their  business  relations  they  were  governed  by 
party  affinities.  Neighbors  differing  in  politics 
would  hardly  speak  to  each  other,  and  each  was 
always  ready  to  accept  the  other’s  political  crooked- 
ness as  the  measure  of  his  possible  depravity  in 
everything  else.  They  would  hardly  walk  on  the 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  209 


same  side  of  the  street ; or  sail  in  the  same  packet ; 
or  ride  in  the  same  stage-coach ; or  buy  their  gro- 
ceries at  the  same  shop ; or  listen  to  the  preaching 
of  the  gospel  from  the  same  pulpit ; indeed,  if  the 
preacher  was  known  to  have  pronounced  political 
opinions,  he  was  held,  by  those  who  did  not  agree 
with  him,  as  one  from  whose  shoulders  the  clerical 
gown  should  be  torn. 

Gratitude  to  France  had  not  yet  even  become 
traditional,  and  it  was  intensified  by  the  deepest 
sympathy  for  a people  struggling  for  what,  by  their 
aid,  Americans  had  so  recently  gained.  Added  to 
this  was  the  old  hatred  to  England,  which  England 
as  carefully  nursed  as  if  it  were  her  settled  policy, 
by  exciting  Indian  hostilities  on  the  borders,  by 
outrages  on  the  high  seas,  and  by  an  interference 
with  American  commerce,  exercised  with  as  little 
consideration  of  the  rights  of  an  independent  nation 
as  if  the  States  were  still  colonies  in  revolt.  Never 
did  a party  find,  ready  made  and  close  at  hand, 
so  many  elements  of  popularity ; and  these  being 
appealed  to  as  Genet  appealed  to  them,  it  was  easy 
to  set  the  country  in  a blaze.  When  the  adminis- 
tration was  determined  that  he  should  be  recalled, 
and  the  Republican  leaders  were  anxious  to  get  rid 
of  him,  as  they  could  not  restrain  him,  Jefferson 
opposed,  in  a meeting  of  the  cabinet,  the  proposition 
to  ask  for  his  recall,  lest  such  popular  indignation 
should  be  aroused  as  would  enable  the  French 
minister  to  defy  the  government  itself.  The  seed 
sowed  by  such  a man,  on  such  a soil,  bore  fruit  a 


210 


JAMES  MADISON 


thousand  fold  for  almost  a generation.  It  is  not  to 
be  wondered  at  that  the  Federalists  could  not  long 
hold  their  own  against  a party  that  did  not  ask  the 
people  to  think,  but  bade  them  only  to  remember 
— much,  indeed,  that  ought  to  be  remembered  — 
and  to  feel.  That  is  always  so  much  easier  to  do 
than  the  other,  and  it  is  always  so  much  easier  to 
aj)peal  effectually  to  sentiment  than  to  reflection, 
that  the  wonder  rather  is  that  the  Federalists  could 
hold  their  own  so  long  as  they  did.  All  things 
were  against  them  but  one.  Washington,  though 
altogether  above  any  partisan  bias,  as  he  believed 
to  be  the  imperative  duty  of  the  chief  magistrate 
of  the  nation,  conducted  his  administration  by  the 
principles  which  distinguished  the  Federalists.  He 
was  neither,  as  he  intimated  to  Jefferson,  so  care- 
less as  not  to  know  what  was  done,  nor  such  a 
fool  as  not  to  understand  why  it  was  done  ; and  so 
greatly  was  he  revered  for  his  exalted  character, 
so  universal  was  the  confidence  in  his  integrity, 
sagacity,  and  sound  judgment,  that,  so  long  as  he 
remained  President,  the  party  that  surrounded  him 
was  immovable  as  a mountain.  His  policy  was  to 
stave  off  a rupture  with  England,  and,  if  possible, 
to  bring  that  power  into  pacific  and  rational  rela- 
tions with  the  United  States.  The  government 
aimed  to  keep  itself  clear  of  entanglement  with  all 
foreign  politics ; to  maintain  that  perfect  neutrality 
which  should  violate  no  treaties,  offend  no  national 
friendships,  provoke  no  jealousies,  and  leave  Eng- 
land and  France  to  fight  their  own  battles,  content 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  211 


that  the  United  States  should  be  an  impartial  spec- 
tator. Thirty  years  afterward,  when  the  Federal 
party  had  ceased  to  exist  under  that  title,  this  was 
announced  as  the  true  American  policy,  and  was 
thenceforth  known  as  “ The  Monroe  Doctrine,” 
though  the  merit,  even  of  re-discovery,  did  not 
belong  to  President  Monroe. 

In  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  perhaps  in  ninety-nine 
out  of  a hundred,  the  wisest  statesmanship  is  the 
knowledge  when  and  how  to  compromise.  Cer- 
tainly that  was  all  John  Jay,  whom  the  President 
sent  to  England  to  make  a treaty,  could  do.  The 
treaty  was  a bad  one  ; that  is,  it  was  not  such  an 
one  as  any  President  and  Senate  would  have  dared 
to  consent  to  for  the  last  sixty  years ; it  was  not 
so  good  an  one  as  that  which  Monroe  and  Pinkney 
negotiated  ten  years  later,  and  which  President 
Jefferson,  lest  it  should  help  England  and  hurt 
France,  then  quietly  locked  up  in  his  desk  without 
permitting  the  Senate  even  to  know  of  its  exist- 
ence ; nor  was  it  so  bad  as  the  treaty  of  peace 
made  with  England  in  1814.  But  it  was  undoubt- 
edly the  best  that  could  be  done  at  the  time.  The 
question  was  between  it  and  nothing ; and  the  best 
its  warmest  defenders  could  say  was  that  it  was 
better  than  nothing.  No  treaty  meant  war;  and 
war  at  that  moment  with  England  meant  ruin. 
At  least  so  the  Federalists  thought,  and,  so  far 
as  human  foresight  could  go,  they  were  probably 
right. 

But  never  was  a treaty  more  unpopular  than 


212 


JAMES  MADISON 


this,  when  its  provisions  came  to  be  understood. 
The  government,  in  delaying  to  make  it  public, 
seemed  to  fear  for  its  reception,  and  by  that  hesi- 
tation helped  to  raise  the  very  doubts  it  was  afraid 
of.  But  when  it  was  published  the  whole  South 
was  aroused  as  one  man  on  finding  that  the  pay- 
ment for  fugitive  slaves,  who  during  the  war  of 
the  Revolution  had  sought  refuge  with  the  British 
army,  was  not  provided  for.  Other  concessions 
made  to  England  were,  in  other  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, deemed  not  less  humiliating  and  injurious  to 
the  national  honor  than  this  refusal  to  pay  for 
runaway  negroes.  Also,  there  was  a one-sided 
stipulation  relating  to  commerce  in  the  West  In- 
dies, so  injurious  to  American  interests  that  the 
President  and  Senate,  rather  than  ratify  it,  de- 
termined to  reject  the  whole  treaty  and  take  the 
consequences.  There  was  hardly  a town  of  any 
note  that  did  not  hold  its  indignation  meeting. 
Jay  was  burned  in  effigy,  or  the  attempt  was  made 
so  to  express  the  public  disapprobation,  in  more 
than  one  of  the  larger  towns.  Hamilton,  when  at 
a public  meeting  in  New  York  he  tried  to  explain 
and  defend  the  treaty,  was  stoned  and  compelled 
to  retire.  If  the  more  violent  opponents  of  the 
administration  were  to  be  believed,  its  members, 
from  the  President  down,  and  all  the  leading  men 
of  the  party  supporting  it,  were  bought  by  “ British 
gold,”  or  were  ready  without  being  bought,  but 
from  pure  original  depravity,  to  betray  their  own 
country  and  help  to  destroy  France.  The  name  of 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  213 


the  ingenious  inventor  of  the  argument  of  British 
gold,”  then  used  for  the  first  time,  has  unfortu- 
nately been  lost;  but  it  has  stood  the  test  of  a 
hundred  years’  usage^  and  is  as  startling  and  con- 
clusive to-day  as  it  was  a century  ago. 

There  soon  came^  however,  the  sober  second 
thought  which  took  into  consideration  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  the  treaty  was  made,  the 
possible  and  even  probable  consequences  of  its 
rejection,  as  well  as  the  objections  to  the  treaty 
itself.  After  the  first  excitement  had  passed  away, 
many  thought  it  worth  while  to  read  for  them- 
selves what  hitherto  they  had  only  reviled  at  the 
suggestion  of  others,  or  from  sympathy  with 
the  popular  clamor.  The  commercial  community, 
the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce  leading  the 
way,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  their  rights  and 
interests  were  reasonably  protected ; that  to  be  re- 
cognized as  a neutral  between  two  such  belligerent 
powers  as  England  and  France  was  a great  point 
gained ; that  partial  indemnity  was  better  than 
total  loss ; and  that  the  chance  of  a fairly  profita- 
ble trade  in  the  future  was  preferable  to  the  ruin 
of  all  foreign  commerce.  It  was  universally  agreed 
that  peace  was  better  than  war;  but  there  was 
this  difference  between  the  two  parties : while  one 
maintained  that  war  was  not  a necessary  conse- 
quence of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  the  other 
declared  it  must  be  inevitable,  where  there  were 
so  many  points  of  collision  which  could  only  be 
escaped  by  mutual  agreement.  This  was  especially 


214 


JAMES  MADISON 


true  on  the  frontier,  where  Indian  hostilities  were 
sure  to  follow,  and  lead  to  general  war,  if  the 
military  posts,  which  should  have  been  given  up  at 
the  close  of  the  Revolution,  should  remain  longer 
in  the  hands  of  the  English. 

But,  after  all,  the  real  question  with  the  Repub- 
licans was  the  influence  which  a treaty  with  Eng- 
land might  have  upon  the  relations  of  France  and 
the  United  States.  They  detested  England  for 
her  own  sake ; they  detested  her  still  more  for  the 
sake  of  France.  If  there  had  been  no  question  of 
France  in  the  way  they  would,  perhaps,  have  been 
willing,  like  the  Federalists,  to  consider  the  rela- 
tions of  England  and  the  United  States  on  their 
merits,  — to  remember  that  the  commerce  between 
them  was  greater  than  that  which  the  United 
States  had  with  any  other  country,  the  loss  of 
which  might  be  a disastrous  check  to  her  prosper- 
ity; that  the  peoples  of  the  two  countries  were, 
after  all,  of  one  blood,  and  that  theirs  was  a com- 
mon heritage  in  the  institutions,  laws,  language, 
and  character  that  distinguished  the  race ; that  the 
quarrel  between  them  was  — though  it  might  be 
the  more  bitter  on  that  account — a family  quarrel, 
and  ought  for  that  reason  to  be  the  more  speedily 
settled.  But,  if  England  would  not  remember 
these  things,  — as  she  never  has  to  this  day,  — if, 
on  the  contrary,  she  chose  to  be  overbearing,  con- 
temptuous, insolent,  quite  regardless  of  American 
rights,  — as  she  always  has  been  when  she  could  be 
so  safely,  — then  it  behooved  the  United  States, 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  215 


inasmuch  as  she  was  a young  and  as  yet  a feeble 
nation,  to  conciliate  this  powerful  enemy  whenever 
she  could  do  so  consistently  with  her  self-respect, 
to  avoid  giving  unnecessary  offense  or  provoking 
fresh  injuries,  and,  in  the  mean  while,  to  nurture 
and  husband  her  strength,  to  keep  an  accurate 
account  of  all  the  wrongs  that  in  her  weakness  she 
should  be  compelled  to  submit  to,  and  to  bide  her 
time.  These  were  the  principles  of  the  Federalists. 
Their  aim  was,  not  the  good  of  England,  but  the 
good  of  the  United  States.  They  were  an  Ameri- 
can party ; to  them  foreign  relations  were  of  im- 
portance mainly  for  the  influence  these  might  have 
upon  the  prosperity,  happiness,  and  power  of  their 
own  country.  They  did  not  forget  the  gratitude 
due  to  France  for  the  aid  she  had  given  to  the 
struggling  colonies,  though  that  aid  was  given  not 
so  much  for  love  of  America  as  for  hatred  of  Eng- 
land. The  pacific  and  friendly  relations  already 
established  with  France  they  held  in  due  estima- 
tion ; and  their  sympathies  went  out  to  her  people 
in  full  measure  in  their  struggle  for  a popular 
government,  so  long  as  that  struggle  was  kept 
within  the  bounds  of  reason  and  humanity.  But 
sympathy  with  and  gratitude  to  France  did  not 
blind  them  to  the  wisdom  and  expediency  of  pacific 
and  friendly  relations  with  England,  provided  such 
could  be  established  without  the  sacrifice  of  their 
own  prosperity,  independence,  and  national  pride. 
It  was  only  to  add  to  that  prosperity,  to  gain  new 
security  for  that  independence,  and  to  build  up  a 


216 


JAMES  MADISON 


nation  of  which  they  and  their  children,  to  the 
latest  generation,  might  well  be  proud,  that  they 
ought  to  be  on  good  terms  with  that  powerful  state 
with  whom  they  were  co-heirs  in  all  the  ideas  and 
institutions  constituting  the  civilization  that  made 
her  great.  They  hoped  to  build  up,  west  of  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  “ an  Inglishe  Nation’’  in  its  broad- 
est sense,  of  which  Walter  Raleigh  had  hoped  that 
he  might  live  to  see  the  beginning,  and  which  the 
latest  historical  writers  in  England  are  just  now 
recognizing  as  the  most  important  part  of  the 
modern  empire  of  the  English  race. 

The  House  of  Representatives  was  nothin  ses- 
sion when  the  Jay  treaty  was  ratified  by  the 
President  and  Senate,  but  Mr.  Madison’s  letters 
show  that  he  could  see  in  it  nothing  but  evil.  In 
February,  1796,  the  ratification  by  both  govern- 
ments was  announced  to  both  houses  of  Congress, 
and  measures  were  at  once  taken  by  the  Repub- 
licans in  the  lower  house  to  render  the  treaty,  if 
possible,  null  and  void.  A resolution,  warmly 
supported  by  Mr.  Madison,  was  offered,  calling 
upon  the  President  for  copies  of  the  instructions 
under  which  Mr.  Jay  acted,  with  the  correspond- 
ence and  any  other  papers,  proper  to  be  made 
public,  relating  to  the  negotiation.  The  resolution 
was  subjected  to  a debate  of  three  weeks,  but  was 
finally  passed.  The  request  was  refused  by  the 
President,  on  the  ground  that  the  treaty-making 
power  was,  by  the  Constitution,  confided  to  the 
President  and  Senate.  It  was  on  this  point  mainly 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  217 


that  the  debate  had  turned ; and  the  President,  in 
support  of  his  opinion  as  well  as  that  of  the  Fed- 
eralists generally,  referred  to  his  recollection  of 
the  plain  intention  of  the  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, and  to  the  fact  that  a proposition,  “ that  no 
treaty  should  be  binding  on  the  United  States 
which  was  not  ratified  by  law,”  was  explicitly 
rejected.”  Mr.  Madison  said  a day  or  two  after, 
that,  while  he  did  not  doubt  ‘‘the  case  to  be  as 
stated,  he  had  no  recollection  of  it.”  Of  the  mes- 
sage itself,  he  said  that  it  was  “ as  unexpected  as 
its  tone  and  tenor  are  improper  and  indelicate.” 
But  Hamilton,  he  thought,  wrote  it,  and  the  Pre- 
sident was,  as  usual,  lamented  over  for  having 
been  taken  in.  A resolution,  however,  was  finally 
passed  in  favor  of  the  treaty,  though  by  a majority 
of  three  only.  The  debate  upon  it  was  earnest 
and  long,  Mr.  Madison  leading  the  opposition. 
His  disappointment  was  bitter.  “ The  progress 
of  this  business  throughout,”  he  wrote  to  Jefferson, 
“ has  been  to  me  the  most  worrying  and  vexatious 
that  I ever  encountered  ; and  the  more  so,  as  the 
causes  lay  in  the  unsteadiness,  the  follies,  the  per- 
verseness, and  the  defections  among  our  friends, 
more  than  in  the  strength,  or  dexterity,  or  malice 
of  our  opponents.” 

Though  the  Jay  treaty  was  not — as  was  said 
on  a previous  page  — such  an  one  as  the  United 
States  would  have  acceded  to  in  latter  times,  the 
result  proved  it  to  be  a wise  and  timely  measure. 
Notwithstanding  the  disturbed  condition  of  affairs 


218 


JAMES  MADISON 


in  Europe,  its  influence  upon  the  United  States, 
and  the  increasing  violence  o£  faction  here,  the 
increase  for  the  next  ten  or  twelve  years  of  the 
commerce,  and  the  consequent  growth  and  pro- 
sperity, of  the  country  were  greater  than  the  most 
sanguine  supporters  of  the  treaty  had  dared  to 
hope  for.  Their  immediate  expectations  that  it 
might  be  possible  to  establish  better  relations  with 
England,  without  disturbing  essentially  those  exists 
ing  with  France,  were,  however,  signally  disap- 
pointed. Their  opponents  were  wiser;  for  they 
not  only  measured  accurately  the  indignation  of 
the  French  by  their  own,  but  they  took  good  care 
that  it  should  not  languish  for  want  of  encourage- 
ment. The  French  Directory  might  have  been 
reconciled  to  the  situation  had  it  been  plain  to 
them  that  there  was  neither  an  ‘‘Anglicized  ” party 
nor  a French  party  in  the  United  States,  but  that 
the  people  were  united  in  the  determination  to 
maintain,  for  their  own  protection,  whatever  their 
personal  sympathies  might  be,  an  absolute  neu- 
trality between  the  belligerent  powers.  But  as 
they  were  assured  that  their  friends  in  America 
meant  also  to  be  their  effectual  allies,  so  they 
believed  that  those  who  professed  neutrality  used 
it  only  as  a mask  for  friendship  to  England. 

James  Monroe  had  been  received  in  Paris  as 
American  minister,  literally  as  well  as  morally, 
with  open  arms,  in  that  memorable  scene  when,  in 
the  presence  and  amid  the  cheers  of  the  National 
Convention,  the  president,  Merlin  de  Douai,  im- 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  219 


printed  upon  his  cheeks,  in  the  name  of  France, 
the  kiss  of  fraternity.  Till  he  was  recalled  in  the 
latter  days  of  Washington’s  administration,  Mon- 
roe was  the  representative  not  so  much  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  which  he  owed  allegiance  as  of  the 
faction  to  which  he  belonged  at  home.  He  was 
not,  it  is  true,  unmindful  of  the  hundreds  of  out- 
rages perpetrated  by  French  naval  vessels  and  pri- 
vateers upon  American  merchantmen ; that  their 
crews  were  thrown  into  French  prisons,  and  that 
the  detention  of  their  cargoes  had  brought  ruin 
upon  many  American  citizens  ; nor  did  he  neglect 
to  demand  redress.  But  he  seemed  absolutely 
incapable  of  understanding  that  if  there  were  any- 
thing to  choose  between  the  insults  and  wrongs 
which  America  was  compelled  to  submit  to  from 
England  and  France,  it  was  only  in  the  greater 
ability  of  England  to  inflict  them.  English  ships 
swept  the  ocean,  and  pretexts  were  never  wanting 
for  overhauling  American  vessels,  stripping  them 
of  some  of  their  men,  or  confiscating  both  ships  and 
cargoes.  France  had  as  many  pretexts,  and  quite 
as  good  a will  to  enforce  them  ; but  she  had  fewer 
ships,  and  for  that  reason,  and  that  only,  did  rather 
less  damage. 

But  however  earnest  Monroe  was  in  insisting 
upon  the  rights  of  neutrals,  in  urging  upon  the 
French  ministry  the  strict  observance  of  treaty 
obligations,  and  in  complaining  of  the  constant 
injuries  done  in  their  despite,  there  was  another 
thing  about  which  he  was  far  more  earnest.  He 


220 


JAMES  MADISON 


was  as  anxious  to  aid  the  French  to  baffle,  if  pos- 
sible, Jay’s  negotiations  in  London  as  if  he  were 
uncovering  a plot  against  his  own  government. 
When  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  was  made 
known  in  Paris,  the  indignation  of  the  Directory 
was  hardly  kept  within  bounds.  The  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  notified  Monroe  that  the  Directory 
considered  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1778 
as  altered  and  suspended  in  their  most  essential 
parts  by  this  treaty  with  England.  Under  any 
circumstances  the  French  would,  no  doubt,  have 
resented  the  establishment  of  friendly  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the  old  enemy  of 
France,  with  whom  she  at  that  moment  was  en- 
gaged in  a war  arousing  more  than  the  bitter  in- 
herited enmity  of  the  two  peoples.  But  the  course 
Monroe  had  seen  fit  to  pursue  had  done  much  to 
assure  the  French  that  the  strong  party  in  the 
United  States,  which  he  represented,  would  never 
permit  the  virgin  republic  to  be  delivered,  as  it 
was  assumed  the  treaty  did  deliver  her,  bound  and 
gagged,  into  the  hands  of  the  power  which  Jeffer- 
son loved  to  call  the  harlot  England.”  The  first 
enthusiasm  of  the  Revolution  was  fast  growing 
into  cant  in  both  countries,  and  the  language  of 
devotion  to  liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity  was 
beginning  to  lose  all  meaning.  But  it  was  easy  to 
be  deceived  by  the  assurances,  more  significant  in 
actions  than  in  words,  of  an  official  representative, 
that  the  American  people,  save  an  Anglicized  and 
decreasing  minority,  were  the  friends,  and  meant 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  221 


to  be  the  allies,  of  France.  Of  course  the  French 
were  all  the  more  exasperated  because  they  had 
permitted  themselves  to  be  deluded.  Monroe  was 
first  rebuked  by  his  own  government  for  neglecting 
to  do  all  that  might  have  been  done  to  reconcile 
the  Directory  to  a treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  ; and  soon  after,  his  conduct 
continuing  unsatisfactory,  he  was  recalled. 

It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  the  French  Direc- 
tory were  not  misled;  that  nothing  would  have 
reconciled  them  to  the  British  treaty;  and  that 
their  subsequent  course  would  have  been  the  same 
had  they  believed  the  American  people  were  desir- 
ous to  be  on  good  terms  with  England  solely  for 
their  own  tranquillity  and  interest,  and  not  at  all 
because  any  large  portion  of  them  were  at  enmity 
with  France.  This,  however,  would  not  be  a valid 
excuse  for  Monroe’s  course  as  a representative  of 
his  government.  The  only  defense  for  him  is, 
that  he  was  deceived  by  his  friends  at  home ; they 
must  share,  therefore,  the  responsibility  for  his 
conduct,  inasmuch  as  they  encouraged  a man  not 
over  strong  in  mind  or  character,  and  more  likely 
to  be  governed  by  impulse  than  by  good  judg- 
ment, to  abuse  the  confidence  placed  in  him  by  the 
administration. 

From  any  share  in  this  responsibility,  however, 
Madison  must  be  relieved.  He  was  in  very  con- 
stant correspondence  with  Monroe,  and  kept  him 
carefully  advised  as  to  the  progress  of  the  treaty. 
No  man  desired  its  defeat  more  earnestly  than  he. 


222 


JAMES  MADISON 


and  he  believed  that  a majority  of  the  people 
were  opposed  to  it.  But  he  evidently  doubted  its 
rejection  from  the  first,  and  his  discussion  of  pos- 
sibilities in  his  letters  to  Monroe  was  always  frank 
and  discriminating.  In  the  end  he  accounted  for 
the  vote  in  its  favor  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives by  the  activity  and  influence  of  its  friends, 
which  its  opponents  wanted  the  ability  or  the  time 
to  overcome.  It  is  probable  that  his  colleagues  of 
his  own  party  in  the  House  did  not  agree  with  him 
that  public  opinion  was  against  the  treaty,  as  it 
was  by  votes  from  their  side  that  its  acceptance 
was  carried. 

With  the  ensuing  session  of  Congress,  at  the 
close  of  Washington’s  administration,  Madison’s 
congressional  service  ended.  The  leadership  of 
the  opposition,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  its 
influence  upon  the  welfare  of  the  country,  or  of 
the  personal  motives  by  which  he  may  have  been 
governed,  had  devolved  upon  him,  almost  from  the 
beginning,  by  natural  selection  of  the  fittest  for 
that  position.  It  was  not  an  easy  place  to  take, 
either  by  one’s  own  choice  or  by  the  suffrages  of 
others ; for  at  the  head  of  the  administration  to  be 
opposed  stood  the  man  most  revered  by  a grateful 
country,  surrounded  by  men  among  those,  at  least, 
who  were  best  known  for  their  past  services  and 
most  esteemed  for  their  ability  and  character.  It 
was  the  more  difficult  for  one  whose  personal  rela- 
tion to  the  President  was  that  of  the  warmest 
friendship  ; to  whom  the  President  was  accustomed 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  223 


to  turn  for  counsel  and  even  for  guidance;  and 
who,  being  among  those  eminent  men  to  whom  the 
people  owed  their  new  Constitution,  was  counted 
upon  to  strengthen  the  union  of  the  States  and 
build  up  a strong  and  stable  government.  He 
played  his  difficult  part,  nevertheless,  with  dig- 
nity; if  not  brilliant,  he  was  always  ready  with  the 
best  reasons  that  could  be  given  for  the  measures 
he  supported;  and  his  zeal  was  invariably  tempered 
with  a wise  moderation  and  a courtesy  toward  op- 
ponents which  made  him  always  respected,  and 
sometimes  feared  for  reserved  force,  in  debate. 

Somewhat  more  than  a year  before  his  retire- 
ment from  Congress  Mr.  Madison  had  married, 
and  it  is  quite  possible  that  this  may  in  part  have 
moved  him  to  seek  rest  in  the  tranquillity  of  a 
country  life.  Tradition  says  that  Mrs.  Madison 
was  a beautiful  woman.  She  has  in  our  time  been 
a marked  figure  in  the  society  of  Washington,  and 
many  remember  her  for  her  fine  presence,  her 
powers  of  conversation,  and  that  beauty  which 
sometimes  belongs  to  the  aged,  though  it  may  not 
have  been  preceded  by  youthful  comeliness.  Her 
maiden  name  was  Dolly  Payne,  and  her  parents 
were  members  of  the  Society  of  Friends.  When 
Madison  married  her  she  was  Mrs.  Todd,  the 
widow  of  John  Todd,  a lawyer  of  Philadelphia. 
Her  age  at  this  time  was  twenty-six  years,  Mr. 
Madison  being  forty-three,  and  she  survived  him 
thirteen  years,  dying  in  1849.  On  her  tombstone 
she  is  called  Dolley ; ” but  Mr.  Hives,  in  his  life 


224 


JAMES  MADISON 


of  her  husband,  ever  mindful  of  the  proprieties, 
calls  her  ‘‘  Dorothea,”  or  rather,  Mrs.  Dorothea 
Payne  Madison;  for,  like  the  Vicar  of  Wakefield, 
he  loved  to  give  the  whole  name. 


CHAPTER  XV 


AT  HOME  — “ KESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99” 

Me.  Madison,  in  retiring  for  a time  from  pub- 
lic office,  did  not  lose  his  interest  in  public  affairs. 
Of  few  Americans  can  it  be  said  with  more  truth 
that  he  had  a genius  for  politics,  and  the  subject, 
wherever  he  might  be,  was  never  out  of  his  mind. 
There  is  not  much  else  in  the  volumes  of  his  pub- 
lished letters,  while  there  is  just  enough  else  to 
show  that  in  these  he  said  all  he  had  to  say  about 
anything.  His  more  ambitious  writings,  the  pa- 
pers in  The  Federalist,”  the  essay  on  The  British 
Doctrine  of  Neutral  Trade,  his  controversial  articles 
in  the  newspapers  under  various  pseudonyms,  are 
all  political,  all  able,  and  all  of  great  value  as  a 
part  of  the  history  of  the  times.  Those  which  are 
controversial,  however,  must  be  taken,  like  his  let- 
ters, as  aids  to  knowledge  rather  than  as  definite 
conclusions  to  be  accepted  without  question.  It 
does  not  detract  from  the  value  of  these  letters, 
however,  that  they  are  written  from  the  point  of 
view  of  a party  leader.  Affairs  of  only  temporary 
importance  sometimes  loom  up  before  him  merely 
because  of  their  infiuence  upon  some  immediate 
party  movement ; and  others,  of  far-reaching  conse- 


226 


JAMES  MADISON 


quences,  which  have  no  such  bearing,  escape  his 
notice  altogether ; but  the  reader  soon  learns  that 
he  may,  at  any  rate,  confide  in  the  sincerity  of  the 
writer,  and  accept  as  freely  the  reasons  given  for 
his  course  as  they  are  frankly  stated. 

Of  the  literary  value  of  his  writings,  aside  from 
their  historical  interest,  there  is  not  much  to  be 
said,  though  Mr.  Madison  always  wrote,  even  in 
his  letters,  as  if  writing  for  posterity.  He  was 
not  felicitous  in  the  use  of  language ; the  style  is 
turgid,  heavy  with  resounding  words  of  many  syl- 
lables, unillumined  by  any  ray  of  imagination,  any 
flash  of  wit  or  of  humor;  and  the  sentences  are 
often  involved  and  badly  put  together.  But  there 
is  a genuineness,  an  evident  sincerity  of  purpose, 
in  all  he  wrote,  and  occasionally  an  expression  of 
deep  feeling,  which  are  always  impressive.  We 
search  for  glimpses  of  his  private  life  and  charac- 
ter in  such  letters,  for  they  are  not  easily  apparent. 
In  one  sense  he  had  no  private  life,  or,  at  least, 
none  that  was  not  so  subordinate  to  his  public 
career  that  there  was  little  in  it  either  significant 
or  attractive.  There  is,  in  this  respect,  a marked 
contrast  between  his  correspondence  and  that  of 
Jefferson.  There  was,  possibly,  a little  affectation 
in  Jefferson’s  frequent  assertions  of  his  intense 
desire  for  the  quiet  of  the  country  and  the  tran- 
quillity of  home,  and  of  his  distaste  for  the  tur- 
moils and  anxieties  of  public  office.  But  he  was 
certainly  fond  of  country  life,  with  the  leisure  to 
potter  about  among  his  sheep  and  his  trees;  to 


AT  HOME 


227 


watcli  the  growth  of  his  wheat  and  his  clover ; to 
contrive  new  coulters  for  his  plows ; to  talk  of 
philosophy,  of  the  Social  Contract,  of  mechanics, 
and  of  natural  history : if  he  was  averse  to  public 
life,  it  was  not  because  political  power  and  distinc- 
tion were  a burden  to  him,  except  as  they  brought 
with  them  strife  and  unpopularity,  which  truly  his 
soul  loathed  for  himself,  though  he  rather  liked  to 
set  other  people  by  the  ears.  His  private  life  was 
unquestionably  as  full  of  interest  to  himself  as  it 
is  entertaining  to  look  upon  in  the  unconscious 
revelation  of  his  own  letters. 

But  with  Madison  it  was  apparently  quite  other- 
wise. He  unbent  with  difficulty.  Always  solemn 
and  dignified,  it  was  rather  painful  than  pleasant 
to  him  to  stoop  to  the  petty  matters  of  every-day 
existence.  He  had  no  small  affectations,  and  was 
not  forever  asserting  that  he  was  without  ambition; 
as  if  that,  without  which  nobody  is  of  much  use  in 
the  world  either  to  himself  or  to  others,  were  a 
weakness  akin  to  depravity.  With  brief  intervals, 
covering  only  a few  months  altogether,  he  was 
where  he  best  liked  to  be,  from  his  entrance  upon 
public  life  in  1775  till  he  stepped  down  in  1817 
from  that  political  elevation  beyond  which  there 
are  no  ascending  steps.  During  these  forty-two 
years  he  found  a certain  enjoyment  in  a country 
home  for  a little  while  at  a time,  but  it  was  chiefiy 
the  enjoyment  of  needed  rest  from  official  labor. 
The  price  of  tobacco  and  the  promise  of  the  wheat 
crop  interested  him  then,  but  only  as  they  inter- 


228 


JAMES  MADISON 


ested  him  always  as  a source  of  his  own  income, 
and  as  the  index  to  the  general  prosperity.  At  the 
end  of  a letter  upon  political  matters,  he  announces 
with  satisfaction  that  his  merino  ewe  has  dropped 
a lamb,  and  both  mother  and  offspring  are  as  well 
as  could  be  expected ; but  it  was  probably  Mr. 
Jefferson’s  gratification  rather  than  his  own  that 
he  had  in  mind,  for  it  was  Mr.  Jefferson  who  had 
imported  the  sheep.  Again,  in  a similar  letter,  he 
takes  a little  remaining  space  to  express  a hope 
that  Mr.  Jefferson  may  permit  the  use  of  the  rams 
of  that  flock  to  improve  the  breed  of  the  native 
stock ; not,  apparently,  that  he  cared  so  much 
about  wool  as  that  he  wished  to  show  a courteous 
and  friendly  interest  in  one  of  Mr.  Jefferson’s 
many  projects  for  the  improvement  of  things  gen- 
erally. 

It  was  probably  during  the  year  of  comparative 
leisure  after  he  left  Congress  that  Mr.  Madison 
built  his  house  at  Montpellier,  though  some  ques- 
tion has  been  raised  on  this  point.  He  certainly 
was  building  a house  at  that  time,  and  it  is  not 
likely  that  he  ever  employed  himself  in  that  way 
more  than  once.  Scattered  among  discussions  of 
Alien  and  Sedition  Laws,  the  war  in  Europe,  free 
goods  in  neutral  ships,  and  other  public  topics, 
are  brief  allusions  to  lathing  nails  which  he  de- 
pended upon  Mr.  Jefferson  to  supply;  that  gentle- 
man having  recently  set  up  a machine  for  their 
manufacture,  which,  however,  like  a good  many 
other  of  his  contrivances,  seems  to  have  had  a 


AT  HOME 


229 


hitch  in  it.  So  also  he  asks  the  Vice-President 
to  see  to  it  that,  when  the  window-glass  and  the 
pulleys  are  forwarded,  the  ‘‘chord”  for  the  latter 
shall  not  be  forgotten ; and  orders  for  other  arti- 
cles, only  to  be  found  in  Philadelphia,  are  sent 
to  his  obliging  friend.  Mr.  Jefferson,  it  is  easy 
to  believe,  found  them  rather  the  most  interesting 
part  of  the  political  letters  to  which  they  were 
appended ; and  he  was  quite  willing,  no  doubt, 
to  relieve  the  tedium  of  presiding  over  the  Senate 
by  searching  through  the  Market  Street  shops  for 
the  latest  improvements  in  builders’  hardware.  To 
Mr.  Monroe,  Madison  wrote  that,  as  he  is  sending 
off  a wagon  to  fetch  nails  for  his  carpenters,  “ it 
will  receive  the  few  articles  which  you  have  been 
so  good  as  to  offer  from  the  superfluities  of  your 
stock,  and  which  circumstances  will  permit  me  now 
to  lay  in.”  Evidently  he  was  getting  ready  to  go 
to  housekeeping  with  his  young  wife.  Monroe’s 
stock  of  household  goods  had  been  replenished, 
perhaps  by  importations  from  France  on  his  re- 
cent return,  and  he  was  disposing  of  his  old  sup- 
plies, by  gift  or  sale,  among  his  neighbors.  Madi- 
son, at  any  rate,  sends  this  modest  list  of  what 
he  would  like  to  have : “ To  wit,  two  table-cloths 
for  a dining-room  of  about  eighteen  feet;  two, 
three,  or  four,  as  may  be  convenient,  for  a more 
limited  scale  ; four  dozen  napkins,  which  will  not 
in  the  least  be  objectionable  for  having  been  used ; 
and  two  mattresses.”  It  was  not  an  extravagant 
outfit,  even  though  it  had  not  been  meant  for 


230 


JAMES  MADISON 


one  of  those  lordly  Virginia  homes  of  which  some 
modern  historians  give  us  such  charming  pictures. 
‘‘We  are  so  little  acquainted,”  — Mr.  Madison 
continues  in  that  stately  way  which  nothing  ever 
surprised  him  into  forgetting,  — “ we  are  so  little 
acquainted  with  the  culinary  utensils  in  detail  that 
it  is  difficult  to  refer  to  such  by  name  or  descrip- 
tion as  would  be  within  our  wants.” 

But  pots  and  kettles,  — though  that  may  not 
be  the  name  they  were  known  by  in  Virginia,  — 
table-cloths  and  mattresses,  however  moderate  in 
number,  are  sure  indications  that  the  house,  which 
was  to  be  his  residence  when  he  should  be  content 
to  retire  from  public  service,  was  finished  early  in 
1798.  He  had  rested  long  enough,  and  was  busy 
that  year  in  attendance  upon  the  state  Assembly 
at  Richmond,  to  which  he  consented  the  next  year 
to  be  returned  as  a member.  Perhaps  it  was  be- 
cause he  could  not  keep  longer  out  of  the  fray. 
Perhaps  he  felt  called  to  a special  duty.  Affairs, 
foreign  and  domestic,  were  in  a critical  condition. 
France,  in  her  resentment  at  the  Jay  treaty,  had 
committed  so  many  fresh  outrages  upon  American 
commerce ; had  so  exasperated  the  American  peo- 
ple by  these  outrages ; and,  by  refusing  to  receive 
the  ministers  from  the  United  States,  had  so  in- 
sulted them  and  the  government  they  represented 
in  the  proposed  arrangements,  — disclosed  in  the 
X.  Y.  Z.  correspondence,  — that  all  friendly  rela- 
tions between  the  two  countries  had  ceased,  and  it 
had  seemed  impossible  that  war  could  be  avoided. 


RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99 


231 


For  a while  the  popular  sympathy  was  entirely 
with  Mr.  Adams’s  administration,  and  the  promise 
could  hardly  be  fairer  that  the  Federalists,  if  they 
managed  wisely,  might  remain  in  power  and  be 
sustained  by  the  whole  country.  But  in  some  re- 
spects they  were  as  unwise  as  in  others  they  were 
unfortunate.  President  Adams,  though  possess- 
ing many  great  qualities,  was  of  too  iraseible  and 
jealous  a temper  to  be  a successful  leader  or  a 
good  ruler.  But  there  were  other  men  of  distinc- 
tion among  the  Federalists  who  were  hardly  less 
fond  of  having  their  own  way  than  the  President 
was  of  having  his.  The  incompatibility  of  tem- 
per was  not  altogether  on  one  side  in  that  family 
quarrel.  But  all  were  equally  responsible  for 
such  a blunder  as  the  enactment  of  the  Alien  and 
Sedition  Laws.  The  provocation,  it  is  true,  was 
unquestionably  great.  Refugees  from  abroad  had 
crowded  to  the  United  States,  many  of  whom  were 
professional  agitators,  and  some  were  very  sorry 
vagabonds.  Whatever  reason  they  might  have 
had  for  fomenting  discontent  with  government 
in  England  or  in  France,  there  was  nothing  to 
justify  any  such  violent  measures  in  this  country. 
But  from  their  conduct  as  political  partisans, 
particularly  as  newspaper  editors,  they  soon  came 
to  be  looked  upon  by  the  Federalists  — for  they 
all  joined  the  other  party  — as  a dangerous  class. 
There  grew  up  a feeling  that  it  would  be  wiser 
for  civil  affairs  to  remain,  in  city,  state,  and  na- 
tion, in  the  hands  of  those  who  were  born  and 


232 


JAMES  MADISON 


educated  under  republican  institutions,  and  not 
to  fall  altogether  under  control  of  those  who  were 
alien  in  blood  and  religion,  and  who  were  in- 
clined to  look  upon  politics,  not  in  the  light  of 
the  citizen’s  duty  to  the  common  weal,  but  as  an 
easy  and  profitable  calling  where  the  least  scrupu- 
lous scoundrel  could  gather  the  largest  share  of 
spoils.  It  may  be  that  the  authors  of  those  laws 
were  so  determined  to  forestall  the  apprehended 
evils  of  such  a dispensation  because  use  had  not 
accustomed  them,  as  it  has  later  generations  of 
American  citizens,  to  live  under  it  in  humility  if 
not  content.  Or,  perhaps,  they  wanted  that  pro- 
found faith  of  our  time  that  the  longer  this  sub- 
version of  government  is  submitted  to,  the  easier 
it  will  be  to  get  back  to  the  rule  of  the  honest  and 
wise. 

But,  at  any  rate,  whatever  their  reasons,  they 
meant  by  these  laws  relating  to  aliens  to  put  the 
acquirement  of  citizenship  under  more  stringent 
regulations,  and  to  check  the  growth  and  promul- 
gation of  seditious  doctrines.  If  it  be  true,  as  is 
sometimes  maintained  with  some  plausibility,  that 
citizens,  to  be  intrusted  with  self  - government, 
should  be  endowed  with  a certain  degree  of  intelli- 
gence and  virtue,  then  the  aim  of  the  framers  of 
the  laws,  in  the  first  case,  was  a good  one  ; and,  in 
the  second  case,  the  country  has  had  some  experi- 
ence in  later  times  which  tends  to  show  that  they 
were  not  altogether  wrong  in  believing  that  doc- 
trines and  practices  which  may  lead  to  insurrection 


RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99 


233 


and  civil  war  might  best  be  met,  so  far  as  is  possi- 
ble, at  the  outset.  Nevertheless,  the  laws,  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  time,  were  ill-considered 
and  injudicious.  For  one  reason,  they  put  an  effi- 
cient weapon  into  the  hands  of  the  opposition  at  a 
moment  when  it  was  at  a loss  where  to  turn  for 
one.  ‘‘  Anglicism  ” and  “ British  gold  ” were  blun- 
derbusses which,  in  the  present  popular  irritation 
a^gainst  France,  had  for  a time  lost  their  useful- 
ness, and  were  apt  to  miss  fire.  But  an  appeal  to 
a generous  and  impulsive  people  on  behalf  of  the 
unfortunate  refugees,  who  had  fled  from  the  tyr- 
anny of  the  Old  World  to  find  liberty  and  a home 
in  the  New,  was  sure  to  be  listened  to.  A good 
many,  besides  those  who  assumed  that  republican- 
ism and  the  rights  of  man  were  in  their  special 
keeping,  believed  that  an  unfortunate  class  had 
been  dealt  with  hastily,  and  even  cruelly.  The 
clamor,  once  begun,  told  heavily  against  the  Fed- 
eralists. They  could  be  denounced  now,  not  only 
as  the  enemies  of  liberty  in  France,  but  as  refusing 
it  to  men  of  any  nation  or  any  race  who  should 
seek  it  in  the  United  States,  — it  being,  of  course, 
understood  that  races  of  black  or  yellow  complex- 
ion need  not  apply.  It  was,  indeed,  advanced  as 
an  argument  against  one  of  the  acts,  — which  gave 
the  President  power  to  order  out  of  the  country  all 
aliens  whose  presence  he  thought  dangerous,  — 
that  it  might  be  used  to  prevent  the  importation  of 
persons  from  Africa.  On  this  point  Mr.  Gallatin, 
a native  of  Switzerland,  was  exceedingly  anxious 


234 


JAMES  MADISON 


lest  there  be  a violation  of  the  Constitution.  But 
the  outrage  upon  the  rights  of  man  here  appre- 
hended was  the  right  of  white  men  to  make  black 
men  slaves. 

Against  the  enactment  of  these  laws  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son did  nothing  as  Vice-President.  But  whatever 
was  his  motive  for  official  inaction,  it  was  not  be- 
cause he  approved  them.  He  wrote  the  Kentucky 
‘^resolutions  of  ’98,”  — the  strongest  protest  that 
could  be  made  against  them,  and  to  be  thenceforth 
held  by  nullifiers  and  secessionists  as  their  cove- 
nant of  faith.  But  he  acted  secretly,  taking  coun- 
sel only  with  George  Nicholas  of  Kentucky  and 
William  C.  Nicholas  of  Virginia  (brothers),  and, 
Hildreth  says,  ‘‘  probably  with  Madison.”  The 
resolutions  were  to  be  offered  in  the  Kentucky 
legislature  by  George  Nicholas,  and,  with  some 
modifications,  were  passed  by  that  body  in  Novem- 
ber. A year  afterward  other  resolutions  were^ 
passed  to  reassert  the  opinions  of  the  previous  ses- 
sion, and  to  record  against  the  laws  the  “ solemn 
protest  ” of  the  legislature  ; and  further  declaring 
‘^that  a nullification  by  those  sovereignties  [the 
States]  of  all  unauthorized  acts  done  under  color 
of  that  instrument  [the  Constitution]  is  the  right- 
ful remedy.”  In  the  resolutions  which  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son had  prepared  for  Nicholas  the  year  before,  this 
essential  doctrine  is  found  in  that  portion  which 
Nicholas  had  omitted,  in  these  words,  — where 
powers  are  assumed  which  have  not  been  delegated, 
a nullification  of  the  act  is  the  rightful  remedy.” 


“RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99 


235 


As  originally  prepared,  the  resolutions  were  found  ^ 
in  Jefferson’s  handwriting  after  his  death.  Hil- 
dreth’s conjecture  that  Madison,  as  well  as  the 
brothers  Nicholas,  was  consulted  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  these  resolutions,  rests  only  on  circumstan- 
tial evidence.  The  Kentucky  resolutions  were 
passed  in  November ; those  of  Virginia  in  Decem- 
ber; the  former  were  written  by  Jefferson,  the 
latter  by  Madison ; and  the  doctrines  in  each  are 
essentially  the  same.  It  would  have  been  a per- 
fectly natural  thing  for  the  two  friends  to  consult 
together  upon  a measure  of  so  much  importance ; 
there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  have  done 
so ; and  these  coincidences  suggest  that  they  prob- 
ably did.  Jefferson  clearly  shirked  the  responsi- 
bility of  an  act  which  he  knew  would  endanger  the 
Union  ; but  Madison  made  no  secret,  so  far  as  can 
be  seen  now,  of  his  going  to  Richmond,  though 
not  a member  of  the  Assembly,  apparently  for 
the  express  purpose  of  writing  these  resolutions 
and  urging  their  adoption.  But  Jefferson  was  not 
a man  of  courage  even  in  doing  that  which  he 
believed  to  be  wise.  In  Madison  it  was  only  the 
conscience  that  was  timid ; and  having  once  con- 
vinced himself  that  the  thing  he  proposed  to  do 
was  right,  he  was  always  ready  to  face  the  conse- 
quences. It  may  be  that  neither  of  them  foresaw 
that  the  real  importance  of  this  particular  act 
was  rather  prospective  than  immediate;  and  if 
so,  their  conduct  is  to  be  measured  by  its  instant 
purpose.  If  Jefferson  meant  then  and  there  to 


236 


JAMES  MADISON 


dissolve  the  Union,  or  even  to  weaken  the  constitu- 
tional bond  that  held  it  together,  he  was  not  over- 
cautious in  keeping  out  of  sight.  But  if  Madison’s 
intention  was  to  strengthen  the  Union  by  with- 
standing what  he  believed  to  be  a perilous  viola- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  then  his  courage,  though 
it  is  to  be  commended,  is  not  to  be  wondered  at. 
That,  he  said,  was  his  motive,  and  to  defend  the 
resolutions  and  his  own  part  in  regard  to  them  was 
the  chief  interest  and  serious  labor  of  the  latter 
years  of  his  life.  He  was  elected  a member  of  the 
Assembly  for  the  session  of  1799-1800,  probably 
because  he  and  his  friends  thought  his  official 
presence  desirable  when  the  subject  should  again 
come  up  for  consideration  at  the  reading  of  the 
replies  from  other  States,  to  all  which  the  resolu- 
tions had  been  sent.  The  report  on  those  replies 
was  also  written  by  him,  and  the  position  taken  the 
year  before  was  therein  reaffirmed,  explained,  and 
elaborated  at  length. 

In  1827-28  the  doctrines  of  nullification  and  of 
secession  were  assumed  to  be  the  legitimate  corollary 
of  the  Kentucky  and  Virginia  resolutions  of  1798 
and  1799.  Jefferson  was  dead;  but  Madison  felt 
called  upon  to  deny,  in  his  own  defense  and  the 
defense  of  the  memory  of  his  friend,  that  there  was 
any  similarity  between  them.  From  1830  to  1836 
his  mind  seems  to  have  been  chiefly  occupied  with 
this  subject,  upon  which  he  wrote  many  letters,  and 
a paper  of  thirty  pages,  entitled  On  Nullification,” 
which  bears  the  date  of  1835-36,  the  latter  year 


RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99 


237 


being  the  last  of  his  life.  He  resents  the  charge 
of  any  political  inconsistency  in  the  course  of  his 
long  career,  and  most  of  all  such  an  inconsistency 
as  would  impugn  his  attachment  to  the  Constitu- 
tion and  the  Union.  The  resolutions  of  1798,  he 
maintains,  do  not  and  were  not  meant  to  assert  a 
right  in  any  one  State  to  arrest  or  annul  an  act  of 
the  general  government,  as  that  is  a right  that  can 
only  belong  to  them  collectively.  Nullification 
and  Secession  he  denounces  as  ‘‘twin  heresies,” 
that  “ ought  to  be  buried  in  the  same  grave.”  “A. 
political  system,”  he  declares,  “which  does  not 
contain  an  effective  provision  for  a peaceable  deci- 
sion of  all  controversies  arising  within  itself  would 
be  a government  in  name  only.”  He  asserts  that 
“the  essential  difference  between  a free  govern- 
ment and  governments  not  free  is  that  the  former 
is  founded  in  compact,  the  parties  to  which  are 
mutually  and  equally  bound  by  it.  Neither  of 
them,  therefore,  can  have  a greater  right  to  break 
off  from  the  bargain  than  the  other  or  others  have 
to  hold  them  to  it.  . . . It  is  high  time  that  the 
claim  to  secede  at  will  should  be  put  down  by  the 
public  opinion.”  What,  — he  writes  to  another 
friend,  — “ what  can  be  more  preposterous  than  to 
say  that  the  States,  as  united,  are  in  no  respect  or 
degree  a nation,  which  implies  sovereignty,  . . . 
and  on  the  other  hand,  and  at  the  same  time,  to 
say  that  the  States  separately  are  completely  na- 
tions and  sovereigns  ? . . . The  words  of  the  Con- 
stitution are  explicit,  that  the  Constitution  and 


238 


JAMES  MADISON 


laws  of  the  United  States  shall  be  supreme  over 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  several  States; 
supreme  in  their  exposition  and  execution,  as  well 
as  in  their  authority.  Without  a supremacy  in 
these  respects,  it  would  be  like  a scabbard,  in  the 
hand  of  a soldier,  without  a sword  in  it.’’  Abra- 
ham Lincoln  might  have  said  this  twenty-eight 
years  later  when  he  determined  that  his  first  duty 
as  President  was  to  suppress  insurrection. 

Such  is  the  drift  of  the  many  pages  Mr.  Madi- 
son wrote  upon  the  subject  during  the  last  five  or 
six  years  of  his  life.  He  looked  then,  whatever 
he  may  have  thought  in  the  closing  years  of  the 
preceding  century,  upon  the  United  States  as  a 
nation,  and  not  as  a confederacy  having  its  parts 
held  together  only  by  a treaty  or  league  ” called 
a constitution.  But  his  object  is  to  show  that 
there  is  nothing  inconsistent  in  the  resolutions  of 
1798  with  these  opinions  upon  the  sovereignty 
of  the  United  States ; that  he  held  them  just  as 
strongly  then  as  he  held  them  now ; and  that  they, 
and  he  as  their  author,  looked  to  the  States  as 
a whole,  not  to  a single  State,  to  find  and  apply 
a remedy,  in  a constitutional  way,  for  an  unconsti- 
tutional measure  of  which  an  administration  of  the 
government  might  be  guilty.  His  position  is  main- 
tained with  all  the  acuteness,  ingenuity,  and  logi- 
cal skill  which  mark  his  earlier  writings.  There  is 
no  sign  of  failure  of  mental  power,  of  which  those 
accused  him  who  could  not  answer  him.  Such  an 
imputation  he  resented  with  as  much  indignation 


“RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99 


239 


as  he  did  a charge  of  inconsistency,  which  here 
could  only  mean  falsehood.  There  is  no  possibil- 
ity, then,  of  misunderstanding  his  opinions  during 
the  last  six  years  of  his  life  ; and  the  world  has  no 
right  to  doubt  his  repeated  and  earnest  assurances 
that  these  were  his  opinions  when  he  wrote  the 
resolutions  of  1798.  It  can  only  be  said  that  the 
construction  he  gave  them  thirty  years  afterward 
is  opposed  to  the  universal  understanding  of  them 
at  the  time  they  were  written. 

But  if  his  defense  of  himself  be  considered  com- 
plete, it  is  not  even  specious  when  presented  on 
behalf  of  Jefferson.  Mr.  Madison  wrote  in  1830  : 
‘‘  That  the  term  ^ nullification  ’ in  the  Kentucky 
resolutions  belongs  to  those  of  1799,  with  which 
Mr.  Jefferson  had  nothing  to  do.  . . . The  resolu- 
tions of  1798,  drawn  by  him,  contain  neither  that 
nor  any  equivalent  term.”  It  was  not  then  gen- 
erally known,  whether  Mr.  Madison  knew  it  or 
not,  that  one  of  the  resolutions  and  part  of  an- 
other which  Jefferson  wrote  to  be  offered  in  the 
Kentucky  legislature  in  1798  were  omitted  by  Mr. 
Nicholas,  and  that  therein  was  the  assertion  already 
quoted,  — where  powers  are  assumed  which  have 
not  been  delegated,  a nullification  of  the  act  is  the 
rightful  remedy.”  The  next  year,  when  additional 
resolutions  were  offered  by  Mr.  Breckenridge,  this 
idea,  in  similar  though  not  in  precisely  the  same 
language,  was  presented  in  the  words,  “that  a 
nullification  by  those  sovereignties  [the  States] 
of  all  unauthorized  acts,  done  under  color  of  that 


240 


JAMES  MADISON 


instrument,  is  the  rightful  remedy.”  In  1832, 
this  fact,  on  the  authority  of  Jefferson’s  grandson 
and  executor,  was  made  public ; and,  further,  that 
another  declaration  of  Mr.  Jefferson’s  in  the  reso- 
lution not  used  was  an  exhortation  to  the  co-States 
‘‘  that  each  will  take  measures  of  its  own  for  pro- 
viding that  neither  these  acts  nor  any  others  of  the 
general  government,  not  plainly  and  intentionally 
authorized  by  the  Constitution,  shall  be  exercised 
within  their  respective  territories.”  All  this  must 
have  been  known  to  Mr.  Madison  then,  if  not  be- 
fore. Yet,  three  years  later,  in  that  paper  ‘‘  On 
Nullification  ” which  has  been  mentioned,  he  wrote  : 
“ The  amount  of  this  modified  right  of  nullifica- 
tion is,  that  a single  State  may  arrest  the  operation 
of  a law  of  the  United  States.  . . . And  this  new- 
fangled theory  is  attempted  to  be  fathered  on  Mr. 
Jefferson,  the  apostle  of  republicanism.”  It  would 
be  charitable  here  to  believe  that  there  was  some 
lapse  of  memory  in  these  latter  days,  and  that  he 
had  forgotten  that  Jefferson  was,  above  all  things, 
his  own  words  being  witness,  the  apostle  of  nullifi- 
cation. 

The  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws  — of  which  the 
more  obnoxious  of  the  former  was  never  enforced, 
and  the  latter  expired  by  limitation  in  two  years 
— had  their  influence  in  the  presidential  election 
of  1800.  But  it  was  due  more  to  differences  be- 
tween the  President  and  some  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Federal  party  that  that  party  lost  its  hold  upon 
power,  never  to  be  regained.  With  the  election  of 


“RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND ’99 


241 


Jefferson,  Madison  entered  upon  another  sphere  of 
duty,  which  was  politically  a promotion,  but  where 
his  influence,  if  it  was  so  large,  was  not  so  evident 
as  when  an  active  leader  of  his  party.  It  was  at 
Mr.  J efferson’s  pressing  desire,”  Mr.  Madison 
himself  says,  in  a letter  written  many  years  after- 
ward, that  he  took  the  office  of  secretary  of  state. 
In  the  same  letter  he  explains  that  he  had  declined 
an  executive  appointment  under  Washington,  be- 
cause, in  taking  a seat  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, he  would  be  less  exposed  to  the  imputation 
of  selfish  views  in  the  part  he  had  taken  in  the 
origin  and  adoption  of  the  Constitution ; ” because 
there,  if  anywhere,  he  could  be  of  service  in  sus- 
taining it  against  its  adversaries,  especially  as  it 
was,  ‘‘  in  its  progress,  encountering  trials  of  a new 
sort  in  the  formation  of  new  parties  attaching 
adverse  constructions  to  it.”  The  latter  reason 
seems  to  be  one  of  those  happy  after-thoughts 
which  public  men  not  unfrequently  flatter  them- 
selves will  anticipate  a question  they  would  prefer 
should  not  be  asked.  Mr.  Madison  was  a member 
of  the  First  Congress  from  the  first  day  it  met, 
before  the  new  Constitution  had  encountered  new 
trials  from  new  parties  by  any  constructions  either 
one  way  or  the  other. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


SECKETARY  OF  STATE 

On  the  morning  of  March  4,  1801,  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son tied  his  horse  to  the  fence  and  walked  alone 
into  the  Capitol  to  take  the  oath  of  office  as  Presi- 
dent. Mr.  Madison  was  not  present  at  that  per- 
functory ceremony,  the  death  of  his  aged  father 
detaining  him  at  home.  He  soon  after,  however, 
assumed  the  duties  of  the  station  to  which  Mr. 
Jefferson  had  called  him,  and  there  he  remained 
till  he  took  the  presidential  office,  in  his  turn,  eight 
years  afterward. 

The  new  dynasty  entered  upon  its  course  under 
happy  circumstances.  There  was,  of  course,  much 
to  fear  from  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Europe; 
for  the  United  States  must  needs  be  in  a perilous 
position  so  long  as  the  struggle  for  supremacy 
continued  between  France  and  England,  and  that 
would  be  while  Napoleon  could  command  an  army. 
But  the  danger  of  war  with  France  was  no  longer 
imminent,  since  Mr.  Adams  had  wisely  reestab- 
^ lished  friendly  relations,  though  many  of  the  lead- 
ing Federalists  believed  it  was  at  the  cost  of  ruin  to 
his  own  party.  English  aggressions  upon  Amer- 
^ ican  commerce  had  for  the  moment  ceased,  as 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


243 


fourteen  years  afterward  they  ceased  altogether, 
when  the  provocation  disappeared  with  the  perma- 
nent establishment  of  peace  in  Europe.  In  the 
temporary  lull  of  the  tempest  the  sun  shone  out 
of  a serene  sky,  and  the  land  was  blessed  with 
quiet  and  prosperity.  ‘‘  Peace,  commerce,  and 
honest  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling  alli- 
ances with  none,”  the  President  said  in  his  inaugu- 
ral address,  were  among  the  essential  principles 
of  our  government,  and  consequently  those  which 
ought  to  shape  its  administration.”  The  condition 
of  the  country  was  in  accord  with  the  thought 
and  may  even  have  suggested  it.  ‘‘We  are  all 
Republicans;  we  are  all  Federalists,”  said  Jeffer- 
son in  his  inaugural:  it  was  meant,  however,  as 
an  avowal  of  a tolerant  belief  in  the  patriotism  of 
both  parties,  rather  than,  as  has  sometimes  been 
supposed,  an  assertion  that  party  lines,  so  clearly 
drawn  in  the  election,  were  at  length  obliterated. 
But  hardly  a year  had  passed  before  this  seemed 
to  be  almost  literally  true.  One  after  another. 
States  hitherto  Federal,  both  at  the  North  and  at 
the  South,  went  over  in  their  state  elections  to  the 
Republican  or  Democratic  party;  till,  with  the 
exception  of  Delaware,  there  was  not  a single 
Federal  State  outside  of  New  England ; and  even 
in  that  stronghold  one  State,  Rhode  Island,  had 
marched  off  with  the  majority.  “ Everywhere,” 
wrote  Madison  in  October,  “the  progress  of  the 
public  sentiment  mocks  the  cavils  and  clamors  of 
the  malignant  adversaries  of  the  administration.” 


244 


JAMES  MADISON 


If  it  may  not  be  asserted  that  this  overthrow  of 
the  Federal  rule  was  fortunate  at  that  juncture,  — 
as  nothing  is  more  idle  in  history  than  speculation 
upon  what  might  have  been,  — it  may  at  least  be 
said  that  Jefferson’s  administration  for  his  first 
four  years  was  a happy  one  for  his  country  and 
acceptable  to  his  countrymen.  None  since  Wash- 
ington’s has  ever  been  so  popular;  and  no  other, 
except  Lincoln’s,  has  ever  been  so  successful.  Nor 
can  it  be  said  of  it  that  it  was  a happy  period 
because  it  is  without  a history ; for  it  included  acts 
of  moment,  accepted  then  with  an  approbation  and 
enthusiasm  which  time  has  justified.  Not  less 
shallow  is  that  view  of  his  character  and  of  those 
years  of  his  administration,  taken  by  many  of  his 
contemporaries,  who  neither  loved  nor  respected 
him,  and  who  attributed  his  success  and  his  popu- 
larity to  his  good  fortune.  This  was  a favorite 
and  easy  way,  among  his  political  opponents,  of 
explaining  a disagreeable  fact.  Parton  notes  in 
his  Life  that  C.  C.  Pinckney  could  only  under- 
stand Jefferson’s  hold  upon  public  confidence  as 
the  infatuation  of  the  people.”  John  Quincy 
Adams  said:  ‘^Fortune  has  taken  a pleasure  in 
making  Jefferson’s  greatest  weaknesses  and  follies 
issue  more  successfully  than  if  he  had  been  inspired 
with  the  profoundest  wisdom.”  When  the  peo- 
ple,” said  Gouverneur  Morris,  ‘‘have  been  long 
enough  drunk,  they  will  get  sober ; but  while  the 
frolic  lasts,  to  reason  with  them  is  useless.”  There 
has  been  more  than  one  occasion  of  late  years,  and 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


245 


in  more  than  one  place,  where  this  may  be  truly 
said  of  popular  political  enthusiasm ; but  it  was 
not  true  of  that  which  prevailed  for  the  first  four 
years  of  this  century ; and  Mr.  Adams’s  sarcasm 
can  hardly  fail  to  recall  the  fact  that  when  Mr. 
Jefferson,  in  his  second  term,  was  really  guilty  of 
a great  folly  in  adhering  to  a prolonged  embargo, 
it  was  Mr.  Adams  who  committed  one  of  the  few 
follies  of  his  own  life  in  abandoning  his  party  to 
give  his  support  to  the  President’s  blunder. 

Though  there  were  many  changes  in  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son’s cabinet  in  the  course  of  eight  years,  they 
were  not  the  result  of  dissensions.  Yet  he  was, 
perhaps,  more  an  absolute  President  than  any 
other  man  who  has  ever  held  that  position.  He 
sought  and  listened  to  counsel,  no  doubt;  but 
taking  it  was  another  matter.  He  certainly  did 
not  take  it  if  it  did  not  suit  him  ; and  if  it  was  not 
likely  to  suit  him,  he  was  in  no  hurry  to  ask  for  it. 
It  was  in  his  own  fertile  brain,  not  in  the  sugges- 
tions of  others,  that  important  measures  had  their 
birth.  That  trait  in  his  character  which  phre- 
nologists have  named  secretiveness  largely  gov- 
erned his  actions.  It  was  natural  for  him  to 
bring  things  about  quietly  and  skillfully  by  set- 
ting others  to  do  what  he  wanted  done,  without 
himself  being  seen,  though  sometimes  there  was  no 
other  motive  than  the  mere  gratification  of  secre- 
tiveness. He  preferred  often  to  suggest  measures 
quietly  to  congressmen  rather  than  to  Congress, 
though  the  result  in  either  case  might  be  the  same. 


246 


JAMES  MADISON 


At  other  times,  where  the  end  to  be  attained  was 
of  great  importance  and  he  was  absolutely  sure 
only  of  himself,  he  boldly  took  the  responsibility, 
as  he  did  in  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  and  in  the 
suppression  of  the  Monroe-Pinckney  treaty  with 
England  in  his  second  term.  It  is  not  surprising, 
therefore,  that  Madison’s  part,  during  the  eight 
years  of  J efferson’s  presidency,  is  found  to  be  more 
a secondary  one  than  is  usual  with  a secretary  of 
state,  or  than  was  usual  with  him.  He  was  in  per- 
fect accord  with  his  chief,  who  held  always  in  the 
highest  esteem  his  knowledge  and  judgment,  and 
sought,  no  doubt,  his  sound  and  moderate  advice 
when  he  thought  he  needed  advice  from  anybody. 
But  Madison’s  influence  is  less  visible  in  Jeffer- 
son’s administration  than  in  Washington’s,  when 
he  was  in  the  opposition.  Washington,  where  he 
doubted  his  own  ability  to  decide  a question  and 
felt  the  need  of  enlightenment,  was  accustomed  to 
call  in  Madison,  though  he  did  not  always  accept 
his  friend’s  conclusions.  It  was  rarely  that  Jeffer- 
son was  troubled  with  any  doubt  of  his  own  judg- 
ment in  the  discussion  or  decision  of  any  question 
that  might  come  before  him. 

The  most  important  measure  of  his  administra- 
tion was  peculiarly  his  own,  and  when  once  deter- 
mined upon  it  was  pushed  to  a conclusion  with 
vigor  and  courage.  Nobody  doubts  now,  or  has 
doubted  since  the  abolition  of  slavery,  that  the 
purchase  of  Louisiana  was  an  act  of  sound  states- 
manship. J eff erson  did  not  foresee  that  the  acqui- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


247 


sition  of  that  fertile  territory  would  stimulate  a 
domestic  trade  in  slaves,  as  profitable  to  the  slave- 
breeding as  to  the  slave -consuming  States;  or 
that,  as  slavery  increased  and  brought  prosperity 
and  power  to  a class,  there  would  grow  up  an 
oligarchy,  resting  on  ownership  in  negroes,  which, 
within  sixty  years,  would  have  to  be  uprooted  at 
an  enormous  cost.  But  his  aim  was  to  secure  the 
peaceful  possession  of  the  Mississippi  territory  on 
both  its  banks,  as  a permanent  settlement  of  a 
question  which,  so  long  as  it  remained  open,  was  a 
perpetual  menace  of  war  with  one  or  another  Euro- 
pean power.  That  danger  would  always  involve 
the  possibility  of  the  Appalachian  range  becoming 
the  western  boundary  of  the  United  States ; in 
which  case  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
vast  region  west  of  it,  would  fall  into  the  power 
of  an  alien  people.  So  far  was  plain  to  Mr.  Jef- 
ferson; but  the  result  of  the  rebellion  of  1861 
proves  that  he  was  wiser  than  he  knew  when  he 
acquired  the  territory  stretching  to  the  Sabine  and 
the  foot  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  for  the  occupation 
of  a free  people. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  here  the  story  of 
the  purchase.  The  news  of  it  reached  Washington 
in  July  and  was  received  with  enthusiasm.  That 
there  was  no  warrant  in  the  Constitution  for  an 
acquisition  of  territory  by  purchase  was  manifest ; 
and  Mr.  Jefferson’s  opponents  were  not  in  the  least 
backward  in  heaping  reproaches  and  ridicule  upon 
the  great  champion  of  strict  construction,  who  had 


248 


JAMES  MADISON 


no  hesitation  in  violating  the  Constitution  when  it 
seemed  to  him  wise  to  do  so.  Both  the  President 
and  his  secretary  frankly  met  the  accusation  by 
acknowledging  its  entire  justice ; but  at  the  same 
time  they  put  in,  as  a sufficient  defense,  the  plea 
of  the  general  welfare.  This  did  not  abate  the 
ridicule,  though  the  argument  was  a hard  one  for 
the  Federalists  to  withstand ; for  it  could  not  be  , 
forgotten  that  it  was  on  this  ground  that  Hamilton, 
as  secretary  of  the  treasury,  had  justified  the  im- 
position of  certain  taxes,  and  the  Republicans  had 
maintained  that  the  plain  limitations  of  the  Consti- 
tution could  not  be  overstepped  on  such  a plea,  even 
for  the  general  good.  Jefferson  was  so  sensitive 
to  this  constitutional  objection  that  he  proposed  to 
meet  it  by  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  ; but 
it  was  soon  evident  that  the  unwritten  law  of  mani- 
fest destiny  did  not  need  the  appeal  to  the  ballot- 
box.  The  grumblers,”  Jefferson  wrote  to  a friend 
soon  after  the  news  of  the  treaty  was  received, 
gave  all  the  credit  of  the  acquisition  to  the  ac- 
cident of  war.”  They  would  see,”  he  added,  in 
records  on  file,  ‘‘  that  though  we  could  not  say 
when  war  would  arise,  yet  we  said  with  energy 
what  would  take  place  when  it  should  arise.”  He 
only  meant  by  this,  probably,  that  from  the  begin- 
ning of  his  administration  he  bad  been  prepared  to 
take  advantage  of  circumstances  when  war  should 
break  out  again  between  England  and  France,  as 
it  was  evident  enough  to  the  whole  world  that  it 
must  break  out  sooner  or  later.  That  the  particu- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


249 


lar  conjunction  of  circumstances,  however,  would 
occur  that  did  occur,  could  not  have  been  foreseen. 
Jefferson  could  have  had  no  prescience  that  Spain 
would  reconvey  Louisiana  to  France  ; that  Napo- 
leon would  enter  at  once  upon  extensive  prepara- 
tions for  colonization  on  the  banks  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ; and  that  he  would  be  willing  to  relinquish 
this  important  step  in  his  great  scheme  of  a uni- 
versal Latin  Empire,  that  he  might  devote  himself 
to  the  necessary  preliminary  work  of  subduing  his 
most  formidable  enemy  of  the  rival  race.  But  it 
is  Jefferson’s  best  title  to  fame  that  he  was  ready 
to  take  advantage  of  this  conjunction  of  incidents 
at  exactly  the  right  moment.  Doubtless  the  pro- 
gress of  civilization  would  have  been  essentially 
the  same  had  he  never  been  born.  But  having 
been  born  it  fell  to  him  to  contribute  largely  to 
the  events  that  have  distributed  the  race  speaking 
the  English  tongue  the  most  widely  over  the  globe, 
and  to  exercise  a powerful  influence  upon  the  age. 
It  does  not  detract  from  the  merit  of  his  act,  how- 
ever, that  he  by  no  means  saw  all  its  importance, 
nor  even  dreamed  of  its  consequences.  The  region 
beyond  the  Mississippi,  he  thought,  might  be 
made  useful  as  a refuge  for  Indian  tribes  of  the 
East ; but  he  neither  saw  nor  could  see  then  that 
the  purchase  of  Louisiana  was  the  essential  though 
only  the  preliminary  step  toward  the  occupation 
of  the  continent  to  the  Pacific  by  the  English  race. 
The  expedition  of  Lewis  and  Clarke,  which  he  sent 
out  the  next  year,  was  in  the  interest  of  science. 


250 


JAMES  MADISON 


and  especially  of  geography,  rather  than  of  any 
possible  settlement  of  that  distant  region.  Indeed, 
he  said  that  if  the  new  acquisition  of  territory  were 
wisely  managed,  so  as  to  induce  the  eastern  Indians 
to  cross  the  great  river,  the  result  would  be  the 
‘‘  condensing,  instead  of  scattering,  our  popula- 
tion.” But  “ man  proposes  and  God  disposes.” 
The  immediate  consequences,  however,  of  the 
acquisition  of  Louisiana  were  enough  to  bring 
almost  universal  popularity  to  the  President,  es- 
pecially at  the  South  and  West,  without  any 
revelation  of  the  future.  Nor  was  the  act  the  less 
popular  because  it  was  an  immediate  stimulus  to 
the  foreign  slave  trade,  partly  because  at  the 
North  that  excited  but  little  interest,  and  partly 
because  at  the  South  it  excited  a great  deal.  The 
abolition  societies,  it  is  true,  asked  that  the  impor- 
tation of  slaves  from  Africa  into  the  annexed  ter- 
ritory should  be  forbidden  ; and  an  act  was  passed 
prohibiting  their  introduction,  except  by  those 
persons  from  other  parts  of  the  United  States  who 
intended  to  be  actual  settlers,  and  were,  therefore, 
permitted  to  bring  slaves  imported  previous  to 
1798.  But  the  law  might  properly  have  been 
entitled  An  Act  for  the  Encouragement  of  the 
Trade  in  Negroes;  and  so  it  seems  to  have  been 
regarded  by  the  older  slave  States.  South  Caro- 
lina reopened  the  trade  to  Africa,  and,  as  Congress 
failed  to  levy  the  constitutional  tax  of  ten  dollars 
a head,  the  raw  material,  so  to  speak,  came  in  free. 
The  rest  could  be  safely  left  to  the  law  of  supply 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


251 


and  demand.  Neither  South  Carolina  nor  any 
other  State  had  imported  slaves  since  1798.  The 
whole  slave  population,  therefore,  could  be  legally 
taken  into  Louisiana  by  actual  settlers,  and  its 
place  supplied  in  the  old  States  by  new  importa- 
tions. The  demand  regulated  the  supply,  and  the 
supply  came  from  Africa  as  truly  as  if  the  impor- 
tation had  been  direct  to  New  Orleans.  This  was 
the  legal  course  of  trade  till  1808 ; thenceforward 
it  flourished,  without  the  protection  of  law  but  in 
spite  of  it,  so  long  as  it  was  profitable,  — so  long, 
that  is,  as  the  natural  increase  of  the  eastern  negro 
was  insufficient  to  answer  the  demand  of  the  south- 
western market. 

But,  besides  the  peaceful  extension  of  the  na- 
tional domain,  there  was  much  else  in  the  first 
four  or  five  years  of  Jefferson’s  administration  to 
commend  it  to  his  countrymen.  His  party  had 
nothing  to  complain  of,  despite  that  genial  and 
generous  assurance  of  the  inaugural  which  could 
not  be  forgotten,  — we  are  all  Republicans ; we 
are  all  Federalists ; ” and  the  other  party  had  rea- 
son to  be  thankful  that,  considering,  as  he  said, 
“ a Federalist  seldom  died,  and  never  resigned,” 
the  number  was  not  large  who  were  reminded,  by 
their  removal  from  office,  of  their  unreasonable 
delay  in  doing  either  the  one  thing  or  the  other. 
It  was  only  the  politicians,  however,  a class  much 
smaller  then  than  it  is  now,  who  were  concerned 
in  such  matters ; the  people  at  large  were  influ- 
enced by  other  considerations.  Credit  was  given 


252 


JAMES  MADISON 


to  the  President  for  things  that  he  did  not  do,  as 
well  as  for  things  that  he  did.  It  was  due  to  him 
that  the  administration  was  an  economical  one, 
but  it  was  through  Mr.  Gallatin’s  skillful  manage- 
ment of  the  finances  that  the  old  public  debt  was 
in  process  of  speedy  extinction.  Occasional  im- 
peachments enlivened  the  proceedings  of  Congress, 
which  otherwise  were  as  harmless  as  they  were 
dull.  Jefferson  was  never  so  much  out  of  his 
proper  element  as  in  war,  yet  a successful  one  was 
carried  on,  during  his  first  term,  with  the  Barbary 
States  which  put  an  end  for  many  years  to  the 
exactions  and  outrages  which  had  long  been  need- 
lessly submitted  to.  It  was  a war,  however,  of 
only  a few  naval  vessels  in  the  hands  of  such  ener- 
getic and  brave  men,  destined  to  become  famous 
in  later  years,  as  Bainbridge,  Decatur,  Preble,  and 
Barron ; and  to  send  off  the  expedition  was  about 
all  the  government  had  to  do  with  it.  It  was  easy 
to  keep  clear  of  entangling  alliances,”  or  entan- 
glements of  any  sort  with  European  powers,  so  long 
as  they  left  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  to 
pursue  its  peaceful  and  profitable  course  without 
molestation.  This  both  England  and  France  did 
for  several  years,  and  there  fell,  in  consequence, 
an  immense  carrying  trade  into  the  hands  of 
American  merchants,  which  brought  prosperity  to 
the  whole  country  such  as  was  never  known  before, 
and  was  not  known  again,  after  it  was  lost,  for 
near  a quarter  of  a century.  All  these  things 
made  Mr.  Jefferson  acceptable  to  the  people  as 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


253 


almost  a heaven-appointed  President.  If,  as  John 
Quincy  Adams  thought,  Fortune  delighted  to  beam 
upon  him  with  her  sunniest  smiles,  he  knew,  at 
least,  how  best  to  take  advantage  of  them.  While 
they  lasted,  his  secretary  of  state  sat  in  their  light 
and  warmth,  quietly  and  contentedly  busy  and  in 
the  diligent  and  faithful  discharge  of  official  duty, 
which  could  not  in  those  years  of  prosperous  tran- 
quillity be  over-burdensome. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  EMBARGO 

Almost  at  the  beginning  of  his  second  term, 
Jefferson  found  himself  in  troubled  waters,  as  the 
United  States  was  drawn  slowly  but  surely  into 
the  vortex  of  European  war.  The  carrying  trade 
at  home  and  abroad  had  fallen  very  much  into  the 
hands  of  Americans,  and  this  became  the  root  of 
bitterness.  The  tonnage  of  their  vessels  employed 
in  foreign  trade  and  entered  at  the  custom-houses  of 
the  United  States  was  equal  to  nearly  four  fifths 
of  the  tonnage  of  British  vessels  engaged  in  the 
same  traffic  and  entered  at  home.  But  there  was 
this  difference : the  foreign  commerce  of  Great 
Britain  was  almost  all  carried  on  from  her  own 
ports,  and  the  returns,  therefore,  showed  its  full 
volume.  On  the  other  hand,  the  American  ships 
were  largely  the  carriers  between  the  ports  of  the 
belligerents  and  of  other  powers  in  Europe,  and 
there  were  no  entries  at  the  American  custom- 
houses of  their  employment,  or  that  they  were  em- 
ployed at  all.  As  early  as  1804-5,  the  aggregate 
value  of  this  foreign  trade  in  the  hands  of  Ameri- 
cans was  probably  much  larger  than  that  controlled 
by  English  merchants ; and  the  former  increased 


THE  EMBARGO 


255 


to  the  time  of  the  promulgation  of  the  Berlin 
decree  of  1806,  and  the  British  orders  in  council 
of  the  next  year.  Nor  was  it  only  that  wealth 
flowed  into  the  country  as  the  immediate  return 
from  this  trade  abroad.  It  stimulated  enterprise 
and  industry  at  home  by  the  increase  of  capital ; 
and  there  was  not  only  more  money  to  work  with, 
but  more  to  spend.  Consequently  the  increase  in 
exports  and  in  imports  grew  steadily.  In  1805, 
1806,  and  1807,  about  one  half  the  average  total 
exports,  something  over  the  value  of  twenty  mil- 
lion dollars,  went  to  Great  Britain  alone ; and 
the  value  of  the  imports  from  that  country  for  the 
same  period  was  about  sixty  million  dollars  a year. 
Nor  did  this  disproportion,  though  increasing  with 
the  growing  prosperity,  represent  a general  bal- 
ance of  trade  against  the  United  States,  as  one 
school  of  political  economists  would  insist  it  must 
have  done.  For  the  imports  were  small  from  other 
European  countries  in  exchange  for  American 
products ; and  the  difference,  together  with  the 
profits  of  the  carrying  trade  abroad,  was  remitted 
in  English  manufactures.  In  other  words,  the  im- 
ports from  England  represented  the  returns  for  all 
exports  to  Europe,  and  the  returns  also  — available 
in  the  first  instance  through  bills  of  exchange  — 
of  the  trade  which  had  been  gained  by  Americans, 
and  lost  by  those  nations  whose  ships  the  war  had 
driven  from  the  ocean. 

The  British  manufacturer  had  no  reason  for  dis- 
content with  this  state  of  things.  The  best  market 


256 


JAMES  MADISON 


for  his  goods  was  constantly  improving,  and  he 
did  not  much  care  who  took  them  to  America. 
But  the  English  government,  and  the  English  mer- 
chants who  owned  ships,  looked  on  with  neither 
pleasure  nor  patience.  It  was  impossible  not  to 
see  that  the  United  States  was  fast  becoming  a 
great  commercial  rival.  This  in  itself  was  bad 
enough  ; but  it  was  the  harder  to  bear  when  it  was 
remembered  — and  it  could  not  be  forgotten  — 
that  the  rivalry  came  from  States  so  lately  in  revolt 
against  England,  and  that  their  President  at  that 
moment  was  one  of  the  most  obnoxious  of  the 
rebels.  Then  what  did  it  avail  that  England  was 
mistress  of  the  seas,  if  her  formidable  enemy  could 
laugh  at  any  effort  of  hers  to  destroy  the  com- 
merce of  France,  so  long  as  that  commerce  could 
be  carried  on  in  safety  under  a neutral  flag  ? If 
that  flag  must  be  respected,  English  naval  vessels 
and  privateers  would  cruise  in  vain  for  prizes,  for 
the  merchant  ships  of  any  belligerent,  not  strong 
enough  to  protect  them,  stayed  in  port.  It  had 
not  yet  come  to  be  the  acknowledged  law  of  nations 
that  free  ships  make  free  goods.  But  nearly  the 
same  purpose  was  answered  if  the  property  of 
belligerents  could  be  safely  carried  in  neutral  ships 
under  the  pretense  of  being  owned  by  neutrals. 
The  products  of  the  French  colonies,  for  example, 
could  be  loaded  on  board  of  American  vessels, 
taken  to  the  United  States  and  reshipped  there  for 
France  as  American  property.  England  looked 
upon  this  as  an  evasion  of  the  recognized  public 


THE  EMBARGO 


257 


law  that  property  of  belligerents  was  good  prize. 
Accordingly,  when  she  saw  that  French  commerce 
was  thus  put  out  of  her  reach,  and  that  the  rival 
she  most  dreaded  was  growing  rich  and  powerful 
in  the  possession  of  it,  she  sought  a remedy  and 
was  not  long  in  finding  one. 

It  was  denied  that  neutrals  could  take  advantage 
of  a state  of  war  to  enter  upon  a trade  which  had 
not  existed  in  time  of  peace ; and  American  ships 
were  seized  on  the  high  seas,  taken  into  port,  and 
condemned  in  the  admiralty  courts  for  carrying 
enemy’s  goods  in  such  a trade.  The  exercise  of 
that  right,  if  it  were  one  by  the  recognized  law  of 
nations,  would  be  of  great  injury  to  American  com- 
merce, unless  it  could  be  successfully  resisted.  To 
show  that  it  was  not  good  law,  Mr.  Madison  wrote 
his  “ Examination  of  the  British  Doctrine  which 
Subjects  to  Capture  a Neutral  Trade  not  Open 
in  the  Time  of  Peace.”  The  essay  was  a careful 
and  thorough  discussion  of  the  whole  question,  and 
showed  by  citations  from  the  most  eminent  writers 
on  international  law,  by  the  terms  of  treaties,  and 
by  the  conduct  of  nations  in  the  past,  that  the 
British  doctrine  was  erroneous  and  would  lead  to 
other  infringements  of  the  rights  of  neutrals.  But 
argument,  however  unanswerable,  has  never  yet 
brought  the  British  government  to  reason,  unless 
there  was  something  behind  it  not  so  easy  to  dis- 
regard. The  appropriation  for  Mr.  Jefferson’s 
gunboats  could  not  get  that  naval  arm  ready  for 
effective  service  much  before  the  year  1815,  even 


258 


JAMES  MADISON 


if  it  could  then  be  of  use  ; and  there  was,  more- 
over, this  further  difficulty  in  the  way  of  its  effi- 
ciency at  the  time,  — that,  as  it  could  not  go  to  the 
enemy,  it  must  wait  for  the  enemy  to  come  to  it ; 
the  conflagration  would  have  to  be  brought  to  the 
fire-engines.  A war  with  England  must  be  a naval 
war ; and  the  United  States  not  only  had  no  navy 
of  any  consequence,  but  it  was  a part  of  Mr.  J ef- 
ferson’s  policy,  in  contrast  with  the  policy  of  the 
preceding  administrations,  that  there  should  be 
none,  except  these  gunboats  kept  on  wheels  and 
under  cover  in  readiness  to  repel  an  invasion.  But 
there  was  no  fear  of  invasion,  for  by  that  England 
could  gain  nothing.  She  is  renewing,”  Madison 
wrote  in  the  autumn  of  1805,  her  depredations 
on  our  commerce  in  the  most  ruinous  shapes,  and 
has  kindled  a more  general  indignation  among  our 
merchants  than  was  ever  before  expressed.” 

These  depredations  were  not  confined  to  the 
seizing  and  confiscating  American  ships  under 
the  pretense  that  their  cargoes  were  contraband. 
Seamen  were  taken  out  of  them  on  the  charge  of 
being  British  subjects  and  deserters,  not  only  on 
the  high  seas  in  larger  numbers  than  ever  before, 
but  within  the  waters  of  the  United  States.  No 
doubt  these  seamen  were  often  British  subjects 
and  their  seizure  was  justifiable,  provided  England 
could  rightfully  extend  to  all  parts  of  the  globe 
and  to  the  ships  of  all  nations  the  merciless  sys- 
tem of  impressment  to  which  her  own  people  were 
compelled  to  submit  at  home.  Monroe,  in  a note 


THE  EMBARGO 


259 


to  Madison,  said  that  the  British  minister  had 
informed  him  that  ‘‘  great  abuses  were  committed 
in  granting  protections  ’’  in  America,  and  acknow- 
ledged that  ‘‘  he  gave  me  some  examples  which 
were  most  shameful.”  But  even  if  it  could  be 
granted  that  English  naval  officers  might  seize 
such  men  without  recourse  to  law,  wherever  they 
should  be  found  and  without  respect  for  the  flag 
of  another  nation,  it  was  a 'national  insult  and 
outrage,  calling  for  resentment  and  resistance,  to 
^ impress  American  citizens  under  the  pretense  that 
\ they  were  British  subjects.  But  what  was  the 
• remedy  ? As  a last  resort  in  such  cases,  nations 
have  but  one.  Diplomacy  and  legislation  may  be 
flrst  tried,  but,  if  these  fail,  war  must  be  the  flnal 
ordeal.  For  this  the  administration  made  no 
preparation,  and  the  more  evident  the  unreadiness 
the  less  was  the  chance  of  redress  in  any  other 
way.  Immediate  war  would,  of  course,  have  been 
unwise  ; for  what  could  a nation  almost  without  a 
ship  hope  from  a contest  with  a power  having  the 
largest  and  most  efficient  navy  in  the  world  ? If 
this,  however,  was  true  from  1805  to  1807,  it  was 
not  less  true  in  1812.  But  it  need  not  have  been 
true  when  war  was  actually  resorted  to,  had  the 
intervening  years  been  years  of  preparation.  The 
fact  was,  however,  that  the  party  which  supported 
the  administration  was  no  more  in  favor  of  war  at 
the  earlier  period  than  the  administration  itself 
was  ; and  meanwhile,  till  a war  party  had  come 
into  existence  and  gained  the  ascendency,  the 


260 


JAMES  MADISON 


country  had  been  growing  every  year  less  and  less 
in  a condition  to  appeal  to  war. 

The  first  measure  adopted  to  meet  the  aggres- 
sions o£  the  English  was  an  act  prohibiting  the 
importation  of  certain  British  products.  This  had 
always  been  a favorite  policy  with  Madison.  He 
had  advanced  and  upheld  it  in  former  years,  when 
a member  of  Congress,  and  when  Great  Britain 
had  first  violated  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the 
United  States  by  interference  with  her  foreign 
trade  and  by  impressing  her  citizens.  Non-inter- 
course had  been  an  effective  measure  thirty  years 
before,  and  had  a kind  of  prestige  as  an  American 
policy.  It  was  not  seen,  perhaps  could  not  be  seen 
without  experience,  that  a measure  suited  to  the 
colonial  condition  was  not  sufficient  for  an  inde- 
pendent nation.  But  the  President  and  secretary 
were  in  perfect  accord ; for  Jefferson  preferred 
anything  to  war,  and  Madison  was  persuaded  that 
England  would  be  brought  to  terms  by  the  loss  of 
the  best  market  for  her  manufactures.  Others, 
and  notably  John  Randolph,  saw  in  the  measure 
only  the  first  step  which,  if  persisted  in,  must  lead 
to  war  ; while,  in  the  mean  time,  to  interfere  with 
importations  would  be  quite  as  great  an  injury  to 
the  United  States  as  to  Great  Britain.  Randolph 
was  apt  to  blurt  out  a good  deal  of  truth  when  it 
happened  to  suit  him.  Impressment,  he  said,  was 
an  old  grievance  which  had  been  thought  a suffi- 
cient provocation  for  war  when  the  nation  was  not 
prepared  ; and  it  was  no  more  ready  to  resort  to 


THE  EMBARGO 


261 


that  desperate  remedy  now  than  it  had  been  in  the 
past.  Without  a navy  it  would  be  impossible  to 
prevent  the  blockading  of  all  the  principal  Ameri- 
can ports  by  English  squadrons.  The  United 
States  would  need  an  ally,  and  he  was  not  willing 
she  should  throw  herself  into  the  arms  of  that  power 
which  was  seeking  universal  conquest.  France,  he 
said,  would  be  the  tyrant  of  the  ocean  if  the  Brit- 
ish navy  should  be  driven  from  it.  The  commerce, 
moreover,  which  it  was  proposed  to  protect,  was 
not  the  “ honest  trade  of  America,”  but  a mush- 
room, a fungus  of  war,  — a trade  which,  so  soon  as 
the  nations  of  Europe  are  at  peace,  will  no  longer 
exist.”  It  was  only  ‘‘  a carrying  trade  which  cov- 
ers enemy’s  property ; ” and  he  did  not  believe  in 
plunging  a great  agricultural  country  into  war  for 
the  benefit  of  the  shipping  merchants  of  a few 
seaports.  There  were  many  who  agreed  with  him ; 
for  it  was  one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  the  Jef- 
fersonian school  of  politics  that  between  commerce 
and  agriculture  there  was  a natural  antagonism. 

But  the  administration  did  not  rely  upon  legis- 
lation alone  in  this  emergency.  The  President 
followed  up  the  act  prohibiting  the  introduction 
of  British  goods  by  sending  William  Pinkney  to 
England  in  the  spring  of  1806  to  join  Monroe, 
the  resident  minister,  in  an  attempt  at  negotiation. 
These  commissioners  soon  wrote  that  there  was 
good  reason  for  hoping  that  a treaty  would  be 
concluded,  and  thereupon  the  non-importation  act 
was  for  a time  suspended.  In  December  came  the 


262 


JAMES  MADISON 


news  that  a treaty  was  agreed  upon,  and  soon  after 
it  was  received  by  the  President.  The  most  seri- 
ous difficulty  in  the  way  of  negotiation  had  been 
the  question  of  impressment.  The  British  govern- 
ment claimed  the  right  to  arrest  deserters  from  its 
service  anywhere  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  other 
nations,  and  that  jurisdiction,  it  was  maintained, 
could  not  extend  beyond  the  coast  limit  over  the 
open  sea,  the  highway  of  all  nations.  There  was 
an  evident  disposition,  however,  to  come  to  some 
compromise.  The  English  commissioners  proposed 
that  their  government  should  prohibit,  under  pen- 
alty, the  seizure  of  American  citizens  anywhere, 
and  that  the  United  States  should  forbid,  on  her 
part,  the  granting  of  certificates  of  citizenship  to 
British  subjects,  of  which  deserters  took  advantage. 
But  as  this  would  be  an  acknowledgment  virtually 
of  the  right  of  search  on  board  American  ships, 
and  the  denial  of  citizenship  in  the  United  States 
to  foreigners,  the  American  commissioners  could 
not  entertain  that  proposition.  They  were  willing, 
however,  if  the  assumed  right  to  board  American 
ships  were  given  up,  to  agree,  on  behalf  of  their 
government,  to  aid  in  the  arrest  and  return  of  Brit- 
ish deserters  when  seeking  a refuge  in  the  United 
States.  But  to  this  the  British  commissioners 
would  not  accede. 

Monroe  and  Pinkney  were  enjoined,  in  the  in- 
structions written  by  the  secretary  of  state,  to  make 
the  abandonment  of  impressment  the  first  condi- 
tion of  a treaty.  A treaty,  nevertheless,  was  agreed 


THE  EMBARGO 


263 


upon,  without  this  provision.  But  when  it  was  sent 
to  the  President,  the  ministers  explained : — 

‘^That,  although  this  government  [the  British]  did 
not  feel  at  liberty  to  relinquish,  formally,  by  treaty,  its 
claim  to  search  our  merchant  vessels  for  British  seamen, 
its  practice  would  nevertheless  be  essentially,  if  not  com- 
pletely, abandoned.  That  opinion  has  since  been  con- 
firmed by  frequent  conferences  on  the  subject  with  the 
British  commissioners,  who  have  repeatedly  assured  us 
that,  in  their  judgment,  we  were  made  as  sure  against 
the  exercise  of  their  pretension  by  the  policy  which  their 
government  had  adopted  in  regard  to  that  very  delicate 
and  important  question,  as  we  could  have  been  made  by 
treaty.” 

These  assurances  did  not  satisfy  the  President. 
Without  consulting  the  Senate,  though  Congress 
was  in  session  when  the  treaty  was  received,  and 
although  the  Senate  had  been  previously  informed 
.that  one  had  been  agreed  upon,  the  President 
rejected  it.  On  several  other  points  it  was  not 
acceptable ; but,  as  Mr.  Madison  wrote  to  a friend, 
“ the  case  of  impressments  particularly  having 
been  brought  to  a formal  issue,  and  having  been 
the  primary  object  of  an  extraordinary  mission, 
a treaty  could  not  be  closed  which  was  silent  on 
that  subject.”  The  commissioners,  therefore,  were 
ordered  to  renew  negotiations.  This  they  faith- 
fully tried  to  do  for  a year,  but  were  finally  told  by 
the  British  minister  that  a treaty  once  concluded 
and  signed,  but  afterward  rejected  in  part  by  one 
of  the  contracting  powers,  could  not  again  be  taken 


264 


JAMES  MADISON 


up  for  consideration.  The  opponents  of  the  ad- 
ministration made  the  most  of  this  action  of  Mr. 
Jefferson.  The  country  was  not  permitted  to  for- 
get, even  were  forgetfulness  possible,  that  thousands 
of  seamen  had  been  taken  from  American  vessels, 
and  that  the  larger  proportion  of  these  were  native- 
born  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Not  that  these 
opponents  wanted  war ; that,  they  believed,  w^ould 
be  ruinous  without  a navy,  and  therefore  some 
reasonable  compromise  was  all  that  could  be  hoped 
for.  But  what  was  to  be  thought  of  an  adminis- 
tration that  would  not  go  to  war  because  it  was 
not  prepared ; would  not  prepare  in  the  hope  that 
some  future  conjunction  of  circumstances  would 
stave  off  that  last  resort;  and,  meanwhile,  would 
accept  no  terms  which  might  at  least  mitigate  the 
injuries  visited  upon  the  sea-faring  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  possibly  relieve  the  nation  from 
an  insolent  exercise  of  power  which  it  was  not 
strong  enough  to  resent  ? 

As  England’s  need  of  seamen  increased,  the 
j captains  of  her  cruisers,  encouraged  by  the  failure 
of  negotiation,  grew  bolder  in  overhauling  Amer- 
ican ships  and  taking  out  as  many  men  as  they 
believed,  or  pretended  to  believe,  were  deserters. 
In  the  summer  of  1807  an  outrage  was  perpetrated 
on  the  frigate  Chesapeake,  as  if  to  emphasize 
the  contempt  with  which  a nation  must  be  looked 
upon  which  only  screamed  like  a woman  at  wrongs 
which  it  wanted  the  courage  and  strength  to  resent, 
or  the  wisdom  to  compound  for.  The  Chesapeake 


THE  EMBARGO 


265 


was  followed  out  of  the  harbor  of  Norfolk  by  the 
British  man-of-war  Leopard,  and  when  a few  miles 
at  sea,  the  Chesapeake  being  brought  to  under  the 
pretense  that  the  English  captain  wished  to  put 
some  dispatches  on  board  for  Europe,  a demand 
was  made  for  certain  deserters  supposed  to  be  on 
the  American  frigate.  Commodore  Barron  replied 
that  he  knew  of  no  deserters  on  his  ship,  and  that 
he  could  permit  no  search  to  be  made,  even  if  there 
were.  After  some  further  altercation  the  English- 
man fired  a broadside,  killing  and  wounding  a 
number  of  the  Chesapeake’s  crew.  Commodore 
Barron  could  do  nothing  else  but  surrender,  for 
he  had  only  a single  gun  in  readiness  for  use,  and 
that  was  fired  only  once  and  then  with  a coal  from 
the  cook’s  galley.  The  ship  was  then  boarded,  the 
crew  mustered,  and  four  men  arrested  as  deserters. 
Three  of  them  were  negroes,  — two  natives  of  the 
United  States,  the  other  of  South  America.  The 
fourth  man,  probably,  was  an  Englishman.  They 
were  all  deserters  from  English  men-of-war  lying 
off  Norfolk ; but  the  three  negroes  declared  that 
they  had  been  kidnaped,  and  their  right  to  escape 
could  not  be  justly  questioned  ; indeed,  the  English 
afterward  took  this  view  of  it  apparently,  for  the 
men  were  released  on  the  arrival  of  the  Leopard  at 
Halifax.  But  the  fourth  man  was  hanged. 

For  this  direct  national  insult,  explanation,  apo- 
logy, and  reparation  were  demanded,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  President  put  forth  a proclamation 
forbidding  all  British  ships  of  war  to  remain  in 


266 


JAMES  MADISON 


American  waters.  Of  how  much  use  the  latter 
was  we  learn  from  a letter  of  Madison  to  Monroe  : 
‘‘  They  continue  to  defy  it,”  he  wrote,  ‘‘  not  only 
by  remaining  within  our  waters,  but  by  chasing 
merchant  vessels  arriving  and  departing.”  Some 
preparation  was  made  for  war,  but  it  was  only  to 
call  upon  the  militia  to  be  in  readiness,  and  to 
order  Mr.  Jefferson’s  gunboats  to  the  most  ex- 
posed ports.  Great  Britain  was  not  alarmed.  The 
captain  of  the  Leopard,  indeed,  was  removed  from 
his  command,  as  having  exceeded  his  duty ; but  a 
proclamation  on  that  side  was  also  issued,  requiring 
all  ships  of  war  to  seize  British  seamen  on  board 
foreign  merchantmen,  to  demand  them  from  for- 
eign ships  of  war,  and  if  the  demand  was  refused 
to  report  the  fact  to  the  admiral  of  the  fleet.  It 
was  not  till  after  four  years  of  irritating  contro- 
versy that  any  settlement  was  reached  in  regard  to 
the  affair  of  the  Chesapeake. 

New  perils  all  the  while  were  besetting  Amer- 
ican commerce.  In  November,  1806,  Napoleon’s 
Berlin  decree  was  promulgated,  forbidding  the 
introduction  into  France  of  the  products  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies,  whether  in  her  own  ships 
or  those  of  other  nations.  This  was  in  violation 
of  the  convention  between  France  and  the  United 
States,  if  it  was  meant  that  American  vessels 
should  come  under  the  prohibition ; but  for  a time 
there  was  some  hope  that  they  might  be  excepted. 
In  the  course  of  the  year,  however,  it  was  officially 
declared  in  Paris  that  the  treaty  would  not  be 


THE  EMBARGO 


267 


allowed  to  weaken  the  force  of  a war  measure 
aimed  at  Great  Britain.  Under  this  decision,  car- 
goes already  seized  were  confiscated  and  the  trade 
of  the  United  States  faced  a new  calamity.  The 
decree,  it  was  declared,  was  a rightful  retaliation 
of  a British  order  in  council  of  six  months  be- 
fore, which  had  established  a partial  blockade  of 
a portion  of  the  French  coast.  In  the  kidnaping 
business,  France  could  not,  of  course,  compete 
with  England ; for  there  were  few  of  her  citizens 
to  be  found  on  board  of  American  vessels,  and  to 
seize  a Yankee  sailor,  under  the  pretense  that  he 
was  a Frenchman,  was  an  absurdity  never  thought 
of.  But  hundreds  of  Americans,  the  crews  of  ships 
seized  for  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  Berlin  de- 
cree, were  thrown  into  French  prisons.  So  far, 
therefore,  as  the  United  States  had  good  ground  of 
complaint  on  any  score  against  either  power,  there 
was  little  to  choose  between  them.  Mr.  Jefferson’s 
repugnance  to  war  was  sufficient  to  hold  him  back 
from  one  with  England,  though  he  might  have  had 
France  for  an  ally ; still  more  unwilling  was  he,  by 
a war  with  France,  to  make  a friend  of  England, 
whom  he  still  looked  upon  as  the  natural  enemy  of 
the  United  States;  for,  notwithstanding  all  that 
had  come  and  gone,  he  still  regarded  France  with 
something  of  the  old  affection.  In  the  autumn  of 
1807  he  called  a special  session  of  Congress  in  con- 
sideration of  the  increasing  aggressions  of  Great 
Britain,  especially  in  the  attack  upon  the  Chesa- 
peake, and  the  injury  done  by  the  interdiction  of 


268 


JAMES  MADISON 


neutral  trade  with  any  country  with  which  that 
power  was  at  war.  But  he  had  no  recommenda- 
tions to  offer  of  resistance  nor  even  of  defense, 
except  that  some  additions  be  made  to  the  gun- 
boats, and  that  sailors  on  shore  be  enrolled  as  a 
sort  of  gunboat  militia.  The  probable  real  pur- 
pose of  calling  the  extra  session,  however,  appeared 
in  about  two  weeks,  when  he  sent  a special  mes- 
sage to  the  Senate  recommending  an  embargo. 

An  act  was  almost  immediately  passed  which, 
if  anything  more  was  needed  to  complete  the  ruin 
of  American  commerce,  supplied  that  deficiency. 
A month  before  this  time  the  English  ministry  had 
issued  a new^^order  in  council) — the  news  of  which 
reached  Jefferson  as  he  was  about  to  send  mhis 
message  — proclaiming  a blockade  of  pretty  mn^ 
,^r~EuTope;  "aiid~iorbiddiiTg"^y  traHe  in  neutral 

FsFgbne  into  someTBritTsh 


vessels  unl^ 
port  and  paid  duties  oii  their  cargoes  ; and  within 
twenty  - four  hours  of  the  President’s  message 
recommending  the  embargo,  Napoleon  proclaimed 
a new  decree  from  Milan,  by  which  it  was  declared 
that  any  ship  was  lawful  prize  that  had  anything 
whatever  to  do  with  Great  Britain,  — that  should 
pay  it  tribute,  that  should  carry  its  merchandise, 
that  should  be  bound  either  to  or  from  any  of  its 
ports.  All  that  these  powers  could  do  to  shut 
every  trading  vessel  out  of  all  European  ports  was 
now  done  ; and  at  this  opportune  moment  Mr. 
Jefferson  came  to  their  aid  by  compelling  all 
American  vessels  to  stay  at  home.  It  is  not  easy 


THE  EMBARGO 


269 


in  our  time  to  conceive  of  a President  proposing, 
or  of  a party  accepting,  or  of  the  people  submit- 
ting to,  such  a measure  as  this.  But  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son’s followers  were  very  obedient,  and  there  was, 
undoubtedly,  a very  general  belief  that  trade  with 
the  United  States  was  so  important  to  the  nations 
at  war  that  for  the  sake  of  its  renewal  the  obnox- 
ious decrees  and  orders  in  council  would  soon  be 
repealed.  But,  except  upon  certain  manufacturers 
in  England,  little  influence  was  visible.  General 
Armstrong,  the  American  minister  in  France, 
wrote  : Here  it  is  not  felt ; and  in  England,  amid 

the  more  recent  and  interesting  events  of  the  day, 
it  is  forgotten.”  When,  however,  the  effect  was 
evident  at  home  of  a law  forbidding  any  American 
vessels  from  going  to  sea,  even  to  catch  fish,  and 
prohibiting  the  export  of  any  of  the  products 
of  the  United  States,  either  in  their  own  ships  or 
those  of  any  other  country,  then  there  arose  a 
popular  clamor  for  the  abandonment  of  a policy 
so  ruinous.  Within  four  months  of  its  enactment, 
Josiah  Quincy  of  Massachusetts  declared,  in  a 
debate  in  Congress,  that  an  experiment  such  as 
is  now  making  was  never  before  — I will  not  say 
tried  — it  never  before  entered  into  the  human 
imagination.  There  is  nothing  like  it  in  the  nar- 
rations of  history  or  in  the  tales  of  fiction.  All 
the  habits  of  a mighty  nation  are  at  once  counter- 
acted. All  their  property  depreciated.  All  their 
external  connections  violated.  Five  millions  of 
people  are  engaged.  They  cannot  go  beyond  the 


270 


JAMES  MADISON 


limits  of  that  once  free  country ; now  they  are 
not  even  permitted  to  thrust  their  own  property 
through  the  grates.”  While  American  ships  at 
home  were  kept  there,  those  which  had  remained 
abroad  to  escape  the  embargo  were  met  by  a new 
peril.  Some  of  them  were  in  French  ports  await- 
ing a turn  in  affairs  ; others  ventured  to  load  with 
English  goods  in  English  ports,  to  be  landed  in 
France  under  the  pretense,  supported  by  fraudu- 
lent papers,  that  they  were  direct  from  the  United 
States  or  other  neutral  country.  The  fraud  was 
too  transparent  to  escape  detection  long,  and  Na- 
poleon thereupon  issued,  in  the  spring  of  1808,  the 
Bayonne  decree  authorizing  the  seizure  and  confis- 
cation of  all  American  vessels.  They  were  either 
English  or  American,  he  said ; if  the  former,  they 
were  enemy’s  ships  and  liable  to  capture ; but  if 
the  latter,  they  should  be  at  home,  and  he  was  only 
enforcing  the  embargo  law  of  the  United  States, 
which  she  ought  to  thank  him  for. 

The  prosperity  and  tranquillity  which  marked 
the  earlier  years  of  Jefferson’s  administration  dis- 
appeared in  its  last  year.  Congress,  both  in  its 
spring  and  winter  sessions,  could  talk  of  little  else 
but  the  disastrous  embargo ; proposing,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  make  it  the  more  stringent  by  an  enforce- 
ment act,  and,  on  the  other,  to  substitute  for  it 
non-intercourse  with  England  and  France,  restor- 
ing trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  leaving 
the  question  of  decrees  and  orders  in  council  open 
for  future  consideration.  The  President  no  longer 


THE  EMBARGO 


271 


held  his  party  under  perfect  control.  The  mis- 
chievous results  of  the  embargo  policy  were  evi- 
dent enough  to  a sufficient  number  of  Republicans 
to  secure  in  February,  1809,  the  repeal  of  that 
measure,  to  take  effect  the  next  month  as  to  all 
countries  except  England  and  France,  and,  with 
regard  to  them,  at  the  adjournment  of  the  next 
Congress.  But  the  prohibition  of  importation  from 
both  these  latter  countries  was  continued  till  the 
obnoxious  orders  in  council  and  the  decrees  should 
be  repealed. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


MADISON  AS  PKESIDENT 

Mr.  Jefferson  named  his  own  successor.  Of 
the  three  Democratic  candidates,  Madison,  Mon- 
roe, and  George  Clinton,  he  preferred  Madison 
now,  and  urged  Monroe  to  wait  patiently  as  next 
in  succession.  Beyond  two  lives  he  did  not,  per- 
haps, think  proper  to  dictate  ; and,  besides,  Clinton 
was  not  a Virginian.  What  little  opposition  there 
was  to  Madison  in  his  own  party  came  from  those 
who  feared  that  he  was  too  thoroughly  identified 
with  Jefferson’s  policy  to  untie  the  knot  in  which 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  country  had  become 
entangled.  Of  the  175  electoral  votes,  however, 
he  received  122 ; but  that  was  fewer  by  39  than 
had  been  cast  for  Jefferson  four  years  before. 
Of  the  New  England  States,  Vermont  alone  gave 
him  its  votes,  changing  places  with  Rhode  Island, 
which  had  wheeled  into  line  again  with  the  Fed- 
eralists. 

During  the  winter  of  1808-9,  after  Madison’s 
election  but  before  his  inauguration,  he  had  qui- 
etly conferred  with  Erskine,  the  British  minis- 
ter at  Washington,  upon  the  condition  of  affairs. 
Much  was  hoped  from  these  conferences ; but  the 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


273 


end  which  they  helped  to  bring  about  was  the 
reverse  of  what  was  hoped  for.  Could  Madison 
have  had  his  way,  he  would  probably  have  pre- 
ferred that  Congress  should  have  left  untouched 
at  that  session  the  questions  of  embargo  and  non- 
intercourse; for  the  tone  of  the  debates  and  the 
tendency  of  legislation  naturally  led  the  English 
ministry  to  doubt  the  assurances  which  Erskine 
gave  that  these  proceedings  did  not  truly  represent 
the  friendly  disposition  of  the  incoming  President. 
In  answer  to  those  representations,  however,  there 
came  in  April  from  Canning,  the  foreign  secre- 
tary, certain  propositions  which  were  so  presented 
by  Erskine,  and  so  received  by  the  administrar 
tion,  as  to  promise  a settlement  of  all  differences 
between  the  two  governments.  Erskine  was  a 
young  man,  anxious  very  likely  for  distinction ; 
but  a laudable  ambition  to  be  of  service  in  a 
good  cause  made  him  over-zealous.  He  exceeded 
the  letter  of  his  instructions,  while  keeping,  as  he 
thought,  to  their  spirit.  Probably  he  mistook  their 
spirit  in  assuming  that  his  government  cared  more 
to  secure  a settlement  of  existing  difficulties  than 
for  the  precise  terms  and  minor  details  by  which 
it  should  be  reached.  At  any  rate,  he  agreed  that 
Great  Britain  would  withdraw  her  orders  in  coun- 
cil provided  the  United  States  would  maintain  the 
non-intercourse  acts  against  France  so  long  as  the 
Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  remained  in  force.  This 
being  secured,  he  did  not  insist  upon  two  other 
conditions  — partly  because  it  was  represented  to 


274 


JAMES  MADISON 


him  that  they  would  need  some  action  by  Congress, 
and  partly  because  he  believed  that  the  essential 
point  was  gained  by  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  enforce  non-intercourse  against 
France  while  her  decrees  were  unrepealed.  These 
other  conditions  were,  first,  that  the  United  States 
should  cease  to  insist  upon  the  right  to  carry  on 
in  time  of  war  the  colonial  trade  of  a belligerent 
which  had  not  been  open  in  time  of  peace  to 
neutrals ; and,  second,  the  acknowledgment  that 
British  men-of-war  might  rightfully  seize  Amer- 
ican merchant  vessels  when  transgressing  the  non- 
intercourse laws  against  France.  He  also  proposed 
a settlement  of  the  Chesapeake  question,  but  omit- 
ted to  say,  as  Canning  had  instructed  him  to  say, 
that  some  provision  would  be  made,  as  an  act  of 
generosity  and  not  of  right,  for  the  wives  and  chil- 
dren of  the  men  who  were  killed  on  board  that 
ship.  But  when  that  settlement  was  accepted  by 
the  administration,  he  failed  to  resent  some  reflec- 
tions from  Robert  Smith,  the  secretary  of  state,  on 
the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  in  that  affair,  which 
Canning,  when  he  heard  of  them,  thought  should 
have  been  resented  and  their  recall  demanded,  or 
the  negotiation  stopped. 

On  the  terms,  however,  as  Erskine  chose  to 
present  them,  an  agreement  was  reached,  and  the 
President  issued  a proclamation  repealing  the  acts 
of  embargo  and  non-intercourse  as  against  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies  after  June  10.  On  that 
day  more  than  a thousand  ships,  loaded  and  riding 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


275 


at  anchor  in  all  the  principal  ports  in  anxious 
readiness  for  the  signal  for  flight,  spread  their 
wings,  like  a flock  of  long-imprisoned  birds,  and 
flew  out  to  sea.  / There  was  an  almost  universal 
shout  of  gratitude  to  the  new  President,  who,  in 
the  first  three  months  of  his  administration,  had 
banished  the  fear  of  war  abroad,  and  at  home  was 
sweeping  away  involuntary  idleness,  want,  and 
ominous  discontent.  Madison  had  known  some- 
thing of  popularity  during  his  long  career ; but 
never  before  had  he  felt  the  exultation  of  riding 
upon  the  very  crest  of  a mighty  wave  of  popular 
applause.  But  it  was  one  of  those  waves  that 
collapse  suddenly  into  a surprising  flatnessy^  Can- 
ning repudiated  all  that  Erskine  had  done  and 
immediately  recalled  him.  The  ships  that  had 
gone  to  sea,  under  the  sanction  of  the  President's 
proclamation,  were  permitted  by  an  order  in  coun- 
cil to  complete  their  voyages  unmolested ; but 
otherwise  all  commerce  was  once  more  brought  to 
a standstill.  It  would  have  been  easier  to  bear 
some  fresh  misfortune  than  to  be  compelled  to 
struggle  again  with  calamities  so  well  understood 
and  which  it  was  hoped  had  been  left  behind  for- 
ever. Gallatin  had  been  retained  in  the  Treasury 
Department  and  was  the  President’s  chief  adviser, 
and  the  two  were  now  accused  of  having  been 
either  imbecile  or  treacherous.  It  was  openly  said 
that  they  had  led  the  young  minister  to  agree 
to  an  arrangement  which  they  knew  his  govern-- 
ment  would  not  sanction.  But  they  could  hardly 


276 


JAMES  MADISON 


have  been  so  foolish  as  to  make  a bargain  with  the 
certainty  that  it  would  stand  only  so  long  as  a ship 
could  go  and  come  across  the  Atlantic.  Nobody 
understood  better  than  Madison  how  grateful  a 
reconciliation  with  England  would  be  to  a large 
proportion  of  the  people,  and  nobody  was  more 
disappointed  that  the  negotiations  came  to  worse 
than  nothing,  inasmuch  as  their  failure  led  to  new 
embarrassments. 

He  said  with  some  bitterness,  in  a letter  to  Jef- 
ferson, early  in  August : ‘‘You  will  see  by  the 
instructions  to  Erskine,  as  published  by  Canning, 
that  the  latter  was  as  much  determined  that  there 
should  be  no  adjustment  as  the  former  was  that 
there  should  be  one.”  He  was  unjust  to  Canning; 
the  real  fault  was  with  Erskine,  and  with  him  only 
because  his  zeal  outran  his  judgment.  In  another 
letter  to  Jefferson,  the  President  says:  “Erskine 
is  in  a ticklish  situation  with  his  government.  I 
suspect  he  will  not  be  able  to  defend  himself  against 
the  charges  of  exceeding  his  instructions,  notwith- 
standing the  appeal  he  makes  to  sundry  others  not 
published.  But  he  will  make  out  a strong  case 
against  Canning,  and  be  able  to  avail  himself 
much  of  the  absurdity  and  evident  inadmissibility 
of  the  articles  disregarded  by  him.”  Possibly  Mr. 
Erskine  considered  that  his  government  would  ap- 
prove of  his  not  urging  these  points  too  earnestly, 
inasmuch  as  the  other  side  refrained  from  insisting 
upon  the  abandonment  of  impressment  of  seamen 
on  board  American  ships.  But  Mr.  Madison’s 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


277 


indignation  must  have  covered  up  a good  deal  o£ 
mortification.  He  could  hardly  have  been  without 
the  sensation  of  one  hoisted  by  his  own  petard.  It 
was  only  two  years  since  Mr.  Jefferson,  with  his 
approval,  had  rejected  the  Monroe-Pinkney  treaty 
because  instructions  had  not  been  literally  com- 
plied with.  Mr.  Canning,  in  following  that  exam- 
ple, could  have  pleaded,  had  he  chosen,  much  the 
stronger  justification,  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  two  cases ; and  Mr.  Madison  could  not  fail  to 
remember,  without  being  reminded  of  it,  when  this 
agreement  was  thrown  back  in  his  face,  that  he 
had  been  willing  to  accept  it  without  any  protec- 
tion of  the  rights  of  American  seamen,  the  want  of 
which  was  the  ostensible  reason  for  rejecting  the 
Monroe-Pinkney  treaty. 

However,  the  administration  was  now  compelled 
to  meet  anew  the  old  difficulties  which  the  Erskine 
agreement  had  failed  to  dispose  of.  The  Presi- 
dent’s first  duty  was  to  issue  a second  proclama- 
tion, recalling  the  previous  one  which  had  sent  to 
sea  every  American  ship  in  port.  They  could  all 
come  back,  if  they  would,  to  be  made  fast  again 
at  their  wharves,  till  the  recurrent  tides  at  last 
should  ripple  in  and  out  of  their  open  seams,  and 
their  yards  and  masts  drop  piecemeal  upon  the 
rotting  decks.  But  many  never  came  back,  pre- 
ferring rather  the  risk  of  being  sunk  or  burned 
at  sea,  which  happened  to  not  a few,  or  of  cap- 
ture and  confiscation  by  the  belligerents  whose 
laws  they  defied.  Erskine  was  followed  by  a new 


278 


JAMES  MADISON 


ambassador  from  England,  Mr.  Jackson.  His  mis- 
sion, however,  had  no  other  result  than  to  widen 
the  breach  between  the  two  nations.  A contro- 
versy almost  immediately  arose  between  the  min- 
ister and  Mr.  Smith,  the  secretary  of  state,  — or 
rather  Mr.  Madison  himself,  who,  as  he  complained 
at  a later  period,  did  most  of  Smith’s  work  as 
well  as  his  own,  — touching  the  arrangement  with 
Erskine.  Jackson  intimated,  or  was  understood 
as  intimating,  that  the  administration  must  have 
known  the  precise  terms  on  which  Erskine  was 
empowered  to  treat  with  the  government  of  the 
United  States ; and  when  a denial  was  made  with 
a good  deal  of  emphasis  on  the  part  of  the  admin- 
istration, the  insinuation  was  repeated  almost  as  a 
direct  charge.  Of  course  there  could  be  but  one 
conclusion  to  correspondence  of  this  sort ; further 
communication  with  Jackson  was  declined  and  his 
recall  asked  for. 

It  was  plain  enough  in  the  latter  months  of 
Jefferson’s  administration,  to  himself  as  well  as  to 
everybody  else,  that  the  embargo  had  not  only 
failed  to  bring  the  belligerents  to  terms  abroad, 
but  that  it  had  added  greatly  to  the  distress  at 
home.  That  the  measure  was  a failure,  Madison 
himself  acknowledged  in  one  of  his  retrospective 
letters  written  in  the  retirement  of  Montpellier, 
sixteen  years  afterward.  It  was  meant,  he  said  in 
that  letter,  as  an  experimental  measure,  preferable 
to  naked  submission  or  to  war  at  a time  when  war 
was  inexpedient.  It  failed,  he  added,  because 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


279 


the  government  did  not  sufficiently  distrust  those 
in  a certain  quarter  whose  successful  violation  of 
the  law  led  to  the  general  discontent,  which  called 
for  its  repeal.”  That  is  to  say,  the  government 
relied  too  confidently  upon  the  submission  of  New 
England ; was  too  ready  to  believe  that  her  mer- 
chants would  not  let  their  ships  slip  quietly  out  to 
sea  whenever  they  could  evade  the  officers  of  the 
customs,  nor  slip  in  to  land  a cargo  at  some  unfre- 
quented place  where  there  was  no  custom-house. 
The  patriotic  fishermen  of  Marblehead,”  he  says, 
at  one  time  offered  their  services ; ” and  he  regrets 
they  were  not  sent  out  as  privateers  to  seize  these 
contraband  ships  as  prizes,  and  to  carry  them  into 
ports  where  the  tribunals  would  enforce  the  law.” 
Apparently  there  was  not  a reasonable  doubt  in 
his  mind  whether  such  tribunals  could  be  found  in 
any  port  along  the  coast  of  New  England.  It  is 
also  rather  more  than  doubtful  — even  assuming 
that  there  was  much  of  the  kind  of  patriotism 
which  he  says  existed  in  Marblehead  — how  long, 
had  the  government  offered  commissions  to  private 
citizens  to  prey  upon  their  neighbors,  the  embargo 
would  have  been  respected  at  all  east  of  Long 
Island  Sound.  But  this  was  the  afterthought  of 
1826.  Madison’s  policy  in  1809-10  was  rather  to 
conciliate  than  provoke  those  in  a certain  quar- 
ter.” He  could  not  command  entire  unanimity 
even  in  his  own  party.  Congress  passed  the  winter 
in  vain  efforts  to  find  some  common  ground,  not 
merely  for  Democrats  and  Federalists,  but  for  the 


280 


JAMES  MADISON 


Democrats  alone.  Various  measures  were  pro- 
posed to  meet  the  critical  condition  of  the  country. 
Some  were  too  radical ; some  not  radical  enough ; 
and  none  were  so  acceptable  that  it  was  not  easy 
to  form  combinations  for  their  defeat.  All  were 
agreed  that  the  non-importation  act  must  be  got 
rid  of ; but  the  difficulty  was  to  find  a way  to  be 
rid  of  it  so  that  the  nation  should  at  once  maintain 
its  dignity,  assert  its  rights,  and  escape  a war. 
The  President  would  have  preferred  that  all  Brit- 
ish and  French  ships  be  excluded  from  American 
ports,  and  that  importations  from  both  countries 
should  be  prohibited  except  in  American  vessels ; 
and  a bill  to  this  effect  was  one  of  several  that  was 
defeated  in  the  course  of  the  session.  But  at  last, 
in  May  (1810),  an  act  was  passed  excluding  only 
the  men-of-war  of  both  nations,  but  suspending  the 
non-importation  act  for  three  months  after  the  ad- 
journment of  Congress.  The  President  was  then 
authorized,  when  the  three  months  were  passed,  to 
declare  the  act  again  in  force  against  either  Great 
Britain  or  France,  should  the  commercial  orders  or 
decrees  of  either  nation  be  continued  in  force  while 
those  of  the  other  were  repealed. 

If  the  aim  of  the  dominant  party  had  been  to 
devise  a scheme  sure  to  lead  to  fresh  complications 
more  difficult  to  manage  than  any  that  had  gone 
before,  it  could  not  have  hit  upon  a better  one 
than  this.  Hitherto,  in  all  the  perplexities  and 
anxieties  of  the  situation,  the  government  had, 
at  least,  kept  its  relations  to  other  powers  in  its 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


281 


own  hands,  to  conduct  them,  whether  wisely  or 
unwisely,  in  its  own  way.  It  could  resent  or  sub- 
mit to  encroachments  upon  the  commerce  of  the 
country,  as  seemed  most  prudent  ; it  could  close 
or  open  the  ports,  as  seemed  most  judicious ; or  it 
could  join  forces  with  that  one  of  its  two  enemies 
whose  alliance  promised  to  secure  respect  on  the 
one  hand,  and  compel  it  on  the  other.  But  now 
it  had  tied  itself  up  in  a knot  of  provisos.  It 
would  do  something  if  England  would  do  some- 
thing else,  or  if  France  would  do  something  else. 
If  the  proposition  was  accepted  by  England  and 
was  not  accepted  by  France,  then  the  United 
States  would  remain  in  friendly  relations  with 
England,  and  assume  by  comparison  an  unfriendly 
attitude  toward  France ; and  if  France  accepted 
the  condition  and  England  declined  it,  then  the 
situation  would  be  reversed.  Nothing  would  be 
gained  in  either  case  that  might  not  have  been 
gained  by  direct  negotiation,  and,  no  doubt,  on 
better  terms.  But  if  the  proposition  now  offered 
should  be  disregarded  by  both  powers,  the  situa- 
tion would  be  worse  than  before.  This  evidently 
was  Madison’s  view  of  the  question.  He  wrote  to 
Pinkney,  the  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James, 
a month  after  the  act  was  passed : At  the  next 

meeting  of  Congress,  it  will  be  found,  according 
to  present  appearances,  that  instead  of  an  adjust- 
ment with  either  of  the  belligerents,  there  is  an 
increasing  obstinacy  in  both ; and  that  the  incon- 
veniences of  embargo  and  non-intercourse  have 


282 


JAMES  MADISON 


been  exchanged  for  the  greater  sacrifices,  as  well 
as  disgrace,  resulting  from  a submission  to  the 
predatory  system  in  force.”  Not  that  he  wanted 
war;  his  faith  in  passive  resistance  was  still  un- 
shaken ; embargo  and  non-intercourse  he  was  still 
confident  would,  if  persisted  in  long  enough,  surely 
bring  the  belligerents  to  terms.  But  as  to  this  act, 
he  weighs  the  chances  as  in  a balance.  In  England 
some  impression  may  be  made  by  the  prices  of 
cotton  and  tobacco,  — ‘‘cotton  down  at  ten  or  eleven 
cents  in  Georgia ; and  the  great  mass  of  tobacco  in 
the  same  situation.”  He  has,  however,  no  “ very 
favorable  expectations.”  But  as  to  France,  he  evi- 
dently is  not  without  hope  that  she  will  be  wise 
enough  to  see  that  “ she  ought  at  once  to  embrace 
the  arrangement  held  out  by  Congress,  the  renewal 
of  a non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain  being  the 
very  species  of  resistance  most  analogous  to  her 
professed  views.”  But  he  was  clearly  not  san- 
guine. 

If  that  was  his  wish,  however,  it  was  gratified. 
Napoleon  did  take  advantage  of  the  act,  but  in 
such  a way  as  to  reverse  the  relative  positions  of 
the  two  nations  by  seizing  for  France  and  taking 
from  the  United  States  the  power  or  the  will  to 
dictate  terms.  The  French  minister,  Champagny, 
announced  in  a letter  merely,  in  August,  the  revo- 
cation of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  from  the 
1st  of  the  following  November ; and,  a day  or  two 
after,  such  new  restrictions  were  imposed  upon 
American  trade,  by  prohibitory  duties  and  a navi- 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


283 


gation  act,  as  pretty  mucli  to  ruin  what  little  there 
was  left  of  it.  The  revocation  of  the  edicts,  more- 
over, was  coupled  with  the  conditions  that  Great 
Britain  should  not  only  recall  her  order  in  council, 
but  renounce  her  new  principles  of  blockade,”  or 
that  the  United  States  should  ‘‘  cause  their  rights 
to  be  respected  by  the  English.”  Napoleon  had  in 
this  three  ends  to  gain,  and  he  gained  them  all : 
First,  to  secure  France  against  a renewal  of  the 
non-importation  act  of  the  United  States,  if  the 
President  should  accept  this  conditional  recall  of 
the  decrees  as  satisfactory ; second,  to  leave  those 
decrees  virtually  unrepealed,  by  making  their  recall 
depend  upon  the  action  of  England,  who,  he  well 
knew,  would  not  listen  to  the  proposed  conditions ; 
and,  third,  to  involve  the  United  States  and  Eng- 
land in  new  disputes,  which  might  lead  to  war. 
Everything  turned  out  as  the  emperor  wished. 
The  President  accepted  the  conditional  withdrawal 
of  the  French  decrees,  as  in  accordance  with  the 
act  of  Congress ; England  refused  to  recognize  a 
contingent  withdrawal  as  a withdrawal  at  all ; and 
the  result  at  length  was  war  between  England  and 
the  United  States. 

The  acquiescence  of  the  President  in  the  decision 
of  Napoleon  was  the  more  significant  inasmuch 
as  Mr.  Smith,  the  secretary  of  state,  had  assured 
the  French  government,  when  a copy  of  the  act 
of  May  was  sent  to  it,  that  there  could  be  no 
negotiation  under  the  act  until  another  matter  was 
disposed  of.  A decree,  issued  at  Rambouillet  in 


284 


JAMES  MADISON 


March,  1810,  and  enforced  in  May,  ordered  the 
confiscation  of  all  American  ships  then  detained 
in  the  ports  of  France,  and  in  Spanish,  Dutch, 
and  Neapolitan  ports  under  the  control  of  France. 
The  loss  to  American  merchants,  including  ships 
and  cargoes,  was  estimated  to  be  about  forty 
million  dollars.  This  decree  was  ostensibly  in 
retaliation  of  that  act  of  non-intercourse  passed  by 
Congress  more  than  a year  before,  and  was,  there- 
fore, a retrospective  law.  The  non  - intercourse 
act,  moreover,  had  expired  by  its  own  limitation 
months  before  many  of  these  ships  were  seized; 

/X  but  all,  nevertheless,  were  confiscated,  though 
some  of  them  had  entered  the  ports  merely  for 
shelter.  By  order  of  the  President,  Smith  wrote 
to  Armstrong,  the  American  minister  at  Paris, 
that  ‘‘a  satisfactory  provision  for  restoring  the 
property  lately  surprised  and  seized,  by  the  order 
or  at  the  instance  of  the  French  government,  must 
be  combined  with  a repeal  of  the  French  edicts, 
with  a view  to  a non-intercourse  with  Great  Brit- 
ain; such  a provision  being  an  indispensable  evi- 
dence of  the  just  purpose  of  France  toward  the 
United  States.”  The  injunction  was  repeated  a 
few  weeks  later ; but  when  the  emperor’s  decision 
upon  the  decrees  was  announced,  in  August,  the 
“ indispensable  ” was  dispensed  with,  and  a few 
months  later  an  absolute  refusal  of  any  compen- 
sation for  the  spoliation  under  the  Eambouillet 
decree  was  quietly  submitted  to. 

But  meanwhile  the  President,  in  November, 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


285 


issued  a proclamation  announcing  that  France  had 
complied  with  the  act  of  the  previous  May  and 
revoked  the  decrees,  while  the  English  orders  in 
council  remained  unrepealed.  But  England  still 
had  three  months,  according  to  the  act,  in  which  to 
make  her  choice  between  a recall  of  her  orders  in 
council  or  the  alternative  of  seeing  the  American 
non-intercourse  act  revived  against  her.  But,  it  is 
to  be  observed,  the  French  minister’s  announce- 
ment of  the  acceptance  of  the  act  of  May  was  not 
made  till  August,  and  then  the  revocation  of  the 
decrees  was  not  to  take  effect  till  November.  No- 
vember came  bringing  with  it  the  President’s  pro- 
clamation, when  it  soon  appeared  that  there  was 
still  to  be  tarrying  in  the  eating  of  the  cake.” 
The  decrees  were  to  remain  in  force  at  least  three 
months  longer,  till  it  should  be  known  whether 
Great  Britain  would  comply  with  those  terms  which 
France  — not  the  United  States  — made  the  con- 
dition of  revoking  the  orders  in  council ; and  if 
Great  Britain  did  not  comply,  then  the  French 
decrees  were  not  revoked.  The  legality  of  the 
President’s  proclamation,  of  course,  was  ques- 
tioned. There  was,  as  Josiah  Quincy  said  in  de- 
bate in  the  House,  the  following  February  (1811), 
“ a continued  seizure  of  all  the  vessels  which  came 
within  the  grasp  of  the  French  custom-house,  from 
the  1st  of  November  down  to  the  date  of  our  last 
accounts.”  Other  members,  not  more  earnest,  were 
less  temperate  in  the  expression  of  their  indigna- 
tion at  what,  one  of  them  said,  would  be  called 


286 


JAMES  MADISON 


swindling  in  the  conduct  of  private  affairs ; while 
another  declared  that  the  President  was  throwing 
the  people  ‘‘  into  the  embrace  of  that  monster  at 
whose  perfidy  Lucifer  blushed  and  hell  stands 
astonished.”  France  knew  all  this  while  what 
England’s  decision  would  be.  She  was  ready  to 
rescind  the  orders  in  council  when  the  French 
edicts  were  revoked,  but  she  did  not  recognize  a 
mere  letter  from  the  French  minister,  Champagny, 
to  the  American  ambassador  as  such  revocation. 
The  second  French  condition,  that  England  should 
abandon  her  ‘‘  new  principles  of  blockade  ” and 
accept  in  their  place  a new  French  principle,  was 
peremptorily  rejected  by  the  English  ministry. 
That  proposition  opened  a question  not  properly 
belonging  to  an  agreement  touching  the  decrees 
and  orders,  — a question  of  what  was  a blockade, 
and  what  could  properly  be  subject  to  it.  Napo- 
leon’s doctrine  was,  not  only  that  a paper  blockade 
was  not  permissible  by  the  law  of  nations,  but  that 
there  could  be  no  right  of  blockade  to  ports  not 
fortified,  to  harbors  and  mouths  of  rivers,  which, 
according  to  reason  and  the  usage  of  civilized 
nations,  is  applicable  only  to  strong  or  fortified 
places.”  Mr.  Emott,  a member  of  the  House 
from  New  York,  said  in  debate  that  the  United 
States  might  well  be  grateful  to  both  England  and 
France,  if  they  would  agree  upon  this  doctrine  as 
good  international  law  ; since  in  that  case,  as  there 
were  no  fortified  places  in  the  United  States,  she 
would  never  be  in  peril  of  a blockade.  But  it  was 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


287 


precisely  what  England  would  not  admit  nor  even 
discuss  as  relevant  to  an  agreement  to  revoke  the 
orders  and  decrees. 

To  ‘‘  this  curious  gallamatry,”  as  Quincy  called  ^ 
it,  ‘‘  of  time  present  and  time  future,  of  doing  and 
refraining  to  do,  of  declaration  and  understand- 
ing of  English  duties  and  American  duties,”  was 
added  another  ingredient  of  Madison’s  own  devis- 
ing. The  American  ministers  in  England  and 
Erance  were  instructed  that  Great  Britain  would 
be  expected  to  include  in  the  revocation  of  her 
orders  in  council  the  blockade  of  a portion  of 
the  coast  of  France,  declared  in  May,  1806 ; and 
the  President  offered,  unasked,  a pledge  to  the 
French  emperor,  that  this  should  be  insisted  upon. 
Whether  he  meant  to  make  it  easier  for  Napoleon 
and  harder  for  Great  Britain  to  respond  to  the  act 
of  May  is  a question  impossible  to  answer;  but 
the  opponents  of  the  policy  he  was  pursuing  were 
careful  to  point  out  that  the  act  of  May  said 
nothing  whatever,  either  of  this  or  any  other  block- 
ade ; that  when,  the  year  before,  the  agreement 
was  made  with  Erskine,  the  President  did  not  pre- 
tend that  the  orders  in  council  included  blockades ; 
and  that  it  was  remarkable  that  he  should  forget 
his  own  declaration  regarding  the  monstrous  spoli- 
ation of  a few  months  before  by  the  French,  under 
the  Rambouillet  decree,  and  yet  remember  this 
British  order  of  blockade  of  four  years  before, 
which  everybody  else  had  forgotten.  Indeed,  so 
completely  had  it  passed  out  of  mind,  that  the 


288 


JAMES  MADISON 


American  minister  in  London,  Mr.  Pinkney,  was 
obliged  to  ask  the  British  foreign  secretary  whether 
that  order  had  been  revoked  or  was  still  considered 
as  in  force.  It  had  never  been  formally  with- 
drawn, was  the  answer,  though  it  had  been  com- 
prehended in  the  subsequent  order  in  council  of 
January,  1807.  England  refused,  however,  to 
recall  specifically  this  blockade  of  1806,  for  that 
would  have  been  construed  as  a recognition  of 
Napoleon’s  right  to  demand  an  abandonment  of 
her  new  principles  of  blockade ; ” but  in  fact  — 
as  the  British  minister  in  Washington  afterward 
acknowledged  — the  recall  of  the  order  in  council 
of  1807  would  have  annulled  the  order  of  blockade 
of  1806,  which  it  had  absorbed. 

The  truth  is,  the  whole  negotiation  was  a trial 
of  skill  at  diplomatic  fence,  in  which  England 
would  not  yield  an  inch  to  the  United  States  or 
to  France.  Madison  and  his  party  were  more  than 
willing  to  aid  Napoleon;  and  Napoleon  hoped  to 
defeat  both  his  antagonists  by  turning  their  swords 
against  each  other.  A quite  different  result  would 
have  followed  had  France  been  as  willing  as  Eng- 
land apparently  was  that  the  commercial  edicts 
should  be  considered  without  regard  to  other 
questions ; or  if  the  American  Executive  had 
insisted  that  it  would  accept  their  unconditional 
revocation,  pure  and  simple  and  not  otherwise, 
from  either  power,  as  was  contemplated  in  the  act 
of  May,  1810.  But  instead,  when  Congress  rose 
in  March,  1811,  it  left  behind  it  an  act  renewing 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT 


289 


non-intercourse  with  England,  in  accordance  with 
Napoleon’s  demand  that  the  United  States  should 
“ cause  their  rights  to  be  respected  by  the  Eng- 
lish.” This  meant  war. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 

In  May,  1811,  there  occurred  one  of  those  acci- 
dents which  happen  on  purpose,  and  often  serve 
as  a relief  when  the  public  temper  is  in  an  exas- 
perated and  almost  dangerous  condition.  This  was 
the  fight  between  the  American  frigate  President, 
of  forty-four  guns,  and  the  English  sloop-of-war 
Little  Belt,  of  eighteen  guns.  This  vessel  belonged 
to  the  British  squadron  which  was  ordered  to  the 
American  coast  to  break  up  the  trade  from  the 
United  States  to  France  ; and  the  President  was 
one  of  the  few  ships  the  government  had  for  the 
protection  of  its  commerce.  The  ships  met  a few 
miles  south  of  Sandy  Hook,  chased  each  other  in 
turn,  then  fired  into  each  other  without  any  rea- 
sonable pretext  for  the  first  shot,  which  each  ac- 
cused the  other  of  having  fired.  The  loss  on  board 
the  English  ship,  in  an  encounter  which  lasted 
only  a few  minutes,  was  over  thirty  in  killed  and 
wounded,  while  only  a single  man  was  slightly 
wounded  on  board  the  President.  It  was,  as  Mr. 
Madison  said,  an  “ occurrence  not  unlikely  to 
bring  on  repetitions,”  and  that  these  would  “ prob- 
ably end  in  an  open  rupture  or  a better  under- 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


291 


standing,  as  the  calculations  of  the  British  govern- 
ment may  prompt  or  dissuade  from  war.”  This 
certainly  was  obvious  enough ; though  it  would  be 
a great  deal  easier  for  England  to  bring  on  a war 
than  to  avert  it,  in  the  angry  mood  in  which  the 
majority  of  the  Democratic  party  then  was.  But 
Mr.  Madison  preserved  his  equanimity.  Consider- 
ing his  old  proclivity  for  France,  and  his  old  dislike 
of  England,  his  impartiality  between  them  is  rather 
remarkable.  But  his  aim  was  still  to  keep  the 
peace  while  he  abated  nothing  of  the  well-founded 
complaints  he  had  against  both  powers.  When  a 
new  Congress  assembled  in  the  autumn  he  was  care- 
ful to  point  out  in  his  message  the  delinquencies  of 
France  as  well  as  the  offenses  of  England.  He 
insisted  that  while  England  should  have  acknow- 
ledged the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  to  be  revoked 
and  have  acted  accordingly,  France  showed  no  dis- 
position to  repair  the  m_any  wrongs  she  had  inflicted 
upon  American  merchants,  and  had  lately  imposed 
such  rigorous  and  unexpected  restrictions  ” upon 
commerce  that  it  would  be  necessary,  unless  they 
were  speedily  discontinued,  to  meet  them  by 
‘‘corresponding  restrictions  on  importations  from 
France.” 

This  tone  is  even  more  pronounced  in  his  let- 
ters for  some  following  months.  If  anything,  it 
is  France  rather  than  England  that  seems  to  be 
looked  upon  as  the  chief  offender,  with  whom  there 
was  the  greater  danger  of  armed  collision.  A fort- 
night after  Congress  had  assembled  he  wrote  to 


292 


JAMES  MADISON 


Barlow,  the  new  minister  to  France,  that  though 
justified  in  assuming  the  French  decrees  to  be  so 
far  withdrawn  that  a withdrawal  of  the  British 
orders  might  be  looked  for,  ‘‘  yet  the  manner  in 
which  the  French  government  has  managed  the 
repeal  of  the  decrees,  and  evaded  a correction  of 
other  outrages,  has  mingled  with  the  conciliatory 
tendency  of  the  repeal  as  much  of  irritation  and 
disgust  as  possible.”  In  fact,”  he  adds,  with- 
out a systematic  change  from  an  appearance  of 
crafty  contrivance  and  insatiate  cupidity,  for  an 
open,  manly,  and  upright  dealing  with  a nation 
whose  example  demands  it,  it  is  impossible  that 
good-will  can  exist;  and  that  the  ill-will  which 
her  policy  aims  at  directing  against  her  enemy 
should  not,  by  her  folly  and  iniquity,  be  drawn 
off  against  herself.”  French  depredations  upon 
American  commerce  in  the  Baltic  were  kindling 
a fresh  flame  here,”  and,  if  they  were  not  stopped, 
“ hostile  collisions  will  as  readily  take  place  with 
one  nation  as  the  other ; ” nor  would  there  be  any 
hesitation  in  sending  American  frigates  to  that  sea, 
‘‘with  orders  to  suppress  by  force  the  French  and 
Danish  depredations,”  were  it  not  for  the  “ danger 
of  rencounters  with  British  ships  of  superior  force 
in  that  quarter.” 

By  this  time,  however.  Congress,  under  the  lead 
of  younger,  vigorous  men  — chief  among  them 
Clay  and  Calhoun  — panting  for  leadership  and 
distinction,  was  beginning  its  clamor  for  war  with 
England.  How  much  respect  had  Madison  for 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


293 


this  movement,  and  how  much  faith  in  it?  A 
letter  to  Jefferson  of  February  7 answers  both 
questions.  Were  he  not  evidently  amused,  he 
would  seem  to  be  contemptuous.  To  enable  the 
Executive  to  step  at  once  into  Canada,”  he  says, 
“they  have  provided,  after  two  months’  delay, 
for  a regular  force  requiring  twelve  to  raise  it, 
and  after  three  months  for  a volunteer  force,  on 
terms  not  likely  to  raise  it  at  all  for  that  object. 
The  mixture  of  good  and  bad,  avowed  and  dis- 
guised motives,  accounting  for  these  things,  is  curi- 
ous enough,  but  not  to  be  explained  in  the  compass 
of  a letter.”  This  is  not  the  tone  of  either  hope 
or  fear.  If  war  was  in  his  mind  at  that  time,  it 
was  not  war  with  England.  Three  weeks  later  he 
writes  to  Barlow  at  Paris.  On  various  points  of 
negotiation  between  that  minister  and  the  French 
government,  he  observes  much  that  “ suggests  dis- 
trust rather  than  expectation.”  He  complains  of 
delay,  of  vagueness,  of  neglect,  of  discourtesy,  of 
a disregard  of  past  obligations  as  to  the  libera- 
tion of  ships  and  cargoes  seized,  and  of  late  con- 
demnations of  ships  captured  in  the  Baltic ; and 
concerning  all  these  and  other  grievances  he  says : 
“ We  find  so  little  of  explicit  dealing  or  substan- 
tial redress  mingled  with  the  compliments  and 
encouragements,  which  cost  nothing  because  they 
mean  nothing,  that  suspicions  are  unavoidable ; and 
if  they  be  erroneous,  the  fault  does  not  lie  with 
those  who  entertain  them.”  He  believed  that 
France,  in  asking  for  a new  treaty,  which  he  thinks 


294 


JAMES  MADISON 


unnecessary,  is  only  seeking  to  gain  time  in  order 
to  take  advantage  of  future  events.  The  com- 
mercial relations  between  the  two  countries  are  so 
intolerable  that  trade  “will  be  prohibited  if  no 
essential  change  take  place.”  Unless  there  be  in- 
demnity for  the  great  wrongs  committed  under  the 
Rambouillet  decree,  and  for  other  spoliations,  he 
declares  that  “ there  can  be  neither  cordiality  nor 
confidence  here ; nor  any  restraint  from  self- 
redress in  any  justifiable  mode  of  effecting  it.” 
The  letter  concludes  with  the  emphatic  assertion 
that,  if  dispatches  soon  looked  for  “ do  not  exhibit 
the  French  government  in  better  colors  than  it 
has  yet  assumed,  there  will  be  but  one  sentiment 
in  this  country;  and  I need  not  say  what  that 
will  be.” 

Congress  all  this  while  was  lashing  itself  into 
fury  against  England.  The  ambitious  young  lead- 
ers of  the  Democratic  party  in  the  House  were, 
so  to  speak,  “ spoiling  for  a fight,”  and  they  chose 
to  have  it  out  with  England  rather  than  with 
France.  Not  that  there  was  not  quite  as  much 
reason  for  resentment  against  France  as  against 
England.  Some,  indeed,  of  the  more  hot-headed 
were  anxious  for  war  with  both;  but  these  were 
of  the  more  impulsive  kind,  like  Henry  Clay, 
who  laughed  in  scorn  at  the  doubt  that  he  could 
not  at  a blow  subdue  the  Canadas  with  a few 
regiments  of  Kentucky  militia.  But  war  with 
England  was  determined  upon,  partly  because 
the  old  enmity  toward  her  made  that  intolerable 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


295 


which  to  the  old  affection  for  France  was  a bur- 
den lightly  borne ; and  partly  because  the  instinc- 
tive jealousy  of  the  commercial  interest,  on  the 
part  of  the  planter-interest,  preferred  that  policy 
which  would  do  the  most  harm  to  the  North.  On 
April  1,  1812,  just  five  weeks  after  the  writing  of 
this  letter  to  Barlow,  Mr.  Madison  sent  to  Con- 
gress a message  of  five  lines  recommending  the 
immediate  passage  of  an  act  to  impose  a general 
embargo  on  all  vessels  now  in  port  or  hereafter 
arriving  for  the  period  of  sixty  days.”  It  was 
meant  to  be  a secret  measure ; but  the  intention 
leaked  out  in  two  or  three  places,  and  the  news 
was  hurried  North  by  several  of  the  Federalist 
members  in  time  to  enable  some  of  their  constitu- 
ents to  send  their  ships  to  sea  before  the  act  was 
passed.  Nor,  probably,  was  it  a surprise  to  any- 
body ; for  war  with  England  had  been  the  topic  of 
debate  in  one  aspect  or  another  all  winter,  and  the 
purpose  of  the  party  in  power  was  plain  to  every- 
body. That  the  embargo  was  intended  as  a pre- 
paration for  war  was  frankly  acknowledged.  An 
act  was  speedily  passed,  though  the  period  was 
extended  from  sixty  to  ninety  days.  Within  less 
than  sixty  days,  however,  another  message  from 
the  President  recommended  a declaration  of  war. 
On  June  3 the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
of  which  Calhoun  was  chairman,  reported  in  favor 
of  ‘‘an  immediate  appeal  to  arms,”  and  the  next 
day  a declaratory  act  was  passed.  Of  the  seventy- 
nine  affirmative  votes  in  the  House,  forty-eight 


j96 


JAMES  MADISON 


were  from  the  South  and  West,  and  of  the  other 
thirty-one  votes  from  the  Northern  States,  fourteen 
were  from  Pennsylvania  alone.  Of  the  forty-nine 
votes  against  it,  thirty-four  were  from  the  Northern 
States,  including  two  from  Pennsylvania.  On  the 
17th,  a fortnight  later,  the  bill  was  got  through 
the  Senate  by  a majority  of  six. 

|Mr.  Madison  for  years  had  opposed  a war  with 
England  as  unwise  and  useless,  — unwise,  because 
the  United  States  was  not  in  a condition  to  go  to 
war  with  the  greatest  naval  power  in  the  world ; 
and  useless,  because  the  end  to  be  reached  by  war 
could  be  gained  more  certaii^,  and  at  infinitely 
Jess  cost,  by  peaceful  measures^  The  situation  had 
not  changed.  Indeed,  up  to  within  a month  of 
the  message  recommending  an  embargo  as  a pre- 
cursor of  war,  his  letters  show  that,  if  he  thought 
war  was  inevitable,  it  must  be  with  France,  not 
England.  But  the  faction  determined  upon  war 
must  have  at  their  command  an  administration  to 
carry  out  that  policy.  Their  choice  was  not  lim- 
ited to  Madison  for  an  available  candidate.  Who- 
ever was  nominated  by  the  Democrats  was  sure 
to  be  chosen,  and  Madison  had  two  formidable 
rivals  in  James  Monroe,  secretary  of  state,  and  De 
Witt  Clinton,  mayor  of  New  York,  both  eager  for 
war.  The  choice  depended  on  that  question  and 
between  the  embargo  message  of  April  1 and  the 
war  message  of  June  1,  the  nomination  was  given 
to  Madison  by  the  congressional  caucus.  It  was 
understood,  and  openly  asserted  at  the  time  by  the 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


297 


opponents  of  the  administration,  that  the  nomina- 
tion was  the  price  of  a change  of  policy.  At  the 
next  session  of  Congress,  before  a year  had  passed 
away,  Mr.  Quincy  said  in  the  House : “ The  great 
mistake  of  all  those  who  reasoned  concerning  the 
war  and  the  invasion  of  Canada,  and  concluded 
that  it  was  impossible  that  either  should  be  seri- 
ously intended,  resulted  from  this,  that  they  never 
took  into  consideration  the  connection  of  both 
those  events  with  the  great  election  for  the  chief 
magistracy  which  was  then  pending.  It  was  never 
sufficiently  considered  by  them  that  plunging  into 
a war  with  Great  Britain  was  among  the  conditions 
on  which  the  support  for  the  presidency  was  made 
dependent.”  The  assertion,  so  plainly  aimed  at 
Madison,  passed  unchallenged,  though  the  charge 
of  any  distinct  bargain  was  vehemently  denied. 

If  Mr.  Madison’s  conscience  was  not  always 
vigorous  enough  to  enable  him  to  resist  temptation, 
it  was  so  sensitive  as  to  prompt  him  to  look  for 
excuses  for  yielding.  In  a sense  this  was  to  his 
credit  as  one  of  the  better  sort  of  politicians, 
without  assuming  it  to  be  akin  to  that  hypocrisy 
which  is  the  homage  vice  pays  to  virtue.  Perhaps 
it  was  this  sentiment  which  led  him  to  accept  so 
readily  the  pretended  disclosures  of  John  Henry, 
and  to  make  the  use  of  them  he  did.  These  were 
contained  in  twenty -four  letters,  for  which  the 
President,  apparently  without  hesitation,  paid  fifty 
thousand  dollars.  On  March  9 he  sent  them  to 
Congress  with  a message,  and  on  the  same  day,  in 


298 


JAMES  MADISON 


a letter  to  Jefferson,  alludes  to  them  as  ‘‘this 
discovery,  or  rather  formal  proof  of  the  coopera- 
tion between  the  Eastern  Junto  and  the  British 
cabinet.”  In  the  message  he  intimates  that  this 
secret  agent  was  sent  directly  by  the  British  gov- 
ernment to  Massachusetts  to  foment  disaffection,  to 
intrigue  “ with  the  disaffected  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  about  resistance  to  the  laws,  and  eventu- 
ally, in  concert  with  a British  force,  of  destroying 
the  Union  ” and  reannexing  the  Eastern  States  to 
England.  In  the  war  message  of  June  1 these 
charges  are  repeated  as  among  the  reasons  for  an 
appeal  to  arms.  Mr.  Calhoun’s  committee  followed 
this  lead  and  improved  upon  it  in  the  report  recom- 
mending an  immediate  declaration  of  war.  The 
Henry  affair  was  declared  an  “ act  of  still  greater 
malignity  ” than  any  of  the  other  outrages  against 
the  United  States  of  which  Great  Britain  had  been 
guilty,  and  that  which  “ excited  the  greatest  hor- 
ror.” The  incident  was  seized  upon,  apparently, 
to  answer  a temporary  purpose,  and  then,  so  far  as 
Mr.  Madison  was  concerned,  was  permitted  to  sink 
into  oblivion.  In  the  hundreds  of  pages  of  his 
published  letters,  written  in  later  life,  in  which  he 
reviews  and  explains  so  many  of  the  events  of  his 
public  career,  there  is  no  allusion  whatever  to  the 
Henry  disclosures,  which  in  1812  were  held,  with 
the  ruin  of  American  commerce  and  the  impress- 
ment of  thousands  of  American  citizens,  as  an 
equally  just  cause  for  war.  In  truth  there  was 
nothing  whatever  in  these  disclosures,  for  which 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


299 


was  paid  an  amount  equal  to  the  salary  of  half  a 
presidential  term,  to  warrant  the  assumptions  of 
either  Mr.  Madison’s  messages  or  Mr.  Calhoun’s 
report.  The  man  had  been  sent,  at  his  own  sug- 
gestion, early  in  1809,  by  the  governor  of  Canada 
to  Massachusetts  to  learn  the  state  of  affairs  there 
and  observe  the  drift  of  public  opinion.  His  na- 
tional proclivity  — he  was  an  Irishman  — to  con- 
spiracy and  revolution  had  led  him  to  see  in  the 
dissatisfaction  with  the  embargo  a determination 
in  the  New  England  people  to  destroy  the  Union, 
reannex  themselves  to  England,  and  return  to  the 
flesh-pots  of  the  colonial  period.  To  learn  how 
far  gone  they  were  in  these  designs,  to  put  himself 
in  intimate  relations  with  the  leading  conspirators 
and  to  bring  them  into  communication  with  Sir 
James  Craig,  the  governor-general  of  Canada,  that 
sufficient  aid  should  come  through  him  at  the 
proper  moment  from  the  British  government,  was 
Henry’s  mission.  Of  this  truly  Irish  plot  Henry 
was  the  villain  and  Craig  the  fool ; but  it  is  hardly 
possible  that  three  years  afterward  Madison  and 
his  friends,  with  all  the  letters  spread  before  them, 
could  really  have  been  the  dupes. 

Henry  went  to  Boston  and  remained  there  about 
three  months,  living  at  a tavern.  He  found  out 
nothing  because  there  was  nothing  to  be  found 
out.  He  knew  nobody,  and  nobody  of  any  note 
knew  him,  and  all  the  information  he  sent  to  Craig 
might  have  been,  and  doubtless  was,  picked  up  in 
the  ordinary  political  gossip  of  the  tavern  bar- 


300 


JAMES  MADISON 


room,  or  culled  from  the  columns  of  the  news- 
papers of  both  parties.  He  compromised  nobody, 
for  — as  Mr.  Monroe,  as  secretary  of  state,  testi- 
fied in  a report  to  the  Senate  — he  named  no  per- 
son or  persons  in  the  United  States  who  had, 
‘‘in  any  way  or  manner  whatever,  entered  into 
or  countenanced  the  project  or  views  ” of  himself 
and  Craig ; and  all  he  had  to  say  was  pointless 
and  unimportant,  except  so  far  as  his  opinions 
might  have  some  interest  as  those  of  a shrewd 
observer  of  public  events.  Indeed,  his  own  con- 
clusion was  that  there  was  no  conspiracy  in  the 
Eastern  States ; that  the  Federal  party  was  strong 
enough  to  keep  the  peace  with  England ; and  that 
there  was  no  talk  of  disunion,  nor  any  likelihood  of 
it  unless  it  should  be  brought  about  by  war.  The 
correspondence  itself  showed,  in  a letter  from 
Bobert  Peel,  then  secretary  to  Lord  Liverpool, 
that  the  letters  of  Henry  were  found,  as  a matter 
of  course,  among  Canadian  official  papers,  as  they 
related  to  public  affairs ; but  they  had  either  never 
attracted  any  attention  or  had  been  entirely  for- 
gotten, and  Lord  "^Liverpool  was  quite  ignorant  of 
any  “ arrangement  or  agreement  ” that  had  been 
made  between  the  governor  of  Canada  and  his 
emissary  to  New  England.  It  was  only  because 
of  his  failure  to  get  any  reward  from  the  British 
government  or  from  Craig’s  successor  in  Canada, 
for  what  he  was  pleased  to  call  his  services,  that 
the  adventurer  came  to  Washington  in  search  of  a 
market  for  himself  and  his  papers.  He  came  at 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


301 


an  opportune  moment.  Notwithstanding  the  sec- 
retary of  state  frankly  declared,  that  neither  by 
writing  nor  by  word  of  mouth  did  the  man  impli- 
cate by  name  anybody  in  the  United  States ; not- 
withstanding one  of  the  letters  was  evidence,  the 
more  conclusive  because  incidental,  that  the  Brit- 
ish secretary  of  state  had  known  nothing  of  this 
mission  contrived  between  Henry  and  Craig,  — yet 
Mr.  Madison  pronounced  the  letters  to  be  the  “ for- 
mal proof  of  the  cooperation  between  the  Eastern 
Junto  and  the  British  cabinet.”  The  charge  was 
monstrous,  for  this  pretended  proof  had  no  exist- 
ence. If  the  President,  however,  could  persuade 
himself  that  the  story  was  true,  it  would  help  him 
to  justify  himself  to  himself  for  a change  of  policy, 
the  result  of  which  would  be  the  coveted  renomi- 
nation for  the  presidency. 

Not  that  there  had  never  been  talk  of  disunion 
in  New  England.  There  had  been  in  years  past, 
as  there  was  to  be  in  years  to  come.  But  talk  of 
that  kind  did  not  belong  exclusively  to  that  par- 
ticular period,  nor  was  it  confined  to  that  particu- 
lar region  of  country.  Ever  since  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  the  one  thing  that  orators.  North 
and  South,  inside  the  halls  of  Congress  and  out- 
side them,  were  agreed  upon  was,  that  in  all  debate 
there  was  one  argument,  equally  good  on  both 
sides,  to  which  there  could  be  no  reply ; that  in  all 
legislation  there  was  one  possible  supreme  move 
that  would  bring  all  the  wheels  of  government  to 
a dead  stop.  The  solemn  warning  or  the  angry 


302 


JAMES  MADISON 


threat  was  always  in  readiness  for  instant  use, 
that  the  bonds  of  the  Union,  in  one  or  another 
contingency,  were  to  be  rent  asunder.  But  so 
frequent  had  been  these  warning  cries  of  the  com- 
ing wolf  that  they  were  listened  to  with  indiffer- 
ence, except  when  some  positive  act  indicated  real 
danger,  as  in  the  Jefferson-Madison  ‘‘  resolutions 
of  ’98.”  It  was  easy,  therefore,  to  alarm  the  pub- 
lic with  confessions  of  a secret  emissary,  as  he  pre- 
tended, who  had  turned  traitor  to  the  government 
which  had  employed  him  and  to  the  conspirators 
to  whom  he  had  been  sent;  and  the  more  repre- 
hensible was  it,  therefore,  in  a President  of  the 
United  States,  to  make  the  use  that  was  made  of 
this  story,  which  an  impartial  examination  would 
have  shown  was  essentially  absurd  and  infamously 
false.  Mr.  Madison’s  intelligence  is  not  to  be 
impugned.  He  was  too  sagacious,  as  well  as  too 
unimpassioned  a man,  to  be  taken  in  by  the  ingen- 
ious tale  of  such  an  adventurer  as  Henry.  In  a 
letter  to  Colonel  David  Humphreys,  written  the 
next  spring,  in  defense  of  the  policy  of  commer- 
cial restrictions,  he  says  : ‘‘  I have  never  allowed 
myself  to  believe  that  the  Union  was  in  danger,  or 
that  a dissolution  of  it  could  be  desired,  unless  by 
a few  individuals,  if  such  there  be,  in  desperate 
situations  or  of  unbridled  passions.”  New  Eng- 
land, he  continues,  would  be  the  greatest  loser 
by  such  an  event,  and  not  likely  therefore  delib- 
erately to  rush  into  it.”  “ On  what  basis,”  he 
asks,  could  New  England  and  Old  England  form 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


303 


commercial  stipulations  ? ” Their  commercial  jeal- 
ousy, he  contends,  forbade  an  alliance  between 
them,  for  that  was  the  real  source  of  our  Revolu- 
tion.” He  closes  with  the  significant  assertion 
that,  if  there  be  links  of  common  interest  between 
the  two  countries,  they  would  connect  the  South- 
ern and  not  the  Northern  States  with  that  part  of 
Europe.”  How,  then,  could  he  seriously  accept 
Henry’s  pretended  disclosures  as  formal  proof,” 
as  he  WTOte  to  Jefferson  at  that  time,  of  the  coop- 
eration between  the  Eastern  Junto  and  the  British 
cabinet”?  By  the  Eastern  Junto  is  meant  the 
Federal  party,  or  at  least  the  influential  and  able 
leaders  of  that  party;  and  he  could  not  consider, 
nor  would  he  have  spoken  of  them  as  ‘‘  a few  indi- 
viduals, if  such  there  be,  in  desperate  situations 
or  of  unbridled  passions.”  He  accepted,  then,  the 
Henry  story  in  spite  of  his  deliberate  opinions,  as 
a help  to  involve  the  country  in  a party  war. 

Even  at  the  risk  of  some  prolixity  it  is  needful 
to  follow  the  course  of  events  that  led  to  this  war 
a little  farther ; for  here  was  the  culmination  of 
Mr.  Madison’s  career,  and  from  his  course  in  shap- 
ing and  directing  these  events  we  best  learn  what 
manner  of  man  he  was,  and  where  his  true  place  is 
among  the  public  men  of  our  earlier  history.  For 
a year  and  a half  the  United  States  had  acted  on 
the  assumption  that  France  had  recalled  her  de- 
crees, and  that  England  had  not  revoked  her  orders. 
The  extracts  from  Mr.  Madison’s  letters,  given  on 
previous  pages,  show  his  conviction  that  the  revo- 


304 


JAMES  MADISON 


cation  of  either  decrees  or  orders  was  practically 
no  more  true  of  one  power  than  it  was  of  the  other. 
The  government  of  the  United  States,  nevertheless, 
submitted  to  the  one,  and  against  the  other  it  first 
reenacted  the  non-intercourse  act,  then  proclaimed 
an  embargo  preparatory  to  war,  and  finally  declared 
war.  Yet  the  whole  world  knew,  and  nobody  so 
surely  as  the  emperor  of  France,  that  the  Berlin 
and  Milan  decrees  had  never  been  formally  repealed 
at  all ; meanwhile  French  outrages  upon  American 
commerce  had  continued,  and  all  redress  so  per- 
sistently refused  that,  so  late  as  the  last  week  in 
February,  1812,  the  President  intimated  that  war 
— war  with  France,  not  England  — might  prove 
the  only  remedy.  But  he  suddenly  yielded  to  the 
clamors  of  the  war  party  at  home,  whatever  may 
have  been  his  motive.  Then,  and  not  till  then, 
were  the  decrees  actually  revoked  by  Napoleon. 
In  May,  1812,  more  than  a month  after  the  Presi- 
dent had  recommended  an  embargo,  the  hostile 
purport  of  which  was  so  well  understood,  a decree 
was  proclaimed  by  the  emperor  which  for  the  first 
time  really  revoked  those  of  Berlin  and  Milan. 
True,  it  was  dated  — “ purported  to  be  dated,”  it 
was  said  in  an  official  English  document  — April, 
1811.  But  that  was  of  no  moment ; the  essential 
point  was,  that  it  had  never  seen  the  light ; that 
any  hint  of  its  existence  had  never  been  given  to 
the  American  government,  or  its  representatives 
abroad,  till  the  United  States  had  taken  measures 
to  ‘‘  cause  their  rights  to  be  respected  by  the  Eng- 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


305 


lish,”  which  was  the  original  condition  of  a revoca- 
tion of  the  decrees.  Its  ostensible  date  was  when 
the  news  reached  France  that  non-intercourse  had 
been  again  enforced  against  England  in  March, 
1811 ; but  its  promulgation  was  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  the  real  date,  when  news  reached  France, 
in  April  or  May,  1812,  that  war  against  England 
was  finally  determined  upon. 

The  Duke  of  Bassano,  the  French  minister,  had 
not,  moreover,  brought  out  this  year-old  decree 
without  pressure  from  the  American  minister.  Bar- 
low.  The  President  had  written  Barlow,  in  that 
February  letter  already  quoted,  that  if  his  ex- 
pected dispatches  did  not  exhibit  the  conduct  of 
the  French  government  in  better  colors  than  it 
has  yet  assumed,  there  will  be  but  one  sentiment 
in  this  country,  and  I need  not  say  what  that  will 
be.”  When  the  dispatches  came,  Mr.  Madison 
received  no  assurances  of  redress  for  past  wrongs 
and  no  promises  for  the  future  ; but  he  learned,  on 
the  contrary,  that  Bassano,  in  a recent  report  to 
the  emperor,  had  referred  to  the  decrees  of  Berlin 
and  Milan  as  still  in  force  against  all  neutral  na- 
tions which  submitted  to  the  seizure  of  their  ships 
by  the  British  when  containing  contraband  goods 
or  enemy’s  property.  Naturally  the  British  minis- 
try was  not  slow  in  presenting  this  precious  acknow- 
ledgment to  the  United  States  as  a proof  that  she 
had  all  along  been  in  the  wrong,  and  that  in  com- 
mon justice  to  England  the  non-importation  act 
should  now  be  repealed.  The  assurance  was  at  the 


306 


JAMES  MADISON 


same  time  repeated,  possibly  in  a tone  of  consider- 
able satisfaction,  that  when  Napoleon  really  should 
revoke  his  decrees  Great  Britain  was  ready,  as  she 
always  had  been,  to  follow  his  example  with  her 
orders.  It  was  an  awkward  dilemma  for  the  Pre- 
sident and  his  minister  to  France.  But  by  this 
time,  the  Presidential  nomination  impending,  Mr. 
Madison  had  made  up  his  mind  what  to  do.  He 
was  not  exactly  a wolf ; neither  was  Great  Britain 
a lamb ; but  the  argument  he  used  was  the  argu- 
ment of  the  fable.  Instead  of  advising  — Bassano 
having  declared  the  decrees  still  in  force  — a 
repeal  of  the  non-importation  act,  as  Great  Britain 
claimed  was  in  justice  and  comity  her  due,  he  re- 
commended a war  measure.  But  Barlow  evidently 
felt  himself  to  be  under  some  decent  restraint  of 
logic  and  consistency.  He  urged  upon  the  French 
minister  the  necessity  now  of  a positive  and  impe- 
rial declaration  that  the  decrees,  so  far  as  regarded 
the  United  States,  were  absolutely  revoked ; for 
this  recent  assertion  of  Bassano,  that  they  were  still 
in  force,  put  the  United  States  in  an  attitude  both 
towards  France  and  England  utterly  and  absurdly 
in  the  wrong.  Barlow  represented  that,  should  the 
revocation  be  extended  only  to  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain  would  not  for  that  alone  repeal  her 
orders.  In  that  case  France  would  lose  nothing 
of  the  advantage  of  her  present  position,  while 
everything  would  be  lost  should  the  United  States 
be  compelled  to  repeal  her  non-importation  laws 
against  England.  Bassano  was  quick  to  see  the 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND 


307 


necessity  of  jumping  into  the  bramble-bush  and 
scratching  his  eyes  in  again,  and  he  then  produced 
his  year-old  edict.  Being  a year  old,  it  of  course 
covered  all  questions.  But  was  it  a year  old?  Who 
knew?  It  had  never  been  published?  No,  the  duke 
said;  but  it  had  been  shown  to  Mr.  Jonathan  Rus- 
sell, who  at  that  time  was  charge  d’affaires  at  Paris. 
Mr.  Russell  denied  it,  though  a denial  was  hardly 
needed.  He  would  not  have  ventured  to  withhold 
information  so  important  from  his  government; 
and  it  was  evident,  from  the  tone  of  his  dispatches 
of  a subsequent  date,  that  he  had  no  suspicion  of 
its  existence.  For  he  had  maintained  it,  as  a point 
of  national  honor,”  that  the  revocation  of  the 
French  decrees  must  have  preceded  the  President’s 
proclamation  of  November  1,  1810 ; and  this  he 
would  not  have  dared  to  do  had  he  known  that  the 
actual  revocation  by  the  French  minister  was  not 
made  till  six  months  after  the  date  of  the  Presi- 
dent’s proclamation,  and  was  then  made  secretly. 

However,  as  if  to  defeat  all  these  machinations 
of  France  and  the  United  States,  Great  Britain 
immediately  recalled  her  orders  in  council,  when, 
in  May,  1812,  the  Duke  of  Bassano  announced 
the  edict  of  April,  1811,  revoking  the  Berlin  and 
Milan  decrees,  though  so  far  only  as  they  con- 
cerned American  vessels.  The  declaration  of  war 
of  J une  18  had  not  reached  England,  and  there  was 
still  a chance  for  peace.  Foster,  the  late  English 
minister  to  the  United  States,  learned  at  Halifax  — 
where  he  had  stopped  on  his  way  home  — that 


308 


JAMES  MADISON 


the  orders  in  council  were  repealed,  and  he  took 
immediate  steps  to  bring  about  an  armistice  be- 
tween the  naval  commanders  on  the  coast  of  Nova 
Scotia,  and  between  the  governor  of  Canada  and 
the  American  general.  Dearborn,  in  command  of 
the  frontier.  The  government  at  Washington,  how- 
ever, refused  to  ratify  any  suspension  of  hostilities. 
Some  negotiations  followed,  but,  decrees  and  orders 
being  out  of  the  way,  there  was  nothing  left  to 
negotiate  about  except  the  question  of  impressment. 
Upon  that  question  the  two  governments  were  as 
wide  apart  as  ever,  and  not  in  the  least  likely  to 
come  together.  Mr.  Madison  determined  that  on 
that  ground  alone  the  war  should  go  on.  It  had 
been  as  good  and  sufficient  ground  for  such  a war 
any  time  for  the  past  dozen  years ; but  whether  it 
could  be  settled  by  an  appeal  to  arms  was  a ques- 
tion of  possibilities  and  probabilities  by  which  both 
Jefferson  and  Madison  had  hitherto  been  ruled. 
Was  that  still  the  essential  question  ? With  the 
result  came  the  answer.  Two  years  later  the  ad- 
ministration was  glad  to  accept  a treaty  of  peace 
in  which  impressment  was  not  even  alluded  to. 
Great  Britain  did  not  relinquish  by  a syllable  her 
assumed  right  to  board  American  ships  in  search  of 
British  seamen  ; and  the  administration  instructed 
its  peace  commissioners  not  even  to  ask  that  she 
should. 


CHAPTER  XX 


CONCLUSION 

Early  in  the  war  Mr.  Madison  said  to  a friend, 
in  a letter  “ altogether  private  and  written  in  con- 
fidence,” that  the  way  to  make  the  conflict  both 
‘‘  short  and  successful  would  be  to  convince  the 
enemy  that  he  was  to  contend  with  the  whole  and 
not  part  of  the  nation.”  That  it  was  a war  of  a 
party,  and  not  of  the  people,  was  a discouragement 
to  himself,  however  the  enemy  may  have  regarded 
it,  which  he  could  never  see  any  way  of  overcom- 
ing. He  could  not  listen  to  an  opponent  nor  learn 
anything  from  disaster.  “ If  the  war  must  con- 
tinue,” said  Webster  within  a year  of  its  end, 

go  to  the  ocean.  Let  it  no  longer  be  said  that 
not  one  ship  of  force,  built  by  your  hands  since 
the  war,  yet  floats.  If  you  are  seriously  contend- 
ing for  maritime  rights,  go  to  the  theatre  where 
those  rights  can  be  defended*  . . . There  the 
united  wishes  and  exertions  of  the  nation  will  go 
with  you.  Even  our  party  divisions,  acrimonious 
as  they  are,  cease  at  the  water’s  edge.  ...  In 
protecting  naval  interests  by  naval  means,  you 
will  arm  yourself  with  the  whole  power  of  na- 
tional sentiment,  and  may  command  the  whole 


310 


JAMES  MADISON 


abundance  of  national  forces.”  Taking  now  in 
one  view  the  events  of  those  years,  it  is  easy  to 
see  in  our  generation  how  mad  were  Madison  and 
his  party  to  turn  deaf  ears  to  such  considerations 
as  these.  Their  force  and  wisdom  had  already  been 
proved  by  eighteen  months  of  disaster  on  land, 
which  had  made  the  war  daily  more  and  more  un- 
popular ; and  by  brilliant  success  for  a time  at  sea, 
when  each  fresh  victory  was  hailed  with  universal 
enthusiasm.  ‘‘  Our  little  naval  triumphs,”  was  the 
President’s  way  of  speaking  of  the  latter  ; and  the 
only  importance  he  seems  to  have  seen  in  them 
was,  that  they  excited  some  ‘‘  rage  and  jealousy  ” in 
England  and  moved  her  to  increase  her  naval  force. 

^ How  could  Mr.  Madison  expect  that  the  whole  and 
not  a part  only  of  the  nation  could  uphold  an  ad- 
ministration which,  after  eighteen  months  of  fight- 
ing, could  be  reproached  on  the  floor  of  Congress 
with  not  having  launched  a ship  since  the  war  w^as 
begun  ? Or  did  he  only  choose  to  remember  that 
the  navy,  which  alone  so  far  had  brought  either 
success  or  honor  to  the  national  arms,  was  the  cre- 
ation of  the  Federalists  in  spite  of  the  Jeffersonian 
policy  ? It  surely  would  have  been  wiser  to  try  to 
propitiate  New  England,  with  which  he  was  in  per- 
petual worry  and  conflict,  by  enlisting  it  in  a naval 
war  in  which  it  had  some  faith.  A large  propor- 
tion of  her  people  would  have  been  glad  to  escape 
idleness  and  poverty  at  home  for  service  at  sea, 
though  they  were  reluctant  to  aid  in  a vain  attempt 
to  conquer  Canada. 


CONCLUSION 


311 


Even  to  that  purpose,  however,  Massachusetts 
contributed,  in  the  second  campaign  of  1814,  more 
recruits  than  any  other  single  State  ; and  New  Eng- 
land more  than  all  the  Southern  States  together. 
New  England  could  have  given  no  stronger  proof 
of  her  loyalty,  if  only  Mr.  Madison  had  known 
how  to  turn  it  to  advantage.  He  was  absolutely 
deaf  and  blind  to  it ; but  his  ears  were  quick  to 
hear  and  his  eyes  to  see,  when  he  learned  pre- 
sently that  the  New  Englanders  were  seriously  cal- 
culating the  value  of  the  Union  under  such  rule 
as  they  had  had  of  late.  It  was  not  often  that  he 
relieved  himself  by  intemperate  language,  but  he 
could  not  help  saying  now,  in  writing  to  Governor 
Nicholas  of  Virginia,  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
people  in  that  quarter  have  been  brought  by  their 
leaders,  aided  by  their  priests,  under  a delusion 
scarcely  exceeded  by  that  recorded  in  the  period 
of  witchcraft ; and  the  leaders  themselves  are  be- 
coming daily  more  desperate  in  the  use  they  make 
of  it.”  The  delusion  ” was  taking  a practical 
direction.  Mr.  Madison  had  learned  before  the 
letter  was  written  that  a convention  was  about  to 
meet  at  Hartford,  the  object  of  which  was  to  weigh 
in  a balance,  upon  the  one  side,  the  continuation  of 
such  government  as  that  of  the  last  two  or  three 
years,  and,  upon  the  other  side,  the  value  of  the 
Union.  He  ardently  hoped  that  the  commission- 
ers, then  assembled  at  Ghent,  would  agree  upon  a 
treaty;  and  there  seemed  to  be  no  good  reason 
why  there  should  not  be  peace  when  nothing  was 


312  . 


JAMES  MADISON 


to  be  said  of  the  cause  of  the  war,  no  apology- 
demanded  for  the  past,  and  no  stipulation  for  the 
future.  But  if  by  any  chance  the  commissioners 
should  fail,  Mr.  Madison  saw  in  the  Hartford  Con- 
vention the  huo:e  shadow  of  a coming:  conflict  more 
diflicult  to  deal  with  than  a foreign  war.  It  was 
the  first  step  in  dead  earnest  for  the  formation  of 
a Northern  Confederacy,  and  it  is  quite  possible 
he  may  have  felt  that  he  was  not  the  man  for  such 
a crisis.  Every  line  of  the  letter  pulsates  with 
anxiety.  The  only  consoling  thought  in  it  is  that 
without  “ foreign  cooperation  revolt  and  separa- 
tion will  hardly  be  risked,”  and  to  such  coopera- 
tion he  hoped  a majority  of  the  New  England 
people  vrould  not  consent.  A treaty  of  peace,  how- 
ever, came  to  save  him  and  the  Union.  Within 
a few  weeks  the  administration  papers  were  laugh- 
ing at  Harrison  Gray  Otis  of  Boston,  who  had 
started  for  Washington  as  the  representative  of 
the  Hartford  Convention,  but  turned  back  at  the 
news  of  peace ; and  were  advertising  him  as 
missing  under  the  name  of  Titus  Oates.  It  was, 
however,  the  hysterical  laugh  of  recovery  from  a 
terrible  fright. 

If  ambition  to  be  a second  time  President  led 
Mr.  Madison  to  consent  against  his*  own  better 
judgment  to  a war  with  England,  he  paid  a heavy 
penalty,  pit  was  the  act  of  a party  politician  and 
not  of  a statesman  ; for  the  country  was  no  more 
prepared  for  a war  in  1812,  when  as  a politician 
he  assented  to  it,  than  it  had  been  for  the  previous 


CONCLUSION 


313 


half  dozen  years  when  as  a statesman  he  had 
opposed  it.  He  gave  the  influence  of  the  United 
States  in  support  of  a despotism  that  aimed  at 
the  subjugation  of  all  Europe  ; he  threw  a fresh 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  that  power  to  which  Europe 
could  chiefly  look  to  resist  a common  enemy ; and 
he  did  both  under  the  pretense  that  the  just  com- 
plaints of  the  United  States  were  greater  against 
one  of  these  powers  than  against  the  other.  He 
declared  war  mainly  to  redress  a wrong  which 
ceased  to  exist  before  a blow  was  struck ; he  then 
rejected  an  offer  of  peace  because  another  wrong 
was  still  persisted  in  ; but  finally,  of  his  own  mo- 
tion, he  accepted  a treaty  in  which  the  assumed 
cause  of  war  was  not  even  alluded  to. 

That  Mr.  Madison  was  not  a good  war  Presi- 
dent, either  by  training  or  by  temperament,  was, 
if  it  may  be  said  of  any  man,  his  misfortune  rather 
than  his  fault.  But  it  was  his  fault  rather  than 
his  misfortune  that  he  permitted  himself  to  be 
dragged  in  a day  into  a line  of  conduct  which  the 
sober  judgment  of  years  had  disapproved.  He 
is  usually  and  most  justly  regarded  as  a man  of 
great  amiability  of  character  ; of  unquestionable 
integrity  in  all  the  purely  personal  relations  of 
life  ; of  more  than  ordinary  intellectual  ability 
of  a solid,  though  not  J)rilliant,  quality  ; and  a 
diligent  student  of  the  science  of  government,  the 
practice  of  which  he  made  a profession.  But  he 
was  better  fitted  by  nature  for  a legislator  than 
for  executive  office,  and  his  fame  would  have  been 


314 


JAMES  MADISON 


more  spotless,  though  his  position  would  have  been 
less  exalted,  had  his  life  been  exclusively  devoted 
to  that  branch  of  government  for  which  he  was 
best  fitted.  It  was  not  merely  that  for  the  sake 
of  the  Presidency  he  plunged  the  country  into  an 
unnecessary  war  ; but  when  it  was  on  his  hands  he 
j neither  knew  what  to  do  with  it  himself  nor  how  to 
I choose  the  right  men  who  did  know. 

It  is  our  amiable  weakness — if  one  may  ven- 
ture to  say  so  of  the  American  people  — that  all 
our  geese  are  swans,  or  rather  eagles  ; that  we  are 
apt  to  mistake  notoriety  for  reputation ; that  it  is 
the  popular  belief  of  the  larger  number  that  he 
who,  no  matter  how,  has  reached  a distinguished 
position,  is  by  virtue  of  that  fact  a great  and  good 
man.  This  is  not  less  true,  in  a measure,  of  Mr. 
Madison  than  of  some  other  men  who  have  been 
Presidents,  and  of  still  more  who  have  thought 
that  they  deserved  to  be.  But,  if  that  false  esti- 
mate surrounds  his  name,  there  is  a strong  under- 
current of  opinion,  common  among  those  whose 
business  or  whose  pleasure  it  is  to  look  beneath 
the  surface  of  things  historical,  that  he  was  want- 
ing in  strength  of  character  and  in  courage.  He 
did  not  lack  discernment  as  to  what  was  wisest  and 
V'""  best ; but  he  was  too  easily  influenced  by  others,  or 
led  by  the  hope  of  gaining  some  glittering  prize 
which  ambition  coveted,  to  turn  his  back  upon 
his  own  convictions.  It  was  this  weakness  which 
swept  him  beyond  his  depth  into  troubled  waters 
where  his  struggles  were  hopeless.  Had  he  refused 


CONCLUSION 


315 


to  assume  the  responsibility  of  a war  which  his 
judgment  condemned,  and  which  he  should  have 
known  that  he  wanted  the  peculiar  ability  to  bring 
to  a successful  and  honorable  conclusion,  he  might 
never  have  been  President,  but  his  fame  would 
have  been  of  a higher  order.  History  might 
have  overlooked  the  act  of  political  fickleness  in 
his  earlier  career,  which  was  so  warmly  resented 
by  many  of  his  contemporaries.  Abandonment 
of  party  is  too  common  and  often  too  justifiable 
to  be  accounted  as  necessarily  a crime;  and  it 
can  rarely  be  said  with  positiveness,  whatever  the 
probabilities,  that  a political  deserter  is  certainly 
moved  by  base  motives.  It  is  rather  from  ex  post 
facto  than  from  immediate  evidence,  as  in  Madi- 
son’s case,  that  a just  verdict  is  likely  to  be 
reached.  But  there  can  be  neither  doubt  nor  mis- 
take as  to  the  President’s  management  of  foreign 
affairs  during  the  two  years  preceding  the  declara- 
tion of  war  against  England;  nor  of  the  remark- 
able incompetence  which  he  showed  in  rallying  the 
moral  and  material  forces  of  the  nation  to  meet  an 
emergency  of  his  own  creation. 

Opposition  to  war  generally  and  therefore  op-  A 
position  to  an  army  and  navy  were  sound  cardinal 
principles  in  the  Jeffersonian  school  of  politics. 

Mr.  Madison  was  curiously  blind  to  the  logical 
consequences  of  this  doctrine ; he  could  not  see, 
or  he  would  not  consider,  that,  when  war  seemed 
advisable  to  an  administration,  the  result  must 
depend  mainly  upon  the  success  of  the  appeal  to 


316 


JAMES  MADISON 


the  people  for  their  countenance  and  help.  But  he 
unwisely  sought  to  raise  and  employ  an  army  for 
the  invasion  and  conquest  of  the  territory  of  the 
enemy  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  a large  propor- 
tion of  the  wealthiest  and  most  intelligent  people 
in  the  country ; while  at  the  same  time  he  refused 
to  see  any  promise  or  any  presage  in  a naval  war- 
fare which  had  opened  with  unexpected  brilliancy, 
and  would,  had  it  been  followed  up,  have  been 
sure  of  popular  support.  His  title  to  fame  rests, 
with  the  multitude,  upon  the  fact  that  he  was  one 
of  the  earlier  Presidents  of  the  republic.  But  it 
is  that  period  of  his  career  which  least  entitles  him 
to  be  remembered  with  gratitude  and  respect  by 
his  countrymen. 

Its  crowning  humiliation  came  with  the  capture 
of  Washington  in  August,  1814,  when  the  British 
admiral,  Cockburn,  entered  the  Hall  of  Represent- 
atives, at  the  head  of  a band  of  followers,  and 
springing  into  the  speaker’s  chair  shouted  : “ Shall 
this  harbor  of  Yankee  Democracy  be  burned? 
All  for  it  will  say.  Aye ! ” Early  in  the  war 
Madison  had  written  to  Jefferson,  ‘‘We  do  not 
apprehend  invasion  by  land,”  — the  one  thing,  it 
would  seem,  that  a commander-in-chief  should 
have  apprehended,  whose  single  aim  was  the  in- 
vasion and  conquest  of  the  enemy’s  territory. 
His  devotion  to  this  one  purpose,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  any  other  idea  of  either  offense  or  defense, 
and  in  spite  of  continued  failure,  was  almost  an 
infatuation.  Within  a year  of  that  expression  of 


CONCLUSION 


317 


confidence  to  Mr.  Jefferson  the  whole  coast  was 
blockaded  from  the  eastern  end  of  Long  Island 
Sound  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  For  a 
year  before  Washington  was  taken,  the  shores  of 
Chesapeake  Bay  were  harassed  and  raided  and 
devastated  by  a blockading  force,  till  the  people 
were  reduced  almost  to  the  condition  of  a con- 
quered countr5^  Two  months  before  the  British 
commanders.  Boss  and  Cockburn,  went  up  the 
Potomac,  Mr.  Gallatin,  who  was  then  in  London, 
had  informed  the  President  that  the  fleet  was  to  be 
reinforced  for  that  very  purpose ; but  neither  he 
nor  Congress  took  any  effective  measures  to  meet 
a danger  so  imminent.  Their  eyes  were  fixed 
with  a far-off*  gaze  across  the  Northern  border, 
while  only  five  hundred  regular  troops,  a body 
of  untrained  militia  who  had  never  heard  the 
whistle  of  a bullet,  and  a few  gunboats  on  the 
Potomac,  guarded  the  national  capital  against  a 
British  fleet,  a thousand  marines,  and  thirty-five 
hundred  men  from  Wellington’s  best  regiments. 
The  President  fleeing  in  one  direction  with  the 
secretary  of  war,  the  secretary  of  state,  and  the 
general  in  command ; Mrs.  Madison  fleeing  in 
another,  with  her  reticule  filled  with  silver  spoons 
snatched  up  in  haste  as  she  left  the  White 
House  ; ^ behind  them  all  as  they  fled,  the  horizon 

1 Paul  Jenning-s,  who  was  a slave  and  the  body  servant  of  Mr. 
Madison,  says  in  his  Reminiscences  : “ It  has  often  been  stated  in 
print,  that  when  Mrs.  Madison  escaped  from  the  White  House,  she 
cut  out  from  the  frame  the  large  portrait  of  Washington  (now  in 
one  of  the  parlors  there)  and  carried  it  off.  This  is  totally  false. 


318 


JAMES  MADISON 


red  with  the  blaze  of  the  largest  navy  yard  in  the 
country  and  of  all  the  public  buildings,  but  one,  of 
the  capital,  — these  incidents  are  an  amazing  com- 
mentary on  the  early  assertion  that  invasion  was 
not  to  be  apprehended. 

The  end  of  this  wretched  war,  which  has  been 
foolishly  called  the  second  war  of  independence, 
came  four  months  afterward.  Never  was  a peace 
so  welcome  as  this  was  on  all  sides.  England  was 
exhausted  with  the  long  contest  with  Napoleon ; 
and  now,  that  being  over,  as  there  was  no  practical 
question  to  differ  about  with  the  United  States, 
the  ministry  were  not  unwilling  to  listen  to  the 
demands  of  the  commercial  and  manufacturing 
classes.  In  America  so  great  was  the  universal 
joy  that  the  Federalists  and  the  Democrats  for- 
got their  differences  and  their  hates,  and  wept 
and  laughed  by  turns  in  each  other’s  arms  and 
kissed  each  other  like  women.  One  party  was  de- 
livered ^rom  calamities  for  which,  if  continued 

She  had  no  time  for  doing*  it.  It  would  have  required  a ladder  to 
get  it  down.  All  she  carried  off  was  the  silver  in  her  reticule,  as 
the  British  were  thought  to  be  but  a few  squares  off,  and  were 
expected  every  moment.  John  Suse  (a  Frenchman,  then  door- 
keeper, and  still  [1865]  living),  and  Magraw,  the  President’s 
gardener,  took  it  down  and  sent  it  off  on  a wagon,  with  some 
large  silver  urns  and  such  other  valuables  as  could  hastily  be  got 
hold  of.  When  the  British  did  arrive,  they  ate  up  the  very 
dinner,  and  drank  the  wines,  etc.,  that  I had  prepared  for  the 
President’s  party.”  On  a previous  page  he  had  related  that: 
“ Mrs.  Madison  ordered  dinner  to  be  ready  at  three  as  usual ; I 
set  the  table  myself,  and  brought  up  the  ale,  cider,  and  wine,  and 
placed  them  in  the  coolers,  as  all  the  cabinet  and  several  military 
gentlemen  and  strangers  were  expected.” 


CONCLUSION 


319 


much  longer,  there  seemed  only  one  desperate  and 
dreaded  remedy ; the  other  was  overjoyed  to  back 
out  of  a blunder  which  was  the  straight  and  broad 
road  to  national  ruin.  Of  all  men,  Mr.  Madison 
had  the  most  reason  to  be  glad  for  a safe  deliver- 
ance from  the  consequences  of  his  own  want  of 
foresight  and  want  of  firmness.  Less  than  two 
years  remained  to  him  of  his  public  career.  In 
that  brief  period  much  was  forgotten  and  more 
forgiven  — as  our  national  way  is  — in  the  pro- 
mise of  a great  prosperity  to  be  speedily  achieved 
in  the  released  energies  of  a vigorous  and  industri- 
ous people.  He  had  not  again  to  choose  between 
differing  factions  of  his  own  party,  nor  to  carry 
out  a policy  against  the  will  of  a formidable  oppo- 
sition. To  the  Federalists  hardly  a name  was  left 
in  the  progress  of  events  at  home  and  abroad; 
while  all  immediate  vital  questions  of  difference 
vanished,  the  party  in  power  remained  in  almost 
undisputed  ascendency.  The  most  important  De- 
mocratic measures  it  then  insisted  upon  were  a 
national  bank  and  a protective  tariff.  To  the 
establishment  of  a bank  Mr.  Madison  assented 
against  his  own  conviction  that  any  provision 
could  be  found  for  it  in  the  Constitution  ; and  a 
tariff,  both  for  revenue  and  for  the  protection  and 
encouragement  of  American  industry,  he  agreed 
with  his  party  was  the  true  policy. 

For  nearly  twenty  years  after  his  retirement  to 
Montpellier  — a name  which,  with  rare  exceptions, 
he  always  spelled  correctly,  and  not  in  the  Ameri- 


320 


JAMES  MADISON 


can  way  — it  was  his  privilege  to  live  a watchful 
observer  of  the  prosperity  of  his  country.  If  it 
ever  occurred  to  him  in  his  secret  soul  that  at  the 
period  of  his  preeminence  he  had  done  anything  to 
arrest  that  prosperity,  he  gave  no  sign.  He  loved 
rather  to  remember  and  sometimes  to  recall  to 
others  the  part  he  had  taken  in  the  nurture  of  the 
young  republic  in  the  feeble  days  of  its  infancy. 

^ Of  his  own  administration  and  the  events  of  that 
time  he  had  much  less  to  say  than  of  the  true 
interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  of  the  intent  of 
its  framers,  and  the  circumstances  that  influenced 
their  deliberations.  His  voluminous  correspond- 
ence shows  the  bent  of  his  mind  as  a legislator  and 
a student  of  fundamental  law  ; and  on  that,  rather 
than  on  his  ability  and  success  as  the  chief  magis- 
trate of  the  nation,  rests  his  true  fame. 

These  twenty  years,  though  passed  in  retire- 
ment, were  not  years  of  leisure.  “ I have  rarely,” 
he  wrote  in  1827,  “ during  the  period  of  my  public 
life,  found  my  time  less  at  my  disposal  than  since 
I took  my  leave  of  it ; nor  have  I the  consolation 
of  finding,  that  as  my  powers  of  application  neces- 
sarily decline,  the  demands  on  them  proportionally 
decrease.”  Much  as  he  wrote  upon  questions  of 
an  earlier  period,  there  were  no  topics  of  the  cur- 
rent time  that  did  not  arouse  his  interest.  Upon 
the  subject  of  slavery  he  thought  much  and  wrote 
much  and  always  earnestly  and  humanely.  How 
to  get  rid  of  it  was  a problem  which  he  never 
solved  to  his  own  satisfaction.  Though  it  was  one 


CONCLUSION 


321 


lie  always  longed  to  see  through,  it  never  occurred 
to  him  that  the  way  to  abolish  slavery  was  — to 
abolish  it.  How  kind  he  was  as  a master,  Paul 
Jennings  bears  witness.  I never,”  he  says,  “ saw 
him  in  a passion,  and  never  knew  him  to  strike 
a slave,  though  he  had  over  a hundred ; neither 
would  he  allow  an  overseer  to  do  it.”  He  re- 
buked those  who  were  in  fault ; but,  adds  Jen- 
nings, he  would  “ never  mortify  them  by  doing  it 
before  others.”  It  will  be  remembered  that  on  the 
first  occasion  of  his  being  a candidate  for  public 
office  he  refused  to  follow  the  universal  Virginian 
habit  of  “ treating  ” the  electors.  To  the  principle 
which  governed  him  then  he  adhered  through  life, 
and  his  letters  show  the  warm  interest  he  always 
took  in  every  phase  of  the  temperance  movement. 
‘‘  I don’t  think  he  drank  a quart  of  brandy  in 
his  whole  life,”  says  Jennings.  A single  glass  of 
wine  was  all  he  ever  took  at  dinner,  and  this  he 
diluted  with  water,  when,  says  the  same  witness, 
he  had  hard  drinkers  at  his  table  who  had  put 
away  his  choice  madeira  pretty  freely.”  This 
will  go  for  something,  considering  the  times,  with 
even  the  most  zealous  of  the  modern  supporters 
of  that  cause  ; but  they  must  be  quite  satisfied 
to  know  that  “ for  the  last  fifteen  years  of  his  life 
he  drank  no  wine  at  all.”  Consideration  for  his 
own  health,  always  feeble,  may  have  led  him  to 
this  abstinence ; but  it  is  rather  remarkable  that  a 
man  of  his  position  should  have  held,  fifty  years 
ago,  the  advanced  notions  which  he  certainly  did 


322 


JAMES  MADISON 


upon  this  question,  and  that  the  doubt  only  of 
the  possibility  of  enforcing  laws  for  prohibiting 
the  manufacture  and  sale  of  spirits  seems  to  have 
withheld  him  from  proposing  them. 

Social  as  well  as  moral  questions  he  discussed 
with  evident  interest  and  without  passion  or  pre- 
judice. Aside  from  the  party  meaning  of  the  term, 
he  belonged  to  that  school  of  democracy,  now 
extinct,  which  believed  that  the  highest  object  of 
human  exertion  is  to  improve  man’s  condition,  and 
to  secure  to  each  the  rights  which  belong  to  all. 
He  did  not  agree  with  Robert  Owen  as  to  meth- 
ods ; but  neither  did  he  reject  his  schemes  as  inev- 
itably absurd  because  they  were  new  and  untried. 
One  would  not  gather  from  his  correspondence 
with  Frances  Wright  that  this  was  the  notorious 
Fanny  Wright  whom  the  world  chose  to  consider, 
as  its  way  is,  a disreputable  and  probably  wicked 
woman,  inasmuch  as  she  proposed  some  radical 
changes  in  its  social  relations  which  she  thought 
would  be  a gain.  He  gave  much  attention  to 
popular  education,  and  all  the  influence  he  could 
command  was  devoted,  through  all  the  later  years 
of  his  life,  to  the  establishment  and  well-being  of 
the  University  of  Virginia.  Education,  he  main- 
tained, was  the  true  foundation  of  civil  liberty,  and 
on  it,  therefore,  rested  the  welfare  and  stability  of 
the  republic.  It  is  probable  that  he  would  have 
drawn  a line  at  difference  of  color  then,  simply 
because  of  the  difference  of  condition  implied  by 
color.  But  he  made  no  such  distinction  in  sex. 


CONCLUSION* 


323 


Sixty-three  years  ago  he  saw  his  way  quite  clearly 
on  a question  which  is  a sore  trial  now  to  many 
timid  souls.  The  capacity  of  ‘‘  the  female  mind  ” 
for  the  highest  education  cannot,  he  said,  ‘‘be 
doubted,  having  been  sufficiently  illustrated  by  its 
works  of  genius,  of  erudition,  and  of  science.” 
The  capacity,  he  assumed,  carried  with  it  the 
right.  In  short,  he  was  ready  always  to  consider 
fairly  questions  relating  to  the  well-being  of  society 
which  since  his  time  have  deeply  agitated  the 
country ; and.  he  approached  them  all  much  in  the 
spirit  of  the  reformer  who  hopes  to  leave  the  world 
a little  better  and  happier  because  he  has  lived 
in  it. 

“ Mr.  Madison,  I think,”  says  Paul  Jennings, 
“ was  one  of  the  best  men  that  ever  lived.”  This 
is  the  testimony  of  an  intelligent  man  whose  oppor- 
tunities of  knowing  the  personal  qualities  of  him 
of  whom  he  was  speaking  were  more  intimate  than 
those  of  any  other  person  could  be  except  Mrs. 
Madison.  “ He  was  guilty,”  says  Hildreth,  “ of 
the  greatest  political  wrong  and  crime  which  it  is 
possible  for  the  head  of  a nation  to  commit.”  One 
saw  the  private  gentleman,  always  conscientious 
and  considerate  in  his  personal  relations  to  other 
men ; the  other  judged  the  public  man,  moved  by 
ambition,  entangled  in  party  ties  and  supposed 
party  obligations,  his  moral  sense  blinded  by  the 
necessities  of  political  compromises  to  reach  party 
ends.  -It  is  not  impossible  to  strike  a just  balance 
between  these  opposing  estimates,  though  one  is 


324 


JAMES  MADISON 


that  of  a servant,  the  other  that  of  a learned  and 
judicious  historian. 

Mr.  Madison  left  a legacy  of  “Advice  to  My 
Country,”  to  be  read  after  his  death  and  to  “ be 
considered  as  issuing  from  the  tomb,  where  truth 
alone  can  be  respected,  and  the  happiness  of  man 
alone  consulted.”  It  is  the  lesson  of  his  life,  as 
he  wished  his  countrymen  to  understand  it.  “ The 
advice,”  he  said,  “ nearest  to  my  heart  and  deepest 
in  my  convictions  is,  that  the  Union  of  the  States 
be  cherished  and  perpetuated.  Let  the  open  en- 
emy to  it  be  regarded  as  a Pandora  with  her  box 
opened,  and  the  disguised  one  as  the  serpent  creep- 
ing with  his  deadly  wiles  into  Paradise.”  The 
thoughtful  reader,  as  he  turns  to  the  first  page  of 
this  volume  to  recall  the  date  of  Mr.  Madison’s 
death,  will  hardly  fail  to  note  how  few  the  years 
were  before  these  open  and  disguised  enemies, 
against  whom  he  warned  his  countrymen,  were 
found  only  in  that  party  which  he  had  done  so 
much,  from  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Consti- 
tution, to  keep  in  power. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abolition  Societies,  petition  for  pro- 
hibition of  African  slave  trade  to 
Louisiana,  250. 

Adams,  John,  refers  question  of 
Presidential  titles  to  Congress,  123  ; 
his  position  in  the  matter,  123, 
124,  125 ; has  popular  sympathy  in 
X Y Z affair,  231  ; not  a leader  of  a 
party,  231 ; his  quarrel  with  party 
leaders,  240 ; effects  of  his  foreign 
policy,  242. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  erroneous 
statement  regarding  date  of  Mad- 
ison’s death,  1-3  ; attempt  to  expel 
from  Congress,  185;  on  good  luck 
of  Jefferson,  244,  253  ; supports 
Jefferson’s  embargo  policy,  245. 

Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  passed  in 
1798,  231 ; their  justification,  231, 
232 ; influence  election  of  1800, 
240. 

Ames,  Fisher,  opposes  impost  on  mo- 
lasses, 127 ; on  proposal  to  tax  im- 
ported slaves,  130  ; his  doubts  of  any 
future  development  of  West,  140  ; 
on  banks,  162 ; on  over--devotion  to 
Constitution,  173  n.  ; on  Madison’s 
partisanship,  192. 

Annapolis  Convention,-  events  leading 
up  to,  52-59 ; proposed  by  Mary- 
land, 55,  59  ; meets  with  delegates 
from  five  States,  50 ; calls  a conven- 
tion of  all  the  States  to  revise  Con- 
stitution, 59,  60;  its  meeting  due 
to  Madison,  61. 

Armstrong,  John,  on  impotence  of 
embargo,  269;  instructed  to  de- 
mand compensation  for  French  spo- 
liation, 284. 

Bainbridge,  Captain  William,  in 
war  with  Tripoli,  252. 

Bank,  United  States,  debated  in  Con- 


gress, 162 ; arguments  for  and 
against,  162, 163 ; favored  by  House, 
163 ; discussion  concerning,  in  cab- 
inet, 163  ; bill  creating,  signed  by 
Washington,  163  ; Madison’s  hostil- 
ity to,  177, 178 ; act  creating,  signed 
by  Madison  as  President,  319. 

Barbary  States,  war  with,  during  Jef- 
ferson’s administration,  252. 

Barlow,  Joel,  letters  of  Madison  to, 
as  minister  to  France,  292,  293,  294  ; 
instructed  by  Madison  to  insist  on 
explanations,  305 ; urges  Bassano 
for  a definite  statement  as  to  de- 
crees, 306. 

Barron,  Commodore  Samuel,  in  war 
with  Tripoli,  252 ; in  the  Chesa- 
peake-Leopard  affair,  265. 

Bassano,  Duke  de,  shows  antedated 
revocation  of  Berlin  and  Milan  de- 
crees to  Barlow,  305-307 ; his  rea- 
sons, 807. 

Bayonne  decree,  270. 

Berlin  decree,  issued,  266 ; negotia- 
tions concerning,  266-307.  See 
France. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  effect  of  his 
career  on  United  States,  242 ; sells 
Louisiana  to  United  States,  249 ; 
promulgates  Berlin  decree,  266 ; the 
Milan  decree,  268 ; the  Bayonne 
decree,  270  ; causes  conditional  re- 
vocation of  decrees,  282  ; his  policy 
and  its  success,  283 ; issues  Ram- 
bouillet  decree,  284 ; refuses  com- 
pensation, 284 ; his  doctrine  of 
blockade,  286,  288 ; willingness  of 
Madison  to  help,  288 ; succeeds  in 
forcing  United  States  to  declare 
war  on  England,  288,  289 ; revokes 
decrees,  304. 

Bradford,  William,  Jr.,  letter  of 
Madison  to.  11,  13,  26. 


328 


INDEX 


Breckenridge,  John,  offers  Kentucky 
Resolutions  of  1799,  239. 

Brown,  John,  on  advantages  of  slave 
trade  for  North,  130  n. 

Burr,  Aaron,  interview  of  Jefferson 
and  Madison  with,  175. 

Butler,  Pierce,  moves  fugitive  slave 
clause  in  Constitutional  Convention, 
107. 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  leads  war  party  in 
Congress,  292;  reports  from  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  in  favor 
of  war,  295 ; denounces  Henry  af- 
fair, 298. 

Canada,  its  conquest  looked  forward 
to  by  war  party,  293,  294,  310 ; re- 
luctance of  New  England  to  invade, 
310. 

Canning,  George,  sends  instructions 
to  Erskine,  273  ; his  directions  not 
obeyed,  274 ; repudiates  Erskine’s 
acts  and  recalls  him,  275 ; bitter 
comments  of  Madison  upon,  276 ; 
not  really  responsible  for  failure 
of  negotiations,  276,  277. 

Capital,  discussion  of  its  site,  139- 
143 ; settlement  of  question  con- 
cerning, by  Jefferson’s  and  Hamil- 
ton’s bargain,  143,  151,  152. 

Carrying  trade  acquired  by  United 
States  during  Napoleonic  wars,  254- 
256. 

Champagny,  announces  conditional 
revocation  of  Berlin  and  Milan  de- 
crees, 282. 

Chesapeake  and  Leopard  affair,  264- 
266,  274. 

Clay,  Henry,  leads  war  party  in  Con- 
gress, 292,  294 ; expects  easy  con- 
quest of  Canada,  294. 

Clinton,  De  Witt,  interview  of  Jeffer- 
son and  Madison  with,  175  ; desires 
presidential  nomination  as  candi- 
date of  war  party,  296. 

Clinton,  George,  candidate  for  presi- 
dential nomination,  272. 

Cockburn,  Admiral  George,  burns 
capital  at  Washington,  316,  317. 

Confederation,  Articles  of,  their  use- 
lessness according  to  Hamilton,  36 ; 
require  taxation  in  proportion  to 
land,  37 ; proposal  to  amend  by 


substituting  population,  38 ; unable 
to  create  commercial  union,  51,  52; 
military  inefficiency  of,  shown  by 
Shays’s  rebellion,  73 ; proposal  of 
Jay  to  disregard,  in  making  Span- 
ish  treaty,  79,  80 ; desire  of  one 
party  in  Constitutional  Convention 
to  retain,  85,  86. 

Congress,  Continental,  impotence  of, 
in  1780,  20  ; financial  powerlessness 
of,  21,  22, 29  ; draws  bills  on  France 
without  waiting  for  its  reply  to  de- 
mand for  loan,  28  ; in  danger  from 
army,  29  ; membership  of,  30 ; in- 
structs Jay  to  insist  on  Mississippi 
navigation,  31 ; reverses  instruc- 
tions, 32 ; again  changes  to  origi- 
nal position,  33 ; proposes  impost 
scheme  to  States,  33 ; proposes  five 
per  cent,  scheme,  33 ; appoints 
committee  to  conciliate  Rhode  Is- 
land, 34 ; proposes  amendment  to 
Articles  of  Confederation,  37 ; 
adopts  compromise  concerning  rate 
of  taxing  slaves,  41 ; alarmed  at 
Shays’s  rebellion,  73 ; raises  troops 
against,  under  pretext  of  attack- 
ing Indians,  73  ; discusses  proposal 
to  abandon  Mississippi  navigation 
in  return  for  commercial  treaty 
with  Spain,  78 ; authorizes  Jay  to 
make  treaty,  79 ; later  retracts  con- 
sent to  abandon  navigation,  80 ; 
prohibits  slavery  in  Northwest  Or- 
dinance, 91,  92 ; provides  for  inau- 
guration of  government  under  fed- 
eral Constitution,  116,  122. 

Congress  of  the  United  States,  its 
slowness  to  assemble,  122,  123  ; de- 
bates question  of  presidential  titles, 
123-126 ; disagreement  in,  between 
Senate  and  House,  124 ; debates 
impost  and  tonnage  duties,  126- 
136 ; debate  in,  over  proposal  to 
tax  imported  slaves,  128-133 ; argu- 
ments in,  against  the  tax,  130,  131  ; 
regrets  proposal,  132 ; imposes  mod- 
erate duties,  133 ; adopts  policy  of 
free  trade  in  slaves,  133  and  n.  ; lays 
differential  tonnage  duties,  134- 
136 ; leadership  of  Madison  in,  136, 
137 ; passing  bills  organizing  gov- 
ernment, 137 ; debates  question  of 


INDEX 


329 


removals  from  office,  137,  138  ; pro- 
poses amendments  to  Constitution, 
139 ; debates  location  of  capital, 
139-142 ; position  of  parties  in, 
140 ; votes  for  Pennsylvania,  141 ; 
its  action  reversed  by  Madison,  141, 
142 ; finally  decides  on  Potomac  as 
site,  142,  143  ; asks  Hamilton  to  re- 
port on  public  credit,  144 ; votes  to 
pay  foreign  debt,  144;  debate  in, 
as  to  payment  of  domestic  debt, 

144- 150  ; arguments  in,  against  and 
for  payment  of  domestic  creditors, 

145- 147 ; rejects  compromise  pro- 
posed by  Madison,  148 ; rejects 
proposal  to  assume  state  debt,  150, 
151 ; later  led  by  Hamilton’s  and 
Jefferson’s  bargain  to  consent,  151, 
152 ; petitioned  by  Quakers  to  op- 
pose slavery,  152,  153 ; debate  in, 
over  its  powers  and  on  slavery, 
153-161  ; ends  debate  without  ac- 
tion, 161 ; later  debate  in,  on  sim- 
ilar petition,  161  ; its  power  over 
slavery  defined  by  Madison  and 
Gerry,  159,  160 ; prohibits  slave 
trade  in  foreign  vessels,  161 ; de- 
bates proposed  National  Bank,  162 ; 
votes  in  its  favor,  163 ; establishes 
newspaper  postage,  172 ; arranges 
presidential  succession  in  emer- 
gency, 176,  177  ; aims  to  exclude 
Jefferson,  177  ; proposal  in  to  refer 
various  matters  to  Hamilton,  180, 
181 ; refuses  to  let  Hamilton  ap- 
pear before  it,  181  ; passes  resolu- 
tions of  inquiry  concerning  Hamil- 
ton’s conduct,  189  ; rejects  resolu- 
tions of  censure,  191 ; attempts  to 
block  Jay  treaty,  216,  217  ; review 
of  Madison’s  leadership  of,  222, 
223 ; adopts  Alien  and  Sedition 
Acts,  231  ; prohibits  introduction 
of  slaves  into  Louisiana  except  by 
actual  settlers,  250 ; called  by  Jef- 
ferson to  consider  British  aggres- 
sions, 267  ; adopts  embargo,  268 ; 
repeals  it,  271 ; unable  to  adopt  a 
policy,  280  ; suspends  non-importa- 
tion act  with  threat  to  renew  unless 
England  and  France  revoke  de- 
crees, 280 ; renews  non-intercourse 
with  England,  288 ; determines  on 


war  with  England,  293,  294  ; passes 
embargo,  295 ; declares  war,  295, 
296  ; denounces  J ohn  Henry  letters 
as  cause  for  war,  298  ; adopts  bank 
and  tariff  for  protection,  319. 

Connecticut,  fails  to  appoint  dele- 
gates to  Annapolis  Convention,  59 ; 
its  Revolutionary  debt,  151. 

Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
part  of  Madison  in  framing,  84,  85 ; 
condemned  by  state-rights  men  as 
monarchical,  88,  89 ; the  slavery 
compromises  in,  91-109  ; strong  and 
weak  points  in,  108, 109 ; dissatisfac- 
tion of  Madison  with,  110  ; his  later 
efforts  to  secure  adoption  of,  110- 
112;  advocated  by  “ The  Federalist,” 
111,  112 ; struggle  in  Virginia  over 
its  ratification,112-116  ; silent  on  re- 
movals from  office,  137 ; thought 
by  Madison  to  justify  impeachment 
for  wanton  removals,  138  ; amend- 
ments to,  proposed  by  Congress, 
139 ; said  to  be  disregarded  by 
petitioners  against  slavery,  153 ; 
its  relation  to  abolition  defined  by 
Madison,  156,  159  ; and  by  Gerry, 
159,  160 ; Madison’s  strict  con- 
struction of,  surprises  Federalists, 
173,  174,  175;  held  by  Jefferson 
to  prohibit  Washington’s  neutrality 
proclamation,  196 ; question  of 
treaty  power  under,  216,  217 ; the 
doctrine  of  nullification  discussed, 
234-240  ; violated  by  Louisiana  pur- 
chase, 247,  248. 

Constitutional  Convention,  called  by 
Annapolis  Convention,  60 ; diffi- 
culties in  gaining  attendance  of 
States,  79 ; its  success  endangered 
by  feeling  in  South  over  proposed 
abandonment  of  Mississippi  naviga- 
tion, 81-83 ; part  played  by  Madi- 
son in,  the  “Virginia”  plan,  84; 
division  of  parties  in,  85  ; attitude 
of  States’-rights  party,  86-88  ; their 
secession  from,  90 ; difficulties  in, 
between  large  and  small  States,  90  ; 
divisions  in,  between  free  and  slave 
States,  91 ; question  of  representa- 
tion in,  94  ; argument  of  Northern 
men  against  counting  slaves  in  re- 
presentation, 95,  96 ; character  of 


330 


INDEX 


the  compromise  demanded  in,  96, 
97 ; position  of  Southern  delegates 
in,  101,  103;  debate  in,  over  slave 
trade,  101-105 ; adopts  compromise 
permitting  slave  trade  and  grant- 
ing Congress  power  over  commerce, 

106  ; adopts  fugitive  slave  clause, 

107  ; estimate  of  results  of  its  la- 
bors, 107,  108. 

Convention  of  Virginia.  See  Legisla- 
ture. 

Convention  of  Virginia  for  ratifying 
United  States  Constitution,  cam- 
paign in  elections  for,  112 ; part 
played  by  Madison  in,  113-115 ; 
votes  to  ratify  Constitution,  115; 
adjourns,  116. 

Conway,  Nelly,  mother  of  Madison, 
3 ; statement  of  Rives  as  to  her 
name,  3 ; statements  of  Madison 
concerning,  3,  4. 

Craddock,  Lieutenant,  7. 

Craig,  Sir  James,  governor  of  Canada, 
sends  Henry  to  investigate  New 
England  Federalists,  299,  300. 

Curtis,  George  Ticknor,  calls  slavery 
compromise  on  representation  an 
“unimportant  anomaly,”  94. 

Deabborn,  Henry,  attempt  of  Foster 
to  arrange  armistice  with,  308. 

Debt,  public,  debate  over  it  in  Conti- 
nental Congress,  28 ; in  first  Con- 
gress, 144-152 ; policy  of  Hamilton 
concerning,  149,  150. 

Decatur,  Stephen,  in  war  with  Tri- 
poli, 252. 

Delaware,  connection  with  Potomac 
navigation,  55;  sends  delegates  to 
Annapolis  Convention,  59 ; only 
Federalist  State  outside  New  Eng- 
land, 243. 

Democratic  party,  formed  in  first 
Congress,  1G5 ; its  career,  165,  166 ; 
opinion  of  Hamilton  on  its  organi- 
zation by  Jefferson  and  Madison, 
166-168 ; reasons  of  Madison  for 
joining,  178-184 ; plans  to  ruin 
Hamilton,  189;  its  attack  defeated 
in  Congress,  189-191 ; attitude  to- 
ward France,  193,  194;  criticises 
the  neutrality  proclamation,  198; 
welcomes  Genet,  200;  suffers  from 


his  extravagance,  202 ; imitates 
French  manners,  207 ; causes  for 
its  success,  210  ; its  reasons  for  dis- 
liking England,  214  ; attacks  Alien 
and  Sedition  Laws,  233;  carries 
election  of  1800,  241 ; does  not  de- 
mand removal  of  Federalists  from 
offices,  251 ; attempts  of  Federal- 
ists to  discredit  its  foreign  policy, 
263,  264 ; elects  Madison  president, 
272 ; determines  on  war  with  Eng- 
land, 291,  292,  293;  renominates 
Madison,  296  ; its  policy  during  war, 
310-318 ; rejoices  at  peace,  318 ; 
supports  national  bank  and  protec- 
tive tariff,  319. 

Dexter,  Samuel,  on  social  equality  in 
New  England,  207,  208. 

Diplomatic  history,  neutrality  de- 
bated between  Hamilton  and  Jef- 
ferson, 195;  neutrality  proclama- 
tion issued,  196 ; question  as  to 
validity  of  treaty  engagements  of 
1778,  199,  200 ; mission  of  Genet  to 
United  States,  199-202 ; summary 
of  Washington’s  foreign  policy, 
210,  211  ; Jay  treaty,  211 ; its  mer- 
its, defects,  and  reasons  for  accept- 
ance, 211-218 ; mission  of  Monroe 
to  France,  218-220 ; foreign  rela- 
tions under  Jefferson’s  administra- 
tion, 242,  243 ; controversy  over 
neutral  commerce  and  impress- 
ments, 256-259 ; Monroe-Pinkney 
treaty  with  England,  261-263  ; Ers- 
kine’s  attempt  to  reconcile  England 
and  America,  272-277 ; mission 
of  Jackson  to  Washington,  278 ; the 
offer  of  Congress  to  France  and 
England,  281 ; Napoleon’s  condi- 
tional revocation,  282-284 ; Eng- 
land’s refusal,  286 ; further  de- 
mands of  Madison  upon  England, 
287  ; threatening  language  of  Mad- 
ison to  France,  291-294 ; circum- 
stances preceding  war  with  Eng- 
land, 304-308 ; treaty  of  Ghent, 
318. 

Directory.  See  France. 

Disunion,  expected  in  1783,  if  five 
per  cent,  scheme  fails,  35,  36 ; dan- 
ger of,  on  account  of  slave  taxation 
question,  39 ; feared  by  Madison  in 


INDEX 


331 


1787,  74,  75  ; would  probably  have 
been  preferred  by  South  to  aban- 
donment of  Mississippi  navigation, 
81 ; threatened  by  South  in  slavery 
debates  in  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, 99,  100,  102,  103,  109  ; freely 
threatened  during  Washington’s 
administration,  187 ; denounced  by 
Madison  late  in  life,  237  ; threat- 
ened by  New  England,  301,  302 ; 
Madison’s  last  words  a warning 
against,  324. 

Douai,  Merlin  de.  President  of  French 
National  Convention,  receives  Mon- 
roe, 218. 

Draper,  Lyman  C.,  letters  of  Madison 
to,  on  his  ancestry,  3,  4 n. , 6. 

Ellsworth,  Oliver,  in  Continental 
Congress,  30 ; his  education,  31 ; dis- 
claims interest  of  North  for  or 
against  slave  trade,  102  ; makes  cyn- 
ical reply  to  Mason’s  condemnation 
of  slavery,  102,  103. 

Emancipation,  movement  for,  in  North- 
ern States,  91  ; petition  of  Benjamin 
Franklin  in  favor  of,  152,  153  ; of 
Warner  Mifflin  for,  161. 

Embargo,  recommended  by  Jefferson, 
passed  by  Congress,  268 ; fails  to 
affect  England  or  France,  269 ; its 
results  in  United  States,  269  ; leads 
to  Bayonne  decree,  270  ; repealed, 
271 ; its  failure  explained  by  Madi- 
son, 278,  279  ; renewed  on  eve  of 
war  with  England,  295. 

Emott,  James,  on  doctrine  of  block- 
ade, 286. 

England,  commercial  retaliation 
against,  proposed  under  the  confed- 
eration, 47 ; Virginian  trade  with, 
47,  48 ; rejoices  at  prospect  of 
trouble  over  Mississippi  navigation, 
78 ; its  constitution  imitated  in  Fed- 
eral Convention,  89,  90;  discrimi- 
nated against  in  tonnage  duties  of 
first  Congress,  134,  135 ; prejudice 
of  Madison  against,  135 ; war  with 
France,  197  ; Federalists  declared 
by  opposition  to  be  partisans  of, 
194, 197,  198,  200, 203-205 ; its  policy 
encourages  dislike  in  America,  209  ; 
makes  Jay  treaty,  211 ; necessity 


of  avoiding  war  with,  211,  214 ; 
causes  for  Democratic  dislike  of, 
214  ; its  overbearing  attitude,  214, 
215 ; real  attitude  of  Federalists  to- 
ward, 215  ; temporary  stoppage  of 
friction  with,  242,  243 ; loses  carry- 
ing trade  to  America,  254,  255; 
obliged  to  adopt  measures  against 
neutrals  in  order  to  defeat  France, 
256,  257  ; inability  of  America  to 
resist  its  depredations,  257,  258, 
259 ; impresses  seamen  from  Amer- 
ican vessels,  258  ; non-importation 
measures  adopted  against,  260  ; re- 
fuses to  abandon  impressment,  262  ; 
makes  treaty  with  Monroe,  262 ; 
refuses  to  reopen  negotiations,  263  ; 
its  part  in  Chesapeake  controversy, 
266 ; issues  order  in  council,  268 ; 
not  affected  by  embargo,  269 ; at- 
tempted reconciliation  with,  made 
through  Erskine,  272-275 ; attempt 
of  Congress  to  induce  her  to  revoke 
orders,  280,  281  ; view  of  Madison 
as  to  her  policy,  282 ; refuses  to 
recognize  France’s  alleged  revoca- 
tion of  decrees,  286 ; refuses  to 
abandon  blockade,  286  ; growth  of 
party  desirous  of  war  with,  292, 
294 ; war  declared  with,  295,  296  ; 
position  of  Madison  concerning  war 
with,  296-303  ; said  to  have  plotted 
with  New  England,  298,  301  ; points 
out  to  United  States  that  France 
has  not  revoked  decrees,  305  ; pro- 
mises to  repeal  order  in  council 
as  soon  as  France  revokes,  306 ; 
does  so,  307  ; fails  to  prevent  war 
on  impressment  issue,  308  ; its  suc- 
cesses in  war,  316,  317 ; makes 
peace  of  Ghent,  318. 

Erskine,  David  M.,  confers  with  Mad- 
ison before  his  inauguration,  272 ; 
exceeds  his  instructions  and  prom- 
ises a withdrawal  of  orders  in  coun- 
cil, 273 ; does  not  insist  on  other 
concessions,  274 ; proposes  settle- 
ment of  Chesapeake  matter,  274  ; 
fails  to  resent  remarks  of  Smith, 
274 ; his  arrangement  repudiated 
and  himself  recalled,  275 ; com- 
ments of  Madison  on  his  behavior, 
276  ; replaced  by  Jackson,  277. 


332 


INDEX 


Essex  Junto,  said  by  Madison  to  have 
been  proved  through  Henry  letters 
to  plan  secession,  298,  301. 

“ Federalist,”  Madison’s  share  in, 

111,  112. 

Federalist  party,  Madison  at  first  a 
member  of,  164;  its  career,  165; 
survival  of  its  principles,  166 ; se- 
cession of  Madison  from,  172,  173 ; 
views  Madison  with  suspicion,  174- 
176 ; in  Congress,  arranges  presiden- 
tial succession  in  emergency  so  as 
to  exclude  Jefferson,  176,  177 ; ac- 
cuses Madison  of  changing  opinions 
in  hopes  of  place,  180,  181  ; its 
deference  to  Hamilton,  180 ; ac- 
cused of  desiring  monarchy  by 
Jefferson  and  Madison,  186  ; and  of 
favoring  England,  194, 197,  198,  200, 
203-205  ; profits  by  reaction  against 
Genet,  202,  203  ; accused  of  deluding 
Washington,  204,  206  ; the  only  im- 
partial American  party,  215 ; com- 
mits blunders  after  X Y Z affair, 
231 ; passes  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts, 
231  ; its  attitude  toward  foreign 
immigrants,  231,  232  ; loses  popu- 
larity, 233  ; quarrels  in,  240 ; de- 
feated in  election  of  1800,  240,  241 ; 
loses  ground  everywhere,  243;  re- 
joices at  peace  of  Ghent,  318  ; dis- 
appears from  politics,  319. 

Ferrar,  Will,  7. 

Finances  of  the  Revolution,  their 
breakdown  in  1780  described  by 
Madison,  20 ; reforms  suggested  by 
Madison  of  state  paper  money,  21  ; 
proposal  to  collect  supplies  and  pay 
in  certificates,  22 ; drawing  of  bills 
on  France  without  waiting  for  ac- 
ceptance of  loan,  28  ; public  debt 
in  1783,  28 ; deficit  in  revenue,  29  ; 
the  impost  scheme  defeated  by 
Rhode  Island,  33 ; the  five  per  cent, 
scheme  proposed,  33 ; debate  con- 
cerning, 34-37  ; fails,  38  ; paper- 
money  craze  in  States,  67. 

Floyd,  Catherine,  engaged  to  Madi- 
son, 42;  breaks  the  engagement, 
43,  44. 

Floyd,  General  William,  wishes  his 
daughter  to  marry  Madison,  42. 


Foster,  Augustus  J. , British  minister, 
tries  to  prevent  outbreak  of  hostil- 
ities on  learning  of  revocation  of 
orders  in  council,  307,  308. 

France,  trade  with,  preferred  by  Madi- 
son to  English  trade,  136 ; enthusi- 
asm of  Jefferson  and  Madison  for, 
192 ; cautious  attitude  of  Hamilton 
in  payments  to,  angers  Democrats, 
193,  194  ; declares  war  against  Eng- 
land, 195 ; desire  of  Democrats  to 
help,  197  ; relations  with,  according 
to  treaty  of  1778,  discussed,  199 ; de- 
fended by  Democrats  in  Genet  case, 
203 ; gratitude  to,  traditional,  209 ; 
mission  of  Monroe  to,  218-220 ; com- 
mits outrages  on  American  mer- 
chant vessels,  219  ; indignant  at  Jay 
treaty,  220  ; takes  Democratic  view 
of  American  administration,  220 ; 
relations  with,  during  Adams’s  ad- 
ministration, 230  ; X Y Z affair,  230; 
improved  relations  of  Jefferson’s 
administration  with,  242  ; enforces 
Berlin  decree  against  American  ves- 
sels, 266,  267 ; these  aggressions  not 
resented  by  Jefferson,  267 ; attempt 
of  Congress  to  induce  it  to  revoke 
decrees,  280,  281  ; expectations  of 
Madison  as  to  its  policy,  282 ; makes 
a conditional  reply  to  the  conditional 
offer  of  Congress,  282-284 ; insists 
that  England  also  withdraw,  or  that 
United  States  “ cause  rights  to  be 
respected,”  283  ; refuses  compensa- 
tion for  Rambouillet  decree,  284; 
succeeds  in  inducing  Madison  to 
accept  revocation,  285 ; continues 
to  seize  American  ships,  285,  286 ; 
partiality  of  Madison’s  policy  to- 
ward, 287,  288 ; success  of  French 
policy,  288,  289  ; vigorous  language 
of  Madison  toward,  291,  292,  293; 
war  with,  threatened,  294  ; does  not 
really  revoke  decrees  until  war  is 
about  to  break  out  between  United 
States  and  England,  304-305;  dis- 
plays ante-dated  revocation,  307. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  signs  memorial 
for  abolition  of  slavery,  152 ; de- 
nounced by  Southerners  in  Congress, 
153. 

French  Revolution,  applauded  by 


INDEX 


333 


Democrats,  193  ; desires  of  Demo- 
crats to  assist,  194 ; attitude  of  Fed- 
eralists toward,  193,  195  ; its  phrase- 
ology and  mannerisms  imitated  in 
America,  207. 

Freneau,  Philip,  Madison’s  responsi- 
bility for  his  establishment  in  State 
Department,  168 ; Madison’s  pur- 
poses in  recommending  him  to  Jef- 
ferson, 169,  170  ; his  paper  and  its 
character,  170,  171  ; his  relations  to 
Jefferson  and  Madison,  171 ; care 
of  Madison  for,  172. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  opposes  Alien  and 
Sedition  Acts,  233  ; career  as  secre- 
tary of  treasury,  252  ; condemned 
by  opposition  for  failure  of  Ers- 
kine’s  negotiations,  275 ; warns  Mad- 
ison of  invasion  of  Chesapeake,  317. 

Guardoqui, , negotiates  with  Jay 

about  Mississippi  navigation,  79. 

Genet,  Edmond  Charles,  his  recogni- 
tion opposed  by  Hamilton,  199  ; up- 
held successfully  by  Jefferson,  200 ; 
anxiety  of  Madison  as  to  his  recep- 
tion, 200  ; alienates  Jefferson  by  his 
excesses,  201  ; accuses  Jefferson  of 
duplicity,  201,  202;  at  first  pro- 
mises good  behavior,  202  ; his  recall, 
207,  209  ; effect  of  his  presence  on 
parties  in  United  States,  207  ; fears 
of  Jefferson  that  his  recall  may 
cause  an  insurrection,  209. 

Georgia,  willing  for  sake  of  alliance 
with  Spain  to  abandon  Mississippi 
navigation,  32  ; fails  to  appoint  dele- 
gates to  Annapolis  convention,  52; 
attitude  toward  slavery  in  Constitu- 
tional Convention,  109. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  anticipated  by  Henry 
in  device  of  gerrymandering,  120; 
in  first  Congress  opposes  taxation 
of  molasses,  127  ; favors  tax  on  im- 
ported slaves,  132  ; asserts  power  of 
Congress  to  interfere  with  slavery 
and  slave  trade,  159,  160. 

Gerrymandering,  used  by  Henry  in 
Virginia  to  defeat  Madison’s  elec- 
tion to  Congress,  120,  121. 

Giddings,  Joshua  R.,  attempt  to  expel 
from  Congress,  185. 

Giles,  W.  B.,  offers  resolutions  de- 


manding investigation  of  Hamil- 
ton’s conduct,  189 ; offers  resolu- 
tions of  censure,  191. 

Goodhue,  Benjamin,  opposes  impost 
on  molasses,  127. 

Gorham,  Nathaniel,  seconds  Pinck- 
ney’s motion  for  extension  of  period 
of  slave  trade,  106. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  in  Continental 
Congress,  30 ; equal  to  Madison  in 
political  information,  31 ; opposes 
limitation  of  five  per  cent,  scheme  to 
twenty-five  years,  34,  35  ; does  not 
wish  to  postpone  crisis  of  confeder- 
ation, 36 ; supports  Madison’s  sla- 
very compromise  concerning  taxa- 
tion, 41  ; writes  address  of  An- 
napolis Convention,  59 ; on  name 
“Federalist,”  86;  in  Constitutional 
Convention  proposes  representation 
according  to  free  population,  94 ; 
his  share  in  “ The  Federalist,”  111  ; 
carries  New  York  for  Constitution, 
115 ; his  bargain  concerning  loca- 
tion of  capital,  143,  151  ; his  report 
on  public  credit,  145;  suspected  of 
purpose  to  throw  government  of 
country  into  hands  of  wealthy,  149  ; 
recommends  a bank,  162  ; his  argu- 
ment persuades  Washington,  163 ; 
becomes  convinced  of  Madison’s 
opposition,  166  ; still  believes  him 
honest,  166  ; begins  to  suspect  sin- 
cerity of  his  motives,  166,  167  ; ac- 
cuses him  of  tampering  with  Presi- 
dent’s message,  167 ; and  of  aiding 
Freneau,  168;  avows  intention  to 
treat  Madison  as  an  enemy,  181 ; 
begins  newspaper  controversy,  185  ; 
attacks  Jefferson  bitterly,  186  ; con- 
sulted by  Washington  as  to  declin- 
ing a second  term,  186  ; denies  ac- 
cusation of  being  a monarchist,  186 ; 
violently  attacked  by  Jefferson  to 
Washington,  187;  his  reply,  188; 
his  conduct  attacked  in  Congress 
by  Giles  and  Madison,  189,  190 ; 
replies  successfully,  190;  failure  of 
resolution  of  censure  against,  191 ; 
personal  hatred  of  Madison  and 
Jefferson  for,  192 ; condemned  also 
because  of  his  attitude  toward 


334 


INDEX 


France,  193  ; slow  to  pay  French 
debt,  193 ; defends  neutrality  in 
“Pacificus”  papers,  198;  argues 
against  alliance  with  France,  199  ; 
and  against  receiving  a minister 
from  French  Republic,  199  ; stoned 
for  defending  Jay  treaty,  212. 

Hamilton,  John  C.,  asserts  Madison’s 
authorship  of  Giles’s  resolutions, 
189,  190. 

Hartford  Convention,  its  purpose,  311; 
alarm  felt  toward,  312 ; brought  to 
nothing  by  peace  of  Ghent,  311. 

Henry,  John,  his  revelations  bought 
by  Madison,  297  ; said  to  prove  a 
plot  for  reannexing  New  England 
to  Great  Britain,  298  ; said  to  be  a 
just  cause  for  war,  298 ; his  career 
as  emissary  of  governor  of  Canada 
in  Massachusetts,  299 ; compro- 
mises nobody,  300,  301. 

Henry,  Patrick,  opposes  ratification 
of  Constitution,  112  ; considers  state 
sovereignty  attacked  by  Constitu- 
tion, 114  ; continues  to  oppose  Con- 
stitution in  Virginia  Assembly,  118  ; 
leads  Assembly  to  call  for  a new 
convention,  118 ; nominates  and 
elects  two  anti-federalist  senators, 
119  ; gerrymanders  Madison’s  con- 
gressional district,  120  ; fails  to  pre- 
vent his  election,  120,  121. 

Hildreth,  Richard,  on  Madison’s  ac- 
quaintance with  Kentucky  Resolu- 
tions, 234,  235  ; on  Madison’s  career, 
323. 

Humphreys,  Colonel  David,  letter  of 
Madison  to,  on  secession  of  New 
England,  302. 

Impressment,  its  exercise  by  England, 
258,  259  ; discussion  over,  in  Monroe 
treaty,  262  ; abandoned  in  treaty, 
262  ; used  as  pretext  for  war  of  1812, 
308  ; yet  not  mentioned  in  treaty  of 
peace,  308. 

Independence  of  colonies,  urged  by 
Virginia,  15,  16. 

Jackson,  Francis  J.,  replaces  Ers- 
kine  as  British  minister  to  United 
States,  278  ; accuses  Madison  of  bad 
faith,  278  ; his  recall  demanded,  278. 


Jay,  John,  instructed  as  minister  to 
Spain,  regarding  Mississippi  naviga- 
tion, 31-33 ; tries  to  induce  Con- 
gress to  abandon  Mississippi  navi- 
gation in  order  to  make  treaty  with 
Spain,  79  ; wishes  to  evade  Articles 
of  Confederation,  80 ; his  project 
opposed  by  Madison,  81,  82;  his  share 
in  “ The  Federalist,”  87,  111  ; his 
treaty  with  England,  211 ; its  char- 
acter and  justification,  211 ; con- 
demned in  cities,  212  ; his  negotia- 
tions opposed  by  Monroe,  220. 

Jay  treaty,  211-218.  See  Diplomatic 
History. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  letter  of  Madison 
to,  on  condition  of  country,  19,  20  ; 
consoles  Madison  on  his  disappoint- 
ment in  love,  44  ; at  Madison’s  sug- 
gestion, confers  with  Maryland  dele- 
gates on  Potomac  navigation,  53; 
his  act  for  establishing  religious 
freedom  passed  by  legislature,  65 ; 
comments  on  its  passage,  65  n.  ; 
wishes  Madison  to  join  him  in  Eu- 
rope, 68  ; corresponds  with  Madison 
on  steamboats,  69,  70  ; informed  by 
Madison  of  prehistoric  relics,  71 ; 
on  Shays’s  rebellion,  75  ; on  bargain 
in  Constitutional  Convention  be- 
tween New  England  and  slave  States, 
106 ; letters  of  Madison  to,  on  Con- 
stitution, 110,  116;  and  on  Virginia 
politics,  119,  120 ; letter  of  Madison 
to,  on  debate  over  President’s  title, 
124 ; letter  of  Madison  to,  on  for- 
eign commerce,  136 ; his  views  on 
removals  from  office,  138 ; relation 
to  bargain  for  location  of  capital, 
143,  152  ; opposes  a national  bank, 
163  ; influences  Madison  to  abandon 
Federalist  party,  164,  174 ; his  char- 
acter and  motives  as  viewed  by 
Hamilton,  166,  167,  168 ; connec- 
tion with  Freneau,  168-171,  175; 
suggestion  of  Madison  to,  with  re- 
gard to  circulating  Freneau’s  paper, 
172 ; his  tour  in  Eastern  States  mis- 
represented by  Federalists,  175  ; ha- 
tred of  Federalists  for,  176 ; action 
of  Federalists  in  Congress  to  pre- 
vent his  accessionas  president  pro 
tempore^  176,  177 ; attacked  by 


INDEX 


335 


Hamilton  in  press,  186 ; condemns 
Hamilton  in  letter  to  Washington, 
187,  188 ; his  personal  hatred  of 
Hamilton,  192  ; dislikes  him  for  at- 
titude toward  French  Revolution, 
193 ; sympathizes  with  Jacobins, 
193,  194  ; objects  to  declaration  of 
neutrality,  195,  196 ; secures  modi- 
fication of  proclamation,  196  ; wishes 
to  aid  France  as  far  as  possible,  197  ; 
urges  Madison  to  reply  to  Hamilton, 
198 ; secures  recognition  of  Genet, 
200  ; letters  of  Madison  to,  on  Ge- 
net’s reception,  200 ; condemns 
Genet’s  excesses,  201,  202 ; fears 
reaction  in  favor  of  administration, 
202,  203  ; letters  of  Madison  to,  on 
Washington,  204 ; describes  Wash- 
ington’s anger  at  Freneau,  205  ; not 
sincere  in  considering  him  a dupe, 
206  ; fears  recall  of  Genet  may  cause 
revolution,  209 ; letter  of  Madison 
to,  on  Jay  treaty  in  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, 217  ; his  honest  love  for 
farming,  226, 227  ; correspondence  of 
Madison  with,  concerning  farming, 
228  ; requested  by  Madison  to  fur- 
nish material  for  house,  228,  229 ; 
writes  Kentucky  Resolutions,  234  ; 
author  of  nullification,  234 ; avoids 
public  responsibility  for  resolutions, 
235  ; his  probable  reasons  for  writ- 
ing them,  235,  236  ; denied  on  erro- 
neous grounds  by  Madison  to  have 
used  term  “ nullification,”  239, 
240 ; offers  Madison  secretaryship 
of  state,  241 ; his  inauguration,  242  ; 
in  his  inaugural  speech  urges  har- 
mony, 243;  success  of  his  first 
term,  244 ; popular  support  of,  called 
infatuation  by  Federalists,  244 ; his 
absolute  control  as  a leader,  245 ; 
his  secretive  methods,  245  ; bold- 
ness in  assuming  responsibility  for 
Louisiana  purchase  and  other  mat- 
ters, 246  ; overshadows  and  directs 
Madison,  246  ; does  not  foresee  con- 
sequences of  Louisiana  annexation 
in  stimulating  slavery,  246,  247 ; 
his  purposes  to  insure  peace,  247, 
249 ; abused  by  opponents,  247  ; ad- 
mits unconstitutionality  of  Louisi- 
ana treaty,  248 ; comments  on  criti- 


cisms of  Federalists,  248;  his  for- 
tune in  seizing  opportunity,  249; 
sends  expedition  of  Lewis  and 
Clarke,  249  ; gains  credit  for  Galla- 
tin’s financial  policy,  252 ; other 
successes  of  his  first  term,  252 ; 
becomes  involved  in  foreign  con- 
troversy, 154 ; his  naval  policy, 
257,  258  ; supported  by  Madison  in 
policy  of  commercial  pressure,  260  ; 
sends  Pinkney  to  make  a treaty 
with  England,  261;  instructs  to  in- 
sist on  abandonment  of  impress- 
ment, 262  ; dissatisfied  with  treaty, 
263;  after  Leopard  affair,  orders 
British  ships  of  war  out  of  Amer- 
ican waters,  265 ; reluctant  to  go 
to  war  with  France,  267 ; calls 
special  session  of  Congress  to  con- 
sider England’s  aggressions,  267  ; 
recommends  an  embargo,  268 ; re- 
ceives news  of  order  in  council  and 
Milan  decree,  268  ; loses  control  of 
party  with  failure  of  embargo,  270, 
271 ; dictates  choice  of  successor, 
272 ; letter  of  Madison  to,  on  Ers- 
kine  affair,  276;  on  preparations 
for  war,  293. 

Jennings,  Paul,  describes  Madison’s 
flight  from  British,  317  n.;  describes 
Madison’s  kindness  to  slaves,  321  ; 
and  his  temperance,  321 ; his  esti- 
mate of  Madison’s  character,  323. 

Jones,  Joseph,  desires  to  be  appointed 
delegate  to  Congress,  22. 

Jordan,  Cicely,  suit  of  Pooley  against, 
7. 

Kentucky  Resolutions,  their  prepa- 
ration by  Jefferson,  234,  235. 

King,  Rufus,  remark  of  Giles  to,  on 
Madison’s  authorship  of  resolutions 
against  Hamilton,  190. 

Knox,  General  Henry,  on  Genet’s 
course,  201. 

Lee,  Richard  Henry,  opposes  Con- 
stitution, 112  ; favors  a high-sound- 
ing presidential  title,  124. 

Legislature,  of  Virginia,  instructs 
delegates  to  Congress  to  urge  inde- 
pendence of  colonies,  15,  16 ; de- 
bates Bill  of  Rights,  16;  adopts 


336 


INDEX 


religious  liberty,  17,  18  ; elects  Mad- 
ison member  of  Council,  19  ; and 
delegate  to  Continental  Congress, 
19  ; . neglects  to  pay  his  salary,  23- 
25  ; its  vacillating  course  regarding 
Mississippi  navigation,  31-33 ; re- 
vokes assent  to  impost  law,  34  ; but 
assents  to  five  per  cent,  scheme,  34  ; 
its  power  to  make  or  mar  central 
government,  46 ; agrees  to  proposed 
amendment  to  Articles  of  Confed- 
eration, 46 ; promises  to  pay  requi- 
sitions and  old  debts,  46, 47  ; agrees 
to  temporary  control  by  Congress 
of  trade,  47  ; led  by  Madison  to  es- 
tablish ports  of  entry  to  regulate 
foreign  trade,  49,  50  ; later  modifies 
the  law,  51 ; appoints  commission- 
ers to  discuss  Potomac  question  with 
Maryland,  54 ; considers  petitions  to 
improve  trade,  55 ; defeats  attempt 
of  Madison  to  instruct  delegates  to 
give  Congress  power  over  financial 
and  commercial  questions,  56 ; in- 
duced by  influence  of  Maryland  to 
appoint  commissioners  to  Annapolis 
Convention,  57,  58  ; elects  delegates 
to  Federal  Convention,  60;  disre- 
gards treaty  provisions  with  Eng- 
land, 61 , 62  ; passes  act  to  incorpo- 
rate Episcopal  Church,  63 ; debates 
question  of  compulsory  support  of 
religion,  63,  64  ; passes  act  for  es- 
tablishing religious  freedom,  65 ; 
resists  paper-money  craze,  67  ; in- 
structs delegates  to  oppose  aban- 
donment of  Mississippi  navigation, 
83;  led  by  Henry  to  call  for  a second 
Constitutional  Convention,  118  ; 
elects  two  anti-Federalist  senators, 
119  ; gerrymanders  Madison’s  con- 
gressional district,  120,  121 ; Madi- 
son’s visit  to,  in  1798,  230,  235 ; 
adopts  resolutions  against  Alien  and 
Sedition  Laws,  235  ; part  played  by 
Madison  in,  1799,  236. 

Leopard  and  Chesapeake  affair,  264- 
266,  274. 

Lewis  and  Clarke,  their  expedition 
sent  by  Jefferson,  249,  250. 

Library  of  Congress,  proposed  by 
Madison,  31. 

Lincoln,  Benjamin,  captured  at 


Charleston,  19  ; defeats  Shays’s  Re- 
bellion, 73. 

Little  Belt  affair,  290. 

Livermore,  Samuel,  his  ingenious  ar- 
gument as  to  taxing  importation  of 
slaves,  131. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  connection  with  John 
Henry  letters,  300. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.,  interview 
of  Jefferson  and  Madison  with, 
175. 

Louisiana,  purchase  of,  essentially 
Jefferson’s  policy,  246  ; unwarranted 
by  Constitution,  247,  248 ; justified 
by  general  welfare,  248  ; a result  of 
fortunate  circumstances,  248,  249 ; 
its  consequences  not  foreseen  by 
Jefferson,  249, 250  ; encourages  slave 
trade,  250,  251. 

Madison,  Mary,  wife  of  Captain 
Isaac  Madison,  7,  8. 

Madison  ancestry,  statement  of  Mad- 
ison concerning,  4 n. 

Madison,  Captain  Isaac,  supposed  by 
Rives  to  be  ancestor  of  James  Mad- 
ison, 7 ; his  career  in  Virginia,  7,  8 ; 
proof  that  he  was  not  James’s  an- 
cestor, 8,  9 ; dies  leaving  a wife 
and  daughter,  8,  9. 

Madison,  James,  father  of  President 
Madison,  3,  4 ; his  estates  and 
wealth,  5 ; educates  his  children, 

10  ; his  death,  242. 

Madison,  James,  dates  of  birth  and 
death,  1 ; said  by  J.  Q.  Adams  to 
have  died  on  anniversary  of  ratifica- 
tion of  Constitution  by  Virginia, 
1-2  ; error  in  the  coincidence,  2,  3 ; 
his  mother’s  family  and  name,  3,  4 ; 
his  ancestry,  4-9 ; his  own  state- 
ments concerning  family,  4 n.,  5, 
6,  9 ; sent  to  school,  10 ; gratitude 
toward  schoolmaster,  10 ; prepares 
for  and  enters  Princeton,  10  ; con- 
flicting statements  concerning  his 
studies,  11  ; depressed  by  ill-health, 

11  ; takes  deep  interest  in  theology, 
11,  12;  becomes  opponent  of  reli- 
gious intolerance,  12,  13 ; speaks 
disparagingly  of  politics,  13,  14. 

Revolutionary  Leader.  Errone- 
ously said  to  have  joined  a militia 


INDEX 


337 


company,  15 ; member  of  county 
committee  of  safety,  15 ; delegate 
to  Virginia  Convention,  15 ; on 
committee  to  frame  Constitution, 
16 ; advocates  recognition  of  right  to 
religious  freedom  instead  of  tolera- 
tion, 16,  17 ; elected  to  Assembly, 
17  ; refuses  to  solicit  or  buy  votes 
and  loses  reelection,  18 ; chosen 
member  of  governor’s  council,  19. 
In  Continental  Congress.  Elected 
delegate  to  Congress,  19 ; describes 
to  Jefferson  the  desperate  situation 
in  1780,  20 ; considers  lack  of  rev- 
enue the  true  cause,  20  ; proposes 
fruitlessly  that  Congress  request 
States  to  cease  issuing  paper  money, 
21 ; proposes  enforced  collection  of 
supplies,  22  ; his  industry,  23 ; ap- 
peals to  Virginia  for  pecuniary  aid, 
23,  24 ; helped  by  Solomon,  a 
broker,  24 ; eventually  paid,  24,  25 ; 
takes  slight  interest  in  military  af- 
fairs, 25 ; his  lack  of  enthusiasm, 
26,  27  ; on  finance  committee,  28 ; 
disgusted  at  method  of  drawing 
foreign  bills,  28 ; his  share  in  pro- 
posing remedies,  30  ; his  knowledge 
of  constitutional  law,  30 ; urges 
formation  of  a Library  of  Congress, 
31 ; instructs  Jay  to  insist  upon 
Mississippi  navigation,  31 ; opposes 
rescinding  these  instructions,  32 ; 
condemns  rejection  by  Rhode  Is- 
land of  impost  scheme,  33,  34;  re- 
fuses to  change  his  position  to  ac- 
commodate Virginia,  34  ; his  reasons 
for  favoring  scheme,  35 ; less  im- 
patient than  Hamilton,  35,  36 ; 
writes  address  urging  acceptance  of 
five  per  cent,  scheme,  36  ; proposes 
a compromise  on  basis  of  taxation 
as  concerns  slaves,  41  ; love  affair 
with  Miss  Floyd,  42  ; jilted  by  her, 
43  ; consoled  by  Jefferson,  44. 
Member  of  Virginia  Legislature. 
Chosen  to  Virginia  Assembly,  45 ; 
hopes  to  strengthen  Union,  46 ; 
supports  measures  to  give  Congress 
greater  power,  47 ; introduces  a 
bill  to  establish  ports  of  entry  in 
Virginia,  49 ; wishes  to  regulate 
commerce,  50 ; his  purpose  de- 1 


feated,  50,  51 ; his  purpose  to  stim- 
ulate Virginian  trade,  52  ; his  views 
on  navigation  of  Potomac,  52  ; sug- 
gests to  Jefferson  a conference  with 
Maryland,  53,  54 ; secures  appoint- 
ment of  commissioners  by  Vir- 
ginia, 54  ; advocates,  vainly,  grant- 
ing Congress  power  to  regulate 
trade,  56 ; prepares  resolution  to 
appoint  commissioners  to  meet  re- 
presentatives of  other  States,  57  ; 
fails  to  carry  measure,  57  ; after  re- 
port of  Maryland’s  proposal,  secures 
passage  of  resolution,  58 ; chosen 
to  Federal  Convention,  60 ; chair- 
man of  committee  to  codify  Vir- 
ginia statutes,  61 ; tries,  vainly,  to 
secure  payment  of  British  debts, 
62  ; votes  for  incorporation  of  Epis- 
copal Church,  63  ; opposes  bill  to 
tax  for  support  of  church,  64 ; cir- 
culates a “ Memorial  and  Remon- 
strance,” 64 ; his  arguments,  65, 
66 ; praised  by  Jefferson,  65  n.  ; 
leads  opposition  to  issue  of  paper 
money,  67  ; assents  to  bill  author- 
izing use  of  tobacco  certificates,  67  ; 
continues  to  study  politics  and  sci- 
ence, 68,  69 ; on  Rumsey’s  steam- 
ship, 69,  70 ; on  discoveries  of  fos- 
sils and  human  relics,  70-72. 

In  Congress.  Describes  collapse 
of  Confederacy  in  1787,  74 ; sus- 
pects plans  for  a monarchy,  74  ; 
discouraged  at  outlook  for  Consti- 
tutional Convention,  76 ; opposes 
Jay’s  plan  to  abandon  Mississippi 
navigation,  81  ; fears  it  will  ruin 
Constitutional  Convention,  82,  83  ; 
said  to  have  “bargained”  on  this 
point  with  Kentucky  delegates  in 
Virginia  legislature,  82  ; fears  Mis- 
sissippi question  will  prevent  Vir- 
ginia from  appointing  delegates  to 
convention,  82. 

Member  of  Federal  Convention. 
“The  Father  of  the  Constitution,” 
84 ; his  report  of  proceedings  of 
convention,  84 ; his  relation  to  for- 
mation  of  Constitution,  84,  85 ; 
on  use  of  term  “Federal,”  86  n.  ; 
unconscious  of  his  own  use  of 
British  precedents,  90 ; views  on 


338 


INDEX 


slavery,  91 ; recognizes  difficulties 
in  convention  to  lie  between  North 
and  South,  92,  99 ; wishes  slaves  to 
count  in  basis  of  representation,  94, 
95  ; opposed  to  foreign  slave  trade, 
104 ; disapproves  its  permission  in 
Constitution,  105 ; on  finality  of 
slavery  compromises,  107  ; his  view 
of  their  necessity  to  preserve  Union, 
108,  109. 

Advocate  of  Constitution  in  Vir- 
ginia. Doubtful  as  to  success  of 
plan,  110  ; later  determines  to  urge 
it,  110,  111  ; disapproves  proposal  for 
a second  convention.  111 ; his  share 
in  “The  Federalist,”  111-112;  re- 
turns to  Virginia  as  candidate  for 

convention,  112;  not  an  orator, 

113;  his  reasoning  ability,  113; 
doubtful  of  success,  114 ; bears 
chief  burden  of  debate,  115;  after 
ratification  returns  to  Congress, 
116;  described  by  Brissot  de  War- 
ville,  117-118 ; defeated  for  sena- 
tor in  Virginia  Assembly  through 
Henry’s  influence,  119 ; wishes  elec- 
tion to  House  of  Representatives, 
119  ; his  election  in  spite  of  “gerry- 
mander” arranged  by  Henry,  120, 
121. 

In  Congress.  Describes  contro- 
versy over  title  of  President,  124; 
introduces  revenue  plan  in  Con- 
gress, 126 ; willing  to  admit  inci- 
dental protection,  126 ; advocates 
taxation  on  imported  slaves,  131, 
132  ; proposes  discriminating  ton- 
nage duties,  134  ; especially  against 
Great  Britain,  135  ; calls  advocates 
of  English  trade  “Anglicists,”  135, 
136 ; acts  as  leader  of  House  in 
organizing  government,  136,  137 ; 
on  power  of  President  to  remove 
from  office,  138 ; considers  wanton 
removal  sufficient  cause  for  im- 
peachment, 138 ; proposes  twelve 
declaratory  amendments  to  Consti- 
tution, 139 ; labors  to  prevent  es- 
tablishment of  national  capital  in 
Pennsylvania,  141,  142  ; opposes  as- 
sumption  of  state  debts,  143 ; con- 
siders the  Southern  location  of  cap- 
ital a compensation,  143  ; reports  in 


favor  of  petition  to  settle  public 
debt,  144 ; proposes  discrimination 
in  favor  of  original  holders  of  do- 
mestic debt,  147,  148 ; his  proposal 
impracticable,  149 ; unjustly  as- 
sumes superiority  for  Virginia  over 
Massachusetts  during  Revolution, 
150  ; his  views  on  Hamilton’s  and 
Jefferson’s  bargain,  152 ; stigma- 
tizes debates  on  Franklin’s  anti- 
slavery petitions  as  “indecent,” 
152  ; advises  moderation  on  part  of 
slaveholders,  154  ; suggests  investi- 
gation of  American  participation  in 
slave  trade  to  foreign  countries, 
155,  156  ; wishes  a decisive  declara- 
tion as  to  limits  of  Congressional 
power,  156 ; dreads  effect  of  agita- 
tion, 157  ; finally  resents  extrava- 
gance of  pro-slavery  advocates,  159  ; 
courage  of  his  position,  162 ; op- 
poses Hamilton’s  plan  of  a bank  as 
unconstitutional,  162;  at  Washing- 
ton’s request,  writes  out  his  objec- 
tions, 163  ; his  change  from  Feder- 
alist to  Democrat,  164 ; influenced 
by  Jefferson,  164 ; comments  of 
Hamilton  on  his  attitude,  166 ; ac- 
cused of  low  motives  for  his  opposi- 
tion, 166,  167 ; and  of  tampering 
with  Washington’s  address  to  Con- 
gress, 167,  168  ; accused  by  Hamil- 
ton of  complicity  with  Freneau, 
168  ; defends  his  patronage  of  Fre- 
neau to  Randolph,  169  ; admits  his 
approval  of  Freneau’s  paper,  169, 
170 ; hopes  it  will  act  as  an  anti- 
dote to  monarchical  schemes,  170 ; 
denies  any  connection  with  its  con- 
tents, 171 ; advises  Freneau  not  to 
send  his  paper  by  mail,  172;  his 
“ apostasy  ” as  viewed  by  Federal- 
ists, 172-175 ; his  Northern  tour 
with  Jefferson  regarded  by  Federal- 
ists with  suspicion,  175,  176 ; ad" 
vocates  succession  of  secretary  of 
state  in  case  of  death  of  President 
and  Vice-President,  176 ; condemns 
stock-jobbing  in  connection  with 
bank,  177 ; dreads  its  influence 
over  country,  178,  179  ; accused  by 
Federalists  of  joining  the  winning 
side,  180 ; seems  to  be  governed  by 


INDEX 


339 


animosity  toward  Hamilton,  180, 
181 ; bitterness  of  Hamilton  toward, 
181  ; discussion  of  causes  for  Mad- 
ison’s changed  position,  181-183  ; 
verdict  of  history  adverse,  183,  184 ; 
consulted  by  Washington  on  propri- 
ety of  declining  a reelection,  186 ; 
asserted  to  be  author  of  Giles’s 
resolutions  of  censure  on  Hamil- 
ton, 189,  190 ; supports  them  in 
debate,  192 ; comments  of  Ames 
upon,  192  ; sympathizes  with  French 
Revolution,  193 ; condemns  Ham- 
ilton’s  slowness  in  paying  French 
debt,  193 ; slow  in  committing 
himself  with  regard  to  neutral- 
ity, 198  ; takes  his  cue  from  party 
denunciation  of  Washington,  198 ; 
urged  by  Jefferson  to  reply  to  Ham- 
ilton’s “ Pacificus  ” papers,  198 ; 
writes  a series  under  name  “Hel- 
vidius,”  198,  199;  hopes  Genet  will 
be  -warmly  welcomed,  200 ; con- 
demns Genet’s  folly,  202  ; reports 
to  Jefferson  increased  strength  of 
“Anglican  party”  in  Virginia,  202, 
203 ; regrets  Washington’s  position, 
204 ; hardly  sincere  in  considering 
him  a dupe  of  Hamilton,  206  ; de- 
plores Jay  treaty,  216  ; introduces 
resolution  calling  for  Jay’s  instruc- 
tions and  other  papers,  216  ; con- 
demns Washington’s  refusal,  217  ; 
bitterly  disappointed  at  support  of 
treaty  in  the  House,  217 ; his  cor- 
respondence with  Monroe  relative 
to  the  treaty,  221,  222  ; review  of 
his  part  in  Congress,  222,  223  ; mar- 
ries Mrs.  Dolly  Payne  Todd,  223. 

In  Retirement.  His  continued  in- 
terest in  politics,  225  ; historical 
value  of  his  writings,  225, 226  ; their 
stiff  literary  style,  226 ; his  mild 
interest  in  farming  compared  with 
Jefferson’s,  226-228 ; builds  house 
at  Montpellier,  228-230  ; his  care  in 
furnishing  it,  229,  230. 

In  Virginia  Assembly^  the  Vir- 
ginia Resolutions.  Elected  to  le- 
gislature, 230-236 ; possibly  con- 
nected with  Jefferson’s  Kentucky 
Resolutions,  234,  235;  determines 
to  induce  Virginia  legislature  to 


protest  against  Alien  and  Sedition 
Acts,  235  ; later,  in  1830-1836,  ex- 
plains his  conduct,  236-238  ; denies 
any  connection  between  the  Vir- 
ginia Resolutions  and  later  doctrine 
of  nullification,  237  ; denounces  se- 
cession, 237,  238 ; tries  to  excul- 
pate Jefferson,  239,  240. 

Secretary  of  State.  His  reasons 
for  accepting  Jefferson’s  offer  of 
Department  of  State,  241 ; detained 
from  attendance  at  inauguration  by 
death  of  father,  242  ; rejoices  in  de- 
cline of  Federalist  party,  243  ; over- 
shadowed in  his  office  by  Jefferson, 
246 ; writes  paper  on  British  treat- 
ment of  neutral  trade,  257  ; indig- 
nant at  English  depredations,  258 ; 
favors  non-importation,  260 ; con- 
demns Monroe’s  treaty  of  1806,  263  ; 
complains  of  British  indifference  to 
proclamation  ordering  them  out  of 
American  waters,  266. 

President.  Named  for  succession 
by  Jefferson,  272  ; received  a di- 
minished electoral  vote,  272 ; con- 
fers with  Erskine,  272,  273  ; on  his 
assurances  issues  proclamation  re- 
pealing non-intercourse,  274;  his 
sudden  popularity,  275;  forced  by 
Canning’s  action  to  resume  em- 
bargo, 275 ; bitterly  condemned  by 
mercantile  classes,  275,  276 ; com- 
ments on  situation,  276 ; his  morti- 
fication, 277 ; issues  proclamation 
recalling  vessels,  277 ; acts  as  his 
own  foreign  secretary,  278 ; in- 
sulted by  Jackson,  demands  his 
recall,  278 ; later  admits  failure 
of  embargo,  278 ; unable  to  com- 
mand harmony  in  his  party,  279; 
wishes  non-intercourse  with  both 
England  and  France,  280  ; author- 
ized to  enforce  it  against  either 
country,  280 ; his  dismay  at  pro- 
spect, 282 ; expects  little  result  from 
non-intercourse,  282  ; accepts  state- 
ment of  Napoleon  as  to  revocation 
of  Milan  and  Berlin  decrees,  283  ; 
orders  Armstrong  to  insist  on  com- 
pensation for  Rambouillet  decree, 
284 ; submits  to  refusal  of  Napo- 
leon, 284 ; issues  proclamation  re- 


340 


INDEX 


yoking  non-intercourse  with  France, 
285  ; bitterly  attacked  by  Federal- 
ists, 285,  286  ; instructs  ministers  to 
insist  on  England’s  revocation  of 
blockade  of  a portion  of  French 
coast,  287  ; willing  to  help  Napoleon, 
288 ; comments  on  Little  Belt  af- 
fair, 290 ; still  wishes  to  keep 
peace,  291  ; repeats  to  Congress  his 
complaints  against  Napoleon  as  well 
as  England,  291  ; protests  to  France 
against  its  trickery,  292  ; despises 
Clay  and  the  war  party,  293 ; con- 
tinues to  threaten  France,  293,  294 ; 
recommends  a sixty-day  embargo, 
295 ; follows  it  by  recommending  a 
"tJeclaration  of  war,  295  ; his  reasons 
for  opposing  war,  296 ; his  rivals 
for  presidential  nomination,  296 ; 
asserted  to  have  bought  renomina- 
tion by  yielding  to  war  party,  297  ; 
buys  letters  of  John  Henry,  297  ; 
submits  them  to  Congress  as  a 
cause  for  war,  298 ; later  never  re- 
fers to  them,  298  ; his  probable  mo- 
tives in  then  believing  them,  301 ; 
,jdoes  not  really  expect  secession  of 
New  England,  302,  303  ; uses  the 
Henry  letters  in  order  to  hurry  on 
war,  303;  this  act  the  test  of  his 
character  and  career,  303,  304 ; 
placed  in  a dilemma  by  Napoleon’s 
duplicity  with  regard  to  Berlin  and 
Milan  decrees,  305 ; and  still  more 
so  by  action  of  France  in  revoking 
decrees  in  1812,  305-307  ; and  by 
English  revocation  of  Orders  in 
Council,  307,  308 ; determines  to 
continue  war  on  impressment  issue 
alone,  308 ; yet  does  not  insist  on 
even  that  in  peace  negotiations, 
308 ; hopes  the  war  will  be  popu- 
lar, 309 ; despises  naval  success, 

310  ; his  error  in  neglecting  navy 
and  failing  to  involve  New  England 
in  war,  310,  311  ; bitterness  toward 
New  England’s  opposition  to  war, 

311  ; alarmed  at  Hartford  Conven- 
tion, 311,  312 ; discussion  of  his 
error  in  consenting  to  war,  312,  313 ; 
his  qualities  not  suited  for  execu- 
tive office,  313,  314  ; in  spite  of 
popular  reputation  shows  weak- 


ness, 314  ; shows  incompetency  in 
conduct  of  war,  315,  316 ; devoted 
to  idea  of  conquering  Canada,  316  ; 
expelled  from  Washington  by  Brit- 
ish, 317  ; rejoices  at  peace  of  Ghent, 
319 ; undisturbed  during  remainder 
of  term,  319 ; assents  to  a national 
bank,  319  ; and  to  a tariff,  319. 

In  Retirement.  Continues  inter- 
ested in  politics  and  history  of 
country,  319,  320 ; writes  much 
upon  slavery,  320,  321 ; his  kind- 
ness as  a master,  321 ; temperate 
habits,  321,  322 ; one  of  the  demo- 
cratic school,  322 ; relations  with 
Robert  Owen,  322 ; with  Fanny 
Wright,  322  ; interest  in  education, 
322;  in  education  of  women,  323; 
contradictory  estimates  of,  323 ; his 
“ Advice  to  My  Country,”  324. 

Characteristics.  General  estimate, 
313-316,  323-324  ; unfriendly  views, 
166-168,  323  ; executive  ability,  lack 
of,  313,  314 ; farming,  interest  in, 
227,  228  ; imagination,  lack  of,  226  ; 
independence,  175,  184,  246;  kind- 
liness, 321,  323  ; liberality,  322 ; lit- 
erary ability,  226  ; mildness,  13,  14  ; 
military  weakness,  25,  309,  310,  313 ; 
modesty,  5 ; natural  science,  inter- 
est in,  68-72 ; oratory,  113 ; per- 
sonal appearance,  117 ; political 
ability,  61,  222,  225 ; reasoning 
power,  113,  115,  117,  238  ; religious 
views,  11,  12 ; self-seeking,  182- 
184,  297,  312,  314 ; sincerity,  169, 
172,  313 ; seriousness,  11,  18,  26,  27, 
43,  226,  227  ; studiousness,  11,  23, 
30,  45,  67,  68  ; subjection  to  Jeffer- 
son, 104,  193  ff.,  246;  temperance, 

321,  322 ; women,  attitude  toward, 

322,  323. 

Political  Opinions.  Annapolis 
Convention,  57,  58  ; assumption  of 
state  debt,  150, 151  ; bank,  162, 163, 

177,  319 ; bill  of  rights,  139 ; com- 
promises in  the  Constitution,  107- 
109,  156  ; Constitution,  84,  110-112, 
139,  173,  237-239,  320;  domestic 
debt,  payment  of,  147 ; embargo, 
278  ; England,  134,  135,  197,  276, 
287,  295,  296,  308  ; Federalists,  170, 

178,  186,  193,  200,  24T;  hukii^BB  Uf 


INDEX 


341 


Confederation,  21,  22 ; financial 
methods  of  Hamilton,  189  ; five  per 
cent,  scheme,  33-37  ; foreign  policy, 
196,  204,  274-275,  280,  281  ; France, 
“Continental”  system  of,  283-285, 
287,  288,  291-294,  304  ; French  Re- 
volution, 193,  200,  203 ; Hartford 
Convention,  312  ; impressment,  308  ; 
instruction,  doctrine  of,  32-34  ; Jay 
treaty,  216 ; John  Henry  letters, 
298,  301,  303 ; Mississippi  naviga- 
tion, 31-33,  80-83  ; navy,  310  ; neu- 
trality proclamation,  198;  New  Eng- 
land, 302,  311 ; non-importation, 
260  ; nullification,  236-238,  239, 240  ; 
paper  money,  67,  118 ; petition, 
right  of,  154  ; Potomac  navigation, 
52-54;  protection,  126,  134,  319; 
removals  from  office,  138  ; religious 
freedom,  12,  13,  16,  17,  62-66  ; se- 
cession, 237,  324 ; site  of  capital, 
141-143  ; slave  trade,  132,  155,  159  ; 
slavery,  108,  109,  320  ; slave  ratio 
in  representation,  94,  99,  104,  105 ; 
slave  ratio  in  taxation,  41 ; slavery, 
power  of  Congress  over,  156,  159 ; 
state  sovereignty,  237 ; taxation, 
126,  131 ; titles,  presidential,  124 ; 
trade  in  Virginia,  49-51  ; treaty 
power,  217  ; union,  necessity  of, 
46,  48,  62,  74,  81-83  ; Virginia  Reso- 
lutions, 235  ff.  ; war  of  1812,  312, 
313, 314,  316. 

Madison,  John,  patentee  in  1635,  sup- 
posed ancestor  of  James  Madison, 

6. 

Magraw, , saves  portrait  of  Wash- 

ington from  British,  318. 

Maryland,  navigates  Potomac  con- 
currently with  Virginia,  52,  53  ; ap- 
points commissioners  to  discuss 
Potomac  matter  with  Virginia,  54 ; 
suggests  inviting  all  the  States  to 
send  delegates,  55 ; fails  to  send 
delegates  to  Annapolis  Convention, 
59. 

Martin,  Luther,  opposes  any  central- 
ization as  monarchical,  75 ; con- 
demns action  of  Federal  Conven- 
tion as  beyond  its  authorization, 
88,  89  ; on  nature  of  Constitution, 
89 ; dreads  too  great  influence  of 
English  precedents,  89. 


Martin,  Rev.  Thomas,  prepares  Mad- 
ison for  college,  10. 

Mason,  George,  denounces  slavery 
in  Constitutional  Convention,  102  ; 
describes  bargain  between  New 
England  and  slave  States,  106 ; op- 
poses ratification  of  Constitution, 
112. 

Massachusetts,  appoints  delegates  to 
Annapolis  Convention  who  do  not 
attend,  59  ; behind  Virginia  in  es- 
tablishing complete  religious  free- 
dom, 66  ; suppresses  Shays’s  Rebel- 
lion, 73 ; its  sacrifices  in  Revolu- 
tion greater  than  those  of  Southern 
States,  150,  151  ; contributes  more 
recruits  in  1814  than  any  other 
State,  311. 

Mifflin,  Warner,  manumits  slaves,  161 ; 
petitions  Congress  for  general  eman- 
cipation, 161 ; motion  to  expunge 
his  petition  from  journal,  161. 

Milan  decree,  268. 

Mississippi  navigation,  desire  of  Con- 
gress for,  31  ; negotiations  of  Jay 
with  Spain  concerning,  32,  33  ; tem- 
porary willingness  of  Southern 
States  to  abandon,  32 ; renewed 
demand  for,  33 ; attitude  of  Southern 
States  toward,  76,  77  ; willingness 
of  Northern  States  to  relinquish, 
77  ; its  abandonment  for  twenty-five 
years  proposed  by  Jay,  78,  79,  80 ; 
rejected  by  Congress,  80  ; possible 
consequences  of  its  abandonment 
to  South,  81  ; agitation  of  question 
prejudices  chances  of  Federal  Con- 
vention, 82. 

Monroe,  James,  defeated  for  Congress 
by  Madison,  121 ; letter  of  Madison 
to,  on  location  of  capital,  142  ; his 
reception  as  American  minister  by 
French  National  Convention,  218 ; 
protests  against  French  aggressions 
on  American  commerce,  219 ; does 
not  consider  France  as  hostile  as 
England,  219 ; wishes  to  baffle 
Jay’s  negotiations,  220  ; encourages 
France  to  threaten  United  States, 
220 ; rebuked  and  recalled,  221  ; 
his  only  excuse  that  he  was  de- 
ceived by  friends  in  America,  221 ; 
correspondence  of  Madison  with. 


342 


INDEX 


221 ; sells  Madison  furniture,  229  ; 
his  treaty  suppressed  by  Jefferson, 
246  ; on  British  complaints  of  Amer- 
ican commercial  trickery,  259 ; in- 
structed to  insist  on  abandonment 
of  impressment  in  proposed  British 
treaty,  262  ; disobeys  instructions, 
262  ; his  reasons,  263 ; makes  subse- 
quent vain  attempts  to  reopen  nego- 
tiations, 263 ; letter  of  Madison  to, 
on  British  outrages,  266  ; urged  by 
Jefferson  not  to  antagonize  Madison 
for  presidency,  272 ; desires  presi- 
dential nomination  as  war  candidate, 
296 ; testifies  that  Henry  compro- 
mises nobody,  300. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  condemns  un- 
reasonableness of  Southern  demand 
for  slave  representation,  98,  99 ; 
makes  a sharp  attack  on  slavery  in 
general,  100 ; moves  reference  of 
slave  trade  and  trade  regulation  to 
a committee,  105  ; on  popular  sup- 
port of  Jefferson,  244. 

“National  Gazette,”  story  of  its 
establishment  by  Freneau,  168,  172. 

New  England,  opposition  in,  to  mo- 
lasses tax,  127  ; tour  of  Madison  and 
Jefferson  in,  175;  stronghold  of 
Federalism,  243;  opposes  embargo, 
279 ; opposes  war  with  England, 
296 ; mission  of  John  Henry  to, 
298-301 ; suspected  by  Henry  of 
plan  to  secede,  299 ; reluctant  to 
attack  Canada,  310 ; yet  contributes 
majority  of  soldiers,  311 ; hatred  of 
Madison  for,  311  ; calls  Hartford 
Convention,  311 ; does  not  really 
desire  alliance  with  England,  300  ; 
talks  disunion,  301  ; insincerity  of 
Madison  in  accusing  it  of  plan  to 
secede,  302,  303  ; folly  of  Madison 
in  not  involving  it,  by  naval  activity, 
in  war,  310. 

New  Hampshire,  appoints  delegates 
to  Annapolis  Convention,  who  do 
not  attend,  59 ; precedes  Virginia 
in  ratifying  Federal  Constitution, 
115. 

New  Jersey,  sends  delegates  to  Anna- 
polis Convention,  59 ; its  instruc- 
tions to  delegates,  50,  60. 


New  York,  refuses  consent,  in  spite  of 
Hamilton’s  efforts,  to  five  per  cent, 
scheme,  36,  37  ; sends  delegates  to 
Annapolis  Convention,  59 ; influ- 
enced by  Virginia’s  ratification  of 
Constitution,  115  ; tour  of  Madison 
and  Jefferson  in,  175,  176. 

New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce,  on 
Jay  treaty,  213. 

Nicholas,  George,  offers  Jefferson’s 
resolutions  in  Kentucky  legislature, 
234,  235,  239. 

Nicholas,  William  C.,  consults  with 
Jefferson  concerning  Kentucky  Re- 
solutions, 234,  235 ; letter  of  Madi- 
son to,  on  New  England,  311. 

Non-importation  Act  adopted  against 
England,  260 ; arguments  of  Jeffer- 
son and  Madison  in  behalf  of,  260, 
261 ; suspended  during  Monroe’s 
negotiations,  261 ; substituted  for 
embargo,  271  ; repealed  against 
England,  274 ; renewed,  277. 

North  Carolina,  appoints  delegates  to 
Annapolis  Convention  who  do  not 
attend,  59  ; influenced  by  Virginia’s 
ratification  of  Federal  Constitution^ 
115 ; comments  of  Madison  and  de 
Warville  on  its  refusal  to  ratify 
Constitution,  117,  118 ; its  repre- 
sentatives prevent  choice  of  a 
Northern  site  for  capital,  141,  142  ; 
its  debt  after  Revolution,  151. 

Nuce,  Captain,  7. 

Nullification,  term  used  in  Kentucky 
Resolutions,  234;  denied  in  1830  by 
Madison,  236 ; his  views  on,  236- 
239  ; responsibility  of  Jefferson  for, 
239,  240. 

Orders  in  Council,  issued,  267,  268 ; 
negotiations  concerning,  268-308. 
See  England. 

Otis,  Harrison  Gray,  his  journey  to 
Washington  as  representative  of 
Hartford  Convention,  312 ; ridi- 
culed, after  treaty  of  peace,  by  De- 
mocrats, 312. 

Owen,  Robert,  Madison’s  opinion  of 
his  schemes,  322. 

Paper-money,  its  ruinous  effects  dur- 
ing Revolution,  20;  proposals  of 


INDEX 


343 


Madison  to  restrict  its  issue,  21,  22 ; 
craze  for,  in  States,  67. 

Parker,  Jonathan,  proposes  a tax  on 
importation  of  slaves,  128,  129  ; his 
opinion  of  slave  trade,  129. 

Party  feeling,  its  bitterness  in  John 
Adams’s,  Jefferson’s,  and  Madison’s 
administrations,  208,  209 ; decays 
during  Jefferson’s  first  term,  251. 

Patterson,  William,  argues  in  Federal 
Convention  against  slave  represen- 
tation, 95. 

Peel,  Robert,  connection  with  John 
Henry  affair,  300. 

Pendleton,  Edmund,  letter  of  Madi- 
son to,  on  Yorktown,  25 ; letter  of 
Madison  to,  on  necessity  of  ratify- 
ing Constitution,  111. 

Pennsylvania,  refuses  consent  to  five 
per  cent,  scheme,  37  ; its  connec- 
tion with  Potomac  Company,  55 ; 
sends  delegates  to  Annapolis  Con- 
vention, 59;  proposal  to  have  na- 
tional capital  in,  141,  142  ; its  debt 
after  the  war,  151. 

Pinckney,  Charles  C.,  alarmed  at 
Morris’s  intention  to  oppose  slave 
representation  in  Constitution,  98  ; 
satisfied  with  results  of  compro- 
mises, 103,  104  ; moves  extension  of 
time  for  slave  trade,  106;  on  its 
adoption,  ceases  to  oppose  granting 
Congress  power  to  regulate  trade, 
106 ; on  fugitive  slave  clause,  107  ; 
on  inability  of  South  Carolina  to 
remain  outside  Union,  109 ; on 
popular  support  of  Jefferson,  144. 

Pinkney,  William,  sent  by  Jefferson 
to  negotiate  a treaty  with  England, 
261 ; his  instructions,  262  ; explains 
why  he  ignored  them,  263  ; subse- 
quent action,  263  ; letter  of  Madi- 
son to,  on  situation  in  1810,  281 ; 
asks  in  regard  to  British  order  in 
council  concerning  blockades,  288. 

Pooley,  Greville,  suit  against  Cicely 
Jordan,  7,  8. 

Potomac  Company,  its  purposes  and 
influences,  54,  55. 

Potomac,  navigation  of,  52-58. 

Powell,  Captain,  7. 

Preble,  Commodore  Edward,  in  war 
with  Barbary  pirates,  252. 


Prehistoric  remains,  opinions  of  Madi- 
son concerning,  70-72. 

Princeton  College,  studies  of  Madison 
in,  10-12. 

Prohibition,  Madison’s  views  upon, 
321,  322. 

Protection,  advocated  by  Madison  in 
first  Congress,  126,  134,  135 ; by 
Democratic  party  in  1816,  319. 

Quakers,  petition  Congress  against 
slave  trade,  152 ; and  against  sla- 
very, 152,  153,  161  ; bitterly  con- 
demned by  slaveholders,  153,  154, 
157,  158. 

Quincy,  Josiah,  describes  effects  of 
embargo,  269,  270 ; points  out  fal- 
sity of  alleged  revocation  of  Milan 
and  Berlin  decrees,  285,  287 ; as- 
serts that  Madison  favored  war 
to  obtain  presidential  nomination, 
297. 

Rambouillet  decree,  283,  284. 

Randolph,  Edmund,  letters  of  Madison 
to,  complaining  of  lack  of  pay,  as 
delegate  to  Congress,  23,  24;  and 
on  collapse  of  confederacy,  74 ; op- 
poses Constitution,  112  ; opposes  a 
national  bank,  163. 

Randolph,  John,  condemns  non-inter- 
course  policy,  260. 

Religious  freedom,  opinion  of  Madi- 
son concerning,  12-14  ; debate  on, 
in  Virginia  Convention,  16,  17  ; af- 
firmed in  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights, 
18  ; Madison’s  share  in  securing,  18 ; 
further  struggle  for,  in  legislature, 
62-66  ; incorporation  of  Episcopal 
Church,  63 ; question  of  compul- 
sory support  of  religion,  63-66 ; ad- 
vanced position  of  Virginia  regard- 
ing, 66  ; remarks  of  Jefferson  upon, 
65  n. 

Rhode  Island,  refuses  assent  to  im- 
post scheme,  33  ; comments  of  Mad- 
ison upon,  34  ; appoints  delegates  to 
Annapolis  Convention,  who  do  not 
attend,  59  ; influenced  by  Virginia’s 
ratification  of  Constitution,  115; 
attitude  toward  slave  trade,  130  n. ; 
carried  by  Democrats,  243. 

Rives,  William  C.,  on  Madison’s  mo- 


344 


INDEX 


ther’s  name,  3 ; on  Madison’s  father, 
5,  10 ; on  his  descent  from  Isaac 
Madison,  6-9 ; other  quotations 
from  his  “ Life  of  Madison,”  10, 11, 
12,  18,  44,  48  ; on  Mrs.  Madison's 
name,  224. 

Robertson,  Donald,  teacher  of  Madi- 
son, 10  ; his  son  applies  to  Madison 
for  office,  10. 

Ross,  General  Robert,  invades  Chesa- 
peake, 317. 

Rumsey,  James,  with  Washington’s 
aid  secures  monopoly  for  his  steam- 
boat, 69,  70  ; opinions  of  Jefferson 
upon,  70. 

Russell,  Jonathan,  denies  having  seen 
ante-dated  revocation  of  Milan  and 
Berlin  decrees,  307. 

Rutledge,  John,  on  necessity  of  slave 
trade  for  the  South,  101. 

Shays’s  rebellion,  73;  relation  of 
Congress  to,  73. 

Sherman,  Roger,  willing  to  permit 
slave  trade  for  sake  of  union,  in 
Constitutional  Convention,  103 ; 
criticises  proposal  to  tax  imported 
slaves,  130 ; on  location  of  capital, 
140. 

Slavery,  possible  consequences  upon, 
if  Southern  States  had  remained 
outside  Union,  39-41  ; economic 
effect  of,  upon  Virginia,  48,  49,  51  ; 
attitude  of  public  opinion  toward,  in 
1787,  91 ; absence  of  extreme  views 
against,  92,  108 ; in  1787,  the  para- 
mount interest  of  South,  92,  93; 
attacked  bitterly  in  Constitutional 
Convention,  98,100,  101,102;  cyni- 
cal attitude  of  Northern  men  toward, 
102  ; debate  concerning,  in  first  Con- 
gress, 152-161 ; foolish  policy  of 
slaveholders  in  defending,  155,  157, 
158  ; the  argument  in  favor  of,  157, 
158. 

Slaves,  question  as  to  their  status  in 
computing  taxes  under  Confedera- 
tion, 38,  39  ; positions  of  North  and 
South,  38 ; necessity  of  compro- 
mise concerning,  39  ; compromise 
adopted,  41 ; debate  as  to  their 
status  in  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, 94-101 ; confusion  as  to  their 


position,  97,  98  ; trade  in,  debated, 
101-105  ; proposal  in  first  Congress 
to  tax  their  importation,  128,  129 ; 
debate  upon,  130-133 ; policy  of 
Congress  concerning  trade  in,  133 
and  note ; Madison’s  treatment  of, 
321. 

Slave  trade.  See  Slaves. 

Smith,  John,  refers  to  Isaac  Madison, 
in  his  “General  History,”  8. 

Smith,  Robert,  his  remarks  on  Eng- 
land’s policy  in  Chesapeake  affair 
cause  difficulty,  274  ; his  relation  to 
Madison,  278  ; insists  on  compen- 
sation for  Rambouillet  decree,  283, 
284. 

Solomon,  Hayne,  his  generous  conduct 
toward  Madison,  23,  24. 

South  Carolina,  fails  to  appoint  dele- 
gates to  Annapolis  Convention,  59 ; 
its  attitude  toward  slavery,  91,  103, 
104 ; unable  to  refuse  Constitution 
in  spite  of  threats,  104,  109  ; its 
sacrifices  in  war  of  Rebellion  greater 
than  Virginia’s,  151 ; reopens  slave 
trade,  250. 

Southern  States,  attitude  of,  toward 
slavery,  92, 93-109;  oppose  a tonnage 
tax,  127,  128  ; demand  seat  of  gov- 
ernment on  Potomac,  140-142  ; gain 
by  Hamilton’s  and  Jefferson’s  deal, 
152. 

Spain,  negotiations  of  Jay  with,  re- 
specting Mississippi  navigation,  31- 
33 ; offers  commercial  treaty  in  re- 
turn for  abandonment  of  Missis- 
sippi navigation,  78-80. 

St.  Clair,  Arthur,  his  defeat  by  In- 
dians, 180. 

States’  rights,  theory  of,  in  Federal 
Convention,  86-88. 

Steam  navigation,  invention  of  Rum- 
sey, 69 ; opinions  of  Washington, 
Madison,  and  Jefferson  concern- 
ing, 70. 

Steele,  John,  moves  to  expunge  anti- 
slavery petition  from  journal  of 
Congress,  161. 

Suse,  John,  at  British  capture  of 
Washington,  318  n. 

Titles,  presidential,  debated  in  first 
Congress,  123-126 ; views  of  Adams 


INDEX 


345 


concerning,  123-125;  of  Madison, 
Washington,  and  Lee,  124,  125. 

Todd,  Dolly  Payne,  marries  Madison, 
her  appearance  and  character,  223  ; 
her  name,  224 ; saves  silver  from 
British  at  capture  of  Washington, 
317  and  note. 

Tyler,  John,  introduces  Madison’s 
resolutions  leading  to  Annapolis 
Convention  into  Virginia  Assembly, 
57,  58. 

University  op  Virginia,  Madison’s 
connection  with,  322. 

Virginia,  society  in,  5,  48 ; religious 
persecution  in,  13 ; elections  in.  18 ; 
sentiment  in  favor  of  Mississippi 
navigation,  32 ; temporarily  aban- 
dons it  under  fear  of  English,  32, 
33;  economic  conditions  in,  and 
trade,  47-49  ; attempts  to  improve 
its  trade  by  establishing  ports  of 
entry,  49-51 ; opposition  in,  to  Mad- 
ison’s ports  of  entry,  51,  55  ; boun- 
dary question  with  Maryland  over 
Potomac,  52,  53  ; question  of  Brit- 
ish debts  in,  62;  religious  freedom 
in,  secured,  63-66 ; paper-money 
craze  in,  67 ; tobacco  certificates 
in,  67 ; sentiment  in,  concerning 
Mississippi  navigation,  82 ; struggle 
over  ratification  of  Constitution  in, 
112-116  ; opponents  of  Constitution 
in,  112  ; attitude  toward  domestic 
slave  trade,  129  ; its  services  in  war 
of  independence  compared  unfa- 
vorably with  those  of  Massachu- 
setts, 150,  151  ; and  with  South 
Carolina,  151 ; growth  of  Demo- 
cratic party  in,  174 ; Federalist 
reaction  in,  against  Genet,  202,  203. 

War  of  1812,  events  leading  up  to, 
280-308  ; hopes  of  Madison,  concern- 
ing, 309 ; naval  activity  urged  by 
Webster,  309 ; attitude  of  adminis- 
tration toward  navy,  310 ; opposi- 
tion of  New  England  to,  311,  312 ; 
unwise  policy  of  Madison  in,  315, 
316 ; capture  of  Washington  by 
Cockburn,  316,  317  ; peace  of  Ghent, 
318. 


Warville,  Brissot  de,  makes  a tour  in 
United  States,  116  ; describes  Mad- 
ison, 117,  118. 

Washington,  George,  president  of  Po- 
tomac Company,  54 ; elected  dele- 
gate to  Constitutional  Convention, 
60 ; letter  of  Madison  to,  on  paper- 
money  craze  in  Virginia,  67  ; cer- 
tifies trustworthiness  of  Rumsey’s 
steamboat,  70  ; letters  of  Madison 
to,  on  proposal  to  abandon  Missis- 
sippi navigation,  83 ; letter  of  Mad- 
son  to,  on  chances  of  ratification 
of  Constitution,  114 ; takes  oath  of 
office  as  President,  122 ; question 
of  his  title,  123,  124 ; said  to  have 
favored  a pretentious  one,  124  ; asks 
opinion  of  Madison  and  of  cabinet 
on  the  bank,  163  ; his  message  to 
Congress  said  to  have  been  tam- 
pered with  by  Madison,  167 ; con- 
sults secretaries  as  to  his  refusing  a 
second  term,  186 ; his  reasons  for 
accepting,  187 ; his  impartiality  in 
cabinet  quarrel,  188  ; on  neutrality 
between  England  and  France,  195 ; 
issues  proclamation,  modified  to 
suit  Jefferson,  196 ; criticised  by 
Democrats,  198 ; attacked  by  Ge- 
net, 201  ; denies  existence  of  a 
monarchical  party,  203 ; opinion  of 
Madison  and  Jefferson  concerning, 
204 ; considered  a dupe,  204,  206 ; 
his  anger  at  Freneau’s  attacks  de- 
scribed by  Jefferson,  205  ; his  influ- 
ence on  Federalist  party  and  na- 
tional policy,  210 ; sends  Jay  on 
mission  to  England,  211  ; rejects 
“provision  clause,”  212;  said  by 
Democrats  to  be  bought  by  “ Brit- 
ish gold,”  212 ; called  upon  by 
House  of  Representatives  for  pa- 
pers in  connection  with  Jay  treaty, 
217 ; refuses  request,  216,  217 ; his 
message  condemned  by  Madison, 
said  to  be  written  by  Hamilton,  216, 
217 ; difficulty  of  Madison’s  rela- 
tions with,  as  leader  of  opposition, 
222,  223  ; his  habit  of  asking  Mad- 
ison’s advice,  223,  246. 

Webster,  Daniel,  urges  naval  prepa- 
rations for  war  of  1812,  309. 

West,  its  development  dreaded  by 


346 


INDEX 


Eastern  States,  77 ; or  considered 
impossible,  140  ; power  of  Congress 
to  regulate  slavery  in,  stated  by 
Madison,  159  ; its  expansion  desired 
by  Jefferson,  246,  247. 

Wilson,  James,  in  Continental  Con- 
gress, 30 ; on  necessity  of  compro- 


mise over  slavery  in  Constitutional 
Convention,  96. 

Women,  education  of,  opinion  of 
Madison  concerning,  322,  323. 
Wright,  Fanny,  Madison’s  corre- 
spondence with,  322. 


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